Jain Journal 1998 04

Author(s): Jain Bhawan Publication
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/520130/1

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ISSN 0021-4043 A QUARTERLY ON JAINOLOGY VOL. XXXII No. 4 APRIL 1998 JOUrnal jaina bhavana JAIN BHAWAN PUBLICATION

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Contents Siddhasena Divakara and his Nyayavatara Satya Ranjan Banerjee The Conception of Dravyas in Jaina Philosophy Kamal Chand Sogani 93 115

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JAIN JOURNAL Vol. XXXII No. 4 April 1998 SIDDHASENA DIVAKARA AND HIS NYAYAVATARA' SATYA RANJAN BANERJEE 1. Siddhasena Divakara Siddhasena Divakara alias Ksapanaka (crica 480-550 A.D.), a celebrated logician, is claimed by both the Digambaras and Svetambaras as one of their own authorities. The earlier eminent authorities before Siddhasena were Kundakunda (1st cent. A.D.), a pupil of Bhadrabahu II, and his disciple Umasvami or Umasvati (1-85 A.D.), Bhattakera (1st cent. A.D.) and Karttikeyasvami(1st cent. A.D.).? According to the evidence of Pattavali's Veddhavadin, Padalipta (=Pkt. Palitta) and Siddhasena Divakara were contemporaries.3 Siddhasena Divakara is famous both as a logician and a lyrical poet. His book, Kalyana-mandira-stotra of 44 stanzas is a hymn-book addressed to Parsvanatha. His other two books - Dvatrimsaddvatrimsika and Sammati-tarka-sutra-though form a part of his Nyayavatara, exhibit his poetic talent. The work for which Siddhasena Divakara is famous is his Nuayavatara. It is written in 32 Sanskrit stanzas and is a fundamental work on Jaina logic. The book discusses the means of acquiring right knowledge (pramana) and of methods (naya). In Jaina logic Pramanasastra is necessary to establish the validity of the nine categories (nava-tattva) of Jaina Philosophy. The Pramana-Sastra, i.e., the science of right knowledge, discusses mainly the principles of pure logic in order to expound the dogmas of Jaina religion and metaphysics. But, in fact, Siddhasena Divakara and Dinnaga, the Buddhist logician, by about 450 A.D., differentiated first the principles of Logic from the domain of religion and metaphysics. Gautama, the ancient logician, enumerates the sixteen categories of 1. Reprinted with additions and alterations from S.R. Banerjee's Introduction to his edition of Nyayavatara, Calcutta, 1981. 2. All the dates are from Winternitz's Hist. Ind. Lit. Vol-II (1933), pp. 476-477. 3. Klatt. IA. Vol. 11, p. 257.

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JAIN JOURNAL: Vol-XXXII, No. 4 April 1998 knowledge, of which pramana is one with other fifteen things. But Siddhasena and Dinnaga discuss only one category, i.e., Pramana, in their treatises in order to establish the doctrines of Jainism and Buddhism respectively. They even excluded prameya, the object of knowledge, from their consideration. 94 The relationship of Logic with the Jaina Philosophy is shown below: The Doctrines of Jainism (Philosophical and Practical) Philosophical systematic Practical Ethics [Metaphysics, Ontology &study [Ethics, Asceticism, MonastiPsychology] of being cism, & Laity rules] A. Metaphysics: (Substance) Navatattva (nine cardinal principles) [Jiva, ajiva, asrava, bandha, punya, papa, samvara, nirjara & moksal-- | to be comprehended by LOGIC B. Philosophy: 1. Anekantavada 2. Syadvada (Sapta-bhangi) 3. Jaina-naya (Sapta-naya) [naigama, samgraha, vyavahara, rju-sutra, sabda, samabhirudha & evambhuta] C. Karmavada: For Moksa the necessary elements are (a) tri-ratna (b) tri-gupti (c) panca-samiti - application of the Karma theory to Ethics. Let me discuss the above principles briefly. II. The Doctrines of Jainism The foundation of Jaina philosophy is mainly based on the conception of the constitution of the world. To the Jains, the world is eternal and vast, it is beginningless and endless. Time is also eternal and is like a wheel with twelve spokes. The wheel of time is divided into two halves: avasarpini (descending order) and utsarpini (ascending order). The present age is the age of avasarpini. This universe is composed of two things: loka and aloka. Loka consists of living and

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BANERJEE : SIDDHASENADIVAKARA AND HIS NYAYAVATARA 95 non-living things and all phenomena around it. Aloka is space which we normally call by the term akasa. It is void and empty, "an abyss of nothing". Having given this description of the world, the Jains have considered the nature of matter or substance (padartha) which is eternal as well as ever-changing. With this idea in their background, they have proceeded to analyse the substance on the one hand and to establish their philosophical speculation on the other. So the doctrines of Jainism will consist of the philosophical and practical utility of their speculations. Jaina philosophy consists of Metaphysics, Ontology and Psychology, while the practical doctrines are concerned with ethics and asceticism, monasticism and the conduct of the laity. Let us first start with Jaina Metaphysics. In the domain of Loka (or lokastikaya, as it is often called), all things (i.e. dravya, substance) are classified into 9 categories : jiva, ajiva, asravo, bandha, punya, papa, samvaro, nirjara, and moksa. Jiva (lit. 'lives') is the soul. There are infinite numbers of souls; the whole world is filled with souls. The souls are eternal, but they can grow, contract or expand according to the necessity of the body in which they are incorporated. The characteristic mark of the souls is intelligence, which is never destroyed, but can be obscured by extrinsic causes. Jiva is of two kinds : Samsari (mundane) and mukta (liberated). Samsari jiva (mundane souls) are the embodied souls of the living beings in the world and they are subject to the cycle of Birth. Mukta jivas are liberated souls and so they will not come to this world again. They are free from the bondage of the world. Man is made up with cetana (consciousness) and jada (unconsciousness). So long as jacatva in man remains, he will come to this world again and again. If jadatva is removed, he will be free (mukta) and will attain nirvana Asrava means flow of Karmic matter into the nature of self or soul. Bandha implies the mixture of the Karmic matter with the nature of the soul on account of which the soul loses its intrinsic purity and brilliance. Samvara represents the act of presenting the inflow of the Karmic matter and hence it is the blocking of Asrava. Nirjara represents the act of destroying the Karmic matter which may adhere to the soul. Each particular karma has been caused by some action, good, bad or indifferent, of the individual being in question, so that karma in return, produces certain painful, or pleasant, or indifferent conditions and events which the individual in question must undergo. If the condition is good, it is called punya, if it is opposite, it is papa. The conception of Jiva may be said to be the central doctrine of

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JAIN JOURNAL: Vol-XXXII, No. 4 April 1998 Jaina philosophy, all the other categories being merely secondary and subsidiary to the central entity. The samsari jiva is again divided into four classes: deva, manusya, tiryak and naraka. The devas live in the upper world (Devaloka), while the narakas live in hell. Manusya (men) live in this world along with the tiryak animals belonging to the zoological and botanical kingdoms. All beings of these four different groups are called samsari jivas, because they are subject to the cycle of birth and death. This samsari jiva associated with its own karmic bondage and its own corporeal existence is considered to be uncreated and therefore beginningless. For the Jaina metaphysical the question when the soul did get associated with material body is a meaningless question, because they say samsara is anadi (beginningless). At the time of liberation of the soul from material and karmic bondage, it is said to attain Moksa, i.e. the cycle of births and deaths is stopped for him. 96 The five categories which are grouped in the ajiva class are distinctly non-spiritual and hence incapable of consciousness. They are therefore acetana. These are- dharma, adharma, akasa, pudgala and kala. The inherent character of dharma is to make move, or to be moved, while adharma is the opposite to it. The idea is that dharma and adharma are necessary conditions for the subsistence of all other things, viz. souls and matter. Akasa is space, while pudgala is matter which is eternal and consists of atoms. There are two kinds of matter: gross (sthula) and subtle (suksma). Gross matter are the things which we perceive, while subtle matter is beyond the reach of our senses. Subtle matter is that matter which is transformed into different kinds of karma. Kala (time) is a quasi-substance, and its necessity to accept it as a substance is to explain the changing state of the souls and matter. Now the last substance moksa. The path to Salvation (moksamarga) is different in Jainism from other religious systems. It is the Right Faith (samyag darsana), Right Knowledge (Samyag jnana), and Right Conduct (samyak caritrya). The emphasis is laid on all the three: only when all the three characteristics are combined, they can constitute Moksamarga. Each by itself is imperfect and therefore insufficient. To depend on any of them will not lead one to Moksa. Further, it is emphasized that these three (faith, knowledge and conduct) must be of right type. Hence the word samyak is prefixed to each of these terms. To bring out the force of the meaning of this definition, one metaphorical example is given by the commentator. A person suffering from a disease (if he desires to cure himself of the disease) must have faith in the capacity of a doctor and must know the exact nature of the medicine prescribed by him for his disease and must take the medicine according to the instructions of

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BANERJEE : SIDDHASENADIVAKARA AND HIS NYAYAVATARA 97 the doctor. Mere faith in the doctor will be of no use. Faith in the capacity of the doctor and the knowledge of the nature of the medicine would equally be useless unless the patient takes the medicine. In this case beings in the world of samsara are assumed to be patients suffering from a spiritual disqualification or disease who desire to get rid of this disease and to attain perfect spiritual health. Thus for the purpose of helping such persons this Moksamarga is prescribed as a spiritual remedy and the spiritual remedy therefore must be associated with all three characteristics of right faith, right knowledge a conduct in order to be effective. These three constituent elements of the path to salvation are called Ratna-traya (the three jewels). To effect this ratna-traya the rules of conduct must be observed and corresponding virtues must be acquired. The Jains have formulated certain vows (uratas) for that. These are : panca mahavrata (five great Vows), panca anuvrata (five small vows), tri-guna vrata (three good qualities) and four siksavratas (four educational vows). Of these the first five vratas are mainly and strictly to be observed by the monks, while the rest are mainly meant for the laity. The five mahavratas are-(1) ahimsa (abstain from killing, (2) satya (abstain from telling lies), (3) acaurya (abstain from stealing). (4) brahmacarya (abstain from sexual intercourse), and (5) aparigraha (to renounce all interest in worldly things, and not to keep any property). For a monk many rules, which aim at preventing the destruction of the life of any living whatsoever, have been laid down. But for a layman these vows are also applicable, but in a less rigorous way. A layman may, for a limited time, follow a rigorous practice, but that is to regulate his conduct. But a monk on entering the order (diksa), should practise these vows rigorously. To effectuate them, more regulations are required, and these constitute the disciplines of the monk. These are-three guptis (i.e. guarding of body, speech, and mind) and five samitis (i.e. a monk must be cautious in walking, speaking, collecting alms, taking up or putting down things, and voiding the body). Besides these, a monk should practise other conduct, such as, ksama (forgiveness), mardava (modesty), arjava (simplicity), nirlobhata (not to be greedy), akincanata) (to consider worldly things insignificant), satya (to speak the truth) tapasya (penance), sauca (purity) and brahmacarya (abstain from any sexual desire). On the whole, there are innumerable vows laid down for a monk who wants to attain salvation (moksa) which is the ultimate object of a monk. In conclusion, it can be said that Jaina religion is mainly a monastic religion, full of vows and penances, required for a monk as well as for a laity to keep them away from killing of any kind of living beings. Life

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98 JAIN JOURNAL : Vol-XXXII, No. 4 April 1998 is very much respected by the Jains. Character has also been given a great prominence, and to control mind from every sphere of life is highly eulogised. The Jains believe that if anybody follows truly their code of conduct, there will be no violence (himsa) in the world and a permanent bliss will pervade throughout the world. It is not the Jains who alone will follow their doctrines, but all the citizens of the world. The Jains also believe that if the peoples of the world can understand Jaina religion as such, then we shall be able to broaden our visions for our future life, to fasten our fraternal ties with our neighbours, to strengthen our minds with a new vigour for our future activities, to deepen our trenchant ideas and reveted thoughts in human beings, to enlighten our future generations for the betterment of our life, and to heighten our ultimate supreme love in mankind. And in this way, we shall be able to slacken completely our narrow-mindedness at the altar of our pride and prejudices, to loosen our beastly acrimony and mental malady for the sake of humanity, and to liken all human beings as belonging to one chum though separated by their natural qualities and environments. After examining the nature of moksa, let us explain some of the fundamental philosophical doctrines associated with it. Let us first take the doctrine of Reality (Sat). The definition of sat as given by Umasvati is utpada-vyayadhrauya-yuktam sat (V. 30) (it is a permanent reality in the midst of change of appearance and disappearance). This conception of reality is peculiar to Jainism. An existing reality in order to maintain its ermanent and continued existence must necessarily undergo change in the form of appearance and disappearance. It seems to us a paradox at the very beginning. But a closer analysis and minute observation will help us to appreciate the significance of this description of reality. For example, let us look at the sged of a plant. When the seed is planted in the soil it must necessarily break the shell and sprout out. This is the first step in its attempt to grow. Then the sprouting seed further undergoes change and some portion of it comes the sunlight and another goes down into the earth. That portion of the sprouting which goes down into the soil will undergo enormous changes into the root system. Similarly, the portion that shoots up into the air and sunlight will also undergo enormous change, of sprouting out in tendrils and leaves finally resulting in branches and stem of the plant all engaged in the task of procuring nourishment with the help of sunlight. At every stage thus we find change, the old leaves being shed off and the new sprouts coming in. This seems to be the general law of Nature. The life of the seed does never die; it lives even though

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BANERJEE : SIDDHASENADIVAKARA AND HIS NYAYAVATARA 99 it is being constantly changed, and this is what is sat. What is true of a plant, is also true with regard to the basic or fundamental things of ure. In this respect, I believe, Jaina conception of Reality is different from the other Indian philosophies. Some philosophers would only emphasize permanency as the nature of reality, while others would emphasize change alone as the characteristic of reality. The one-sided emphasis either of permanency or change is rejected by Jaina thinkers. They consider this system as wekanta-vada, a system which clings to a partial aspect of the reality. So they call their own system as anekanta-vada, that is to say, a system of philosophy which maintains that Reality has multifarious aspects and that a complete comprehension of such a nature must necessarily take into consideration all the different aspects through which reality manifests itself. Hence the Jaina darsana is technically called Anekantavada, often translated as "Indefiniteness of Being". It tells us that any material thing continues for ever to exist as matter, and this matter may assume any shape and quality. Thus mittika (clay) as a substance may be regarded as permanent, but the form of a jar of clay (ghata-patadi), or its colour, may come into existence and perish. The doctrine of anekantavada is upheld by a logical method called syad-vada. According to the doctrine, there are seven forms of metaphysical propositions and all contain the word syat, meaning 'may be'. As it consists of seven propositions, it is known as Saptabhangi. These propositions are (1) syad asti, (2) syan nasti (3) syad asti nasti ca, (4) syad avyaktavyah, (5) syad asti avyaktavyasca, (6) syan nasti avyaktavyasca, (7) syad asti nasti avyaktavyasca. According to this logical doctrine every fact of reality can be described in two logical propositions-one affirmative and the other negative. We have described before that the ultimate reality is a permanent and changing entity manifesting itself through constant change of appearance and disappearance, then we can understand that a fact of reality when looked at from the underlying permanent substance may be described to be non-permanent and changing. When a substance is described from the aspect of the underlying substance, it is called dravyarthika-naya and when the description is based on the modifications or changes, it is called paryayarthika-naya. As a dravya has two aspects, it should be described logically from two points of view : positive and negative. For example, if a jar is made of clay,

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100 JAIN JOURNAL: Vol-XXXII, No. 4 April 1998 then it is possible to describe it as a jar made of clay. But can we describe it as 'a jar made of stone'? Certainly not. But it must be remembered that to describe every fact of reality, four conditions are to be taken into considerations: dravya, ksetra, kala and bhava. Name of the substance, the place where it is, the time when it exists, and characteristics intrinsically presented in it, the time when it exists, and characteristics intrinsically presented init. Every object from its own dravya admits an affirmative predication and looked at from the paradravya admits of a negative predication. So the example given above from its own substance (clay) admits of affirmative predication, and from the view of paradravya, a negative predication. Similarly, from the point of view of ksetra, it can be stated in two ways: if a thing is really in the room, then we can say affirmatively it is in the room, and negatively it is not in the verandah. Similarly in other two cases. For want of space I cannot dilate upon this point any more. Supplementary to the doctrine of syad-vada is the doctrine of nayavada. The nayas are ways of expressing the nature of things. There are seven nayas: naigama, samgraha, vyavahara, rju-sutra, sabda, samabhirudha and evambhuta. Without going into detail, it can be said that the nayas are necessary in order to understand the partial true nature of a thing. After having described briefly the doctrines of Jainism, let me now pass on to the subject of logic with particular reference to the Nyayavatara. Before Siddhasena Divakara, another logician who talked about the subject of logic was Umasvati (1-85 A.D.).' He, in his Tattvarthasutra, has divided pramana into two categories: paroksa and pratyaksa. Paroksa (indirect knowledge) is of two kinds-mati and sruta. Pratyaksa (direct knowledge) has three stages: avadhi, manahparyaya and kevala. Paroksa knowledge is acquired by the soul through external agencies, such as, the organs of sense, whereas the pratyaksa knowledge is acquired by the soul without external agencies. Of the Paroksa knowledge, mati is "knowledge of existing things acquired through the senses and the mind," whereas sruta is "knowledge of things (past, present and future) acquired through reasoning and study". In the pratyaksa knowledge again avadhi means "knowledge of things beyond the range of our perception", whereas manahparyaya means "knowledge derived from reading the thoughts of others, while kevala means "unobstructed, unconditional and absolute knowledge." However, before describing the analytical contents, let me give in a chart the contents of the Nyayavatara. 1. S.C. Vidyabhusana, A History of Indian Logic, p. 169.

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101 BANERJEE : SIDDHASENADIVAKARA AND HIS NYAYAVATARA Nine categories of Jaina Philosophy can only be comprehended by pramana and Naya pratyaksa paroksa Inaigama, samgraha, vyavahara, rju-sutre, sabda, samabhirudha, & evambhuta) vyavaharika paramarthika (kevala) lanumana, sadhya, hetu/linga) sabda svarthanumana Laukika Sabda Sastriya Sabda pararthanumana 1. paksa 2. sadhya 3. hetu 4. dostanta 5. upanaya 6. nigamana [terms of a Syllogism vyapti antar vyapti bahir vyapti sadharmya vaidharmya paksa hetu sadhya drstanta hetu sadhya Fallacles of pararthanumana 1. paksabhasa 2. hetvabhasa 3. drstantabhasa 4. dusanabhasa asiddha viruddha anaikantika sadharmya. drstantabhasa vaidharmya drstantabhasa Effects of pramana (Moksa) The above chart is explained below. NII. Analytical Contents of the Nyayavatara? I. Pramana-Right knowledge, 1. Perception Pramana is right knowledge which illumines itself as well as other 1. Adapted from S.C. Vidyabhusana's A History of Indian Logic

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102 JAIN JOURNAL: Vol-XXXII, No. 4 April 1998 things without any obstruction. It is of two kinds : (1) direct valid knowledge or perception (pratyaksa) and (2) indirect valid knowledge (paroksa). Direct valid knowledge (pratyaksa) is twofold: (1) practical (vyavaharika) which is the knowledge acquired by the soul through the five senses (the eye, ear, nose, tongue and touch) and the mind (manas), and (2) transcendental (paramarthika) which is the infinite knowledge that comes from the perfect enlightenment of the soul: it is called kevala or absolute knowledge. 2. Verbal testimony Indirect valid knowledge (paroksa) is also of two kinds : (1) inference (anumana) and (2) verbal testimony (sabda). Verbal testimony is the knowledge derived from the words of reliable persons including knowledge from scripture. Suppose a young man coming to the side of a river cannot ascertain whether the river is fordable or not, and immediately an old experienced man of the locality, who has no enmity against him, comes and tells him that the river is easily fordable: the word of the old man is to be accepted as a source of valid knowledge called personal testimony or laukika sabda. Scripture is also a source of valid knowledge for it lays down injunctions on matters which baffle perception and inference : for instance, it teaches that misery is the consequence of vice. Knowledge derived from this source is called scriptural testimony or sastraja sabda. Scripture is defined as that which was first cognised or composed by a competent person, which is not such as to be passed over by others, which is not incompatible with the truths derived from perception, which imparts true instruction and which is profitable to all men and is preventive of the evil path.' 3. Inference Inference (anumana) is the correct knowledge of the major term (sadhya) derived through the middle term (hetu, reason, or linga, sign) which is inseparably connected with it. It is of two kinds : (1) inference for one's own self (svarthanumana) and (2) inference for the sake of others (pararthanumana). The first kind is the inference deduced in one's own mind after having made repeated observations. A man by repeated observations in the kitchen and elsewhere forms the conclusion in his mind that fire is always an antecedent of smoke. Afterwords, he is not certain whether a hill which he sees has fire on it or not. But, noticing smoke, 1. aptopajnam anullanghyam adrstesta-virodhakam/tattvopadesakrt sarvam sastram kapatha-ghattanam. (verse 9, Nyayavatara)

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BANERJEE : SIDDHASENADIVAKARA AND HIS NYAYAVATARA 103 he at once brings to mind the inseparable connection between fire and smoke, and concludes that there must be fire on the hill. This is the inference for one's own self. If the inference is communicated to others through words, it is called an inference for the sake of others. A type of this kind of inference is as follows: (1) The hill (minor term or paksa) is full of fire (major term or sadhya); (2) because it is full of smoke (middle term or hetu); (3) whatever is full of smoke is full of fire, as, e.g. a kitchen (example or drstanta); (4) so is this hill full of smoke (application or upanaya); (5) therefore this hill is full of fire (conclusion or nigamana). 4.Terms of a syllogism In a proposition the subject is the minor term (paksa) and the predicate the major term (sadhya). The minor term is that with which the connection of the major term is to be shown. In the proposition "the hill is full of fire", the hill is the minor term and fire major term. The middle term (hetu) is defined as that which cannot occur otherwise than in connection with the major term. Thus in the proposition : "the hill is full of fire because it is full of smoke", smoke is the middle term which cannot arise from any other thing than fire which is the major term. The example (drstanta) is a familiar case which assures the connection between the major term and the middle term. It is of two kinds. (1) homogeneous or affirmative (sadharmya), such as, "the hill is full of fire because it is full of smoke, as a kitchen", and (2) heterogeneous or negative (vaidharmya) which assures the connection between the middle term and major term by contrariety, that is, by showing that the absence of the major term is attended by the absence of the middle term, such as "where there is no fire there is no smoke, as in a lake." In an inference for the sake of others the minor term (paksa) must be explicitly set forth, otherwise the reasoning might be misunderstood by the opponent, e.g. This hill has fire because it has smoke. This instance, if the minor term is omitted, will assume the following form: Having fire, I Because having smoke. Here the opponent might not at once recollect any instance in which fire and smoke exist in union, and might mistake a lake for

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104 JAIN JOURNAL : Vol-XXXII, No. 4 April 1998 such an instance. In such a case the whole reasoning will be misunderstood. If that of which the major term or predicate is affirmed, is opposed by evidence, public opinion, one's own statement, etc., we have that which is known as the fallacy of the minor term (paksabhasa) of which there are many varieties. 5. Fallacies of the minor term The semblance or fallacy of the minor term (paksabhasa) arises when one attributes to it as a proved fact that which is yet to be proved, or which is incapable of being proved, or when it is opposed to perception and inference, or inconsistent with public opinion or incongruous with one's own statement, thus :1) "The jar is corporeal (paudgalika)" - this is a conclusion which is yet to be proved to the opponent. 2) "Every thing is momentary" - this is a Saugata conclusion which, according to the Jainas, is incapable of being proved. 3) "The general particular (samanya visesa) things are without parts, are distinct from each other and are like themselves alone" - this is opposed to perception. 4) "There is no omniscient being" - this is, according to the Jainas, opposed to inference. 5) "The sister is to be taken as wife" - this is inconsistent with public opinion. 6) "All things are non-existent"- this is incongruous with one's own statement. 6. Inseparable connection Inseparable connection or invariable concomitance (vyapti) is the constant accompaniment of the middle term by the major term. In the inference : "this hill is full of fire, because it is full of smoke", the connection between fire and smoke, this is, the constant presence of fire with smoke, is called vyapti or Inseparable Connection. It is of two kinds : (1) Intrinsic, and (2) Extrinsic. 7. Antar vyapti Intrinsic inseparable connection (antar-vyapti) occurs when the

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BANERJEE SIDDHASENADIVAKARA AND HIS NYAYAVATARA minor term (paksa), itself as the common abode of the middle term (hetu) and the major term (sadhya), shows the inseparable connection between them, thus : 1) This hill (minor term) is full of fire (major term); 2) because it is full of smoke (middle term). Here the inseparable connection between fire and smoke is shown by the hill (minor term) in which both of them abide. 8. Bahir Vyapti Extrinsic inseparable connection (bahir-vyapti) occurs when an example (drstanta) from the outside is introduced as the common abode of the middle term (hetu) and the major term (sadhya) to assure the inseparable connection between them, thus : 1) This hill is full of fire (major term); 2) because it is full of smoke (middle term); 3) as a kitchen (example). 105 Here the reference to the kitchen is no essential part of the inference, but is introduced from without as a common instance of a place in which fire and smoke exist together, and so it reaffirms the inseparable connection between them. Some logicians hold that that which is to be proved, that is, the major term (sadhya), can be established by intrinsic inseparable connection (antar-vyapti) only hence the extrinsic inseparable connection (bahir vyapti) is superfluous. 9. Fallacies of the middle term The semblance of reason or fallacy of the middle term (hetvabhasa) arises from doubt, misconception or non-conception about it (the middle term). It is of three kinds : 1) The unproved (asiddha): This is fragrant, because it is a sky lotus. Here the reason (middle term), viz. the sky-lotus, is unreal. 2) The contradictory (viruddha): "This is fiery, because it is a body of water." Here the reason alleged is opposed to what is to be established. 3) The uncertain (anaikantika). "Sound is eternal, because it is always audible." Here the reason or middle term is uncertain, because audibleness may or may not be a proof of eternity.

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106 JAIN JOURNAL: Vol-XXXII, No. 4 April 1998 10. Fallacies of homogeneous examples The Fallacy of example (drstantabhasa) may arise in the homogeneous or heterogeneous form, from a defect in the middle term (hetu) or major term (sadhya) or both, or from doubt about them. Fallacies of the homogeneous example (sadharmya-drstantabhasa) are follows: 1) Inference is invalid (major term), because it is a source of knowledge (middle term), like perception (homogeneous example). Here the example involves a defect in the major term (sadhya), for perception is not invalid. 2) Perception is invalid (major term), because it is a source of valid knowledge (middle term), like a dream (homogeneous example). Here the example involves a defect in the middle term (hetu) for the dream is not a source of valid knowledge. 3) The omniscient being is not existent (major term), because he is not apprehended by the senses (middle term), like a jar (homogeneous example). Here the example involves a defect in both the major and middle terms (sadhya and hetu), for the jar is both existent and apprehended by the senses. 4) This person is devoid of passions (major term), because he is mortal (middle term), like the man in the street (homogeneous example). Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the major term, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is devoid of passions. 5) This person is mortal (major term), because he is full of passions (middle term), like the man in the street (homogeneous example). Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the middle term, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is devoid of passions. 6) This person is non-omniscient (major term), because he is full of passions (middle term), like the man in the street (homogeneous example). Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of both the major and middle terms, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is full of passions and non-omniscient.

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BANERJEE : SIDDHASENADIVAKARA AND HIS NYAYAVATARA It is stated in the Nyayavatara-vivrti that some unnecessarily lay down three other kinds of fallacy of the homogeneous example (sadharmya-drstantabhasa), viz. : 1) Unconnected (ananvyaya), such as: This person is full of passions (major term), because he is a speaker (middle term), like a certain man in Magadha (example). 107 Here though a certain man in Magadha is both a speaker and full of passions, yet there is no inseparable connection between "being a speaker" and "being full of passions". (2) Of connection unshown (apradarsitanvaya), such as: Sound is non-eternal (major term), because it is produced (middle term), as a jar (example). Here though there is an inseparable connection between "produced" and "non-eternal", yet it has not been shown in the proper form as : "Whatever is produced is non-eternal, as a jar." 3) of inverted connection (viparitanvaya), such as: Sound is non-eternal (major term), because it is produced (middle term). Here if the inseparable connection (vyapti) is shown thus"Whatever is non-eternal is produced as a jar", instead of "Whatever is produced is non-eternal as a jar", the example would involve the fallacy of inverted connection. 11. Fallacies of heterogenous example Fallacies of the heterogeneous example (vaidharmyadrstantabhasa) are of six kinds, thus : 1) Inference is invalid (major term), because it is a source of knowledge (middle term): whatever is not invalid is not a source of knowledge, as a dream (heterogeneous example). Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in the major term (sadhya), for the dream is really invalid though it has been cited as not invalid. 2) Perception is non-reflective or nirvikalpaka (major term), because

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108 JAIN JOURNAL : Vol-XXXII, No. 4 April 1998 it is a source of knowledge (middle term) : whatever is reflective or savikalpaka, is not a source of knowledge, as inference (heterogeneous example). Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in the middle term (sadhana), for inference is really a source of knowledge it has been cited as not such. 3) Sound is eternal and non-eternal (major term, because it is an existence (middle term) : whatever is not eternal and non-eternal is not an existence, as a jar (heterogeneous example). Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in both the major and middle terms (sadhya and sadhana), for the jar is both "eternal and non-eternal" and "an existence". 4) Kapila is not omniscient (major term), because he is not a propounder of the four noble truths (middle term) : whoever is omniscient is propounder of the four noble truths, as Buddha (the heterogeneous example). Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a doubt as to the validity of the major term (sadhya), for it is doubtful whether Buddha was omniscient. 5) This person is untrustworthy (major term), because he is full of passions (middle term) : whoever is trustworthy is not full of passions, as Buddha (heterogeneous example). Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the middle term (hetu), for it is doubtful whether Buddha is not full of passions. 6) Kapila is not devoid of passions (major term), because he did not give his own flesh to the hungry (middle term) : whoever is devoid of passions gives his own flesh to the hungry, as Buddha (heterogeneous example). Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of both the major and middle terms (sadhya and sadhana), for it is doubtful whether Buddha was devoid of passions and gave his own flesh to the hungry. It is stated in the Nyayavatara-vivsti that some unnecessarily lay down three other kinds of fallacy of the heterogeneous example (vaidharmya-drstantabhasa), viz. - (i) Unseparated (avyatireki): This person is not devoid of passions (major term), because he is a speaker(middle term) : whoever is devoid

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BANERJEE : SIDDHASENADIVAKARA AND HIS NYAYAVATARA 109 of passions is not a speaker, as a piece of stone (heterogeneous example). Here, though a piece of stone is both "devoid of passions" and "not a speaker", yet there is no invariable separation (vyatireka vyapti) between "devoid of passions" and "a speaker". (ii) Of separation unshown (apradarsita-vyatireka) : Sound is non-eternal (major term), because it is produced (middle term); as ether (example). Here, though there is an invariable separation between "produced" and "eternal", yet it has not been shown in the proper form, such as: "Whatever is non-non-eternal is not produced, e.g. ether". (iii) Of contrary separation (viparita-vyatireka) : Sound is non-eternal (major term), because it is produced (middle term) : whatever is not produced is non-non-eternal, e.g. ether (example). Here the example has been put in a contrary way, for the proper form should have been : Whatever is non-non-eternal is not produced, e.g. ether." 12. Refutation Refutation (dusana) is the pointing out of defects or fallacies in the statements of the opponent in any of the forms enumerated above. The semblance of a refutation (dusanabhasa) is the contrivance to allege defects where there are no defects at all. 13. Consequence of Pramana The immediate effect of pramana (valid knowledge) is the removal of ignorance. The consequence of the transcendental perception (paramarthika pratyaksa pramana) is bliss and equanimity consisting in salvation (Moksa or final emancipation), while that of the other kinds of pramana (direct and indirect knowledge) is the facility which they afford us to choose the desirable and reject the undesirable things. II. Naya-the method of description Naya is the method of comprehending things from particular standpoints. Thus we may conceive rose either as a flower possessing the attributes common to all flowers or as a thing possessing attributes

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JAIN JOURNAL: Vol-XXXII, No. 4 April 1998 which are peculiar to the rose as distinguished from other flowers. The Naya is of seven kinds : naigama, samgraha, vyavahara, rju-sutra, sabda, samabhirudha, and evambhuta. 110 1. Syadvada Knowledge which determines the full meaning of an object through the employment, in the scriptural method, of one-sided nayas, is called Syadvada-sruta. It is the perfect knowledge of things taken from all possible standpoints. Thus a thing may be, may not be, both may or may not be, etc., according as we take it from one or other standpoint. The soul (Jiva) is the knower, the illuminator of self and non-self, doer and enjoyer. It undergoes changes of condition and is selfconscious, being different from the earth, water, etc. This system of pramana and naya, with which all of us are familiar and which serves to perform all practical functions, cannot be traced to its beginning or followed to its end. A Survey of Jaina Logic (based on S.C. Vidyabhusana's A History of Indian Logic including his dates) compiled by Satya Ranjan Banerjee Dates by Centuries B.C. 1500-900 B.C. 900-600 B.C. 600-100 B.C. Ancient Indian Logic Origin of Indian logic in Vedic literature knowledge, action and worship. Brahmana, Aranyaka and Upanisad. Origin of atma vidya, 'self-realisation' and its development Origin of Anviksiki Vidya (650 B.C.) Jain Logic Mahavira Svami (599-527 B.C. or 659-587 B.C. The birth of Jaina logic as can be gleaned from Jain Canons. Indrabhuti Gautama (607-515 B.C.) Buddhist Logic Gautama Buddha (570-490 B.C.) Origin of the Buddist logic (490-76 B.C.)

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BANERJEE : SIDDHASENADIVAKARA AND HIS NYAYAVATARA 111 Jain Logic Buddhist Logic Dates by Centuries Ancient Indian Logic 600-100 B.C. Bhadrabahu I (433-357 B.C.), Pali Tripitaka. Origin of different samghas. Suttanipata, Vinayapitaka Birth of Indian logic : Carvaka (650 B.C.), Kapila (650-575 B.C.), Dattatreya (650 B.C.), Punarvasu Atreya (550 B.C.) Sulabha, (550500 B.C.), Astavakra (550-500 B.C.) Medhatithi Gautama (550 B.C.) Bhadrabahur II (1st cent. B.C.) AD 1st cent. Nyayasastra Origin of Hinayana and Mahayana (78). Umasvati (1-85) Division of Svetam bara and Digambara sects. Milinda Panha (100) 2nd cent. | Aksapada Gautama's Nyayasutra (150) 3rd cent. 4th cent. Nagarjuna (250-320) Aryadeva (320-520) 5th cent. Vatsyayana's Nyayabhasya (500) [Bhadrabahu II (450-520)] Siddhasena Diva kara (480-550), Jinabhadra Gani (484-588) Maitreya (400), Arya Asanga (405470) Vasubandhu (410-490), Dinnaga (450-520) 6th cent. A.D. Siddhasena Gani (600), Samantabhadra (600) 7th cent. Uddyotakara's Nyaya-varttika (600 or 635) Paramartha (498569), Sankara Svami (500) Dharmapala (600635), Acarya silabhadra (695), Dharmakirti (635-650), Devendra Bodhi (650), Sakyabodhi (675)

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112 JAIN JOURNAL : Vol-XXXII, No. 4 April 1998 Jain Logic CT Buddhist Logic T Dates T Ancient Indian Logic Centuries by 8th cent. Akalankadeva (750) Vinitadeva (700), Vidyananda (800) Ravigupta (725), Manikyanandi (800) Jinendrabodhi (725), santaraksita (749), Kamalasila (750) 9th cent. Vacaspati Misra's Nyaya-varttika Tatparyatika (841) Prabhacandra (825) Kalyana Raksita Mallavadin (827) (829), DharmottaraRabhasanandi (850) carya (857)Mukta kumbha (900]Arcata (900)Asoka (900) 10th cent. | Udayanacarya's Nyaya-varttika TatparyatikaParisuddhi, Kusumanjali, Atratattvaviveka (984) Jayantabhatta's Nyaya manjari (10th cent.) Amrtacandra-suri Candrasomin (925) (905), Devasena Prabhakara Gupta Bhattaraka (899- (940), Acarya Jet950), Pradyumna ari (940-980), Jina Suri (980), Abhay- | (940), Ratnakuti adeva Suri (1000), (940-1000), Ratna Laghu-Samantabha Vajra (979-1040) dra (1000),Kalyanacandra (1000). 11th cent. Ananta Virya (1039), Deva Suri (1086-1169) Jina Mitra (1025) Danasila (1025) Jnana-sri Mitra (1040), Ratnakara Santi (1040), Jnana Sri Bhadra (1050), Yamari (1050), Sankarananda (1050), Subhakara Gupta (1080), Moksakara Gupta (1100). 12th cent. Sasadhara (1 125), Varadaraja (1150), Ballabhacarya (1200) Ganesa's Nyayalitavati (1200), Gangesa Upadhyaya's Tattvacintamani (1200) Hemacandra (10881172), Candraprabha Suri (1 102), Nemicandra (1150) Ananda Suri and Amaracandra Suri (1093-1135), Haribhadra Suri (1120), Parsvadeva Gari (1133), Sri Candra (1137-1165),

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BANERJEE : SIDDHASENADIVAKARA AND HIS NYAYAVATARA 113 Dates Jain Logic Buddhist Logic Ancient Indian Logic by Centuries 12th cent. Devabhadra (1150), Candrasena Suri (1150), Ratnaprabha Suri (1181), Tilakacarya (1180-1240) 13th Cent. Vardhamana Upadhyaya (1250), Kesava Misra (1275), Tarkabhasa, Paksadhara Misra (1275), Vasudeva Misra (1275), Rucidatta Misra (1275), Mallisena Suri (1292) 14th Cent. Bhagiratha (1400) Mahesa Thakura (1400) Rajasekhara Suri (1348), Jnanacandra (1350) 15th Cent. Sri Kantha (1409), Gunaratna (1409), Abhaya Tilakopa- Srutasagara Gani dhyaya (1409) (1493), Sankara Misra (1450), Vacaspati Misra (1450) Misaru Misra (1475), Vasudeva Sarvabhauma (1450-1525), Raghunatha Siromani (1477-1547), Haridasa Nyayalankara Bhattacarya (1480-1540) 16th Cent. Durgadatta (1550) Janakinatha Sarma (1550), Kanada Tarkavagisa (1560), Ramakrsna Bhattacarya (1560), Devanatha Thakura | (1562), Mathuranatha Tarkavagisa Dharmabhusana (1570), (1600)

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114 JAIN JOURNAL : Vol-XXXII, No. 4 April 1998 Jain Logic Buddhist Logic Dates by Centuries Ancient Indian Logic 16th cent. Gunananda Vidyavagisa (1570), Krsnadasa Sarvabhauma (1575) Madhusudana Thakura (1575) 17th cent. Annambhatta Yasovijaya Gani (1623) Jagadisa (1608-1688) Tarkalankara (1625), Vinaya-vijaya Bhavananda (1625). (1613-1681) Harirama (1625), Rajacudamani (1630), Visvanatha Nyayapancanana (1634), Govinda (1650), Gopinatha Mauni (1650), Raghunatha (1650), Gadadhara Bhattacarya (1650), Sri Krsna Nyayalankara (1650), Ramabhadra (1660) NTsimha (1675), Ramadeva Ciranjiva (1700), Ramarudra Tarkavagisa (1700), Jayarama Tarkalankara (1700) 18th cent. Gaurikanta Sarvabhauma (1725), Rudrarama (1750), 'Buno' Ramanatha (1780), Krsnakanta Vidyavagisa (1780) Mahadeva Puntamkara (1790) 19th cent. Raghunatha Sastri (Parvata) (1815)

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THE CONCEPTION OF DRAVYAS IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY * KAMAL CHAND SOGANI Jainism takes experience as its guide and resolves the whole of the universe of being into two everlasting, uncreated, co-existing, but independent categories of Jiva and Ajiva. The Ajiva is further classified into pudgala (matter), Dharma (principle of motion), Adharma (principle of rest), Akasa (space) and Kala (time). Hence reality is dualistic as well as pluralistic. But according to the Jaina plurality, though an ontological fact, entails unity also, if it is considered from the synthetic and objective point of view of one existence. According to Kundakunda, in spite of the unique characteristics possessed by the different substances (Dravyas) existence has been regarded as an all-comprising characteristics of reality which ends all distinctions.' The Karttikeyanupreksa recognises that all substances are one from the stand-point of substance, while they are distinct and separate from their characteristic differences.2 Samantabhadra also endorses this view by affirming that in view of the conception of one universal existence all are one, but from the point of view of substances distinctions arise.3 Padmaprabhamaladharideva pronounces that a 'Mahasatta' pervades all the things in their entiriety, but it is always associated with 'Avantarasatta' which pervades only the particular objects. In a similar vein, Amrtacandra speaks of the two types of Satta, namely, 'Svarupasatta' and 'Sadrasyasatta.' The latter is the same as 'Samanyasatta;5 In his Saptabhangitarangnini Vimaladasa discusses the problem of unity and plurality of existence in detail, and concludes that both the postulation of existential identity and the articulation of differences from the stand-point of different substance are logically justifiable. Thus Jainism gives credence to the recognition of existential oneness but not exclusively, since it is always bound up with plurality. This is quite consistent with the Anekantatmaka view * Reprinted from C. L. Jain's Felicitation Volume. 1. Prava. comm. Amrta. 11-5 2. Kartti. 236 3. Aptamimansa-34 4. Niyama. comm. Padmaprabha. 34 5. Prava. comm. Amrta. II, 3, 5, 6. Saptabhangitarangini p. 78.

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116 JAIN JOURNAL : Vol-XXXII, No. 4 April 1998 of reality propounded by the Jaina philosophers. The sole warrant for the existence of one and many, unity and diversity, is experience which vouches for such a character of reality. Thus, Mahasatta will be associated with its opposite, namely, Avantarasatta.? It may again be pointed out that this Mahasatta is not an independent something as may be conceived, but is invariably accompanied by its opposite.8 Kundakunda holds the nature of existence as one, immanent in the totality of substances constituting the universe, comprehending and summarizing the universe, having infinite modifications, indicative of the triple characteristics of origination, destruction, and persistence and in the last as associated with the charateristics opposite to those ed above. Hence unity, duality, and plurality are inseparably and inevitably involved in the structure of reality. By recognising both Jiva and pudgala as substances Jainism steers clear of the two extremes of materialism and idealism which are radically opposed to each other. Materialism considers the universe as rooted in matter, while idealism imagines the mind or spirit to the fundamental and primary. The former lays stress on the recognition of the reality of matter and considers the mind to be an incident or accompaniment; the latter affirms that mind or spirit is to be reckoned as real and matter just an appearance. But according to Jainism, both matter and spirit are only partially true, and neither is warrantable unless experience is allowed to be robbed of its significance. Notwithstanding the mutual interpenetration of the six Dravyas and the accommodative nature of each, they never part with their original nature. 10 This statement is indicative of the fact that these Dravyas are incapable of transgressing their fixed number which is six. Therefore, this reduction or multiplication is an impossibility.11 With the solitary exception of Kala Dravya, the remaining five are termed as Pancastikaya for the simple reason of possessing many Pradesas, 12The word 'Kaya' should be understood only to connote ' many Pradesas. 13 Jiva, Dharma and Adharma separately own innumerable Pradesas; Akasa possesses infinite ones; Kala, one; but Pudgala possesses numberable, and infinite Pradesas.l4 All the Dravyas except 7. Panca. comm. Amrata. 8 8. Pancadhyayi. 1. 15 9. Panca. 8 10. Ibid 7 11. Sarvartha V. 4 12. panca. comm. Amrta. 22 Panca 102; Parva II. 43; Niyama. 34. 13. Sarvartha. V I. 14. Dravya 25; Tsu. V. 8, 9, 10; Niama 35, 36. The Space occupied by an atom is called a Pradesa.

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SOGANI: THE CONCEPTION OF DRAVYAS IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Pudgala are pronounced to be bereft of material qualities of touch, taste, smell and colour, and only Jiva is believed to have possessed consciousness. Hence Dharma, Adharma, Kala and Akasa are destitute of consciousness, as also of material qualities. Thus they should not be misapprehended as being comprised under the category of matter, but under a different category of non-sentiency-cum-non-materiality. As for Dharma, Adharma and Akasa, each of them is considered to be one, while Jiva and Pudgala are infinite; and Kala is innumerable. 15 Besides Dharma, Adharma, Akasa and Kala are by nature non-active and the remaining two are active. 16 Nature of self: Having discussed the general nature of the six substances, we now proceed to deal with their specific nature. We start with Jiva (self). 117 The problem of self is the most fundamental in the domain of philosophy. Since the dawn of philosophical speculation down to the present time it has vexed great philosophers and led them to formulate different conceptions consistent with the metaphysical outlook upheld by them. With Jainism though the probing into the nature of self is not a new enterprise, the special point of the Jaina view consists in substantiating the notion of self without blinking the loftiest mystical heights on the one hand and without condemning the unabstracted experience as sheer illusion on the other. The self, as an Ontologically underived fact, is one of the six substances subsisting independently of anything else. The experience of knowing17 feeling18 and willing undeniably proves the existence of self. The Karttikeyanupreksa recognises that the self is to be regarded as possessing supreme significance among the substances and as having the highest value among the Tattvas. 20 It is the repository of excellent characteristics.21 It is the internal Tattva. It is to be distinguished from the other substances which are merely external, since they are without any knowledge of things to be renounced and accepted,22 Kundakunda in the Pravacanasara calls it Mahartha (a great objectivity23). It is neither 15. Gomma. Ji 587; Tsu. V. 6. 16. Sarvartha. V 7; Panca. 98. 17. Acaranga 1 1.5 p. 50 18. Kartti. 183. 19. Kartti. 184. 20. Kartti. 204. 21. Ibid.... 22. Kartti 205. 23. Parva II. 150.

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JAIN JOURNAL: Vol-XXXII, No. 4 April 1998 merely an immutable principle as advocated by the Vedanta, the Samkhya-Yoga and the Nyaya-Vaisesika, not merely a momentarily transmutable series of psychical states as recognised by the Buddhist. But, according to the Jaina, it is a synthesis of permanence and change. Consciousness, according to him, is its essential and distinguishing feature. The Jaina, therefore differs from the Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Purva-Mimamsa which regard consciousness as an adventitious attribute, as also from the Carvaka which envisages consciousness as an epiphenomenon of matter, something like the inebriating power emerged from the mixing of certain ingredients. The systems of thought like the Samkhya-Yoga and the Vedanta of Samkara and Ramanuja betrary a fair resemblance to the consideration of the Jaina that consciousness is intrinsically associated with the self. 118 Nature of empirical self: First the empirical self has been in a state of transmigration since an indeterminable past. It is on this account contended that the self originates and decays. But this is valid only from the Paryayarthika point of view and not from the Dravyarthika one which lays down indestructibility and unproductivity of the Self.24 Secondly, the empirical self is in possession of non-essential vyanjanaparyaya and non-essential arthaparyaya. It illumines the whole of the body by pervading in it, just as the lotus-hued ruby illumines the cup of milk.25 Thirdly, the empirical self is considered by the Jaina as the doer of evil and good actions. Fourthly, it is also the enjoyer. To sum up, the empirical self is bound by Karmas from an indefinite past, is the enjoyer of the self-performed good and bad actions, is the knower and the seer, and is associated with the triple nature of origination, destruction and continuance. Besides, it possesses the narrowing and dilating characteristics, extends up to the limit of bodily dimensions and owns its specific characteristics of knowledge, bliss etc26. It may be noted here that Jainism recognises the metaphysical reality of infinite selves. We may point out in passing that the relation between the empirical self and transcendental one is one of identity-cum-difference, i.e, there is metaphysical identity between the two states (empirical and superempirical) of the same self, but the difference is also undeniable in respect of the Upadhis which have been persisting since an infinite past. The empirical self is potentially transcendental, though this nominal state of existence is not actualised at present; hence the distinction is incontrovertible. 24. Prava. 11-20-22, Panca 17, 1S and comm. Jayasena. 25. Panca. 33. 26. Siddha Bhakti. 2

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SOGANI : THE CONCEPTION OF DRAVYAS IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 119 One sensed empirical selves : The empirical self is recognised by the Pranas it owns. The minimum number of Pranas possessed by the empirical self is four (one-sense, one bala, life-limit and breathing), and the maximum number is ten (five senses, three balas, life-limit, and breathing). However, encumbered by the cruel matter self may be, it cannot obstruct the manifestation of consciousness to the full, just as even the most dense cloud cannot interrupt the light of the sun to its farthest extreme. The lowest in the grade of existence are the one-sensed jivas. They possess four Pranas. To make it clear, of the five senses namely the sense of touch, taste, smell, colour and sound, the one-sensed jivas possess only the sence of touch; and of the three balas namely: balas of mind, body and speech, they have only bala of body, and besides they hold life-limit and breathing. These one-sensed jivas admit of five fold classification,28 namely earth-bodied, water-bodied, fire-bodied, air bodied and lastly, vegetable-bodied souls. The recognition of these one-sensed souls is fraught with great difficulty since the four Pranas are not explicitly manifested, just as the Pranas of a man in the state of numbness, or just as the Pranas of a growing soul in the egg of a bird or in the embryonic state cannot be recognised owing to the lack of their explicit manifestation.29 Two-sensed to five sensed impirical souls : Having pointed out the various forms of existence of one-sensed jivas and the number of Pranas upheld by them, we now proceed to the higher grades of existence. The two-sensed Jivas possess six Pranans, i.e. in addition to the four Pranas of one-sensed souls, they have two Pranas more, namely, sense of taste, and bala of speech; the three-sensed souls have the sense of smell additionally, the four-sensed souls have the sense of colour besides the above; and lastly the five sensed souls which are mindless are endowed with the sense of hearing in addition, and those with mind possess all the the ten Pranas. 30 Thus the number of Pranas, possessed by one-sensed to five-sensed souls are four, six, seven, eight, nine and ten respectively. The illustrations of the two-sensed souls are, sea-snail, cowrie-shell-fish, conch-shell-fish, earth-worm etc., of the three-sensed souls are louce, 27. Panca 30, Prava II, 54, 55 and comm. Amrta. 28. Panca 110, Sarvartha II-13. 29. Panca. 113. 30. Sarvartha II-14. 31. Panca. 114.

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120 JAIN JOURNAL : Vol-XXXII, No. 4 April 1998 bug, ant32, of the four-sensed souls are mosquito, fly and butter fly33 of the five-sensed souls with ten Pranas are celestial, hellish, and human beings and some sub-human souls34; and of the five-sensed souls with nine-pranas are only some sub-human souls35. All the diverse mundane souls right up to four-sensed ones are designated as non-rational or mindless (Asamjni), whereas the five-sensed subhuman beings may be rational and non-rational, but the celestial, hellish and human beings are necessarily rational36. The rational souls may be recognised by the capability of being preached, of receiving instruction, and of voluntary action37. Spiritual classification of selves : Apart from the empirical classification of selves, Jainism gives us a different classification of selves from the spiritual point of view. If the former classification refers to the scientific attitude of the Jains, the latter refers to his spiritual outlook. The three kinds of self which the Jains recognise from the spiritual stand -piont are Bahiratman, Antaratman, and Paramatman. (a) Bahiratman : The attitude of Carvaka materialist may very well sum up the meaning of the Bahiratman. The characteristics of the Bahiratman may, in the first place, be accounted for by affirming that he identifies himself with the physical body.,38 wife and children, silver and gold39 etc. with the logical consequence that he is constantly obsessed with the fear of self-annihilation of the body and the like.40 Secondly, he remains engaged in the transient pleasures of the senses,41 feels elated in getting the coveted things of the unsubstantial world, and becomes dejected when they depart. Thirdly, he is desirous of getting beautiful body and physical enjoyment in the life hereafter as a result of his penances, 42 and is tormented even by the thought of death.43 32. Ibid. 115. 33. Ibid. 116. 34. Panca. 117 and comm. Amrita. 35. ibid (In all references from 4 to 5 translation borrowed from Chakravarti's Pancastikaya) 36. Panca comm. Amrta, 117. 37. Gomm. Ji, 660. 38. Mo, Pa, 8. Samadhi 7, 13, 69 Kartti 193. 39. Mo. Pa. 10 Samadhi 11, 14 Jnana XXXII 17, 21. 40. Jnana XXXII. 18. 41. Samadhi 7, 55 pp. 1-84 42. Samadhi-42. 43. Samadhi-76.

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SOGANI : THE CONCEPTION OF DRAVYAS IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 121 (b) Antaratman : First, he is the spiritually converted self44 who has relinquished the eight kinds of pride45, and reflects on his own self as his legitimate and genuine abode, disparaging the outward physical dwelling places as unnatural and artificial.46 Secondly, he renounces all identification with the animate objects like wife, children etc. and inanimate objects like wealth, property etc. and properly weighs them in the balance of his discriminative knowledge.47 Thirdly, by virtue of the sprouting of profound wisdom in him, he develops a unique attitude towards himself and the world around him. He is the only self that has acquired the right of Moksa, 48 and consequently he adopts such attitude as is necessary to safeguard his spiritual status and interest. He gets endowed with such type of insight as will enable him resolutely to march for spiritual invasion and then sound the bugle of triumph after defeating the treacherous foes of attachment and aversion assaulting him in his Bahiratman. (c) Paramatman : The paramatman is the supreme-self, the consummation of aspirant's life, the terminus of his spiritual endeavours. The embodied nan is Arhat, while the disembodied one is Siddha.49 The Moksa Pahuda proclaims Paramatman as bereft of collyrium, defects, body. senses and as associated with omniscience, and purity.50 He is free from birth, old age and death; he is supreme, pure, and devoid of eight Karmas; he possesses infinite knowledge, intuition, bliss, and potency; and he is indivisible, indestructible, and inexhaustible,51 Besides, he is super-sensuous and unparalleled; is free from obstructions, merit, demerit, and rebirth; and is enternal, steady, and independent.52 Nature and Function of Pudgala (Matter) : Matter, according to Jainism, is not something formless, indefinite, 44. Mo. Pa-5, Kartti. 194. 5. Kartti-194. The eight kinds of pride are-pride of (1) learning (2) honour (3) family (4) caste (5) power (6) opulence (7) penace and (8) body. 46. Samadhi-73 47. Mo. Pa. 17. 48. Ibid 14, 37. 49. Kartti 198. 50. Mo Pa. 5, 6. 51. Niyama-176. 52. Ibid. 177. pridoceface learning honour

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JAIN JOURNAL: Vol-XXXII, No. 4 April 1998 and absolutely featureless as conceived by Anaximander, nor is it to be regarded as norr-being in the Platonic sense, "a secondary; a dull, irrational, recalcitrant force, the unwilling slave of mind. 53 Neither does it admit of its being considered to be a sensation complex, a collection of ideas as signified by the subjective idealism of Barkeley. Apart from this, it is to be distinguished from the Prakrti of Samkhya. Jainism propounds matter in the realistic sense, and so its congnizance is based on its characteristics sense-qualities of touch, taste, smell and colour which are in the relation of invariable concomitance, i.e, one quality is never found in isolation, but always is a group of four, though in varying degrees of intensity.54 The conception of matter is so comprehensive as to comprise under it the five substances of earth., water, air, light and Dravya-mind out of nine substances admitted by the Vaisesika. Hence these five snbstances are easily assimilable in Pudgala55, since they emerge out of material atoms by varying combinations. The aforementioned four qualities of atom admit of numberable, innumberable and infinite classifications; but the principal kinds are regarded as twenty; namely eight kinds of touch (soft, hard, heavy, light hot, cold, viscous, and dry56); five kinds of tastes (bitter, pungent, sour, sweet, and astringent)57; two kinds of smell (fragrance and the reverse58); five kinds of colour (blue, yellow, white, black and red).59 The functions of Pudgala are: the five types of body, the speach, the mind, the karmic particles, the breathing including exhailing and inhailing the pleasure and the pain, the life and the death, and the five senses.60 122 Kinds of Pudgala: The principal forms in which Pudgala (matter) exists are anu (atom) and skhandha (aggregate).61 Binary to infinite aggregates are included in skhandha.62 An atom is of only one Pradesa, is the terminus of divisibility of matter, is by itself without beginning, end or middle, is destitute of sound and is coupled with the qualities of taste, touch, smell and colour.63 Besides it is indestructible and eternal, is responsible 53. History of Philosophy (Edition 1949) p. 59 54. Tsu. V. 23; Sarvartha V.5. 55. Sarvartha V. 3. 56. Sarvartha V. 23. 57. Ibid. 58. Ibid. 59. Ibid. 60. Panca 82, Sarvatha. V. 19, 20 61. Tsu V 25; Niyama. 20. 62. Sarvartha V. 26. 63. Panca 77.

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SOGANI: THE CONCEPTION OF DRAVYAS IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY for the disruption of skhandhas by virtue of its segregation from them, is also the substantial cause of them and is the measure of time.64 Again it is devoid of sound, but is the cause of sound i.e., the combination of atoms may produce sound when they strike against other aggregates of atoms.65 It possesses any one colour, any one taste, any one smell, but a pair of such touches as are not of cotradictory nature, namely, cold and viscous, or cold and dry, or hot and viscous or hot and dry.66 The remaining touches, namely, soft and hard, light and heavy are only manifested in the skhandha state of matter, and thus are not present in its atomic state. The qualities of viscousness (snigdhata) and dryness (ruksata) vary in degrees of intensity extending from the lowest limit to the highest, from one point to infinity.67 The variation in the degrees of intensity may be ordinarily witnessed in the milk of she-goat, cow, buffalo, and she-camel in point of viscousness, and in dust (pamsu), gross-sand (kanika), and sand (sarkara) in respect of dryness. 68 Hence atoms are capable of existing with infinite variability in these two characteristics. These are responsible for atomic linking.69 Thus, for explaining the combination of atoms this assumption excludes God or Adrasta as recognised by the Nyaya-Vaisesika school of thought, as also the primordial motion of atoms as advocated by Democritus. Though, according to the Jaina, atom is active,70 activity is not the cause of combination. It will not be amiss to say that those atoms which are at the lowest in the scale of viscousness and dryness are not given in combination either with one another or with other intensifications." But atoms which hold two degrees of viscousness and dryness in excess are given to interlinking; i.e. atoms which hold two degrees of viscousness and dryness are interlinkable with four degrees of the same in all respects. Similarly, this law holds good for other interlinkings.73 Besides, the atoms which possess four degrees of viscousness or dryness are capable of transforming atoms having two degrees of viscousness or dryness into their own nature.74 Similarly, this holds good for all those atoms which have a difference of two degrees of viscousness or dryness. This theory 64. Panca. 80. 65. Panca. 78, 79; 81. 66. Ibid. 81., Niyama, 27. comm. Amtata. 67. Sarvartha V 33, 68. Ibid. 33. 69. Gomm. Ji 608, 70, Panca. comm. Amrta. 98. 71. Sarvartha V. 34. 72. Ibid. V. 35. 73. Ibid. V. 36. 74. Ibid. V 37. 123

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124 JAIN JOURNAL : Vol-XXXII, No. 4 April 1998 thus avoids mere conjunction of atoms, but propounds their synthetic indentification.75 We now proceed to skhandha. The aggregates of atoms exist in six different forms, nemely- (1) Gross-gross, (2) Gross, (3) Gross-fine, (4) Fine-Gross (5) Fine and lastly (6) Fine fine. 76 (1) The class of matter which, when divided, cannot restore its original state without any extraneous help is termed as gross-gross. The examples of which are wood, stone, and the like. (2) That which can be reunited on being divided without the intervention of a third something is called gross, as for example, water, oil, etc. (3) Shadow, Sunshine, etc. which are incapable of distintegration and grasp are subsumed under grossfine. (4) The object of touch, taste, smell and hearing are called fine gross. (5) The Karmic matter etc. which are imperceptible by the senses are included into the category of fine. (6) The binary aggregates and the skandhas smaller than the Karmic matter come under the next category of fine-fine. As we have said, the generation of sound is effected by the striking of skandhas against one another. Thus Jainism take exception to the view of Nyaya-Vaisesika which calls sound the quality of Akasa, in as much as it is capable of being sensed which would not have been possible had it been the quality of Akasa. Next comes the reality of Dharma, Adharma, Akasa and Kala. None of the philosophical systems originated in the east and west postulated the independent existence of the principle of motion (Dharma) and the principle of rest (Adharma). Besides, the idealistic thinkers have unhesitatingly brushed aside the reality even of space and time, since they find themselves in the meshes of irreconcilable contradictions. Kant regarded them as the forms of perceptions which are imposed by sensibility upon things. Hence on account of glasses of space and time attached to sensibility, the noumenal reality escapes our grip and its attainment becomes a wild goose-chase. But the Jaina who relies upon the findings of experience absolves us from the creations of a priori logic by positing the reality of Dharma, Adharma, Akasa and Kala answering to the experienced motion, rest, allowance of room, and change respectively. We shall now throw some light on the nature of motion. All the idealists are unanimous in rejecting the reality of motion and in designating it as mere appearance, phenomenal, and unworthy of being intelligibly applied to thing-in itself. The Eleatic philosopher Zeno was the first to raise the voice against the possibility of motion. But Jainism 75. Sarvatha. V. 37.

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SOGANI : THE CONCEPTION OF DRAVYAS IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 125 recognises the reality of motion. It is defined as the modification originating from the external and internal inducements which make possible the traversing from one point of space to anotber.77 The substances like Dharma, Adharma, Akasa and Kala are non-active and motionless in this sense, but Jiva and Pudgala are said to be the authors of motion; that is, these two Dravyas are capable of being active to the exclusion of others.78 Activity is not a different, independent category, but a special modification of these two substances due to the external and internal causes.79Besides, it should be distinguished from the Arthaparyaya which means motionless change possessed by all the six Dravyas. The activity of Jiva is due to the external causal agency of Karman. Thus Siddhas are non-active on account of the absence of Karman.80 The activity of Pudgala is due to the external agency of Kala. It will remain perpetual, since unlike Karmic particles Kala can never be absent at any time. Thus the Pudgala unlike the Siddhas cannot be non-active.81 Akasa : That extent of speace which is replete with matter, souls, time, principle of motion, and principle of rest is labelled as Lokakasa, or world space. This distinguishes it from Alokakasa or empty space wherein none of the five substances abides.82 Thus the former is recognised as being capable of providing accommodation to Jivas, Pudgala and to the rest of the Dravyas. That space is in its own base and support, and does not call for any other substance to accommodate. It is evident from the fact that there is no other substance of more vastness than this which may provide room to it. And even if it is conceded, it will implicitly lead us to the fallacy of regress and infinitum.83 Bedsides, it is imperative to note that, considered from the point of view of the thing-in-itself, all substances exist in themselves. It is only regarded from the commonplace point of view that all substances are subsisting in space.84 The principles of motion of oil in the seed.85 Despite the omnipresence of Dharma and Adharma in the 76. Niyama. 21 to 24 77. Sarvartha. V. 7; Panca comm. Amrta. 98 78. Sarvartha. V. 7. 79. Rajava, V. 7/1,2. 80. Panca. comm. Amrta 98; Rajava V. 7/14 to 16. 81. Panca comm. Amrta 98. 82. Dravya. 20; Sarvartha V. 12, Panca. 90, 91. 83. Rajava. V. 12/2 to 4. 84. Rajava. V. 12/5 to 6. 85. Sarvartha V. 13.

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126 JAIN JOURNAL : Vol-XXXII, No. 4 April 1998 Lokakasa and the existence of Jiva, Pudgala, and Kala therein they never forfeit their respective specific nature. 86 Dharma and Adharma : Dharma and Adharma are the indifferent conditions of movement and rest respectively. Dharmastikaya is itself incapable of migration and of generating motion in other things, but is the sine qua non of the movement of Jivas and Pudgala by its mere existence, just as water assists in spontaneous movement of fish by its mere presence and not as the wind which has the capability to develop activity in certain things.87 Similarly, Adharmastikaya does not persuade Jiva and Pudgala in motion to stand still, but becomes the passive cause when they of their own accord discontinue to move, just as the shadow of a tree does not persuade a traveller to take rest under it. 88 Thus neither Dharmastikaya actuates motion, nor Adharmastikaya stops it. Both of them are the non-provoking conditions. Besides, these two Principles are also responsible for the demarcation89 of Lokakasa and Alokakasa in as much as they make possible the existence of Jiva and Pudgala only in Lokakasa. Again, the residence of the Siddhas at summit of the world also proves that space cannot account for motion and rest and different principles like Dharma and Adharma must needs be assumed. 90 Kala : The underlying assumption of the whole Jaina philosophy is that though reality is incessantly subject to mutation, it sustains its identical character. Thus everyone of the substances without exception is credited with origination, destruction and persistence. In the substances like Dharma, Adharma, Akasa and liberated soul and an atom of matter the qualities are continuously changing in themselves. The experience of change, however, in the mundane soul and in the gross matter is omnipresent. And this is of necessity to be accounted for, and should not be speculatively condemned as mere illusion. In view of this, the Jainas realistically confer an existantial status on 'time' as substance to anwer for the experienced change92 just as 86. Rajava. V. 16/10. 87. Panca 85, 88 and comm. Amrta. 88. Ibid. 86. 89. Panca. 87. 90. Ibid. 92, 93 and comm. Amrta. 91. Prava. comm Amrata. II. 1. 92. Niyama. 33.

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SOGANI : THE CONCEPTION OF DRAVYAS IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 127 Dharma, Adharma and Akasa have been calculated to throw light on be called motion, rest and providing of room.93 Kant's statement is worthy to be noted when he affirms that it is impossible to emancipate ourselves from the spatial and temporal ways of thinking and speaking despite our-endeavours; but the Jains though honour their thesis, refuse to acquiesce in the fact that space and time are contributed by sensibility, since according to them they are revealed in experience and are objectively and ontologically true. Just as space is its own support, so also real time is conceived to be assisting its own change or modification along with its being the condition of change in other substances constituting the universe. Kala may be classified into real time (Paramartha Kala) and conditioned time (Vyavahara Kala).94 The former is the substance proper95 and Samay vali are conditioned time. 96 The function of Paramartha kala is Vartana; i.e, it passively helps the self-changing substances; and the functions of conditioned time are change, motion and the feeling of being young and old.97 As has already been pointed out, Kala Dravya is deprived of the designation 'Kaya' inasmuch as it has only one Pradesa in the form of Kala Anu. These Kala anus are innumerable and separtely exist on each Pradesa of Lokakasa without being mixed with one another. 98 The unit of conditioned time is called "Samaya" which may be defined as the period required by the primary material atom to traverse with slow pace from one Pradesa of Akasa to the immediately next. 99 It is practically inconceivable in life. It should be borne in mind that the innumberable 'Samayas' lapse in the opening of an eyelid. 93. Niyama. 30. 94. Sarvartha. V. 22. 95. Tsu. V. 39. 96. Niyama. 31 97. Sarvartha. V-22. 98. Dravya. 22; Niyama. 32. 99. Prava. II, 47.

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128 JAIN JOURNAL : Vol-XXXII, No. 4 April 1998 List of Abbreviations Acaranga - Acaranga-sutra (Sacred Books of the East, Vol. XXII.) Aptamimamsa - Aptamimamsa of Samantabhadhra (Ananta kirti Granthamala, Bombay). Dravya-Dravyasangraha (Sarale Jain Grantha Bhandara, Jabalpur). Gomma Ji-Gommatasara-Jivakanda of Nemicandra (Rayacandra Jaina Sastramala) History of Philosophy by Jhilly (Allahabad Central Book Depot 1949). Jnana-Jnanarnava of subhacandra (Rayacandra Jaina Sastramala, Bombay). Kartti - Karttikeyanupreksa (Rayacandra Jaina Sastramala, Bombay). Mo. Pa.-Moksa-Pahuda of Kunda kunda (Patani Digambara Jaina Granthamala, Marotha). Niyama-Niyamasara of Kundakunda (Sacred Books of the Jainas Vol. IX). Niyama comm. Padmaprabha-Niyamasara of Kundakunda along with the commentary of Padmaprabhamaladhara (Jain Grantharatnakara Karyalaya, Bombay). Pancadhyayi-Pancadhyayi (Malika Granthaprakasaka Karayalaya, Indore). Panca-Pancastikaya of Kundakunda (Rayacandra Jaina Sastramala, Bombay). Panca comm. Amrta-Pancastikaya of Kundakunda along with the commentry of Amrtacandra (Rayacandra Jain Sastramala, Bombay). Panca comm. Jayasena-Pancastikaya of Kundakunda along with the commentary of Jayasena (Rayacandra Jain Sastramala, Bombay). Prava - Pravacanasara of Rayachandra Jain Sastramala, Bombay). Prava comm. Ameta-Pravacanasara of Kundakunda along with the commentary of Amrtacandra (Rayacandra Jaina Sastramala, Bombay).

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