Jain Journal 1998 04

SR No.: 520130
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Jain Bhawan Publication
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication
Publication Year: 1998
Total Pages: 39
Language: English
Classification: Magazine, India_Jain Journal, & India
File Size: 3 MB

Page 19

BANERJEE : SIDDHASENADIVĀKARA AND HIS NYĀYĀVATĀRA
109 of passions is not a speaker, as a piece of stone (heterogeneous example).
Here, though a piece of stone is both "devoid of passions" and "not a speaker", yet there is no invariable separation (vyatireka vyāpti) between "devoid of passions" and "a speaker".
(ii) Of separation unshown (apradarsita-vyatireka) :
Sound is non-eternal (major term), because it is produced (middle term); as ether (example).
Here, though there is an invariable separation between “produced" and "eternal", yet it has not been shown in the proper form, such as: "Whatever is non-non-eternal is not produced, e.g. ether".
(iii) Of contrary separation (viparita-vyatireka) :
Sound is non-eternal (major term), because it is produced (middle term) : whatever is not produced is non-non-eternal, e.g. ether (example).
Here the example has been put in a contrary way, for the proper form should have been :
Whatever is non-non-eternal is not produced, e.g. ether."
12. Refutation Refutation (dūşana) is the pointing out of defects or fallacies in the statements of the opponent in any of the forms enumerated above. The semblance of a refutation (dūşaņābhāsa) is the contrivance to allege defects where there are no defects at all.
13. Consequence of Pramāņa The immediate effect of pramāna (valid knowledge) is the removal of ignorance. The consequence of the transcendental perception (pāramārthika pratyaksa pramāna) is bliss and equanimity consisting in salvation (Moksa or final emancipation), while that of the other kinds of pramāna (direct and indirect knowledge) is the facility which they afford us to choose the desirable and reject the undesirable things.
II. Naya-the method of description
Naya is the method of comprehending things from particular standpoints. Thus we may conceive rose either as a flower possessing the attributes common to all flowers or as a thing possessing attributes