Jainism Precepts and Practice

Author(s): Puranchand Nahar, Krishnakant Ghosh
Publisher: Caxton Publications
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/011026/1

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NAH-J JAINISM" PRECEPTS AND PRACTICE Y emen 016869 PURAN CHAND NAHAR AND KRISHNACHANDRA GHOSH VOL. 1 CAXTON PUBLICATIONS DELHI

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( vi ) CHAPTER XIII. Theories of Evolution Theories of Evolution and Creation by External Agency-Spencerian Formulation of the Principle of Evolution--Difficulties in in Spencerian hypothesis. OBAPTER XIV. The Sankhya Philosophy Sankhya principles of EvolutionTraceable in the 'Rigveda'-'Purush' and Prakriti~The Three "Gunas' in their Equilibrium form 'Prakriti or the Root-Evolvent --Prakriti is the first Category The Three other Categories -- Inconsistency of the Sankhya Hypothesis. 391-270 OHAPTER XV. Causation and Compound Evolution The world is the permutation and combination of atoms-Causes of differences -Science fails to explain--The principles of causation-Criticism of Mill's conception of the law of causation-Patient and Agent -The Jain view of Causation and compound eyolution. 211-056.

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(vii) OBAPTAR XVI. God Jainism makes no room for an extramundane God.-Laplace and Nepolean- The Idea is not singular in India-Yet the Jains are not depend int on any All-mighty Ruler standing in the without--Dr. Bose and the Super-physical Puwer-Spencer and Spinoza-"Tetian Q.ud"-nature of the Power-The Coalescence these powers in different beings on the attainment of "Nirvan" is the idea of the God-head of the Jains. 257-sos. ORAPTAR XVII Soul Souls and the Gud-head -Materialistic conception of SoulA bye-product of matter -Eastern and Western 14 tridsin compared- Charvak and Hrel ei wd Guardian, the Socialist-Cusmuingial and Moral difficulties involved in Alaterialism Admissions by Huxley, Spencer and Darwin - The Jain conception of Spuit and Matter -Their Correlativity-Purde has_Parts or Soul-Units-Conscious efficace form the spiritual essence of the Su-Soul's constitu tional firedom-Its Traust.igration through the grades of Sansar and Emancipation. 266-280

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CHAPTER XVIII The Karma Phenomenology Constitutional Freedom and Divinity of the Soul -- Karma' and Soul--Fiow could Soul get enfettered in the Chairs f 'Karma' -Different Theories as to the Relation between Saul and 'Kurmi-Lavf'Karma' and Re birth--The Bises of the ja 1 Ethics Heredity can not explain clifferences between Ciganismis---Heredily and 'Karm. 281-294 ORAPTOR XIX. Churchianity and the Law of Karma. Christian Criticism of Karma'-'Empty Heart of Jainism'-Examinatiou of the Criticism--Inconsistencies and Difficulties of the Christian Theology-God and Sa'an-Good and Evil - The Indian Widows an] Christian unmarried Gfris. 295-302. OHAPTER XX Belief in Re-birth Karma' and Re-births--Complimentary Aspects of one and the Same Laiv governing the Universe Buddhistic Nibilism--all without an Ego-Belief in the Law brings in. Solace and Comfort in ones failures-Wide range of the belief in Asia and Europe

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Poets, Scientists and Philosophers-- Transmigration luas its root in reality--Karma Sarira. Joro OEAPTER XXI. Re-birth and Karma-Sarira Prof. Huxley and Re-birth-Huxley's Character'apd our Karma-matter--Chracter -Inner Niture-Linga-deha of the Hindu Philosophers - The Five Koshas or the Con. centric Circles-Pranas of the Hindus and of the Jain Philosophers Transmission of Character brough Heredity Vs. Trani gration of Kra-Sarira through Re buti 311-323 GBAPTER XXII. Karma-Sarira and Oudarlka-Sarira. Relations between the 'Karma' and the "Oudariki'Stages of development-'K.rman' produces the 'Oud trika Oudarika' produces Karma' Not Identical but two distinct Entities-Co-existence Inexplicable -Then no Inter-action possible-Relation of Crico ni' ant V.erici01-Difficulties of Parallelisn--The 'Karman body and the Qudarika' stand to each other in Relation of Intermutation.

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ILLUSTRATIONS. I From Life of Parshwanath (Kalpa Sutra Mss.) Pre-Mahomedan Period 2. Do Mogul Period 3. Metal Image (Ardhapadmasan)

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PREFACE. In humbly placing the present book entitled An EPITOME OF JAINISM on the table of the World-library, a few words of explanation by way of an apologia are, it appears, needed to justify the claims, it lays upon the valuable time of its various readers And we may state at the outset that it is not an attempt to supersede any of the modern treatises on Jainism Its claim to attention, if it has any, arises from the fact that it is but a compilation forming an epitome *having for its basis the most orthodox principles, doctrines and tenets as found in the Jain original works of authority and high antiquity, or promulgated on the, subject by Jain speculative writers and conformed to by accurate thinkers in their spiritual inquiries. But to connect together these detached fragments of a subject never yet treated as a whole, from the real Jain point of view, in these days of transition under Western refinement, to harmonise the different portions of the seemingly discordant notes

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( II ) lying scattered over the grey pages of works handed down from the spiritual sire to the spiritual son, by freeing them from errors which they have become more or less shrouded with, through the revolution of ages and empires, or through long-standing conventions which have come down to us from time immemorial, must require a power of interpretation and original speculation To other originality than this, the volume lays no claim. For it goes without saying that in the present age of the cultivation of universal learning when the literati of both the East and the West are sedulously engaged in exploring the rich and almost inexhaustible mines of the ancient lores of India, it would indeed be very presumptuous on the part of any one to imagine even that he had contributed something new and original in the domain of ideas and ideals. But still for all that there is ample scope for thinkers to improve upon the methods of philosophising and interpreting the old ideas and ideals, tenets and doctrines in perfect keeping with the changed conditions of the times to suit newer environments without deviating in the least from the real spirit "

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( III ) and import which they are replete with. For it is only the form that changes and must change, spirit always remaining essentially the same all through. And if there is any deviation anywhere from the real spirit, it should be understood as due to some thing wanting in the qualification of the interpreter. To do this we had, therefore, had to begin with the enuncialion and interpretation of the Jain principles of epistemology as propounded by the omniscient sages and scholars of bye-gone days. Epistemology really supplies the key-note to the interpretation and understanding of a system of thought and culture It gives us the stand point to have a clear and correct vision into the metaphysics of things and thoughts. This is the reason why every system of thought and culture in India really begins with a clear exposition of the principles of its epistemology, the moment it has done with describing in the briefest manner possible, its own hypothesis, its necessity and sublimity, and finally its right to be heard So is the case with . Jainism itself;

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( iv ) and having, therefois, explained all these, in brief in our Introduction and in Chapters I and II from the Jain point of view, we have begun discussing its science and philosophy from Chapter III headed as "Knowledge and Its Forms' But with Chapter IV on 'Epistemology and Logic' begins the real discussion which ends with Chapter VIII on 'Syaduad ultimately and finally indentifying logic with ontology A patient perusual of these chapters will clearly show the readers as to how the formal logic of the other schools of thought becomes, in the hands of the Jain sages, metamorphosed, as it were, into transcendental logic in and through the processes of the dialectical movements of thought and Being inherent in their very nature, But however it is generally held by students of modern thought and culture that this dialectic method of reasoning identifying logic with ontology is of Hegelian origin and meaning Indeed the word dialectic means reasoning for and against, exposing thereby fallacies and inconsistencies, and clearing them away. Socrates used this method of

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reasoning in lus oni iug.ci polemics with the sophists of his ti ne, putting them betiveen the horns of loro definite alternatives. But in modern philosophy of the West, it was Kant who rcrival: 12 has exposing the contradictions involvell the fundamental assumptions of dognizuic philosoplay and in the popular conceptions at Soul, Woild and God. But it was left !o Hegel to give a new meaning to dialectic and to interpret it in a new light altogether For with Hegel, Being contains within itself oppositions and contradictions Every thought, every reality is but a mixture of Being and non-Being Dialectic with Hegel, therefore, is equivalent to Self-devolopment or unfoldment, and the world-process itself is a process of dialectic, of antithisis and synthesis, making differences serve as means to higher unities. The legitimate out-come of working, out the Hegelian interpretation of the world-process as shown in his dialectica, is the pronouncement of the eternity of the world-process And with it the soul is also declared to be in the never-ending process of higher and higher evolution without any ultimate rest or quiscent anywhere. D

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( v ) But those who have followed our exposition of the Jain principles of episite.nology ending with Syadzidz running up to Chapter XII, will be at one with us when we state that the dialectic method of reasoning identifying logic with metaphysic was not Hegel's own making. It originated with the Jain sages and omniscient kevalins, and has been prevelant in the field of philosophy in India from a time when Greece and Rome those cradles of European civilization, were still steeped in the darkness of ignorauce It is true that with the Jains the Absolute is but an Expression of Unity in Difference as distinguished from the Absolute beyond the Relative of the Vedantins, ( Vide Chapter XI), and that the world-process is also without beginning and end (Vide Chapter XII to XV), but the soul according to Jainism does not remain for ever entangled in the meshes of the dialectic process of evolution without knoving any rest or repose anywhere The sains, as weil is every other system of Indian thought and culture, hold that the Jiva will never remain eternally caught up in the never-endi.g process of evolution It

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( VII ) is bound to get at that state of being and beatitude which is all free and divine. For freedom is our birth-right. Every soul is consututionally free and potentially divine. Aud the struggle for existence in this nether world. means with the Jains not only the struggle for bare existence in this mortal coil, but for the realization as well of this Ideal Freedom and Divinity. With this end the enquiries constituting the Right Vision--the basis of Right know. ledge But Right Knowledge which proceeds from Right Vision by a coherent train of thought and reasoning and which can only lead to Right Conduct without which the attainment of the Goal in vision is held to be impossible, is the knowledge which embrares concisely or in details, the relations in which the constituent factors of the world stand to soul and the changes as well of these relations in the dialectic movement of thouglac and being. And all these, more technically speaking, begin with Chapter XVIII on the 'Karma Phenomenology'. The readers will find much interest to enter on a nery kind of

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(vin ) discussion on metaphysical issues of vital importance in regard to the relation in question and its changes as well. The question as to when and how the soul which is constitutionally free and potentially divine came to be entangled into the meshes of the dialectic movements of the world-process without beginning and end, and which irritates the metaphysicans and speculative writers most in these days of scientific enquiry, has been discussed and solution given once for all. Every other position being untenable, the Jains hold that both the Soul and the Karma (ze the materialised units into which givic energetics resolve themselves) stand to each other in relation of phenomenal conjunction, which reveals itself in the continuity of the display from time without beginning, neither of the two being either prior or posterior to the other in the order of time, so far the question of their metaphysical entity is concerned-anidi apaschinupurur sanyoga sambandha pravdha. Such is the position of the jivas in the ocean of samsar whereon tumultuous waves furiously surging in various names and forms, ruffle the vast expanse. And just as the angularities of

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( IX ) the gravels at the bottom of the grugling stream of strong currents are rubbed off by being drifted from place to place, so the angularities of the Jwa sunk in the ocean of Samsar are also rubbed off by being driven from womb to womb, from region to region, under the strong pressure of Karma-causality. In this way with the rubbing off of the angularities and thinning out of the gross meterial veil and covering, when the java gets a comparatively improved vision into its own nature and ideal, it struggles to work out its own emancipation as a free-centre of origination. All these and such allied subjects as Rebirth and the like which are required to determine our place and function in the world, have been discussed with comparative ditails up till Chapter XXVI on the 'Classification of Karmas' with which end the enquiries into the constitution of Right Knowledge. From Right knowledge of our ultimate Ideal, of our place and function in the world, arises the possibilites of Right Conduct which is imperative in the attaiment of the Ideal. And the enquiries into the constitution

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of the Right Conduct open with Chapter XXVII 'From Metaphysics to Ethics.' No system of Indian thought and culture has such a stage-by-stage exposition in a systematic way of the ways and means to the attainment of that Goal which we all have in view. The very arrangement, it will appear on a careful perusual, is not only most psychological so far the unfoldment of knowledge itself is concerned, but appears to be modern as well when we judge it from the scientific and practical point of view. Having cleared up the Jain Conceptions of Virtue and Vice (Vide Chapter XXVIII), of their fruitions here and hereafter, the problems of evil and the like rudimentary notions of the Jain Ethics, the moral categories have been taken up one by one in consecutive order beginning with 'Influx' (Vide Chap XXXI) of the alien matter into the constitution of the soul and the consequent bondage of the same ander subreption (Jithyatta) which is nothing else than taking a thing for something which is not that thing (asete sat buddhi) This, mithyatva is the prime 1oot of all troubles. Such being the case we have discussed

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at some length, the psychology and philosophy of the matter and form of this methyatva A little reflection will be sufficient, 'we belive, to convince an impartial student of the history of Indian schools of thought that the theory of Maya resolving into dvaran and urkshepa as interpreted by Shankar and others of his line of thinking, is but a .distorted shadow of the Jain theory of mithyatva For, to deny Maye, therefore, of any positive entity and to posit .it at the same time as the great impediment in the way to the true selfrealisation is to be guilty of substantializing the abstraction In order to escape from this difficulty, Ramanuja, another interpreter of the Vedanta Sutrus, had to draw inspirations from the teachings and writtings of the Jain sages, and, in consequence, bad to fall back upon the Jain doctrine of Unity in Difference or the Theory of Bhedabheda vad, the legitimate outcome of the Syadvid or the dialectic method of reasoning giving a more comprehensive view of thought and Being It is true that Ramanuja speaks of Bodhayana as his authority for the enunciation of the doctrine of Unity in

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( XII ) Difference, but nowhere in his scholium on the Brahm Sutras could he quote direct from the writtings of Bodhayana. What Bodhayan taught no body knows. Had there been the existence of any commentary by him on the Sutras in question even at the time of Shankar, then Shankar, the upright and audacious, would never have left him unnoticed in his unrivalled commentaries and writtings because he is found to freely draw upon his predecessors, friend or opponent. With Be that as it may, the Jain sages have made sifting enquiry into the nature and matter of this mathy&tva and found possibilites of its removal through Samvar or Stoppage of the Influx and through Nirjar or gradual dissipation of what already found its way into the soul the completion of this dissipation, the soul gets rid of all the veil and covering of Karma and shines in perfect freedom and omniscience enjoying bliss divine for all time to come, this is what called Moksha of Nirvan or Extinction of all pain and suffering, the grand Summum Bonum of one and all life and living (Vide Chapters XXXII to XXXV).

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(XIII) But this final and ultimate state of being in bliss and beatitude cannot be attained all of a sudden, Great indeed is the vision but only the few behold. Great is the goal, but only the few attain. Great really is the struggle but only the few can withstand. For the goal In fact is gradually reached by steady and strenuous striving subjecting the self to gladly undergo a series practical disciplines in a manner and along the lines as enjoined in the Jural (Charan) and Teleological (Karan) Ethics of the Jains. And the stages which the mumukshin has to pass through, are fourteen in number and are called Gunasthanas which can be squeezed up into four stages to suit modern intellect. We have seen that according to Jainsm, Freedom is our birth-right and that its philosophy declares this freedom to be already in us. Freedom is constitutiona! with man. Feel that you are great and you will be great Feel that you are free and all quarrels will cease With the Jain, is but a question of realization in the very heart of hearts where life throbs and the soul of religion w

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(XVI) which is unique in the history of the world. And this is wby life in India really throbs in religion, whe, e as in the West, it has been more or less a fashion to attend the Church. But to return to the point at issue : as in India the function of philosophy is to support a particular form of Faith, so the function of Jainism is to harmonise all the contending religions of the world. And it is here that Jainism super sedes all the other forms of faith and creed. For, it is philosophy and religion both rolled in one A little reflection on the theory itself and its predominance from time to time, along with its growth and spread, will prove the truth and validity of our statement. Will any one tell the world what is it that so boldly declares the glorious dignity of man? Is it the civilization that creates for man new wants and desires only to bind him down more tightly to the mires of the world? Or is it that reconciles for man all the seemtug differences without sacrificing anything of permanent interest, kills that egotism by virtue of which his envenomed passions howl at every disappointment, and ultimately opens out to him the way to perfection, real happiness and

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( XVII eternal beatitude where all wants and cares cease for ever, and all passions as well for good, and which makes mau really to be his own real self in infinite delight divine ? Surely you will have to pronounce judgment in favour of the latter, and in that case we state once for all, and that without the slightest fear of contradiction, that Jainism is the means to the introduction into this miundane world a reign of peace, ordered harmony and reasonable sweetness which are most wanting in these days of rank materialism and uncompromising self-aggrandisement wherewith this blessed land of Bharat has become surcharged. It has, therefore, become highly imperative to repress this growing ardour of our youth in poletical polemics and practical tactics that are detrimental to and destructive of the felicity of their temporal and future lives, by a revival of the humble instructions of the ancient Kevalens and peaceful preceptors of old, and reclaiming them to the simple mode of life led by their forefathers from the perverted tendencies finding a firm hold on them under the influence of Western refinement. It is this degeneracy of our

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(XVIII) rising generation from an utter ignorace of the superiority of their own code and adoption, in consequence, of foreign ideas and ideals, habits and manners, that ought to engage the serious attention of our educated children of the soil Now apart from the question of any sublimity, necessity and utility of the cultivation of the Philosophy of Jainism roughly consisting as it does in outward peace (Shanta) and internal tranquility (Chitta Prasanti) united with contentment(Santosh) and apathy (Vardgya) to the alluring pleasures of the world, a glance at the description of the Jain Church as portrayed in Chapter XXXVII, a survey of the Jain places of Pilgrimage, of Art and Architecture &c. (Chapters XXXIX &c. XLI), a study of the great and not yet fully accessible complex of writings , making up the Jain Literature and record ing the appearauces of the Tirthankars in the era of avasarpini, and chronicling the organisation of the Sanghas, the great split in the original camp into the Swetambaris and the Digambaris the consecutive succession of the acharyas and the list of gachchas which originated with them, and

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( XIX ) finally other secular events of historical importance to a considerable extent, will make if pretty clear that Jainism is a religion that is not only born of the depths of ages but also that its Tirthankars were real historical persons who lived, moved and had their beings amongst our forefathers. Besides, these pages contain historical statements and allusions of no mean value. What we want to point out is that apart from the question of religious merit as is manifest in the literary works of the Jains, they go to a great extent to clear up many a historical anomaly and settle dates of important historical events For instance, it is from the perusual of these pages that we could settle the date of Mahavira's Nirvan or the accession of Chandragupta Ahtis from these pages we find that during the time of Rishava Deva, the systems of Jaina, Shurva and Sankhya philosophies were exant The Mimansa and the Nyaya flourished during the period of Sitalnath whereas the Bouddha and the Vaisheshiku came to prominence during the time of Parshwanath and Mahavir. This account of the chronological developments of the different Schools of Philosophy may read

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very strange. But when one iemembers that none of the systems of philosophy came to being all of a sudden, but they were more or less in extant in a still remoter age, and that this development into systems of philosophy means tveir embodiment in the forms of Sutras at different periods, things becomes easy to understand. For this is further corroborated if we interpret the religious upheaval in view of the fact that in the great religious Congress of the Indian saints and sages of yore in the 'Naimisharanya, when the authority of the Vedas were being made as binding upon the free thinkers of those days, those who left the Congrsss in silent protest against such actions of the Brahman-Rishis, were dubbed as Nastikas The word Nastika (atheist) in the Indian scripture does not mean one who did not believe in the existence of God, but rather one who did not accept the infallibility and ultimate authority of the Vedas. Were it otherwise then the System of Sankhy in which Kapil, like Laplace, did not care for getting in a God in the scheme of his universe, would not have been taken as one of the six theistic systems of philo

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XXVIII) all rights and privileges which so long belonged exclusively to them Oui Digambari brethren are squandering away good money in the name of religion They are showing a great enthusiasm, at the present moment, to set up claims and run to the Courts of Law for tne settlement of issues. Everywhere, whether at Sametsikhar, at Pawapuri or at Rajgir, we hear of litigations cropping up from their endeavours to get equal rights in the control and management of the sacred places which the Jain Swetambari Community have been doing since the foundation of these shrines and temples. If things really go on in this way, then the Jain Community, as a whole, will have not only to pay dearly for it, but those monumental works as well of the Jain genius in art, architecture and sculpture will shortly disappear into the sui rounding ruins And it grieves us much therefore to find that the Digambaris are,quarrelling with the Swetambaris without any just cause to advocate in claiming equal share with them in the South, the Digambaris have their wellknown images at Sravana Belgola and other temples in their sole management. No

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Swetambari ever thinks of interfering with the just rights of the Digambaris in those provinces. The Diganharis have got lands from the Swetanuari Sangha for ereccion of their temples, sometim23 they have also purchased land for the purpose and have built separate temples. But indecd deeply regrettable it is on their part that inspite of these stupendous facts, they have not put a stop to their policy of agression. We, therefore, sincerely appeal to the Digambaris, at least to the sensible and educated members amongst them, to put an end to such sort of dealings and avoid litigation especially in matters of religion. Even before the Court of Justice, there is a limitation to everything. For centuries after centuries, the Swetambaris have tried their best to build, maintain and improve the sacred places. They hold Formasis, Grants, Sunnvds and Parwanas from the reigning Sovci eigns of the past and have been managing the affairs generation after' generation, without any co-operation from the Digambai:s from time immemorial without any clain sur, dissension or intervention. And it is i disgrace that they

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- AN EPITOME OF JAINISM purification of our hearts and minds and establish the tirtha or the order. According to the Jains, the first Tirthankara 'Reshava Deva' of the present era, gave to the world a systematic exposition of Truth in all its aspects, both secular and spiritual. He also laid down rules of conduct for the proper guidance of the church as well as of the laity. Rishava Deva is also mentioned in the Hindu Scripture, the 'Srimat Bhagvat, as the second in the list of kings, who, towards the end of his life, abandoned the world and went about as a naked ascetic and rose from manhood to divinity by meditation. "Parshwanatha', the twenty-third, and 'Mahavira', the twentyfourth, were not founders but they were merely reformers like other Tirthankars in different ages. On the face of such overwhelming evidences as can be collated from pages of high antiquity, there cannot be any doubt as to the existence of Mahavna or Parshwatha as historical personages. M Guerinot, in the Introduction to his learned Essay on Jam Bibliography, indicates the important points of difference between the life of Mahavira and that of Buddha.

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INTRODUCTION MAHAVIRA BUDDHA 3. Born at Vaisal (Kunda 1. Born at Kapilavastu about gram) about 599 B. C. 557 B. C. 2. His parents lived to a 3. His mother died soon after good old age. gning huis birth. 3. Assumed the ascetic life 3. Made himself a monk with the consent of his against the wishes of his relatiscs. father. 4 His preparalion in tuc . Obtained Illumination at ascetic stage lasted for the end of 6 years 12 years only. 5 Died at Pana in S Died at Kusinagar about 577 B. C. 488 B. C. Parshwanatha was born at Benares in 877 B. C, and reached nl2rvana in 777 B. C. on a hill which is still known as Parcshnath Hills in Bengal. Mahavira or Vardhamana, the last Tirthankara of this age, only improved upon the then cxisting doctrines and customs according to the exigencies of the tinie, and it was hc who gave Jainism its final formi. The current tenets and practices of Jainism, dscmbodied in the existing Sutras or canons, are his ulterances Mahavira was the son of Siddhartha, the chief of the Nat clan of Kundagrama near the city of Varsali, who belonged to a noble

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Hegel AN EPITOME OF JAINISM unified knowledge". "Philosophy" according to a third, "is the science of the Absolute," in the sense that it takes the world of Nature not as a product of chance but of a Single Infinite Power whose activity consists in the working out of a plan or purpose in the course of which It evolves this world out of Itself Thus has philosophy been variously defined by different thinkers of different ages and climes. The Jains, however, teach that philoas defined sophy consists in the voluntary and consistent by the Jo striving, intellectual and moral, manifest in the removal of impediments on the way to Right Vision (ARTE ETA) into the metaphysics of things and thoughts leading to Right Knowledge (HRT $19) of the world as a whole, and of our own function and placeRight Conduct (HRGE afra) therein with the express object of realizing finally the free and beatific state of our being the ultimate end and purpose of all life and activity Taking. philosophy, then, as an attempt Its Method to attain to a free and beatific state of of enquiry being by the virtue of Right Conduct. - (groot fra) proceeding from Right Know nas

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The two factors of 0 sva. PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION. ledge (samyak jndra) acquired through Right Vision ( sanyak darshan) into the realities of things and thoughts, we can ascertain beforehand what the principal branches and problems of our enquiry will be. We can see fundamental that there are two fundamental factors of the the world. world : (i) Jeva, the Cogitative Substance or the Soul, including the system of finite minds either in Nigoda, fixed, fettered, or fiee, in the various gradations of their being ; (ii) Ajiva, the Non-Cogitative Substance, the Non-living or the Non Soul, including objective things and processes and the like Hence our en- (u) Aziva. quiry into philosophy, roughly speaking, will branch out into - (1) The Cogitative Substance or Soul (prva), (vi) The Non-Cogitative Substance or the Non-Soul (ajara), and finally, (iii) The End or Freedom (moksha) of the soul in relation as to how it_is attained. But from a consideration of these funda. Idens ao a mentals, it becomes evident that we have to make a frequent use of such metaphysical ideas and notions as Dravya (substance), Guna (quality), Paryaya (modality or modi Necessary Notions

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AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. fication), Karma (action, motion or change of relative position ), Karan (causality ) and the like ; and no consistent result of our enquiry into philosophy can be ex. pected until appropriate and complete understanding has been arrived at in regard to these fundamental ideas and notions. But an understanding of the content and origin of these ideas involves, to a great extent, analytical psychology of cognition. Furthermore, philosophy, as we have And onder- seen above, claims to know the relalities as these in they are, and therefore it must proceed with the justification of its rights by showing chology of cognition what the conditions or means (Pramanas) of on the means attaining knowledge are, and proving as well, that knowledge of realities corresponding to the above ideas is within its power and competence. Otherwise, instead of explaining the relations which the Fivas and Ajrvas bear to each other, it will go on only dogmatising, sometimes sinking into the l'ower level of scepticism' and agnosticism, or at other times rising into pseudo-rationalism-only' to add to the impediments of which there are plenty already to obscure standiag of volves & nalytical psy. W and question or conditions of know ledge.

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PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION. our right vision into realities of ideas and ideals and forge thereby fresh links to the chains of misery that tie us down to the mires of this suffering world. But to avoid such pitfalls and to know the realities in conformity with the rules and canons required to be observed in the acquirenient of a correct knowledge, we must proceed from such and other notions and ideas as form the subject-matter of the next chapter. GERIR HEITIE 16869 1

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CHAPTER 11. PREDICAMENTS BY PRE-EMINENCE. Fundamental Notiona.-Categories or Predicaments by preeminence.-Theis Necessity and Origin - How determined. Advantages of such determination.Dravya. Guns, Paryaya and Karmi.-Papa and Punya. -Classification and description in Seneral of the Predicaments. Their enumeration. context of mental Ideas such as We have already seen that Right Vision, Right Knowledge, and Right Conduct are the three principal departments of our philosophical enquiry. Origin and But in dealing with - these, as we have the funda. remarked, we have often to-make use aad Notions of such -and certain fundamental ideas or notions as are not only the necessary forms according to which we ourselves must conceive things but which must also be regarded as necessary forms and relations of the things themselves. For in thinking, to be more clear, we think something about a thing and what we think about a thing is that it has powers 20

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Its consti Freedom, but in number AN EPITOME OF JAINISM bondage and attain to a free and beatific tutionai state of being by means of the Truine Gems (tait), the Fiva is held to be constitutionally free and essentially all bliss (lar). It is potentially divine in the sense that it attains to Divinity or Perfection in Its Divinity, the end when it shines in all its glory and effulgence beyond all thought and speech near the regions of Aloka. And its Infi Now there are an infinite number of these magnitude Frvas-filling the entire space and void of the universe and are mainly grouped into - (A) Freed Fivas--are those beings who 1)The Freed have attained to divinity and become self conscious and self-luminous neai the lyperphysical regions and, (B) Fettered Frvas-are those who are tered Jeastill bound down with the chains of karma either on Earth, in Heaven, or in Purgatory Which is These fettered Fivas are again sub again into, divided into (1) Sthavura and (ii) Tras (1) Sthavara Fivas--are those which w The Sth. are devoid of all power of locomotion and have only one organ of sense, viz, that of touch (q). Earth, water, fire, air and all those that come within the Irva (2) The Fet classified vara and 26

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PREDICAMENTS. range of the vegetable kingdom, are known as Jivas belonging to the Sthavara class Symptoms of life in these Sapran Sthavar ( a gat) or living fixtures consist, amongst other phenomena, in responsiveness which evidently involve memory as displayed in the mental activity of feeling, cognition and re-cognition (ii) Tras Fivas-are those who have the power of locomotion and are grouped into the tas. four kinds according to the nature and number of the sense-organs they are the four possessed of The four kinds of Tros Fras Tras, are , (a) those that have the organs of touch and taste, (nice and refreu ) eg., leeches, worms, etc (b) those that have three organs such as touch, taste and smell, ( figu, reforum and Tobago ) eg, ants, lice, etc (c) those that have organ of sight (nayanendriya ) in addition to the above three orgaus, eg, bees, scurpions, etc. (d) and, lastly, those that have all the above four organs in addition to that of the hearing ( Tafsu ) Tlus last kind of kinds of the

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va defin. modes of ed AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. Jivas includes birds, acquatics, animals and human beings and all those that people Heaven, Earth and Purgatory. II. Ajiva (vita -Non-cogitative substance, Non-soul, Not-self or the Object is all what is absolutely bereft of all intelligence, and consequently of the tripartite modes of consciousness This Ajevu or Noncogitative substauce is of five kinds, viz ; (1) Pudgala signifies what develops fully only to be dissolved again. It is that kind of dead dull ponderable ( put) matter, which is qualified with touch, taste, smell and colour. It is found to exist generally Ponderable Aprva-Pud in two modes of being :-(a) Anu (70) aton, and (b) Skandha ( a), --compound. When the dead and dull matter exists in the last indissoluble stage where the ingredients admit of no further analysis, it is called anu or atom And Skandha-compound is the natural conglomeration of pudgal-atoms under chemical and physical laws. It is these Pudgala-atoms that incessantly enter and leave our bodies and are infinitely more numerous than the Fivas Karma is a kind of fine Pudgal-atoms. gal and its indications -Laksiana 28

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PREDICAMENTS. Pudgala The Pudgala-matter is also classified in the following manner according to other Classified. modes of its being : (a) Sthula-Sthula () or the Grossest of the gross, as, for example,logs of wood or blocks of stone; i.e., solids which can be cut into equal parts. (b) Sthula (a) or the Gross-simple, milk or water, i. e., liquids, which are restorable to their original mass-forms even after their measurable divisions. (c) Sthula-sukshma (EFT) or the Compound of the gross and the fine (e g. gases which is visible in the light of the sun or the moon but cannot be caught, as for example smokes and the like) (d) Sukshma-Sthula (-) or the Compound of the fine and the gross is what is not visible to the eye but is perceptible by the auditory or olfactory nerves; as, for example, music and smell. (e) Sukshma () or the Fine. (f) Sukshma-Sukshma (THE) or the Finest of the fine, the ultimate atoms which admit of no further divisions. These finest of the fine, are mere simples as oppos 29

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able Ava AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. ed to compounds and like points have posisions but no magnitude. (ri). Dharna or Dharmastikdya is that Imponder. simple imponderable ( *) substance by the virtue of which bodies are able to move. Dharma here seems to be a reality, correspouding to the Rajus (The) of the Sankhya philosophy, helping to the mobility of material things. (rit). Adharnia or Adk irmastikaya is that simple imponderable (FR) substance by the virtue of which bodies are able to be * at rest Adharna, like Dharma, appears to be a reality corresponding to the Tamas (ma:) of the Sankhya philosophy tending to bring things to a rest (iv). Akash or Space is the uncontained container of all that exists. (v) Kal or Time is what reveals itself in a series or succession of events or changes. It is in the course of time that things wear out, unfold themselves or undergo changes It is this time that is conventionally divided and termed as moments, muutes, hours and the like for which reason it is technically called Kalandtmak Kal. 30

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Tive Fortas of KDOWledge, AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. Now knowledge is of five different forms, such as, (1) Mati ( afat), (2) Sruti ( gfat), (3) Abadhi (wafa)(4) Manaparyaya (AT ) (5) and Keval (297) Thus, Mati .is that form of knowledge by which a Jeva ( a) cognises an object through the operation of the sense-organs, all hindrances to the formation of such knowledge being removed. (2) Srutz is the clear knowledge formed on some verbal testimony of the Omniscient, all obstruction to the formation of such knowledge being removed. (3) Avadhi is the knowledge in the form of recognition of particular physical occurrences that happened in some time past, all obstruction to the way being removed; (4) Manaparyaya is the knowledge of what is in others' thoughts, originating, as it does, from the removal of hindrances to the formation of such knowledge. (5) Keval is the pure unimpeded knowledge-knowledge absolute, which precedes the attainment of Nirvana. It is characterised by omniscience, transcending all relativity of discursive thought involving -

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Characteristic Indicafron of Kaval of Intuition minds KNOWLEDGE AND IT'S FORMS the idea of succession and series. Being devoid of every sort of ratiocinative ele fico ment, we may call it 'Intuition' power By Dr Intation Intuitive knowledge we mean, of course, what we get by a single stroke of cognition, unadulterated by any of the processes of representation As for us, finite beings, conditioned naturally by the relativity. of thought, we cannot have this sort of cognition ; because a careful analysis of the psychological impossibility processes seems to show that by virtue of the by ordinary frame and constitution of our mind, in every cognition which we can have, both the presentative and the representative elements are, as it were, inseparably blended together. Indeed, some philosophers may hold the quite opposite view and affirm that we can perceive objects directly by our senses and that forma. tion of the percept requires no help of representation. But surely, we can meet them in the language of Kant by saying that mere sensa. tions, unalloyed with any reactionary and representative processes, are as good as pothing, because they are no better than manifold of senses quite undifferentiated and homogeneous in character. But this--though an im 37

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Is essential a correct AN EPITOME OF JAINISM canons that a Judgment must obey in order The observ- that it might be true anceof which A good and correct to the Judgment has some respousibility, and this formation of responsibility takes on the form of rules, Judgment laws and canons that a Judgment must obey, oi else be an untrue or false claimant of the respective demands To disobey these rules would, therefore, be tantamount to treason to knowledge itself. We have already dwelt on the first two elements of Judgment. We are now to deal with the third one, or the laws and canons for the formation of correct Judgment Students of Indian systemis of thought Etymolo all know that the word pramana (AIT) gical signicance of originally meant an instrument of measure ment--from man-to measure and pra-forth. It may be translated as a measured, standard authority. But the prandna which serves as a Function of means (199) of determination pro duces pramiti (afafa) which means accurate or right knowledge, just as sadhan (means) produces siddhz (truth or certainty) This pramana is a means of information and determination and has variously, Praman 46 .

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EPISTEMOLOGY AND LOGIC been admitted, divided and defined from differ- Ihe Charent points of view by different sages and scholars of different ages and climes to suit their respective systems of thought vaka CrittCism of Knowledge Whoever has a little acquaintance with the different Indian systems of thought knows full well that the followers of the Charvaka School admit of but one source one Source of knowledge, viz Experience, 1. e sense- There is but perception (), contemptuously rejecting of Know ledge and the other sources, viz. Inference, (IR), that is Pratyaksha. Testimony(), Tradition (fau), Implication (arthApatti), Probability (sambhava) and Nonentity (H), which are warranted in drawing from facts of experience Little indeed do we know what is really taught by the Sage Brihaspati, the oldest propounder of the most uncompromising materialism and thorough going Epicuranism or whence he drew his inspiration to rely solely on sense perception or facts of actual experience and to overlook other logical inferences and the like which have been in vogue from time immemorial, for, where we perceive smoke we infer at once the fire there, oi, when a reliable person informs any one that there are fruits he 47

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AN EPITOME OF JAINISM, requires on the bank of the river, he runs to the place and plucks fruits. Thus, Inferernce and Testimony along with other's have all along been held to be valid sources of knowledge. But, curiously enough, the Charvakas question the validity of these And so far we could gather from the fragments of this philosophy, scattered here and there in the different systems of thought and as collated by Madhavacharya in his Sarvadarshana Sangraha, he begins bis enquiries into Epistemology with such startling questions as, what is the value of Inference? How can ever its conclusions be certain ? The most elementary form of conclusion must invariably have three terms-two ex tremes and a reason, mark or middle term ce (g. fgg or 91478). To give a conclusion, the middle-term or mark (a fac or 1971) must be universally and unconditionlly connected with the major-Sadhya ( 11, #15) on one side i.e, according to the phraseology of European logic must be distributed. and on the other side with the minor term paksha (0) But what evidence can we 48 Invalidity of Inference Anuntat

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EPISTEMOLOGY AND LOGIC. evet have that the connection between the magor ( aisa ) and the midnie or sign fetitate fat or fange) is necessaly alid universal ? For (a) Sense-perception that ) taidot piove it in as much as, universal connection Senaten. is not a fact of experience. Experience establish can give only one particular fact arid thiat only of the present thomeiit and not of the long past not of the distant future. The eye by fact of its exercisiflg its fulictichal activity only in the preselilt reveals the objectivity of a particulat tbittg here and od But a universal truth goes infinitely beyond what the eye cat give. Hetice setse-berception cannbt prove ally tilecessary cotinection between the major folket) aud the minor (aithany universal propositiohi 65 Pretijns (onfet befast) b) But here a prima facie abfeelid might be raised to the effect that perceptible prend being botk intetrial and external it idcludes 19 ikituition of reason whilch gives Hebeles saty did utiversal trulhi Not even that klinders fortli the thorough-going waterial: ist : thite is to such thing as fwtuitidh

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Hamilton, Mill and Comte. AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. or internal perception. For mind has no perception except through the senses and cf Reid, therefore external. It is interesting to compare the Charvakas with Reid and Hamilton, who on the one hand deny the possibility of internal intuition of universal truths, and Mill and Comte on the other hand who reject all 'Introspective knowledge as ever possible. (c) * Then again, "Inference," says the Indian materialist, "cannot give it; for Inference (CAT) itself always requires Inference' cannot give, universal proposition affirming the connec cion between the major and the middle as, universally true" For example when we say that a man is mortal, Socrates is a man and therefore mortal, we are assuming a necessary connection between humanity and mortality But the possibility of such a connection, at least of our knowing such a connection, even if it existed, is just what we require to prove Thus we can see that mere Inference cannot prove it, for it is only assumed to say that the connection, thougb assumed yet makes inference possible is to argue in a circle. And hence we cannot assumed 50

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of the forma AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. states and processes of the psychology of cognition of extra-mental realities. .. Knowledge born of the contact of the Intermedia tory Stages senses with their corresponding objects tory of such (afpremiet of 17 ) is not direct. There are, remark the Jain Psychologists, five iqtermediatory stages from sense to thought : viz. (a) Vanjyandvagraha ( up), (b) Arthavagraha (97197), (c) Tha (FET), (d) Avaya (497) and (e) Dharand ( HITT) as will be presently explained. Knowledge. SYS

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Pramian CHAPTER V. PRATYAKSBA IS REALLY PAROKSHA. The Jain dimension with reference to Pratyakohe Praman.-Direct Perception is really Indirect.-Analysis of the Psychological Processes of Cognition. The Different Stages - From Sense to Thought-Proof of the Truth end Validity of the Jain Point of View.-The sensuous 'Pratyaksha' is really 'Paroksha' While discussing the questions of epistemology and logic in the previous chapter, The Jain . ticism of th we have seen how the different schools of Pratyaksh Indian thought substantially agree as to Direct Pe ception the character of the different instruments of knowledge. And so far the characteristic indication, specially of the Direct Perception (WRUT HAIT), is concerned, we have seen too that almost all the schools, from the out-and-out materialist Charudka down to the all-believing Paurunikas, agree with one another But the Jain savants, as But the I we have stated already, do not fall in indirect with this view According to them, the so-called Pratyaksha-Direct Perception_is but an Indirect source of knowledge The so-called Pratyaksha is really Paroksha rect is reall

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ment of on tion by the Jains. AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. in manifest opposition to the uniformly ed abandona accepted sense and signification of the ginal post terms in question ? Besides, this would be construed as an abandonment on our part of the original position (affat 10) taken up by us in the demonstration of the logical possibility and validity of inferential knowledge (atra a) in addition to the perceptual and yielding as well to the view held by our adversary, in so far, indeed, as the epistimological side of the question is concerned, simply by a cunning display of pun upon words and terms from their etymological significations, Specially such is your position when we, Charvakas, do not admit of Pure Intuitions or Transcendental Perceptions which are impossible on your own statement to the ordinary mortals living, moving and having their being in the empirical world of ideas and ideals Indeed! we, the Jains, reply There is much of sense in your argument. But that of the Jain; is only apparently in as much as they vanish le altogether like cob-webs on searching vaka hypo analysis, as we shall see presently True it is that our definition and interpretation of Vindication position and examination of the Char thesis 66

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JAIN THEORY OF FORMAL LOGIC. the logical terms in question are in contravention to the too. common acceptation and uses of the same. But common is the common place and being too common would not diminish the weight and gravity of our philosophy We walk straight along the lines of Riju-sutra (Fy ea) and interpret and explain things both as they are and appear instead of wrangling and beating about the bush. In our empirical life and thought, we indeed admit Perception as the direct and Infer. ence as the indirect means of knowledge But, however, to meet you on your grounds, First-You hold that direct Perception ( a ) in the common acceptation of the Summary of the Hypoterm is the one and only means of knowledge and that the so-called Inference (Vg#ta) being not possible according to your view is not to be recognised as valid knowledge Now, do you or do you not adduce any proof in support of your contention? If you The Chardo not, your assertions would be but ipse Dilemma dixit and none will care to listen to you On the other hand, if you adduce proof, yours would be a suicidal procedure making yourself thesis vakas in a

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er admission of induction in sensuous perception of inferential knowledge. your AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. guilty of a crime for the abandonment of the original position (afaat yare) already taken up by you in sone form or other. Secondly,~Again when you maintain that Unconcious excepting Perception all other forms of evidence are alike fallacious and as such homogeneous, you admit yourself the legitimacy of induction which is but a form of inference. Thirdly-Then again you reject every Vindication kind of inference, but how do you carry on your debate? Surely by means of words which are but symbols of thought and when you attack your antagonists for their mistaken faith in inference without which you could not so much as surmise that your antagonists held erroneous opinions, such erroneous opinions being never brought into contact with your organs of sense but are only supposed to exist on the strength of inference (46A1A) from the symbolic movement of thought. And, Finally,--you can not but admit of interence being another means of knowledge as will be evident from the following To take for example, I have been very often into 68

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TAIN THEORY OF FORMAL LOGIC the kitchen room as well as in other places and I have invariably observed that where there was smoke there was fire Having met with not a single exception to the rule, I become convinced of the fact that there is an universal antecedence of fire in respect of smoke Afterwards 1 go to a hill for a trip I see smoke there and I doubt somehow whether or not there is fire in the hill and the moment I observe smoke on it, I recall to my mind the invariable concommitance between fire and smoke of which I had become pretty well convinced before, and I conclude that the hill has fire in it as there is smoke on it Surely this is a case of inference to the point and and you cannot but admit the legitimacy of the issue in question Having thus refuted the Charvaka hypothesis so far their means of knowledge is concerned and having demonstrated as well the legitimate possibility of Inference() beyond all shadow of doubt according to the general acceptation of the logical term in question, it is imperative that we shall, ere we enter on any other topics bearing upon 69 Demonstra tion of the legitimacy of Inference Necsesity of a brief Sur sey of the Jain of formal logic

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AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. in their proper significance and acceptance express real objects not inconsistent with what is established by perception. and its This Testimony is of two kinds-(a) classification Lonkika (af) and (6) Shastraja (men) (a) Loukika sabda (af 95) is the Verbal Testimony from reliable persons having authority to speak. 6) Sastraja sabda (mes) is the Scriptural Testimony. By scripture is meant that which was inrented by self-realized persons who have seen truths and whose pronouncements in consequence are not incompatible with truths derived from perception Now the sain sages hold the Scriptural . Knowledge to be of three different kinds. VIZ, - (1) Knowledge derived from the teachiClassifica- ings, recorded or otherwise, of ku devas or Shasir aja bad spiutual teachers. (2) Knowledge derived from the Naye Sruta or that part of the Jain scripture which teaches us as to the ways of comprehending things and realities in one or the other of the many aspects they are possessed of tion of the Testimony h

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JAIN THEORY OF FORMAL LOGIC, (3) Knowledge derived from Syadvad sruta or that part of the Jain scripture which teaches us how to test and comprehend things and realities in all their aspects for which reason it is also called Anekantavad or the doctrine of the versatality of aspects. Of these three kinds of scriptural knowledge, we shall deal with the Nayavad and the Syadvad in the subsequent chapters and leave the first to be dealt with later on for the sake of our arrangement and convenience 77

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asuddha AN EPITOME OF JAINISM under the inmediately present external mode (vin) Kramo padhi sapek- of ils appearance as in the case of taking a shaasudho redhot piece iron for fire itself; or taking a man to be insane for the temporary fit of insanity lie has displayed for the moment (ix) Utpada vydya sapeksha satta (1x) Ulpka - grkaka asuddha-implies taking a thug vyaya sapekShe is also in its tripartite aspects of origination, des truction and permanence at one and the same time, as in the case of casting a gold necklace into the mould of a bracelet, the substance rempaming the same substance all through the time, involving. ds it does, in it the idea of the origination of the bracelet from the destruction of the necklace, gold remaining essentially the same all through Bheda kalpan: sapeksha asuddha-s the Bheda kala consideration of the thing after resolving it pana sd peksha usredaka. though the processes of mental abstraction into substance and quality, though the two are really non-different and inseparable from each other for instance, consciousness is the essential quality of the soul, but we often draw a line of distinction between consciousness and soul 11 our ordinary 95

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THE JAIN LOGIC AND THE NAYAS parlance when we say, "the soul's consciousness," or "conciousness of the soul", though soul 19 non different from or the latter from the former ON PARYAYAS consciousness Before we come to the discussion -of the second class of Naya known as the Paryayarthika, it is imperative that we must have a clear understanding of what we mean by a paryaya. Definition of A paryaya is but a mood or state of being Or whatever has origin and end Paryaya or destruction in time is paryaya The ripples in waters or the surging waves ruffling the vast expanse of the ocean are but typical illustrations of what is really meant by paryaya . Such being the nature of Paryayas, they are but phenomena or appearances and as such they must be appearances of something with which they stand in certain relations .Following up the character of these relations, the Jain sages have classified paryayas primarily into (1) Sahabhavr and (i) Kramabhabi. 87 Classification of Paryayas

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Sahabkavi (W) Kramadhah AN EPITOME OF JAINISM Of these two kinds of parydya, the first, Sahabhair refers to the quality which is coexistent with what it reveals , as for example, consciousness (fata) is the Sahabhabe paryaya which is co-existent with soul, and the second, Kramabhabi stands for the paryaya proper Kramabhavi paryayas may be described as contingent in the sense that their presence depends on the variable circumstances so that they may differ in the same thing at different times just as happiness and misery or joy and grief which are not co-existent with the mind like consciousness but are moods which depend on the environment, the mind finds itself placed in by the virtue of its own karma It is also interesting to note, by the way, how the Jain philosophers have otherwise classified paryayas as in the following : (a) Svabhva drnvya vyanjana paryaya -means substantive variation in the ultimate constitution (TAM ) which a thing under-- goes in the course of its adaptation to the environment as sve find in the cases of siddha souls whose nature differ only Svad ava dratyagyarjana &

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THE JAIN LOGIC AND THE NAYAS. slightly from the ultimate and real nature of the soul which is essentially free and full of bliss. (b) Swabhava guna vyanjana paryaya --means variations in the natural quality (b) Svabhava of a thing as we find in the case of the sanaparyen finitude of vision and imperfection of the embodied soul whose real and essential quality consists in the infinitude of vision and perfection which become manifest of themselves in the pure and disembodied state of being on the attainment of Freedom. (c) Bibhava dravya vyanjana paryaya --IS an accidental variation in the general (6) Bibhava drapya vyanconstitution of a substance as is observed in janaparmaya the soul's transmigrations through various kinds of organic beings. (d) Bibhdus gune vyanjana paryayam means an accidental variation in the form of (d) Bibhava knowledge which is but a quality of soul, kuna wyd me japaratura as in the case of matijntn and the like as distinguished from the immediate intuitive knowledge possible to the kevalins only. The above is but a kind of classification of paryayes as applied to living beings But the As applied Jain philosophers hold that the same classic world. ** 89 I 2

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AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. fication is also applicable with equal logic to the inorganic world of pudgal-matter. (a) Indivisible atoms or electrons are examples of the first kind of classifications as applicd in the non-living world. (b) Each kind of colour, smell, taste and two non-conflicting sensations of touch are but instances of the second class of variation in the non-living (c) The binary and tertiary compounds of the pudgal-matter are illustrations of the third kind of variation (d) Chemical compounds stand for the present fourth. In fine, it is also to be noted that Unity Unity, Varie. topica) and Parety (raha) are but modes of but other appearance- Paryaya Unity is complete Parydyas Identity and Varety consists in Differences of feature Combination (EU), Configuration (Hera), Division (fahrt), Number (EFT). Newness and Oldness under the influence of time are but other characteristic indications of paryani or phenomenon For it is said, - egattaM ca pahuttaM ca saMkhyA sAThapamavaya / saMjogI ya vibhAgo ya yajjayANaM tu lakmaNam // ty etc, are modes or 90

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THETAIN LOGIC AND THE NAYAS SUBSTANOB AND QUALITY From the above classification of Paryayas into SahabhQur and Kramabhauz, we are constrained to discuss, in brief, qualities and attributes as distinguished from substances. For without having made our ideas and notions about quality and substance pretty clear, it would be difficult for us to understand and - appreciate the utility and importance of Naya as applied in the study of the phenomenology of thought and being Substance, as we have seen, is what has some degree of independent existence of its own, preserving itself as it does by and quality reacting on and resisting other things. This power of self-preservation constitutes the essence or reality (9711) of the thing and manifests itself in the different effects which it produces by re-acting on other things And the powers of re-action which thus manifest themselves in producing effects in other things are known as qualities or properties of the thing and are represented in terms of the effects they produce To illustrate, when a thing has the powers of occasioning in us Substai'ce distinguished

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AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. (s) Generic qualities the sensations of colour, taste, smell, weight, we say that it has the qualities of colour, smell etc, for which reason qualities are understood to be inherent in or to constitute the nature of the thing in as much as they are but different ways in which the self-preservative power which is the real essence of the thing manifests itself outwardly. But qualities of things appear to us as as being of two kinds, so different that one may be described as essential and the other as 1101-essential For, some of the qualities which perception reveals appear to constitute the very essence of things qualities without which there cannot be any conception whatsoever of things as extramental realities and these are called generic (1917) qualities which are common to all things and beings. The Jain sages hold that the generic qualities without which a thing becomes wholly inconcivable to us are ten in number VIZ, (1) Entity (ufca)which may be described as having the characteristics of 02

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THE JAIN LOGIC AND THE NAYAS.. reality (afil) and permanence (Ha) in and through the principle of which it manifests itself as the ground for the phenomena of both the Universal (Hina) and Particular (faitor) (2) Thinghood (999)---may be described as the property revealed in and through the relations of the universal and particular in which objects subsist (Harag fan !) (3) Substantiality. (alc)-means the power of self-preservation constituting the essence oi reality (#7) which is characteristic indication of Dravya (4) Knowability (PAUCE)--may be described as the capacity of being koown or measured by the means of Valid-knowledge (5) Subtlety (9479)--may be described as the capacity of being in the state of irriducible minimum with a maximum intensity (of vibration) defying thought and speech. (6) Extension (nama) may be described as the property of occupying space. (7) Sensibility (amma)-may be described as the capacity of responding to stimuli (8) Insensibility ( TC)- may be described as the property incapable of giving any response to a stimulus 93

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qualities, AN EPITOME OF JAINISM , (9) Ponderableness (adica )-may be described as the quality of existing in some form or other. (10) Imponderableness ( a)--may be described as the power of existing without having any particular form. These are, then, the ten generic qualities of things or substances in general. But there are certain other qualities which do not appear to constitute either (11) Specific the essence of or common to all things Because the things may have them or be without them and yet remain essentially the same in kind for which reason these are understood to be but modifications of our consciousness and are termed as specific qualities. (1) Consciousness (91A), (11) Vision (Xa), Enumeration (iii) Pleasure (vo), (iv) Vigour (ald), (v) Touch (i), (vi) Taste (TA), (v11) Smell (oran), (v111) Colour (af), (ix) Mobility (stfagga), (x) Inertia (fafa sgea), (xi) Volumeness (716078), (x11)Becomingness (alaga), (x111) Sensibility (Tata), (xiv) Insensibility (manca), (xv) Ponderableness (aria), (xvi) Imponderableness (977a) of these of Specific Qualities as belonging Particular substances 94

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THE JAIN LOGIC AND THE NAYAS. sixteen specific properties, the ist, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 13th, and the 16th belong to the Jivasoul, the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th 14th and the 15th belong the Pudgal-atoms, the 9th, 14th and the 16th belong to the Dharmastikaya, the roth, 14th and the 16th belong to Adharma stuksdya, the 11th, 14th and 16th to the Akash and finally the 12th, 14th and the 16th to Kala. U THE PHENOMENAL NAPA. Having seen what is implied by a paryaya, it would be easy now to comprehend the process of analytical enquiry into paryayas or Phenomena which form the subject-matter of the Parydyarthika or Phenomenal Naya Of these nayas the first is, (a) Anddi nitya suddha &cis what deals with that kind of poudgalic variations, (a) Anads the series of which remaining unbroken from mitya suddha time without begining puts on, in consequence, the appearance of permanence, inspite of the ravages of time upon the same. As 'for example, the Himalayas, though time has wrought havoc on the same, yet the high mountain ranges appear ever the same from time immemorial. C 95

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AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. (3) Sadi nitya suddhaparyarthika &c (b)Sadimlya has for its subject such particular class of suddhaparyd, the ha &c variations as have origination in time but undergoes no subsequent transformation as for instance, when the embodied soul enters on a liberated state of existence, it attains to a state of variation which has, as a matter of fact, a begining in time but knows no subsequent change; because a soul once liberated cannot enter into any bondage again. (c) Satta gounatvena utpada vyaya (c) Satta grahaka nitya suddha &c enquires into that gounatve na utpadavyaya kind of variations which flow in rapid succesgra haka mutya suddha sions of destruction and origination consisting &c as it does in the ever-changing character of the phenomena without looking into its permanent feature underlying the same (d) Satta sapeksha nitya asuddha~ (d) Satta not only investigates into the origination and sapksh a nity a distruction of variations but takes also into asuddha consideration the persisting element underlying them as well The word paryaya--. variation-usually means variations in quality, modality and configuration, a thing undergoes without any reference to the substance itself which persists all through the changes ob

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THE JAIN LOGIC AND THE NAYAS and which on that account is generally left out of consideration. But here, as the persisting element is taken into consideration along with the changes in its appearances, it is called asuddha 2 e, improper. (e) Kramopadh nirapeksha } nilya suddha etc --deals with regard only to the essential and real nature of the noumenon irrespective of the phenomenal variations it undergoes It consists in looking into things with reference to its real nature as apart from the temporal variations which the thing might happen to undergo (f) Kramopadh sapeksha anitya asuddha &c.-is an enquiry into the temporal and perishable aspect of variations in so far only as they are subject to causality of karma. THE SEVEN NAYAS It is now clear how the two nayas, Noumenal and Phenomenal, differ from each other The one enquires into the very substance of a thing under consideration and the other investigates into the phenomena in and through which the substance # makes its appearance to us. 97 Karmopadh nir a peksha mitya suddha etc Kas mopadha sapeksha amiya asud dha etc The Nayas Seven

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AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. of knowledge so far as we are concerned ; because it has the characteristics of accessity i.e. the constituent elements of it are apprehended, not as isolated or independant tes ms or notions but as related to or Nowing out of cach other so that one being given, the others must necessarily follow and the whole body of knowledge constitutes one organised system A penetrating insight into things will Ordinary inake us sure of this existing unity among way of thinking Agzdas the factors of the world. To the unreflec tive observer, the objects present themselves as separate individual realities quite simple in character But this is not the case, for They are essentially coniplex They are made up of parts which lie outside of one another m space, they do not remain absolutely the same though successive movements of time. They are continually betraying the pheno Ordinary menal changes when brought into relation -How can with other existences around them How, the world seem to be then, can we think of them as individual a unity things inspite of the changes ? The answer often unliesitatingly forwarded by philosophers is that we can combine diversity with Parplexities 106

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THE DOCTRINE OF SYADVAD. unity in our conception of things by thinking Criticism of them as individual entities each endowed the Solutions offered by with manifold qualities. They are substances the faina Realistic according to philosophers, which possess various properties such as extension, soli. dity, weight, colour etc. Or they are substances or subjects to whon belong the capacities of sensation, feeling, and perception etc But a careful obsei vation will show that such a device obviously fails to give us any real apprehension of existence-even though it may be the simplest individual existence. because in trying to give unity to a number of unconnccted determinations by dscribing them to a common substance what we really do is to add to these determinations another determination, equally isolated and unconnected with the rest Take away the other determinations what will be left of your substance? It is impossible to explain the known by the unknown So to apprehend the real unity of different qualities or to put in other words, lo think them as one what mind denjands is, that we should thuk or have a sational notion of the ielation of each to each and that we should discern how the solutions super side the Realisuc 107

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41 EPITOJE OF JIXTS.. same end and to rlich it ores its existerite and Ese? So true aprehension car cuir be possible if we take it in the light of not what it is only : but also that it is a as well. But this may appear parcdoxical to an uatrained mind because it obrtous! transgresses the law of contradiction. The most fira: convictions which we have cherished fror our cradles witaout the least tesitation, are backed up and supported also by the vigorous rules and canons of forwal logic those fundamental principle, as we have seen before, is the law of identity and con tradiction that d is d cannot be not-s. Ic te Sex But not be come to a per vision of things Vision of rings is in which & appears to be no: merely but A, Ext. Va rol-d as rell ; because is real in so far it stands in relation with what is risind. The true life of rould then consist not onir in 1 as formal logic teaches us but also in 5:62-. The ideal nature of a thing consists therefore, not only in assertion of its being but also at the same time in the denial of itin that which comprehends those antagonistic elements and yet harmonises and explains tiem. So if there be any knowiedge in the rio Hot Deals as wel

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THE DOCTRINE OF SYADVAD. proper sense of the term, if there be any vison we may call spiritual and far from being nawe realistic, it is undoubtedly this notion of ours in which all antagonistic and contradictory elements are reconciled and find repose in a higher universality which includes them all and yet is not aggregate of them, which explains all and yet does not merge in them This is what the Syadvad or the Doctrine of the Assertion of Possibilities explains and emphasises SAPTABHANGI FORMS or Saptabhang With these preliminary remarks we come straight to our subject-matter to be more definite to the Saptabhangi or Forms the Heptagonic forms of our ontological enquiry We have mentioned before that Saptabhangi is the method which supersedes all other methods of cognition in matters of apprehension of the spiritual realities by virtue of its universal and synthetic character of vision. Now we shall try to explain how by the help of this heptagonic vision, Saptabhangi Naya we get, as it were, into the real coherence and harmony which permeate through the world 117

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AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. revealing themselves through a system of interrelated parts FORM I "syAdastova sarvvamiti sadaMza kalpanA vibhajanena prathamobhaGga : as for example - syAt astova ghaTa: 19 May be, partly or in a certain sense the jar exists. Although this form is applicable to every Form-Some how the thing crists The First thing or being in affirming its existence still the ghata, the jar, is only here taken into consideration as a concrete instance for the illustration of this heptagonic principle This is no more than affirming the existence of the Jar as such and none can ordinarily deny the existence of it when clearly perceived So this affirmation relative to the existence of the jar as such presupposes an anterior perception of the object It may be contended, indeed, that we often rely upon the words of others and do not perceive things directly. But if we dive deep into the question, we find that everything, the existence of which we either affirm or deny, is in relation to some particular thought or percep tion having a finitude of expression-a fact so emphasised by the ontological argument 118

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to exist THE DOCTRINE OF SYADVAD Thus we find that we can affirm the existence of the jar only when we have How the previously perceived it and the formation thing is said of the percept presupposes, as a careful psychological analysis reveals, comprehension of the thing in respect of the four particularising elements viz,--substance Dravya (a), duration kala ( 19), locality kshets a (a) and attributes bhava (478) There is no percept which does not involve, as we have elsewhere seen before, these elements, and unless a percept is formed we cannot be conscious of the thing at all. So the understanding of every object involves, comprehension of the object in these four aspects. We may go so far as to say that these four elements or aspects so interrelated as in this case of the jar go together to make up the identity of the jar as such Take away or change one of these elements and the jai loses its identity From these facts we may safely state that the identity of the jar is kept up and reveals itself through these four elements which stand mutually into peculiar relationship to one another. 119

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the truth AN EPITOME OF JAINISM So long these four elements exist in this particular combination, the jar is said to exist there as such We may arrive at the same conclusion in another way We know that there is a Am revenit distinction between the moumenal and phenomenal aspects of a thing Phenomenal aspect is that in which a thing presents itself to us or as it appears to us Clearly then it follows that we are conscious of an object only as it appears to us. But a deeper reflection reveal to us that what we know of the thing is only knowledge of its powers and properties. What is an orange to us except a peculiar combination of different qualities viz size, shape, colour, taste etc These pecular qualities in such particular combination as is found in an orange constitute what we call the knowledge of it. Of course it may be objected that these qualities cannot exist by themselves and so i equire a ground for their inference, so that these qualities themselves cannot make up the orange itself But we are far from denying this as we hold the view that all that we know of the thing is merely its 120

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THE DOCTRINE OF SYADVAD., qualities or attributes which exist in such peculiar combination. What the thing or substance is apart from these modes or modifications, we don't know except this that it is a principle which manifests itself in and through these attributes linking them together and constituting what we call the knowledge of the object Therefore we may well say that so long these qualities are intact and exist in such peculiar and particular combination the object is there FORM II samAnAkhAva samiti paghudAsa kalpanA bimAnena fraint h as fita atera zie May be, partly or in a certain sense the jar does not exist. In the previous form we have taken the jar as a self-subsisting, self-complete reality The Second Form-Some as if subsisting in and by itself and possessing how, thething different attributes which go together in exist making up the knowledge of the object. We thought of the jar as an individual independent object as it were amidst innumerable objects of the same kind in the neighbourhood In short, we took it in the light of a self-identical unit But this is only a does not 121

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erists in relation to and distinction from some AN EPITOME OF JAINISM partial and dogmatic view of the reality as it overlooks one important truth viz., the world is a system of interrelated parts in which nothing is so self-identical, self-complete as we suppose the jar to be Every thing which is, exists only in relation to and dis tinction from something else The jar exists Every thing there, not alone as a self-complete reality but exists in relation to and distinction from what thing else, is not-jar In fact, the existence of the jar as a self-complete unity is possible only because it differentiates from what is not-jar If, on the other hand, it looses its distinction and merges in the rest that is not-jar, then how can it present its own self-subsisting and identical character We may, therefore, well state that because it keeps itself in distinction from what is nol-jar, and yet bears at the same time essential relation to it as the principle of mutual reciprocity postulates that it can lead a life of self-completeness, self-identity But this self-completeness cannot obviously be absolute in character simply for the reason that it has to depend for its existence upon other things from which it rigidly distinguishes itself and yet stands I 22

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THE DOCTRINE OF SYADVAD. as well in essential and vital relationship To be more clear and precise, we may say that the true life of a being consists in selfabnegation or in ceasing to be So if in a sense we emphasise the fact that the jar IS a self-complete reality amidst various factors of the world possessing numerous attributes to act and react with, we can also with equal logic and 'emphasis state that it does not exist in the above sense, because for its existence, it has to depend upon what is not-ja to which it must oppose itself to preserve its so-called self-subsisting aspect Thus to sum up, we may say, the jar is a jar only in contradistinction with what is not-jar, expressing a vital relationship between the positive and negative character of it co-existing simultaneously in the same stroke of congnition of the thing in question and making way thereby for the thud form which is as follows. FORM III syAdastova syAnnAstAveti kramena sadaMzAsadaza kalpanA vibhajanena tRtIyo bhaGgaH as syAt asti nAsteva ghaTa:May be, partly or 2n a certain sense 123 The Third Tom-Some how the thing exist s and does not exist as well

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of arriving at the same truth. AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. the jar exist as well as in a sense it does not exist. We may explain this from two different stand points. We will arrive at the same Another way conclusion of we proceed from the world showing it to be a system in which everything is determined by everything else in such a way that nothing is self-adeptical and self-complete in the sense in which the untrained mind takes it to be. Everything being determined by other things in this system of reals, the doctrine of pluralism propagating the view of self-sufficiency of objects falls to the ground as we have discussed at length in the preliminary remarks as well as in the Form II Besides, we may explain the above otherwise which will, we believe, throw sufficient light on the close relationship which exists between the self and the not-self or between mind and matter We must of course bear in mind on this occasion that though these forms apparently deal with concrete instances such as the jar, still they are no less applicable to every thing and being which this universe contains So 124

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THE DOCTRINE OF SYADVAD. it would be convenient for us if, instead of dealing with concrete instances, we proceed and manipulate the subject in its generic aspect. In fact we will try to show that instead of 'saying the jar us and is not,' we may say more generally that in a sense matter exists and does not exist at the same time. Of course it is necessary first of all to clear up our position and to defend our cause and vindicate our themes by defining the relationship as graphically as possible which exists between self and not-self or between mind and matter But before stating the exact relation between them let us try to depict as clearly as possible the view cherished by the common people regarding it To the untrained intellect, things are before us-rather matter and material The view of objects exist apart in themselves just as we people perceive theni--as a world of realities independent of any mind to perceive them , on the other hand we, who perceive the world are here in our complete and independent existence. In short, matter is matter and mind is mind and there exists neither any 125 the common

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AN EPITOME OF JAINISM similarity nor anything commensurate between them Many attempts have been made to define the exact relationship Some have uncritiOf the other Schools of cally asserted the hard and fast opposition Thought between them giving rise to absolute dualism like the Samkhya materialist, others have again tried to solve the problem at a stroke as it were by explaining away one or the other term giving rise to materialism of the Charvaka School or Subjective idealism of the Buddhist School. As materialism ultimately fails to evolve this world and all thought out of matter or material forces, so subjective idealism fails in showing that the whole objective world is but a phantasm of the heated brain. We won't speak of the rigid dualistic theory as it obviously fails to explain knowledge owing to its own inherent inconsistency of thought as revealed in its presupposition that the constituent elements of knowledge stand in hard opposition and cannot be reconciled. Now if we try to account for this failure in solving the problem of mind and matter, we will find no doubt that its main cause lies 13 126

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THE DOCTRINE OF SYADVAD the false presupposition that nature and mind, the world without and the world within, constitute two fixed independent realities, each by itself complete in its own self-included being The real solution however of the problem in question lies not in the asser- in what lies tion of self-individuality and self-sufficiency tion? of objects constituting the external world, but in the surrender of this false identity and substantiality for that principle of organic unity which we have discussed at length and explained before in the preliminary remarks. Beginning with the rigid isolated existences separated by the impassable gulf of self-identity, no theory or doctrine can ever force them into a rational coherence or consistency. But when we begin to see in nature without and mind within not two independent things, one existing in isolation from the other, but two members of one organic whole having indeed each a being of its own, but a being which/implies and finds itself in the living relation to the other, then and then only can we bring such two factors into a rational coherence Nature in 127

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CHAPTER IX. SHANKAR AND SYADVAD. one Vyasa, and Shankar against the Doctrine of Syadved. Impossibility of the co-existence of the contradictory attributes in -Shankara's summary of the Syadvad and its interpretation-Its critical examination by Shankar-Inconsistencies and fallacies in Syadvad. The unique position of The above, in short, is the principle and character of the Saptabhangi Naya, the grand the Sapta heptangular stronghold of the Jain philo bhang in the arena of sophers It is from these angles that the philosophical Jain philosophers see into the realities of all thought and being. It is from within this heptagonic fortress that they throw off their gauntlets as a challenge to their antagonists to outwit them Being guarded by the seven trenches of this their logical synthesis, their they measure the strength of adversaries and test the truth and validity Such of their knowledge and doctrines being the high and prominent position the ascribed to the Saptabhangi in arena of philosophical speculation in quest of truth, many a scholar and philosopher, ancient or modern, have invariably been 136

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SHANKAR AND SYADVAD. found to cannonade on this heptagonic It is the fortification which has been from time imme. target of attack by the morial shielding the whole structure of the enemies at the Syadvad Jain philosophy against any attack Many bave brought in their heavy artilleries to damage one or the other angles of this fortification and force an entrance into the same and many have been baffled in their attempts and thus become the buttend of all ridicule before the whispering galleries of the Jain philosophers and Omniscient beings At least such has been the case with the venerable Krishna Dwaipayan Vyasa, the compiler yasandund of the Vedas, maker of the Brahma Sutras and the author of the Great Epic, Mahabharata, who Aourished towards the end of third age. To come straight however to the point, the venerable old Vyasa fired his first artillery Brahma naftaamaa" as the thirty-third canon in the Second Section of the Second Chapter of hus Bruhna Sutras. By this he wants us to understand that on account of the impossibility of co-existence of contradictory attributes as abiding in the same substance, 137 Shankar

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summarised AN EPITOME OF JAINISM the doctune of the Jainas is not to be recognised. In his famous scholium on the Brahma Sutras, Acharya Shankara, the ablest exponent of the Adwarta Vedanta philosophy while commenting ou the canon referred to, writes - The Jainas admit of seven predicaments The Rudimentary such as (1) Teva (2) Ajiva (3) Asrava, Principles of Jain philo (4) Sambara, (5) Nirjard, (6) Bandha, and sophy as (7) Moksha. These seven they admit and by Shankar nothing beyond these. Summarily speaking, the Jiva and the Azeva, are the two primary predicaments. The others are included in either of these two. Besides they admit of five composites or compounds from the above two categories and are designated as "Astika zas" or composites such as Jivastzkdya, Pudgaldstrkaya, Dharmastikaya, Adharndstikdya, and Akdshastik&ya They fancy, again, an infinite number of variations of these 'astskayas' or composite and to all and each of these, they apply their so-called synthetic logic known by the name of Saptabhangi saya in the following manner 738

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SHANKAR AND SYADVAD. (1) In a sense it is. (2) In a sense it is not. (3) In a sense it is and it is not. (4) In a sense it is not predicable. (5) In a sense it is and is not predicable. (6) In a sense ut is not and is not predicable () in a sense of is and us not and is not predicable. Now this Saptabhangi form of reasoning is also directed to the determination of such notions as, unity, plurality, eternity, identity, difference and the like. In other words following up the principle of Saptabhangr raya, they hold that existence itself is a contradiction, for instance unity is not only unity but also a plurality as well. A thing is not only eternal but otherwise as well and so on. Having thus summarised the funda- Examination mentals of the Jain philosophy, and taking his stand on the above Vyasa Sutra Shankar Contradic Swami remarks l. It would be contrary to reason to accept the Jain doctrine. Why? Because Being and of the impossibility of co-existence of contra- can not at dictory attributes in one. Just as a thing time belong cannot be hot and cold simultaneously, so and criticism view point of the Law of tion Nop-being the same to one thing 139

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AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. being (fa) and non-being (fam) cannot, at the same time, belong to one thing. would be of as undeter minate cha doubt or diffidence 15 II. And to speak of the seven predicaments which have been determined to be as Knowledge so many and such if they really be so many in number and such-and-such in character, racter as then they must as the Jains teach exist in either of their modes of suchness (24) and unsuchness (a) at one and the same point of time. If it were so, it would follow that because of the indefiniteness as desiderated to be expressed in their being as such and not-being as such at the same moment of time, the knowledge of the -same would be also equally indeterminate like diffidence or doubt for which reason it cannot be held as a true criterion of right knowledge III If the Jains contend here that the The Know ledge, the thing itself being instinct with multiplicity and versatility of modes or aspects ( anekAnta svabhAva ) knowabilities and, the knowing subJect all being inde terminate is really of determinate character as such and in them- the knowledge of the thing, therefore, both selves, the Syadvada as being and non-being, cannot be non deter cannot be a source of minate and consequently non-authoritative valid know ledge like that of doubtful knowledge, Shankar 140

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SHANKAR AND SYADVAD. rejoins, it is not right on your part to say all that ; for, every thing being admitted to be instinct with a multiplicity of nature, without having any check or rest any where, the determination of the nature of very determination itself through the means of 'partly-is' and partly-is-not" being not excluded it would simply result in non-determinate knowledge. And for the very reason as well the means of knowledge (HATU),objacts of knowledge (nat), the knowing subject (HATAT), and the act of knowledge (HFA fi), all would remain themselves non-determinate. And where the determinator and the result of determination, both are thus non-determinate, how can then the teacher, who is thus of indefinite opinion himself, can give definite instructions on a doctrine the matter and the principles of the epistemology of which are themselves indeterminate in their very nature and character? Again, what would prevail upon the followers of such a doctrine to actualise in life and conduct the moral principles inculcated in the same? For, if the effects of their actualisation in life and conduct be of themselves instinct 141

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of the unsett ter of reason more than five AN EPITOME OF JAINISM with uncertainties, nobody would have any inclination to work-for the same Therefore the doctrine, pungently retorts Shankar, of those undecisive masters who have nothing definite to teach or preach, is not to be accepted. IV. Then, again, applying this unmonstration settling principle of reasoning to that ling charac portion of their doctrine which teaches ing-Fewer that the composites (wfr911T) are five in number, one has got to understand that on the one hand they are five and on the other, they are not five i. e from the latter point of view, they are fewer or more than five which is a ridiculous position to uphold V Also you cannot logically maintain Involving an that the predicaments are indescribable If ment of Originai they were so, they could on 10 account be described, but as a matter of fact they are described and as such you abandon your original position : VI If you say,' on the contrary, self-contra- that predicaments being so' described are ascertained to be such and such, and at the same time they are not such and such , a bandon Position, Rudiculous dictions 142

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SHANKAR AND SYADVAD. and that the consequence of their being thus ascertained is Right Vision ( samyak darzana) and is not Right Vision as well at one and the same point of time, and that Un-Right Vision is and is not opposite of Right Vision at one and the same time, you will be really raving like a mad cap who is certainly not to be relied upon Freedomboth are uncertain VII If you argue further that Heaven and Freedom, are both existent and inexis- Heaven and tent at once or they are both eternal and non-eternal at one and the same moment, none will be inclined to work for the same the very nature of whose existence is so uncertain and indeterminate in nature and character And, On account of the impossibility of any definite a s VIII Finally, it having been found to follow from your doctrine that Jiva, Ajwa etc whose nature you claim to have ascertained and which have been in existent certamment, from all eternity at once relapse into the, of the Syadvada must condition of absolute indetermination, and needs be rejected the doctrine that the being excluding the non-being and vice-versa, the non-being excluding the being, and that further more it being impossible to decide whether of one thing there is to be 143

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AN EPITOME OF JAINISI. predicated oneness or plurality, permanency or non-permanency, separateness or nonseparateness and the like, your doctrine of Syddold must needs be rejected. 14

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CHAPTER X. EXAMINATION OF SHANKAR Examination of Shankar's animadversion and his position -- Further discusion of the Principle of Syadvad and the Law of contradiction-Thought is not simply a distinction--It us relation u wellReply to Shanker point by point Such is the criticism which Shankar The ground makes taking his stand on the Susa " Not; of Shaukar's because of the impossibility in one " + objections-("fainaamaa") of the Vedanta Sutras by Vyasa. Or in other words, 'it is impossi Contra dica ble', remarks Shankar, 'that contradictory ory butes cannot attributes such as being and non-being coexist in should at the same time belong to one and thing the same thing' This is the long and short of his whole argument as urged for the rejection of the doctrine of Syddodd which forms the metaphysical basis of our religion. And it is imperative, therefore, that we should examine the above animadversion as briefly as possible and see how far his reasonings reveal his real insight into the heart of things as well as how far is Shankar correct in his understanding and 145 uw s ** " 5 the same

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Law of contradiction, AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. estimation of the principle of our dialectic movement as applied to thought and being -a form of reasoning which originally and exclusively belongs to the Jain philosophy. To begin with, therefore, so far the fundamentals of our doctrine as summarised by Shankar are concerned, we must at once admit that he is not guilty of misrepresentation. But when he starts his criticism with the Thus Shanstartling remark that, being and non-being kar lays stress on the cannot co-exist in one and the same thing, we beg to differ from him. Shankar puts all through his arguments, a great stress on the Law of Contradiction. And as it is a law of thought which cannot be transgressed without committing ourselves to contradictions and inconsistencies as the Formal Logic teaches, any theory which does the same, he says, cannot be accepted as having any worth at all. When the Formal Logic laid down the Law of Contradiction as the highest law of thought, what it evidently meant is simply this that distinction is necessary for thought. Unless things are definitely 146

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EXAMINATION OF SHANKAR. determina what they are and are kept to their definition, thought and knowledge become impossible. For instance, if A and not-A be the same, it is hardly possible to find any meaning even in the simplest statements, for the nature of the thing becomes absolutely indefinite and so indeterminate Hence Formal Logic teaches that thought is distinction and is not possible without it But is thought simply a distinction and nothing else? Is the distinction absolute and ultimate? We, the Jains, would undoubtedly died Is thought a say that it can never be absolute distinction. tron simply If thought is distinction, yet it implies at the same time relation. Everything implies something other than it, This' implies That; Now implies 'Then' 'Here' implies 'There' and the like. Each thing, each aspect of reality, is possible only in relation to and distinct from some other aspect of reality. If SO, A is only possible in relation to and distinct from not-d. Thus, by marking one thing off from auother, it, at the same time, connects one thing with another. A thing which has nothing to distinguish from, is as impossible ds equally unthinkable is the thing which is 147

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AN EPITOME OF JAINISM IV. With reference to objection regardThe Nomber ing the composites (cf8910) being numerifive of the cally five, we point out that the number composites. five as such is really five, but as the other than five itself, ie, relative to such numbers as four, six or seven, the five is not Let us take otherwise the number Five only. Here we have undoubtedly a definite concept. Now the definite concept of five by the fact that it is definite excludes other thoughts and specially the opposite thought. We, the Jains, admit this, but proceed still further and hold that every definite thought or concept by the fact that it is definite, has a necessary relation to its negative and so cannot be separated from it without losing its own meaning Five is five as distinguished from eight, nine, ten, or not-seven and so bears essential relation with them Hence we hold that the composites which are numerically five can thus be neither more nor fewer than five V. Then again the seven predicaments, Indes crib. they are certainly never absolutely indesabiltty cribable They are indescribable in the sense 150

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diatios EXAMINATION OF SHANKAR that they cannot be described all at once and simultaneously (Taman gauzatura), but surely they are describable gradually and successively (Thauma1919). VI To repudiate the sixth, we submit that the knowledge accruing from Final Repu. the ascertainment of the predicaments both as such and not such, according to the four-fold constituent elements of themselves and as belonging to the Other than themselves and our determination as well of their existence and non-existence in like manner being Right Knowledge (URITE si ), and Un-right Knowledge (FRETE qu'#) being opposite to Right Knowledge, the Right Knowledge exists only as such ie, in so far its own matter and form are concerned but does not exist in the matter and form of the Wrong Knowledge and vice-versa, the Wrong Knowledge exists in its own matter and form and does not exist as the matter and form of the Right Knowledge. And likewise the Heaven and Freedom, they are in their own matter and form; but they are not as the matter and form of what are known as Hell and Bondage 157

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AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. Also such is the case in respect of eternity which is real and actual only in its own matter and form as distinguished from its opposite, the matter and form of what it is not. Or in other words, the predicaments are eternal in relation to noumenon only but non-eternal in relation to paryaya-phenomenon. And this is how to a thing, being is ascribed in relation to Its own matter and form as well as non-being in relation to the matter and form of the Other.

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CHAPTER XI. THE DOCTRINE OF UNITY IN DIFFERENCE. The dialectic seasoning leads to the Theory of Bhedabhed ic. of Unity in difference Distinction presupposes Unity--The world ayatem is an exprerion of thought-The Juin conception of the Absolute distinguished from the Absolute beyond the relative of the Vedentiae Now what has been discussed in the The law preceeding pages on Syadvad, it is quite contrad: tron ist apparent that the law of contradiction is the negati: aspect of t negative aspect of thelaw of identity. We have law of ido seen that with the Jains, everything implies 'something' opposed to it. This implies 'that', 'bere' implies 'there', 'now' implies 'then' The trend of the argument is that everything is real only in relation to and distinction from every other thing This being so, the law of contradiction is not virtually denied absolutely. What the Jain philosophers want us to understand is this that absolute distinction which the ordinary interpretation presupposes is not a correct view of things. Rather it is to be borne in mind that distinction presupposes a unity of which, the Jiva and Ajiva and the like that 159

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TIe 2. o EPIT0E BF JAILS::. go in pairs of opposites are ba: 50 expre sions. The o-li system is no afea to those Thoughi is not accedearai to mot.d. Teorg s so is embodied in the world-system. Popular view is that itonght is coscestei mith ce's Lz3 2nd so acidea: tot: Tori siries. la opposition to this the Jaizs teaca tha: tae mi.. sister is the experian c: tbought The word system is that iarach thosgb goes out of isel. Those is in nade che essezce of te world. It is a Vedanta tizi somentere teaches that are is the working out of ite it is realso far the intelligecce of man's concerns. But we diner frem ihe veckans and 523 that thouglt wich is the secce o ice world is objective is sosebing dirasa! or absolute it whici tie z ar tangis of particular cea partake. Bet tisa tiere is a grita faci objecisa Tre Lare to see. Some says it is echo pessible to ake thoug!: as the escacs Gi the 10:2. For it toze 2 tercum::0 cm. ignorirg fee'ing o 'zg wich is as imp:23t as thosh: Irre the objectice 160

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UNITY IN DIFFERENCE. would have been valid had we conceived thought as excluding will and feeling. Thought is not one thing, and feeling another - thing Will is not apart from thought. How are we to conceive of will if it is exclusive of thought? Again thought implies will. Dynamic thought is Will When I identify myself Dynami with the end, I am said to will But I cannot will do so unless I am conscious of the end. So activity is impossible without thought Thus our thought is not exclusive of will With us thought is concrete, thought inclu. sive of feeling and will and is the constitutive principle of the universe Now therefore the Absolute is the ultimate unity of thought which expresses Absolute is itself as ma on the one side and correlative unity. of the subject as Ajiva on the other side This unity is all inclusive unity which embraces everything that is real. But this conception of the Absolute has to be distinguished from the absolute beyond Jara concep. tion of the the relative of the Vedantins These phila- absolute as distinguishsophers hold that our intellect deals with ed from the Vedantic, the relative only The world of experience 101 the ultimate 27

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AN EPITOME OF JAINISM is the world relative only So the absolute lies beyond the world of the relative--beyond the world of phenomena Shankar thinks in this way, We hold, however, that absolute is not beyond the phenomena rather all phenomena are but particular aspects or phases of this all inclusive unity which is Absolute ---The whole and the aspects of The whole The whole of reality conceived as a single ultimate unity is noumenon and phenomena are but its partial phases. But then the question is, What is a Noumenon ? Is it an aggregate of phenomena The Noumenon, we hold, is superior to phenoniena; because it is all inclusive whole. Phenomena are but fragmentary aspects of Noumenon. This all inclusive whole (noumenon) cannot stand apart from those which it includes (phenomena). If it is an all inclusive unity and phenomena are fragmentary aspects of this unity, then is it an aggregate of phenomena? No The Self is not apart from its various determinations or states of the Self. It is not something above and over the psychoses. What is the Self? It is not a mere sum of its determinations as the Noume non and Phenomena

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of the abso UNITY IN DIFFERENCE. Vijnanvadi Buddhists hold ; nor is it different from the sum of its determinations as the Vedantins try to explain. It is a unity of all its determinations It is an ideal unity which realises itself through these particular determinations So the partial phases of the Absolute are phenomena and these are related to the Phenomena are but par. Absolute as the members of a living body are tsal phases related to the body itself The particular lute things of experience are aspects of the Absolute which is the all inclusive unity expressing itself through particular determinations. It is the subject, but not as correlative of the object, rather a unity implied in the correlation The Absolute is thus the ultimate Unity. But here again the familiar conception gives Suppose. difficulty in us trouble. If the Absolute is One, then the the accepta tion of the Absolute is not Many. If it is unity then it is to concepnot a Plurality. The Vedantins of the type of absolute Shankar hold that the absolute is the Unity. It is not a plurality therefore But Plurality is a stupendous fact which cannot be denied So plurality, according to those Vedantins, is but an illusion-Maya (1971) and not a reality 163

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of the rela the One and the Many AN EPITOME OF JAINISM Plurality is a fact, although it may be From the stand-point another kind of experience. Anyhow to give tion between it the name of Illusion (Aten) is not to explain " it. The question then turns to this. How thus Illusion comes to be reconciled with the Absolute? How is this solution possible, if the Absolute is the one without a second to stand by it (ekamevAhitIya). And the Ultimate Reality without anything to aid or stand by it being one, what is the source of this Illusion of Plurality. Thus the whole question resolves itself into the Relation of Unity and Plurality. If the ultimate reality be many, how can ifficulties you explain a single self-existent coherent lishment of system? If there is a relationship between A. B. C D., and so on then these are elements of a single whole and so related to each other If you begin with the Absolute separation Set out in a between Unity and Plurality, then you must alterialive. either deny Plurality like Shankar or deny Unity like Kanad, the propounder of the Specific (Vaisheshika) school of thought. But these difficulties crop up only on the assumption that the ultimate Reality is either One or 164 In the estab. the Relation Definite

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UNITY IN DIFFERENCE. Many And we, the Jains, therefore, reject this disjunction altogether. From our point of view, all differences are differences of a Unity which is expressed in the differences One is One not apart from the Many, but One is in the Many. So Plurality must be taken as the self-expression of this unity-the Absolute. To conceive of the Absolute as the One is not to conceive the facts of experience as Illusion-Maya (1) Or, the Many is real in as much as the Many is galvanised into life by the One, because Many is the selfexpression of the One The absolute is a Unity but the Unity which is immanent in the Many The Many, in Jainism, do not ding one vanish in the luminosity of the One like clouds before the rising sun as taught in the philosophy of Vyasa and Vasistha rather the Many is vitalised by the One and is as real as every other facts of experience In Jainism, One is shown to come out of its own privacy as it were and appears Itself as the Many The Many vanishes in the One (Shankar) but the One presents itself to us as the Many (the Jains) The One reveals itself in the Many and the Many is the self differences of a unity expressed in the differ ences-the two aspects not exclu another 165 But this dis Junction 1 n the form of definitealteratives is rejected by the Jains All differ ences being

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lute 15 the revealing itself in the Particulars AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. expression of the ultimate Unity. In our philosophy, the ordinary disjunction of feitheror falls to the ground. The two aspects of one truth do not exclude each other. The concrete whole is the abstract which is one in the Many and Many as grounded in the One The Absolute is the Universal This The Abso Universal is not the abstract Universal of the ...ersal formal logic but the concrete Universal The absolute expresses itself in A, but not limited to A A is the particularisation of the Universal Hence the Universal goes beyond A, to B, to C and so A, B, C, D are immanently and vitally connected with one another The Universal comes out of Itself and particularises Itself in the particular objects of the world system and which, therefore, is vitally and essentially and immanently connected with one another constituting the world system The Universal of the Jains does not fight shy of the Particulars of the world--the categories of thought and being --like the Universal of the formal logic; but reveals itself in the particulars of the world

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UNITY IN DIFFERENCE Such being the Jain conception of the Absolute, the whole universe of things, we Everything see, must needs adere Care 15 different - and non different at time vend ment with our cognitions We are conscious the same of things as different and non-different at the same time They are non-different in their causal or universal aspect ( m imarjAtyAmanA cAbhinnama) and different in so far as viewed as effects or particulars (kAvyAtmanA. MH Tatia). But some hold that cognition of things as such is impossible and remark that like Reply to the entiques of light and darkness, the identity and the above difference can not co-exist in the same thing But we reply, the contradictoriness that exists between light and darkness is of two kinds One is of the nature of impossibility of co-existing in one and the other of the nature of co-existing but in different things But such contradictoriness is not perceived in the correct intrepretation of the true character of the relation in which the cause and the effect or the universal and the particular mutually sland together On the contrary we really perceive that the one and the same thing is possessed of 167

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naturally of ter AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. dual aspect naa paha o feu natan). Things are Thus when we say "This jar is clay'; Ram dual charac is a human being. Here in the instance of 'clay' and 'the Jar', clay is the cause and the jar is the effect thereof. The jar is but a particular state of being of the cause which is clay. Were co-existence of the cause and effect contradictory it would never have been possible for clay to exist as in the form of the 'Jarl in the second instance 'Ram is a human being' humanity is the universal (stfa) and Ram is but a particular (afm) expression of humanity. Were Universal and Particular contradictory, one excluding the other, then Ram could never have been a human being. Nor even any one of many Identity anything experience has ever perceived is not always way having an absolutely uniform character absolutely devoid of all distinction and difference whatever in the same. Nor can it be upheld that just as fire consumes straw and other combustibles so non difference (quz) sets at nought the difference on the ground that Identity being unity, it is a nullity of all Difference. And therefore the admission of identity and difference as co 108 destruction of differences

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UNITY IN differencE. existing in the same involves a contradiction But this, we contend, is not borne out by facts of experience; nor is there any absolute law to the effect that identity should always and everywhere be destructive of difference On the contrary, we have things with twofold aspects, just because it is thus that they are perceived. For, the same thing which exists as clay or gold, or man &c at the same time exists as jar, diadem or Ram And no man is able to distinguish in an object, eg Jar or Ram,-placed before him, which part is clay and which the Jar or which part is the universal character of Ram and which the particular Rather our thought finds its true expression in the following judgments, 'this Jar is clay' and 'Ram is a man'. Nor can it be maintained that a distinction is made between the cause and the universal as objects of the idea of persistence and the effect and the particular as objects of the notion of discontinuancedifference, in as much as, truly speaking, we have no perception of these two factors, in separation However close we may look into a thing, we won't be able still 169 Impossibility of rigidly distinguishing between the Cause and the Effect or the Universal and the Particular 22

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Our thought and life move between these two AN EPITOME OF JAINISM of objects constitute one world, and in opposition to the Object, all experiences of the Subject, all its thoughts and actions are merged in the unity of one Self All our life, all our conscious thought then moves between these two terms which are distinct from and even opposed to each other. Yet though thus set in antagonism which can never cease, because with its ceasing the whole nature of the both would be subverted, they are also essentially related, for neither of them could be conceived to exist without the other The consciousness of the one is, we might say, inseparably blended with the consciousness of its relation to the other. We know the object only as we bring it back to the unity of the Self and we know the Self only as we realise it in the Object. And lastly these two ideas within the spheres of which our whole life of thought and activity is contained and from one to the other of which it is continually moving to and fro, point back to a third term which embraces them both and which in turn constitutes 176

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logical AN EPITOME OF JAINISM from its embryonic beginning to its final and Evolution mature form. This adult form was regarded as 1 Teleo- the end aimed at through the whole process, so that the whole process was the working of an idea-entelechy or soul shaping the plastic material and directing the process of growth. Evolution, in short, implied ideal ends controlling physical means--in a word was 'teleological'. But now the term 'Evolution, though retained, is retained merely to denote the process by which the mass and energy of the Universe have passed from some assumed primeval state to that of distribution which we have at present. It is also implied that the process will last till some ultimate distribution is reached whereupon a counterprocess of dissolution will begin and from which new Evolution will proceed "An entire history of anything" Mr. Spencerian Spencer tells us "must include its appearance out of the imperceptible and its disappearance into the imperceptible Be it a single object or the whole Universe, any account which begins with it in a concrete form is incomplete." In these and such like instances Mr Spencer sees the formula of evolution 786 definition of Evolution,

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tion of the THEORY OF EVOLUTION. and dissolution foreshadowed. He again goes on saying that "the change from a diffuscd imperceptible form to a perceptible concentrated state is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion and the change from a concentrated perceptible statc is an absorption of motion and concomittant disintegration of matter." Now there is onc obvious and yet scrious Examinaobjcction to this theory. It proposes to treat Theory thic Universe or in fact requires us to treat the Universc as a single object. Every singic object is first cvolved and then dissolved and so the Universe The Universe also, he thinks, cmerges from the imperceptiblc and into thc imperceptible it disappears again Surely Mr Spencer commits here the fallacy of composition. What is prcdicable of the parts, he thinks, The uns erse can be prcdicated of the whole collectively. treated as a Again, we may ask on what grounds is it assumed that the Universe was ever evolved at all? A given man, a given nation, a given continent have their general finite histories of birth and death, upheaval and subsidence. But growth and decay, rise 187 can not be single Object

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AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. (a) Universally Co-existent; () Universally Inter-dependent, (c) Universally Inter-mutative and lastly (1) Universally Inter-antagonistic. Thus, . (a) They are Universally Co-existent, because the existence of one of the gunas requires the existence of the other two as necessary accompaniments. (6) But from the fact that they are Universally co-existent and concommittant as they are equally fundamental, it follows that they stand to one another in relation of mutual inter-dependence so that none of them can have any functional activity of its own without the co-operation of the other two. Again, (c) The gunas being thus mutually dependent upon one another, they are also inter-mutattve so that just as heat is convertible auto electricity so anyone of the gunas may become converted into one or the other of the remaining two gunas. And lastly, (d) These gunas stand to one another in relation as well of Universal inter-antagon- 1522 Though these are always present as . 196

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Patanjali and Kapil AN EPITOME OF JAINISA. grees of excellences such as .omniscience, greatnesss, smallness etc., proves the existence of a Being possessing the non plus ultra of excellence This Being, Ishvara, was, with the yogines, originally, no other than one among many Purushas, only with this difference that Ishvara had never been implicated in metempsychosis and was supreme in every sense. Whether this theism of Patanjali's Philosophy is consistent with its Sankhya basis is often disputed. The simplest solution seems to be that Kapila was never directly hostile to theism, but was rather indifferent in his attitude towards the question and that this made it possible for Patanjali to foist bis theistic yoga upon the Sankhya philosophy. In the Yoga systemui, however, no such importance has been accorded to God as Soleity is the surrmum bom could very well be expected, and as we find in such European systems, otherwise analogous with the yoga, .as those of Martineau, Lotze and other Personal Idealists. Devotion to God, in Patanjali's system, is merely one of Kaivalya or Soleity 206 . num of yogam

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logic THE NYAYA PHILOSOPHY, which is the highest object of the Yoga system. THE NYAYA PHILOSOPHY. Nyaya has always been translated by 'logic', and there are important considerations 'NyAya' is which partially justify such an interpretation not merely of the system. For, here, in the Nyaya system, a greater amount of space has been allowed to logical questions than in any of the other systems of Indian Philosophy, and, the theory of inference (anuman) is, undoub. tedly the predominant feature of the system Nevertheless, we must not imagine that Nyaya Sutras are mere treatises on Formal Logic. Logic is not the sole nor even the other relation chief aim of Gotama's Philosophy. Its chief end like that of all other Indian systems, is the attainment of liberation or as the Nyaya calls it, Nihshreyasa, the non plus ultra of blessedness. This liberation which the Nyaya Philosophy promises to all, is not a state of pure unmixed pleasure, as the Vedantin affirms, but a state of pleasure which supposes pain as its pre-condition. In fact, the doctrine of a pure continuous happiness as the summum bonum of life, is, according 207

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Liberation how it is attained AN EPITOYE OF JAIVISM. to the Naiydyika, a chimera : it is a psycho. gical fallacy to assert that any such state exists, for, pleasure is always accompanied by pain and without pain there could be no pleasure. Liberation, thus according to the Nydya, is a state of negative pleasure and is proof Nyaya duced by deliverance from pain. The next question that naturally presents itself to the Naiyayika, is 'how this deliverance is to be secured ?' Liberation, says the Naiyayika, arises from the knowledge of the truth, the knowledge of the cause of pain and of the means of its removal. Liberation, however, must not be supposed to arise immediately after the knowledge of the truth has been attained, for, the causes of pain form a series which can only be annihilated in succession, and succession is a process in time. The series of the sucessive causes of pain is : (1) false notions (mithyagnanam), giving rise to (2) faults (doshani) which lead to (3) activity (karma) which again is the cause of birth (ianma) and birth is the cause of pain (dukkha). Hence in order to shake off pain we have to strike at the very root 208

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THE NYAYA PHILOSOPHY. via, Mithyagnanam, and the annihilation of Muthyagnanam will be followed by the annihilation of the entire series of causes. The Naiyayika proceeds to prove the existence of God by an argument which is Theistic argument of inuch like what is known as the cosmologi. the Nyaya cal argument in the European Pholosophy. Like the latter, the Naiyayika's proof also reasons from the world as effect to God as its First Cause 'Faafai pana iata. The four mahabkutas require, as effects, a cause This, however, looks, at first sight, like Effect-hood imples 20 a petitro principiu, for, to admit that a intelligent thing is an effect, is to say that it has a effectuate. cause. The real difficulty lies, it will be said, not in showing that an effect must have a cause but in proving that a thing is an effect, that it has a nor a mark possessed by the Paksha by means of which, its statica (effect-bood) can be inferred. The Naiyayika finds such a mark in praegna or the fact of possessing parts. Thus aterra (being possessed of parts) leads to wa (effect-hood) and a to najmera (the fact of being effectuated or caused by an agent). 209 agent to

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AN EPITOME OF JAINISM 1 But the Naiyayika does not stop at the conception of a mere cause which a purely cosmological argument leads to, but shows that katijanyatva or kAyyaitva (the fact of being effectuated or produced) implies, not only an agent but an intelligent agent-afung katijanyatva'. 1 11 210

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CHAPTER XV. CAUSATION AND COMPOUND EVOLUTION The world is the permutation and combination of stoms-Causes of differences-Science fails to explainThe principles of causation-Criticism of Mills conception of the law of causation-Patient and Agent--The Jain view of causation and compound evolution I 1 "' Having discussed in a previous chapter how we look upon the Universe as selfexistent something having its being from all eternity, and having briefly reviewed as well the other principal systems of thought bearing mainly on cosmology, we are led to enquire into how, according to our philosophy, old things change giving place to newer combinations and forms We have seen that the Universe taken as one undivided whole must be in-create, eternal, self-existent and ever-permanent. But viewed from the standpoint of its interrelated parts, it is transitory, phenomenal and evanascent. And it' goes without saying that the assertion of self-existent is simply an indirect denial of creation f 1 8.95 1 " 13 211 L Universe ueing a self existent unit.

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AN EPITOME OF JAINISM involving as it does the idea of an exisDenial of tence without beginning But this tanta mounts to a veritable denial of an extracosmic personal God who builds the cosmos out of the chaotic matter which, according to the creationists and other deists, lay diffused homogeneously filling up the entire space, at the dissolution of the Universe with the end of the so-called previous cycle or created it out of Himself or His own energy (at a particular point of time) through a kind of dialectic process as taught in the other theistic systems of philosophy such as the Yoga, the Nyaya or the Vedanta. The question, therefore, is, if God is denied where are we to look for a rational If no God solution for the various mysteries_which of Nature? underlie the flashes of lightning dazzling our vision, or the . thundering cataracts deafning our ears? Is it that the sprouting forth of the small seed bringing into existence a big tree, the bursting of the eggshells giving birth to beautifully moving bipeds and a variety of other awe-inspiring phenomenal changes, astonishingly mysterioas in character, which not,only infuse in us Issicitudes 272

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permutation bination of CAUSATION AND EVOLUTION. a feeling of wonder and admiration but morally prevail upon us to posit and believe, as it were, in an Intelligent Designer and Maker behind, mis it that all these and the like changes are but so many results of chances? Wherein lies the necessity and utility of the philosophy then, if it denies God but cannot reasonably account for the amazing occurances in the world of phenomena? Indeed and it is worth while to remark Universe th it a patieot perusual of the preceding and com pages on the predicaments, their character aims. and their devolopments will convince anyone in the truth of the sunmary statement we make here that speaking of the Universe as a whole or in part, it is but permutations and combinations of our four primary rudiments viz., time, space, soul and Pudgal matter. These rudiments are resolvable into the minutest of their minute parts which give a limit to fresh divisions by not admitting of any further analysis. Now a study of the nature of these ultimate ingredients reveals to us that these each and everyone are surcharg 213

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Corrobora tion from science, AN EPITOME OF JAINISM ed with innumerable powers having the potentiality of being developed in various ways, and of bringing as well into existence such an infinite variety of their permutations and combinations which will account for the amazing phases and phenomena of Nature. Even modern science has had to acknowledge the truth of this. Chemistry demonstrates beyond doubt that all compound substances owe their existence to the permutations and combinations of the atoms of Hydrozen, Oxygen, Nitrogen, and Carbon etc.--Heat, light, electricity, hold Physics, are but different arrangements of molecules-in-motion constituting the same. Biology teaches that all organismsm-vegitable or animalmare only composed of cells under a variety of their corabinations. This is not all. Science dives deep to fathom the amazing mysteries underlying the differences between things chemical, physical or biological ; and like a master-surgeon she dissects and analyses Nature and attributes the cause of the mutual differences between things to the said principle of permutation and combination 214

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AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. of atoms, molecules or cells forming the structure and character of the chemical, physical or biological evolution. Thus even according to the researches of modern science, Universe is nothing more than an ever changing permutations and combinations of the atoms, molecules and cells forming the chacter and composition of the same. But what are permutations and combinations which seem to play the part of unitary method as it were in explaining the differences and diversities in and through which the Universe reveals to us its being? Permutation and Combination, we know, are but processes of mathematical calculations to find order in the atomic or molecular arrangement of things having their being in time and space We all know that in the science of mathematics, the members I, 2, 3, 4 etc or a, b, c, d, and the like are but so many symbols, each giving us a definite idea of something conditioned as represented by the same And Permutation is their arrangement in a line reference being had to the order of sequence; as for 215 What Permuta tion 15

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Combination. CAUSATION AND EVOLUTION instance, a-b and b-a are but two permuta.. tions of a and b. Similarly Combination is their arrangement in groups without reference to the order of sequence, as for example, "a-b-c' is a combination involving a, b, and c, and 'b-a-c' is but another combination, both consisting simply of a, b, and c, grouped together In Combination, it is worthy of note, we take notice only of the presence or absence of a certain thing and pay no regard to its place in order of time and space There being buta, b, c, d and so on, it finds out only how many combinations could there possibly arise by taking at a time the two, three, or four of the symbols While investigating into the structure Application and composition of chemical things we sub had stitute.-H, N, O, C as symbolic represent ation of Hydrozen, Nitrogen, Oxygen and Carbon, the ultimate rudiments or atoms of which are innumerable in number, in the places of a, b, c, d Now experiment shows that it is due to the innumerable variety of atomic combinations of H, N, O and C , that we have differences between the different 276 Application an of Permulation and combination

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CAUSATION AND EVOLUTION in finding causes of in things compounds. To take Carbo-hydrates and fats for examples : Analysis shows carbohydrates to be a compound of C, H, O; and out the if we analyse fats, we get the same three differences chemical elements Therefore the question Is What makes for the differences both in colour, character and configuration between the tivo compounds, the component parts of a molecule of carbo-hydrate being found to consist of C, H, O., and a molecule of fat to consist of C, H, O, Then, again, to take the cases of Strychnine, Quinine, and Gluten Analysis of these three shows them to be but combinations of C.H N.O And it is needless to add that the three compounds are wholly different from one another Strychnine and quinine are poisonous whereas gluten is nutritious. A molecule of quinine is a combination of Cg.Hg. N, O, whereas a molecule of strychnine is a combination of C, H,, N, and O Now from a reflective study of the results Scientific of the above analysis, one might venture to explanation remark that the mutual differences existing di perence either between carbo-hydrate and fat or between strychnine and quinine, are due, 217 as to the causes of

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AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. it is apparent, to the numerical differences in the combination of the component atoms Pattison Muir on the constituting the structure of a molecule of point in ques tion each of them. But is the numerical differences in the combination adequate to explain the causes of differences in question? The molecule of Ammonium of Cyanate is composed of two atoms of Nitrogen, one atom of Oxygen, one atom of Carbon, and four atoms of Hydrogen; and the molecule of Urea is composed of the same number of the same atoms. How, then, can the properties of the two molecules be different from one another?"What can that circumstance be", rightly enquires Pattison Muir in answer to the above question, "except the arrangement of the atoms that compose the molecules ?" But the answer of Pattison Muir given in the form of interrogation, will it satisfy the reflecting mind yearning for a rational solution for the differences in question in To things we everyday find around us ? say that the difference is due to the difference in the arrangement of atoms forming the composition of the two molecules is to 218

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Saentific ex planation 18 inadequete CAUSATION AND EVOLUTION. simply state a fact. It is an attempt to explain X by Y both of which are unknown quantities. It does not clear up the mystery that underlies the real question at issue. The question is Whence is the difference? Every other condition being the same, what is it that leads to the difference in the combination of the component parts forming the conposition of the two compounds ? Modern science is quite out at sea here and her helm of Reason is lost She can explain how things happen but gets hopelessly comfounded and confused to answer why they do so. And unless this Why' is cleared up, we cannot expect to get at the reason that lies behind the differences in the world of phenomena. The reason why modern science cannot answer the point in question, lies simply in the fact that she takes only a partial view of things and does not look straight to the two principles of Causation. We have stated that the Universe is a system of interrelated parts and the parts, as such, are conditioned But things conditioned, it is a truism to say, are but products, effects of something 219 The two placiples of Causation,

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Determining AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. else which is termed as cause. A cause is Causes--SubStantial and what brings about an effect, the latter being what follows from the cause. Such being the definitions, in general, of the cause and the effect, many a logician have drawn a line of distinction between the circumstances and the active agents which co-operate to bring about an effect. One has been termed as the Substantial cause and the other as Deter. 112ining or Efficient cause otherwise known as Patient and Agent in European logic. The i eason why such distinction is drawn consists in this. We see the potter manufactures the jar out of clay by means of Danda-chakra -- the mill-stone-and-the-lever. The jar is thus the pioduct or effect of the co-operation of clay, the lever, the mill-stone, and the potter 16. the manufactuier himself Such being the case, all these beginning with clay must have to be taken as the cause, the effect of which is the jarthe product or the output of the co-operation, for a cause is the aggiegate of all such accidents both in the agents and the patients as concur in production of the effect propounded The manulac!uci, the mill slone and the like have 220

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funchons of causes ex CAUSATION AND EVOLUTION. all co-operated indeed to bring about the jar ; but they have got their peculiar functions of Nature and their own. So long the jar is there, clay the o is there too. The actual existence of the plaided. jar cannot come to be as such if you extract out clay from it. But after the production of the jar, if the manufacturer or the millstone is separated from the jar, it is not in the least affected. Again the function of the manufacturer is not the same with that of the mill-stone or the lever or clay even. It is clay that is cast into the mould and moulded into the form of the jar, and it is for this reason that clay is named as the substantial cause and that by means of which the effect already existing imperceptibly in the substantial cause is brought about or developed into a perceptible form is the efficient or determining cause. That without which nothing can there be, that which invariably . precedes something else which is but an effect, is the true nature of the cause. When we see that the jar cannot come into existence either without - the manufacturer or without the mill-stone, , and the lever, it follows a priori therefore 221 1

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Every effect requires a Determining c2use. AN EPITOME OF JAINISM, that the manufacturer, the wheel, the lever are also but causes which combine in the production of the jar. It is thus clear that every-product or effect requires also a Determining cause (in addition to the Substantial one) to bring the same into actual existence. We have stated already that the primary ingredients--each and every one of these--are surcharged with infinite powers of their own having the potentiality of being developed in innumerable ways and these being but materials giving constitution and structure to all earthly existences are worked upon by the Determining cause to bring the same into varieties of combinations. And therefore it is due to the intervention of this Determining cause that we find the difference in the arrangements of atoms constituting the structure of the two molecules of Ammonium of cyanate and of Urea and it is this that accounts as well for other various differences in things in all the three worlds, chemical, physical and biological. But would not the ascription of Causality to the substance which is worked upon !nvolve the difficulty 222

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CAUSATION AND EVOLUTION. of making the Patient to be the Agent? Indeed there is a school of logic predominent in these days of scientific culture which refuses to 'make any distinction between the Determining cause and the Substantial cause in the law of causation. Even the most classical of the English logicians, as Mr Mill, has taken exception to this distinction "In most cases of causation," writes Mill, "a distinction is commonly drawn between something which acts and some other thing which is acted upon, between an agent and a patient Both of these, it would be universally allowed, are conditions of the phenomenon, but it would be thought absurd to call the latter the cause-that title being reserved for the former." Mill on the Determining cause and Substantial 223 Cause The distinction, contends Mr. Mill in sup port, is a verbal one and not real, because of its vanishing on examination for the of M object which is acted upon and which is considered as the scene in which the effect takes place is commonly included in the phrase by which the effect is spoken of, so that if it were also reckoned as a part of the cause, the seeming incongruity would Arguments

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Hustration of Mr, Mill's contention AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. arise of its being supposed to cause itself. To cite an instance we have the falling of bodies. "What is the cause which makes a stone fall ?" observes Mill, "and if the answer had been the stone itself' the expression would have been in apparent contradiction to the meaning of the word cause. The stone, therefore, is conceived as the patient and the earth (or according to the common and most unphilosophical practice, an occult quality of the earth is represented as the agent or cause. But that there is nothing fundamental in the distinction may be seen from this that it is quite possible to conceive the stone as causing its own fall provided the language employed be such as to save the mere verbal incongruity. We might say that the stone moves towards the earth by the properties of the matter composing it, and according to this mode of presenting the phenomenon, the stone itself might without impropriety be called the agent; though to save the established doctrine of the inactivity of matter, men usually prefer here also to ascribe the effect to an occult quality and 224

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,,'CAUSATION AND EVOLUTION. say that the cause is not the stone itself but the weight or gravitation of the stone." "Those who have contended for a radical. distinction between agents and patients have The distinc tion is a logre generally conceived the agent as that which cal fiction. causes some state of, or some change in the state of another object which is called the patient. But a little reflection will show that the license, we assume of speaking of phenomena as states of the various objects which take part in them (an artifice of which so much use has been made by some philo. sophers, Brown, in particular, for the apparent explanation of phenomena) is simply a sort of logical fiction, useful sometimes as one among several modes of expression but which should never be supposed to be the enunciation of a scientific truth. Even those attributes of an object which might seem with greatest propriety to be called states of the object itself, its sensible qualities its colour, hardaess, shape and the like are in reality ( as no one has painted out more clearly than Brown himself) phenomena of causation in which the substance is distinctly the agent or producing cause, the patient - 225

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Patients are always agents. AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. being our own organs and those of other sentient beings. What we call states of objects, are always sequences into which the objects enter generally as antecedents or causes; and things are never more active than in the production of those phenomena in which they are said to be acted upon. Thus in the example of a stone falling to the earth, according to the theory of gravitation the stone is as much an agent as the earth, which not only attracts but itself attracted by the stone. In the case of a sensation produced in our organs, the laws of our organism and even those of our minds are as directly operative in determining the effect produced as the laws of the outward object Though we call prussic acid the agent of a person's death, the whole of the vital and organic properties of the patient are as actively instrumental as the poison in the chain of effects which so rapidly terminates his sentient existence. In the process of education we may call the teacher the agent and the scholar only the material acted upon. Yet in truth all the facts which pre-existed in the scholar's mind exert either co-opera 226

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CAUSATION AND EVOLUTION. ting or counteracting agencies in relation to the teacher's efforts. It is not light alone which is the agent in vision but light coupled with the active properties of the eye and brain and with those of the visible object. The distinction between agent and patient is merely verbal patients are always agents." Taking stands on these and the like arguments, Hume, Whately and Mill and many other scholars of the same attitude of mind under European culture made themselves so bold as to attribute weakness to the exponents of our philosophy in regard to our drawing a sharp line of distinction as between the Determining cause and the Substantial cause And as the Jain cosmology is based on the law of causation as stated herein before, it is imperative to enter into an examination, by the way, of Mill's doctrine on this point Let us begin with the remark at the outset, that the upadan or substantial cause and patient of the European logicians are not one and the same either in meaning or in their bearing. Nowhere in our works on the subject has it been taught that the 227 Examination of Mill-Pa tient and 'Upadan' are not identical

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tic concep Vedanta AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. confronts us in the form--who created or why and when was evolved that moral evil which provokes the punishment of pain and suffering? One might well contend that 'an-entheis- the Self-same Ultimate Reality who is of tion of the the nature of All-knowledge-bliss-absolute being but One Existence without a second to stand by It; all that exists being but He, it having been repeatedly declared that *That Thou Art" and "That Am l' too all what is said to exist as evil or suffe ng, it is He that must labour under the same in the creature who is no the other than He Himself. For just as a spider spins its web out of itself and nestles in or creeps on it, so it is He who throws Himself out into the world of names and forms, in sport, as it were, and it is He that crawls on them in the form of a child, it is He that enjoys the pleasures of His own make in the form of a youth and it ts He that totters on the road leaning on the stick in the form of the old and worn out. Indeed when thus viewed, the whole problem shifts the ground and there cannot crop up the question as to how God came to create evil and suffering for His creature. But still

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AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. and regular chemical transformation of the tissues and the preparation of the effette products which have to be given out It is thus clear that the External Nature (1199xfa) stands to supply the needs, demands and requirements of the organism for its proper nourishment and normal growth. If she in any way fail to supply what is demanded of her by the organism, the latter deteriorates and becomes weak to carry on the struggle, to cope with the undesirable forces and elements, or to propagate species and thus goes to the walls in the long run. 3. Niyati (Forufa ) means, Fate or Destiny. According to some school of thought, it means Divine Decree which must come to pass to bear its command over our thoughts and activities. Thus interpreted, it takes away from us all the moral responsibility which lies only in our option of doing a thing, and not in compulsion. But in Jain philosophy, however, the term Neyati signifying 'Necessity' is described as the concatenation of causes whence all things must necessarily follow as the four follows from two plus two or as three angles of a triangle 3) Destiny. 246

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CAUSATION AND EVOLUTION. and phenomena. To illustrate for a more thorough grasp of the point at issue as to how these determining causes and conditions co-operate in bringing about the countless differences and diversities in the processes of the compound evolution let us take the case of a huge tree developing from its own seed. We have already stated that every thing in the universe is surcharged with infinite powers of developing itself after its own type So also is the case with the seed. The seed of a particular tree is also instinct with infinite powers of developing itself so much so that the huge form of the tree together with its bark, branches, twigs, leaves, flowers and fruits in the course of time, lie hidden in a potential state of existence in the seed. The protoplasm which ultimately developes into the seed being the substantial cause, it changes and transforms itself into the seed and ultimately into the tree by the help of such causes, and conditions as time, nature and the like-which determine its manner and growth of development. On close examination of the seed we 249 Ilustration of the principle of causation in question.

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The pleasuie to-be AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. it is not that is evidently the cause of of the world of distinctions and forms. If to-be or not it is asked what was the root cause of the organism coming into existence, we must reply, "Itself." Who was the creator of the being ? 'Itself, is the ready answer we have to make in response to the question. 'Itself' is its own object and ztself alone is its reason for existence. And, therefore, it has been well said that all the true reasons and transcendant motives a man can assign for the way in which he acts can be rendered into the simple formula "in that was my pleasure." And likewise is the case with the wherefore of the other things and beings. The highest philosophy brings us no other reply beings and worlds are because it was their pleasure-to-be. To be or not-to-be is but a matter of option for selfassertion, or otherwise wherein lies deep the primordial root of all responsibility Now Time ( 919 ), the External Nature (EHTA), Necessity (faufa), Action (*"), and Exertion (3H) whose natures have been just discussed in brief, speak for the differences and diversities in the world of forms 248

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Causes and conditions for the development CAUSATION AND EVOLUTION. So we see the seed has the potency to develop itself into a tree after its own type, but it has to wait for the proper Immthe arrival of the season which might be the rainy one. The season is there but the seed must be planted in the soil with such other natural environment as would allow a reasonable circulation of the sap and chemical action of heat and light and would as be well able to supply the requisitions of the seed. Again, granted that the time, the external nature, the necessity_all the three dre present, the seed, if not planted by some body, does not fall on earth by the virtue of its own exertion and weight, making all the necessary transformations thereby impossible. Then, again, though the season is there and the seed too has been planted in the desirable soil with favourable environment, yet the seed will not grow into the tree of such and such bulk and configuration for the manifestation of which it has the potency unless there be the concatenation of the causes and conditions which is but 251

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under parti cular, conditions AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. find that the granular protoplasmic particles the contents of the outer shell, the cuticle, The sced 15 the seed which holds together the granules in a parti cular combination is all through uniform both in texture and chemical composition without any difference and differentiation between its parts in the primary stage of its being If you crush the seed so instinct with the potency of development, it will not bud forth and why not? There are the component parts of the seed--the granules not an atom of which has been lost in any way. Why would it not then develop into a tree? The answer is simple enough and we need not travel far to look for it. The seed is the seed under a particular arrangement and disposition of its constituent elements and as such it is the substantial cause having the potency of developing itself inco a tree of its own type, if only the determining causes conjoin with one another to help its growth. But the crushing of the seed interferes with the relative disposition and arrangement of its constituent elements and thus has rendered it impossible for the five-fold determining causes to act on the sced. 250

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CAUSATION AND EVOLUTION. {. 'ences of the two-fold nature-Inner and 17 ? Outer. (a) The seed is the inner nature of the tree where as the outer nature comprises the soil, the water, the heat, the light, and the air. The seed has the potency to develop into - a tree and it is only the outer nature that stands as a help to the seed in the exertion of its latent powers for its proper development into a tree, but this outer nature is almost the same to all the different trees. The real difference, therefore, hes in the inner natures' of the different trees i. e. in the seeds. And the same old question comes round yet, Whence is this difference? If it is said in reply that the difference is due to the difference in the relative disposition of the particles constituting the two seeds, then the difference is only explained by another difference which tantamounts to explaining by 'y' both of which are unknown quantities and therefore the second difference again has yet to be inquired into. Science stops short here She does not know. The '17 mystery, though pushed back, remains un 253 Yet whence is the differentiation?

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of the seed its parent type, AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. another name for 'Necessity' that operates irresistibly. The seed fructifies, as is often observ ed, but yet it may not sprout forth into a tree into a tree of indentical with the parent one and bearing leaves and flowers and fruits or seeds of the same size, taste, colour, beauty and grandeur of the tree whereof the seed was born And why? Surely these are the effects of karma of the seed in one or the other periods or stages of its existence and it is due to this very karma even done in some time past, that the seed has come to be a seed of this and not of another organism. To enter a bit more into details as to the causality of karma in bringing about the phenominal diversities and differences, the existence of various kinds of vegetable organisms all around us, is undeniable. In the organic world, it is but a truism to say that the like produces the like. The mangoe seed will develop into a mangoe tree and to nothing else. So with the other kinds of seeds. Now in the processes of metabolism every living organism grows and undergoes through the adjusting and regulating influ 252

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The differen of Nature but are cans Karina CAUSATION AND EVOLUTION. than to take recourse to the Law of Karma to explain the causes of differentiations and differences as manifest in their combinations ces are not and subsequent variations. The granules of protoplasm were registered with impres dinoned by sions of the acts and deeds they have done in their past lives whereof they have developed a kind of disposition or tendency towards each other under the influences of which they have come to the existing forms of combination making up the different 'Inner Natures in the different species of crees . and other organic beings. Or what else is there to explain the diversities of Nature ? They can't be explained as her mere freaks or as fortuitous concourse of what is invariably conditional - a fact which is but a visible contradiction and negation of the chance hypothesis ; nor can they come out of nothing, for, we are unable on the one hand to conceive nothing becoming something or on the other something nothing. It being thus impossible to establish in * thought a relation between something and nothing, we cannot but deduce thereof the indestructibility of matter (pudgal) and conti 255

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AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. altered. However may a Lamarck take Biology mis recourse to the principles of conservation ses the mark (Heredity) and progression (Adaptation) and touch upon the struggle of each against all , or a Darwin may twist and stretch his so called principle of Natural Selection to show the Origin of Species and the Descent of Man or however may a Spencer write volumes on the interpretations of the Law of the Survival of the Fittest through the processes of which the weakest go to the walls, or to explain the ansurmountable gaps in the gradations of the organic beings vegetable or animal or however may a Haeckel knock his brains out to find out the missing links in the ever-evolving chain of organic evolutions from Monera to Man, the present and the last expression of the organism of the highest type, Biology only misses the mark and beats about the bush when she says that protoplasms are alike and identical but does not assign any reason for their subsequent differentiations and variations. And years afterwards she will have to admit that there is no other alternative course 254

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CHAPTER XVI. GOD Jainism makes no room for an extra-mundane God Laplace and Nepoleon-The idea is not singular in Indu-Yet the Jains are not dependent on any All-mighty Ruler standing in the without-De-Box and the Super-physical Power---Spencer and Spinozem *Tertiam Quid" nature of the Power - The Coalescence these powers in different beings on the attainment of "Nirvan" is the idea of the God-head of the Jains. In the last chapter on the compound Evolution and the Law of Universal Causation, it has been made clear as to how from the standpoint of phenomenal Naya the universe is ever sity of an extra munchanging and transitory, and how from the stand-point of Noumenal Naya according to which the universe is taken as one undivided whole of inter-related reals, it is self-existent and permanent We have also seen that because it is self-existent and permanent, therefore, it is not an effect of some anterior cause working from behind the universe, and further that the diversities and differences in the world of phenomena and forms owe their existences to the operation of No neces dane God 257

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AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. nuity of motion-karma. Other determinant conditions being there, it is the continuity of karma that explains why the protinuity of perties of a molecule of urea and that of Indestructi bility of pud gal and con karma. cyanate of ammonia are different, though they are composed of the same number of chemical elements and it is also this continuity of karma that accounts for the development of the diverse forms of a mollusc, a frog and a mammal though arising from apparently identical primitive cells. 256

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GOD. Emperor Napoleon, the latter remarked, "M. Laplace, they tell me, you have written this large book on the System of Universe, and you have never mentioned its Creator". Whereupon M. Laplace drew himself up and answered bluntly, "Sir I had no need of any such hypothesis." And this piece of dialogue between the two greatest minds of the Eighteenth century, does not strike singular in India, and the reason is that from the time when Greece and Rome. those cradles of western civilization, were still steeped in profound ignorance, nay, from long before the pyramids of Egypt had raised their hoary heads to have a look down upon the valleys of the Nile, such doctrines which do not find any rhyme or reason or necessity to call in the existence of the so-called Diety have been in vogue in India. The followers of the Numerical philosophy of India-The Samkhya School of thought-not only do not postulate any such Divine being but make a definite pronouncement to the effect that "God is not in existence, because of the want of all manner of evidence." Nor the Mimansaka atheists 259 The Sam khya, the Mimansaka etc. in God.

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To posit God itself AN EPITOME OF JAINISM the five-fold, determinant causes such as Time, External Nature, and the like. Such being the trend of thought and progressive retiocination, the Jain philosophy leaves no room whatsoever for an iron willed capricious God in the Jain scheme of is to conceal the universe. The Jains hold that a correct 18 norance unaware of understanding, according to the teaching of Victors, of the true principles of causality and phenomenology, dispenses with the necessity of any divine interventiom in the affairs of the world. They are of opinion that the very attempt to posit an all-ruling extra-mundane God is, to conceal the ignorance of the true principles of causality under a pomp of delusive reasonings--an ignorance unware of itself. Such a doctrine may indeed strike Laplace and curious and atheistic to the adherents of the various European schools of Monotheists and to other doctors of Divinity so as to give them a rude shaking But there is no help to it. Truth must be told. When Laplace, the world-renowned French scientist went to make a formal presentation of his famous work to the world-conquering Nepoleon on God 258

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idea of God GOD. who can curve out paths for ourselves here and herein-after both for enjoyment of pleasures and emancipation of our souls by our own will and exertion. Here-in-before we have fairly discussed what sort of God we do not believe in , we have seen there what it is not. We shall see now what He is to us as taught by the Jain Teachers According to the Jain philosophy the universe is not a fortuitous concourse of dead, The Jain dull matter (pudgal) only ; for that would head mean crude materialism which Jainism does not allow. The Victors say that the series of changes as presented by the organic and inorganic woulds, show, as has been recently demonstrated by Dr. J. C Bose, that in addition to the dead dull pudgal-matter, there is something superphysical both in the living and in the so-called non-living When this something superphysical departs from the constitution of the living and the so-called non-living, we say it is dead by which we mean that it does not respond. Experiments have shown that like plants and animals, d piece of metal responds in a like manner, 261

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AN EPITOME OF JAINISM Jains atheists NO yield an inch in their astute denial of an omnipotent extra-mudane God. The Charvaka materialists openly and avowedly teach and preach that there is not only no God but there is no soul at all for the so-called redemption of which one should toil and moil all the day and night forsaking all pleasures of life and thought. One might well venture to remark here Are the that all these schools being more or less atheistic, are the Jains too atheists of similar type ? 'No', is the emphatic answer, we have to offer to the equirers The Jains do believe in a God after their own way of thinking--a belief which is in and through saturated with all the vigour and strength of life. It does not make us dependant on any Almighty Ruler for our being and beatitude here or hereinafter It does not cast us into the moulds of those weaklings who love to creep' with a quivering prayer" on their lips to the silent doors of the Deity, nor of those who crawl; beating breast at every step before his ficlitious feet or figure to adore' Rathei it makes us feel that we are independent autonomous individuals 260

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GOD. Now that (call it soul, spirit, superphysical something or by any other name you God is what gives sublike) by the departure of which the living sta n tiality, materiality becomes dead is of the highest spiritual or mentility to all things essence and is common to all. The manifes- and beings tation of this divine principle may differ in different living beings but the collective idea derived from such observations as of this something inherent in the living and in the so-called non-living, is called God. According to the Jains there are energies present both in the material and dynamic worlds Living apart the material or mental energies, the spiritual ones as a whole is God giving materiality, mentality and substantiality to all things and beings The Ultimate Spiritual Power, often called by Spencer, as Primal Energy, forming the last limit of the knowables, reveals itself, Spniora. Spencer and in various forms and with varying degrees of perfection in different grades of being The universe with all its bewildering mani. festation, is nothing but the revelation of this Ultimate Power or Energy. This is by its nature a tertium quid being matter conscious only when it reveals itself through a senti 263

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AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. if suitably influenced. But when "killed by poison," like the plant or animal, it does not respond. European thinkers and biologists have so far assigned the presence and Dr. 'Vital Force' of a separate vital force' in the physical Bose's super- phenomenon connected with the living physical Power. organism. In place of any real explanation, a hypothetical nomenclature was used either to explain away or to clothe in a greater mystery the most complex phenomena that we ever come across. From this position with its assumption of superphysical character of response, it is clear that on the discovery by Dr. J. C. Bose, the most renowned Bengalee scientist of the day, of similar effects in inorganic substances, the necessity of theoretically maintaining such Dualism in Nature, must fall to the ground. There is, therefore, not any unknown arbitrary vital force as Physiologists have taught us to suppose but a law, the working of which, knows no change, nor any deviation, but which, as the Victors hold, acts uniformly from within throughout the inorganic and the organic worlds. 262

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GOD ed. our lives sublime. By following the footprints on the sands of time of the Ideal By dessipaTirthankaras who were real heroes, pure and many mo free, who attained to omniscience and quie- to be reach tude, Nirudna, by the dissipation of their karma, we shall be able to raise ourselves from the mires of the world and to attain to Nirvan by a like dissipation of our own karma and by freeing ourselves from the eighteen blemishes that inevitably lead ultimately to ominiscience, the next door to Nirvanam. 265

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AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. ent organism, and remains unconscious so long its embodiment is the sentient one. This is the. Primery Reality from which other realities owe their existence and this is the sap which supports every thing what we call real. The same or allied thought is expressed also by Benedict Spinoza when he says that mind and matter are but two among infinite aspects of the Ultimate Reality which can neither be designated as material or psychical in the sense of being conscious. God is, in short, the coalescence of this spiritual principle emancipated from the bondages of matter in all its purity, perfection, freedom and blessedness They do us wrong when they say that we are agnostics ; for we worship this Supreme Essence.the Ideal of all of life and thought. We bow down to this Ideal, because we desire to realize the Ideal in every acts of our life and thought. We worship the Tirthankaras, the pure and perfect souls, merely for the sake of their purity and perfection ; but not for the expectation of any reward in return. "Lives of great men remind us that we can make 264 The head

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SOUL. materia higher unity without losing the traces of their individuality in the same? What Soul-a by product o is the naure of this soul-substance? Is it a matter an spark from the anvil of the Blacksmith, forces a bye-product of matter of the Physicist, the nascent or the just-born of the Chemists? The Charobka school of thought teaches that there is no plausible reason and evidence to demonstrate the existence of soul as something distinct and separate from matter and material forces, for consciousness which is a quality of the soul-substance is but the resultant of the concussion of the brain-matter. Just as liver secrets bile so brain produces consciousness This phenomenon of matter and material powers which is characterised by consciousness in different forms in the living and the so-called non-living, is soul for which reason, we often take recourse to such forms of expressions as consist in saying in our common parlance that the plant lives, the brute lives and feels, and the man lives, feels and thinks. It is thus evident that more the subtle is the organic mechanism, by far the more clear 267

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Soul and God Conceptions of Soul CHAPTER XVII. SOUL. Souls and the God-head-Materialistic conception of Soul-A bye-product of matter-Eastern and Western materialism compared-Charvak and Hekel STIC Girardian, the socialist-Cosmological and Moral diffi. culties involved in Materialism-Admissions by Huxley, Spencer and Darwin-The Jain conception of Spirit and Matter Their Correlativity-Pradeshas-Parts or Soul-units.-Conscious effulgence form the spiritual essence of the Soul.-Soul'a constitutional freedom-Ita Transmigration through the grades of Sansar and Emancipation. While dealing with our conception of God, we have seen that the individual soul, when it becomes free from all taints and blemishes, reaches perfection characterised by omniscience and realizes itself as a self-conscious spirit of the nature of all-delight, distinct and separate from other than itself, it becomes God. But what is this soul whch is thus potentially divine and attians to God-head, He being no other than the coalesence of the pure and free self-conscious spirits existing in a 266

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SOUL. seems to receive additional support from the researches in Biology by some of the master-minds of the west. In summing Haeckel on up his 'Last Words on Evolution, Earnst the origin of Haeckel says, "the very interesting and important phenomena of impregnation have only been known to us in details for thirty years. It has been conclusively shown after a number of detailed investigation that the individual development of the embryo from the stem-cell or fertilised ovum is controlled by the same laws in all cases. *One important result of these modern discoveries, was the phenomena given to one fact that the personal soul has a begining of existence and that we can determine the precise moment in which this takes place; it is when the parent cells, the ovum and the spermatazoon, coalesce. Hence what we call the soul of man, or animal, has not presisted, but begins its career * Zhao at the moment of impregnation. It is bound up with the chemical constitution of the plasm which is the vehicle of heredity in the nucleus of the maternal ovum and the 269 *

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Soul-Units and self-cons ac cionsness. AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. to the regions of the un-extended which is accounts for the plurality of its existence The conception of pudgal-matter is that it has weight and fills up space, but the essence of the soul is conceived in selfconsciousness absolutely devoid of any tinge of materiality whatsoever. The soul being as such it is according to our philosophy a self-existent ultimate reality without beginning and end Berest of all colour, taste, smell and touch, it is metaphysically formless though it takes on the form of that wherein it happens to dwell by virtue of its own Karma. Like the vacuous space it has innumerable pradeshas. By Pradeshas are meant the minutest parts, the soul-units, which do not admit of futher psychological analysis. These indivisible parts of the soul or soul-units which are infinite in number are all alike in essence for which reason the soul is said to be characterised by unity with a difference. They are essentially of the nature of conscious effulgence which seems to have been put out, as it were, by the super-imposition of the Karma matter on the various parts of the soul, just as a mirror becomes clouded 278

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AN EPITOJIE OF JAINISM happen And why? Because of the difference of heredity,' as they say, which is the conservative principle accounting for the comparative persistency of the type of the organism. But the validity of this principle of transmission into the offsprings, is still open to question, Why is it that the children of the same parent showy marked dissim larities to their parents and to one another? Why do the twins derelop dissimilar characters and possess irreconciliable tastes and tendencies, though coming almost at the same time, from the same stalk and nurtured and brought up with the same care and affection under similar conditions and environments? These cannot be explained away as accidents There is nothing as such in science Nothing in the universe of phenomena and form is exempt from the inexorerable law of the cause and effect There must be some reason, therefore, underlying these inequalities And what is that reason? To say that these inequalities. in children are due to the parents is to admit the truth and validity of the principles of heredity 28S

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Heredity THE KARMA PHENOMENOLOGY. and adaptation to the environment as working out these differencees in the spheres of organic evolution. But such eminent biologists as Dr. August Weisman and a man good many others of equal authority and repute deny that hereditary tendencies of the parents predominate in one; of the grand-father in another, those of the grandmother in the third and the like. Not this alone. Weisman goes further and reasons out that the acquired tendencies are never trans mitted to the offsprings He believes in the 'continuity of germ-plasm' and is of opinion that the inequalities are caused by the differences in germ-cells'. "I have called this substance germ-plasm", says Weisman, "and have assumed that it possesses a highly coniplex structure, conferring upon it the power of developing into a complex organism" Heredity-Vol I. p. 170). Dr. Weis 1 man states further "there is therefore conti nuity of the germ-plasm from one generation to another. One might represent the germ-plasm by the metaphor of a long creeping root-stock from which plants arise at intervals, these latter representing the 289 Dr. Weisand 37

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cha Hereditary transmission impossible, AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. individuals of successive generations. Hence it follows that the transmission of acquired characters is an impossibility, for if the germ-plasm is not formed anew in each individual, but is derived from what preceded it, its structure, and above all, its molecular constitution can not depend upon the individual in which it happens to occur, but such an individual anly forms, as it were, the nutritive soil at the expense of which the germ-plasm grows, while the latter possessed its characteristic structure from the beginning, viz., before the commencement of growth. But the tendencies of heredity, of which the germ plasm is the bearer, depend upon this very molecular structure and hence only those characters can be transmitted through successive generations which have been previously inherited, viz., those characters which were potentially contained in the structure of the germ-plasm It also follows that those other characters which have been acquired by the influence of special, external conditions during the life-time of the parent, cannot be transmitted at all." (vol I. p. 273-) "But at all events," sums up Dr. Wiesman, 290

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THE KARMA PHENOMENOLOGY. "we have gained this much that the only fact which appears to directly prove a transmission of acquired characters, has been refuted and that the only firm foundation on which this hypothesis had been hitherto based, has been destroyed."-(Vol. I. p. 461).. In suffiof Natural So we see how the theory of heredity and adaptation, in short, the theory of Natural Selection through the cosmic processes of ciency, which Charles Darwin and a host of others Selection. of his line of thinking attempted to show the origin of species, fails to explain the real causes and conditions for the specific differentiations in the spheres of organic evolution. The real causes and conditions determing the origin of the different types of organisms are to be found out in the principle of metempsychoses. And if the remarks of Dr. Weisman are read between the lines, it will be quite apparent that the Dr. stands on the very threshold of a revelation. He is knocking at the gate and it will open to give him an entrance into the mysteries of Transmigration, "the undivorceable spouse of Karma", for, according to 291

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AN EPITOME OF JAINISM . become angels or they loose their angelhood by the force of their own karnia "The experience gained in one life", to quote the language of Hartmann, the great German philosopher, "may not be remembered in their detail in the net, but the impressions which they produce will remain. Again and again man passes through the wheel of transformation, and changing his lower energies into higher ones until matter attracts him no longer and he becomeswhat he is destined to be-A GOD." 294

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THE KARMA PHENOMENOLOGY counts also for all organ to put the idea with all the Orientality we can command, because the karma of the human being is different. Karma, here, does Kas man acnot mean heredity' through the principle of elected which the offsprings are alleged to coherit the qualities of the Yachers In Jain philosophy, it signifies what the soul carries with itself from an anterior stage of its being by virtue of its prior deeds and desires The idea is that every thought we think, every act we do, tells upon our souls and thereby leaves an impression upon them, as it were, which continues to exercise influence on them in their subsequent careers And accordingly our present happiness or misery is not the award of any power existing outside ourselves but is rather the consequent of what we ourselves had done in the past either in this life or in an anterior birth None is exempt from the operation of karna -Nor Krishna, nor Buddha, nor Christ Jesus. This doctrine of karma thus unquestionably furnishes the key to the interpretation of the phenomenal greatness in humanity. Christ Jesus of Nazereth was a Christ by the virtue of his own karma So angels 293

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AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. energy of his past actions, Karma, which Mrs Sinclair on the Law can no more be affected by love or prayer of Karma and Rebirth than a run-away locomotive. On and on it goes remorsely dealing out mutilation and suffering, till the energy it has amassed is at last exhausted and a merciful silence follows. The belief in Karma and transmigration kills all sympathy and human kindness for sufferers, since any pain a man endures is only the wages he has earned in a previous birth. It is this belief that is responsible among other things for the suffering of the thousands of childwidows in India who are taught they are now reaping the fruit of their own unchastity in a former life." So writes Mrs. Sinclare in exposing the so-called 'Empty Heart of Jainism and in vindication of her Christian creed. But alas ! she can not explain the world of inequalities and diversities from the stand-point of her own Christian Theology. If an All-mercy Personal God created this universe out of nothing, could He not make all things good and beautiful and all beings happy? Why one is a born saint and another a murderer? 296

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CHAPTER XIX. CHURCHIANITY AND THE LAW OF KARMA. Christian Criticism of 'Karma'-Empty Heart of Jainism-Examination of the Criticism-Inconsistencies and Difficulties of the Christian Theology-God and Satan-Good and Evil.-Indian Widows Christian unmarried Girls From what has been discussed in the preceeding pages so far the inexorable Law of Karma-causality is concerned, it is perfectly clear that man is the maker of his own Destiny This is the main principle whereon the grand edifice of the Jain ethics is securely based But this belief in the ethical autonomy of man making him thoroughly free and independent of the iron will of any Being outside himself cannot but irritate Christian minds. "Instead of a God delighting in mercy, who rules and judges the fair world that He has made," writes Mrs. Sinclare Stevenson in her latest contribution, 'The Heart of Jainsm,' "the Jain have set in this place a hedious thing the accumulated 295 Man is the maker of his Destiny.

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The pit-fall of Original Sin. AN EPITOME OF JAINISM.. This dramatical piece incident reminds us of the famous lines of another poet who sang in the following srain, "He who does not sin, cannot hope for mercy ; Mercy was made for sinners; be not sad." But with the Jains such conceptions do not count for anything. If the Supreme Being delighting in mercy is the Prime Author of all that is, He should have shown mercy and perfect forbearance, from the very beginning to man--His own handi-work, instead of allowing him to fall into the pit-fall of Original Sin. Man is not ommiscient, and according to the Christian theology, nor a perfect being as well, and as such he must have his shortcomings and failures ; but as he was living under the protecting and paternal care of his All-mercy Maker, could he not naturally expect that if he were to commit any mistake in his movements, his Omniscient Father and Guardian who must have fore seen things long before he himself could realise, should protect his son, showing thereby, His perfection of forbearance and mercy to his creature which he is to delight in ? We have 298

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CHURCHIANITY: LAW OF KARMA. Why one waddles in wealth and opulence and another starves to death? If God created one to enjoy the pleasures of life which the world can afford to supply with and another to labour life-long under the stiffling, tyrrany of his master, how could he be an embodiment of All-love and All-mercy? Need she be told in the language of the poet that "A God All-mercy is a God Unjust." Christianity teaches that man has but one life on earth to live either for an eternal existence in Heaven or to be condemned into Hell according to the merits or demerits of his deeds. But this naturally encourages a man to make the most of his opportunities here. Besides an appeal for mercy at the hands of an Omnipotent God best suits him who has consciously failed in the discharge of duties. But the great disadvantage of such form of faith is that it makes some violently reckless so much so that when the poet Henri Hein was asked if he believed in Divine Grace, he replied, "God will forgive me, for that is his profession". 297 38 Mercy made for Sinners

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AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. and Devil worked together to create this universe of ours which is therefore but a mixture of good and evil. And to push the question still further, both of them being equally powerful and limited by each other, it follows that neither of them was omnipotent, omnipresent and omniscient. Does Mrs. Sinclair wish us to set up within the shrines of our tender hearts such a God the very conception of which is logically absurd. Turning to the effects of karma on social matters it is true, indeed, that here the of India vs earth is soaked by the tears of the ed girls of child-widows, but will Mrs. Sinclair inform her readers as to why the Christian world echoes with the sighs of the unmarried ? Here the Indian widows had had a chance for the husbands to love and to loose in this life as these were written in the their own Karma and there is every reason to hope that they would receive their beloved back more cordially in their warm embraces during the subsequent turn and term of their natural life quite in accor. dance with their own Karma. But what hope The widows the unmarri Europe. 300

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CHURCHIANITY. LAW OF KARMA. already remarked that we the Jains cannot persuade ourselves to believe in a God in the sense of an extra-mundane Creator who caused the down-fall of mankind but afterwards taking pity on them dropped down from Heaven his only Son through whose crucifixion mankind was saved. Some Christian Divines hold, however, that the pit-fall of Original Sin which caused the down fall of the entire human race was but dug out by the Devil. They teach that God created all that is good and beautiful and it was Satan who brought in the Evil and spoiled man-the handi-work of God. But little do these Divines think that good and evil are but relative terms. Good can not be without evil and vice versa evil without good. There is a soul of goodness in things evil and conversely there is a soul of evil in things good. And when God created what is good he must, at the same time, have created the evil too. Similarly, when the Satan created the evil, he too must have created, at the same time, what is good. Now to veiw things as they stand, we cannot but logically infer that God 299 God and Satan working together?

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AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. absolute exhaustion of the individual's Karma, liberation is surely and inevitably attained, sooner or later. In fine Mrs. Sinclair would do well to bear in mind that the law of Karma which in the Physical world speaks of the continuity of motion and indestructibility of matter teaches in the domain of Ethics, the immortality of deeds and the inevitability of the moral responsibility in the case of an individual, family, or nation. 303

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AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. hasty thinkers will reject it * * * Like the doctrine of evolution itself, that of transmigration has its root in the world of reality' Among the Christian theologians many prominent theological leaders have mainChristian tained it. Dr. Julius Muller, the eminent Thcological German theologian, supports the theory of Re-births in his work known as "The Christian Doctrine of Sin." Besides Swedenborg and Emerson telieved in metempsychoses. Leaders. 310

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BELIEF IN RE-BIRTH. below and rise to the intellectual world, that we may not fall into a purely sensilbe life by allowing ourselves to follow sensible images etc." Philo of Alexandria, a contemporary of Christ, says "The company of m Modern phidisembodied souls is distributed in various descoperites orders. The law of some of them is to enter mortal bodies, and after certain prescribed periods (as according to our ayuh-kara) be again set free" Besides these, copious passages could be gleaned from the philosophical writings and dissertations of such eminent men and leaders of thought as Kant, Schelling, Fichte, Schapenhauer, Goethe and the like. Even the most astute moulder of the Sensationist school of thought, Hume, the sceptic, in his Essay on the 'Immortality of Soul' had to acknowledge the truth and validity of the theory of rebirths. He says : "The metempsychoses is therefore the only system of this kind that philosophy can' harken to". Prof. Huxley of the modern scientific world somewhere remarks * "None but the 509

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AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. fant the character of the stock lies latent, and the ego is a little more than a bundle of potentialities; but very early those become actualities; from childhood to age, they manifest themselves, in dullness or brightness, weakness or strength, visciousness or uprightness; and with each feature modified by confluence of another, if by nothing else, the character passes on to its incarnation in new bodies. "The Indian philosophers called 'Charac"Character ter' as thus defined, 'Karma'. It is this of Huxley. * karma which passed from life to life and linked them in chains of transmigrations and they held that it is modified in each life, not merely by confluence of parentage, but by its own acts. They were in fact strong believers in the theory, so much disputed just at present, of the hereditary transmission of acquired characters. That the manifestation of tendencies of a character may be greatly facillitated or impeded by conditions, of which self-discipline or the absence of it are among the most important, is indubitable, but that the character' itself is modified in this way is by no means so 372

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CHAPTER XVI. RE-BIRTH AND KARMA-SARIRA. Prof Huxley and Re-buth-Huxley's Character and our Kurme-matter Character - Inner NatureLinga-deka of the Hindu Philosophess-The Five Konhas of the Concentric Circles--Pranu of the Hindus and of the Jain Philosophern-Transmission of Character through Heredity-V.-Transmigration of Karwa-Sarinu through Re-bisth. In another place of his last Romane's Lectures, says Huxley, "Every day experience familiarises us with the facts which line of Karma are grouped under the name of heredity. Every one of us bears upon him the obvious marks of his parentage, perhaps remote relationship. More particularly the sum of tendencies to act in a certain way which we call 'character is often to be traced through a long series of progenitors' and collaterals. So we may justly say that this 'character'--this moral and intellectual essence of a man does veritably pass over from one flesbly tabernacle to another and does really transmigrate from generation to generation. In the new born in

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AN EPITOME OF JAINISM, is another inviolable physical condition in the shape of a medium for the manifestation and operation of the above energies and it is Transmis- t the mortal physical frame which the man sion through Heredity takes on. And there is invariably a kind of or through Re-births ? chemical affinity under the secret influence of which the man is drawn to a particular body wherein he is to take birth It is true that man passes from body to body through the repetition of births and deaths, and as he progresses or retrogresses quite in accordance with the good or bad deeds he per formed in the past, it is evident enough that he passes out with his own self-acquired habits, qualities and desires fitly called karnasarira according to our philosophical terminology. But this does not necessarily mean that the habits and qualities he acquired through the processes of natural selection or through the processes of selfdiscipline he might have undergone.be these for good, or for bad-are transmitted to the off-springs through the physiological principle of heredity True it is that the offsprings display at times such habits and tendencies as can well be traced out 314

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RE-BIRTH AND KARMA-SARIRA. misrepresen. tation and wrong inter the Law, certain, it is not so sure that the trans- Huxley's mitted character of an evil-doer is worse or that of a righteous man better than that pretation of which he received. Indian philosophy, however, does not admit of any doubt on the subject, the belief in the influence of conditions, notably self-discipline, on the karmas was not merely a necessary postulate of its theory of retribution, but it presented the only way of escape from the endless of round of transmigrations," Such is Prof. Huxley's interpretation and presentation of the law of karna and metempsychoses in Indian philosophy. But we differ from him in as much as neither the interpretation, nor the presentation, on that account, is correct. For we must have to draw a line of distinction between a man and his conditions According to our philosophy a man may, indeed, be roughly taken as the embodiment of intellectual, spiritual and moral (Fo'w a fra ) essences which Huxley sums up by the word 'character.' And the man as such is not different from the sumtotal of the the energies summed up by 'character' as just explained. But then there 313

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Exposition of the prin ciple AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. attainment of bliss and beatitude, as the case may be, according to its karma in a previous birth. To enter a bit more into details we have stated before that there is some 'superphysical' power in every living body, by the presence of which the body is enabled to respond, if suitably influenced. Responsiveness, here, forms a predominating phenomenon of life, and death of the body means the departure of the super-physical' power, called alman-Juva (soul) --from the living body after which it can no longer respond to any stimulus. At the time of death, when this soul er the 'super-physical' power shuffles off its mortal coil, it passes out assuming the form of a subtle unit of energy clothing itself, as it does, in a subtle body as its vehicle which is built out of the fine karma-matter-the crystalised particles of the soul's past experiences and unfulfilled desires etc. with which it happens to pass out. According to our philosophy, these fine karna matters or the crysta lised particles of past experiences and unfulfilled desires, embodied in which the 316

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Tranmission ssion is explained through transmigration of the armas Sarira RE-BIRTH AND KARMA-SARIRA ds if coming down from the parent or sonje remote ancestor. The way in which this hereditary transmission is explained by the modern physiologists cannot, as we have seen elsewhere, give us a satisfactory solution of the problem in question. The phenomenon of apparent transmission through the physiological principle of heredity as explained in our philosophy seems to clear up the difficulties involved in the question According to our philosophy, the re-incarnating soul, bearing as it does about it the karma-pudgal which the stva acquired by dint of its past experiences and unfulfilled desires, forming its character in the past, automatically developes with a mathematical precision, a sort of affinity or tendency of attraction, for the appropriate physiological and moral conditions wherein it may find a fit and favourable soul for moulding out of the same, a suitable body as the manifesting media for the display of its powers and qualities, either to cope with nature in the fulfilment of its unsatisfied desires and enjoyment of the pleasures of the world, or to strive for the 315

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KarnaSarira AN EPITOME OF JAINISM forces of its own making, which become metamorphosed as it were into the form of karmaparticles wherein remain stored up in a potential state all the experiences, desires and tendencies which Prof. Huxley sums up by the word. Character.' The experiences and forces of its own, metamorphosed into a material particles, which the Jiva carries with it at the time of its departure froni the body wherein it had been encased in a previous birth, and known as the karma-pudgal of the stva-form, according to our sages, the physical basis of a future life. It is also technically called Karman Sarira of the fiva which along with the tejas sarira which is also inseparable from it, clings round to the soul until it reaches final liberation. Here again we find another display of the grand truth teaching us of the indestructibility of matter and continuity of motion-Karma. After shuffing off the gross mortal frame like a pair of old worn-out shoes, the in dividual soul, taking the form of a subtle unit of energy clothed in the karma-pudga) as explained, instinctively fles off to one or the other of the different grades of sansar or 318

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RE-BIRTH. AND KARMA-SARIRA soul passes out leaving the body dead, form the very germ of physical life in future. The use of the phrase "karma-pudgalkarma-limatter) is singular in our philosophy. All karmas, the other systems of Indian Lama pudgal and Thought, accept onwaveringly the truth and Character. validity of the doctrine of karma-causality and re-births ; but with them karma is amuria-imponderable. None has yet been found to take the word karma in the sense and significance as we find it to have been used in our philosophy. It is true that karma of the siva means its past activities or energies forces of its own making that tend it to be a murderer or a saint in the next life but the energies or forces, as they are in themselves are formless and as such they cannot act and react on any thing and produce changes in the tendency of the same Sky, like void space, because of its being formless, cannot affect us In order to act and re-act and thereby to produce changes in things on which they work, the energies and forces must have to be metamorphosed into forms or centies of forces. So are the cases with Jiva's karmam-its past-activities or energies 317

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RE-BIRTH AND KARMA-SARIRA. Sansar gats, as it is called, for which it has devoloped a strong affinity and where, on that account, it may find a more favourable soil for Gats or the different suller expressions of the energies and forces grades of of its own making during the course of the previous term of the physical life. It may happen to be located for some time in the regions of hell (ar) or go to some other world It may travel among the brutes and beasts (facut afa) or may become a god or a demon in the world of gods and demons (devAsura loka). It may also by the virtue of its own karma under which it willingly laboured, run to Heaven, the region of the gods, there to enjoy the sweetest pleasures of life which he so much hankered after or be born again to such parents in the human, world (GMT gla) as is consistent with its prior deeds and desires, either to waddle in wealth and prosperity, or to starve to death in poverty, or to strive after bliss and beatitude, forsaking all the pleasures of wordly life and living. So we see that the 'Character of Prof. Huxley is somewhat the same with the karnasarira in the Jain philosophy, The Hindu 319

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AN EPITOME OF JAINISM But the karman-sarra in our philosophy is of different make. It is true that the Jain Pranara as philosophy speaks of prinas as organic and the Jain bodily powers, but these develop only as philosophy the seva ascends up the scale of evolution from lower to higher organisms. The highest type of organism of a leva has ten pranas and the lowest type must have at least four. Of the ten pronas or powers which are to be found in the higher types of organism as man, mmfive belong to the five organs of sense, viz., touch, taste, smell, sight and hearing. Add to these five, the three powers of body, mind and speech (kAya mana vacana). The ninth is the power of inhalation and exhalation termed (FOTA) and the tenth is the ayu-balmor the power whereby is determined the longivity of, the Teva during which it has to keep to a certain definite configuration of the bodyin which, it might happen to enter in a particular stage of its existence determined by its own past * karma. The Jain philosophers hold, however, that of these pranas in their abstract or etherial forms, accompany the karna-sanira clothed in which the soul departs from an organism wherein it dwelt for a certain period 322

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of cause and KARMA AND OUDARIKA-SARIRA. ceases to exist, when it has grown up into a tree, so the inner world would cease to the relation have its being after its transformation into the affect and its difficulties outer world, for they belong to the same thing although at different periods of its development The fact of co-existence being thus inexplicable, the mutual interaction between them, which cannot be denied becomes inexplicable also. Of course of the purvapakshin say that the earlier state is not altogether lost in the later state of a thing developing, but is retained there our obvious retort will be that if it is retained at all, it is retained in such a transformed manner that it loses its distinct existence For what is accidental to the different stages of a developing thing, vanishes away with the lapse of time and what persists is the essence or the substance in abstract which reveals itself through these different stages of development To get over the difficulties as exposed in the above, some may erroneously hold that the inner nature produces the outer nature of a man The relation is that of a cause and effect 331

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AN EPITOME OF JAINISM the karman, the organ of thought, desires and will, determines the character of the former by its preferential interest. So the relation is intermutative. And this is borne out by our analysis of the question at issue. The relation between karma-body and How they act and the Oudarika-this is our immediate topic. re-act? And we begin our discussion by defining the two in the clearest possible manner. By karman-body we mean the Experiential-body where the effects caused by the Oudarikabody are stored up, as it were, in a subtle form. The operation of the Odarika-body or the Perceptual organ leaves a permanent vestige upon the karma-body known as karma-vestige, just as the agitation of the brain molecules in thought, leaves a permanent vestige upon the brain itself. This is what we mean by karma-matter This karma-matter again,, we shall show hereafter, determines the nature of the perceptual organ or the Oudarika-body. The operation of the Oudarika-body leaves thus vestiges upon the experiential body and thereby modifies it to a certain extent, while on the other, the karma-body or the organ 336

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AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. valid Validity can well be established by the actual sensory contact of the object conceived. The conception thus becomes something general, universal in character, which differentiates itself, so to Conception speak, without losing its unity and character, to the Kanan-body. into so many individual actual objects capable of being presented to the senses, The individual objects, the subject-matter of the perceptual organ, becomes so many concrete embodiments of the conception itself which cannot be, like the former, presented to the senses. From the point of view of the perception also, it may be shown that they are unintelligible, unless they are interpreted with the light of the concept itself. An individual, or a single perception, caused by the actual contact of the object with the senses, remains unintelligible, unless it is subsumed under its respective concept which is, again, nothing but perceptions universalised. The conception we thus see, is the perception itself in its universal character and' embodies itself in the actual objects forming the subject-matter of the perceptual organism (eft int)and the perception is nothing but specific differen 338

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of yet. AN EPITOME OF JAINISM between the experiences of the Ouddrik A study from body (percran et ) aud the experiences of another point mint the karman body (mnoho uri). By oudarika (bhaudArika zarIra ) we mean our neural organism which is the vehicle of the sensations, gross in form. While the experiences of the karman body (74* Tat) is confined within its thought, ideas, desires and will. Here there is an important matter to note. The experiences of the Orddrika body (perfin m ) which follows on the direct presentment of the actual objects, have no interest for us unless they are owned by us i.e referred to our own inney nature or karman body (Phyet). To be conscious that I am experiencing such and such things, the whole of objective experience requires to be viewed as the experience of my inner nature or in other words the objective experience, belonging to the ordarzka body (uherfi gilt) must, be referied back to and determined by the inner nature ; otherwise the experience, being devoid of every subjective reference, will lose all interest for us, and cannot be viewed as my own experience The outer experience, unless they are referred 340

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KARMA AND OUDARIKA-SARIRA The idea of -how it As a mere theoretical thinker, we cannot get any idea of individuality, nor can we form any clear conception of it. We can individuality prove all this by psychological analysis of develops? the development of a child's mind. A child's first ideas are all unconsciously universal or vaguely abstract ideas. Even the child's first conscious ideas must be of what we call the universal as such. The many presentations he cannot yet know as so many individuals, for he cannot grasp single facts for their own sake. He only learns to recognise the type which persists through many presentations. He knows things by types, by universals. The one that persists through the many, he comes to recognise as the one, the universal, the type, the idea. As a mere theoretical thinker his progress has stopped and cannot go beyond it But observe another side of his nature He has a doll, and say, he loves it. He breaks it Now offer him another doll as nearly as possible like the former one. Now will the child accept this as compensation ? No. And what is the reason of this? It is this that the love for this toy is in its 343

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AN EPITOME OF JAINISM. the real and ultimate goal of all that live, move and have their being in the different abodes of the Sansdr. Now do we not see that without immortality and re-birth of the Jiva-i.e., without the persistence and continuance of the Karman-body through the ravages of time and the processes of metampsychosis the whole purpose of such life and individuality as manifest in the incessant struggling of the Jiva becomes absolutely meaningless! 346

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From Kalpa Sutra MS (Life of Parshva Nath) . 2 731 3 . v Mogul Period