Debate And Independent Reasoning Vs Tradition On Precarious Position Of Early Nyaya

Author(s): Karin Preisendanz
Publisher: Karin Preisendanz
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269501/1

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Debate and Independent Reasoning vs. Tradition:
On the Precarious Position of Early Nyaya
KARIN PREISENDANZ, Vienna
Already in the Vedic period the Indian intellectual tradition displays an unusually high capacity for systematic and analytical thinking which it applies to various areas of human concern. It suffices to mention two prominent examples in core areas of interest: in the religious sphere, the so-called speculations of the Brahmana-s which, following OLDENBERG's designation, deserve to be styled a "pre-scientific science," and in the linguistic sphere, initially subservient to religious and ritual purposes, the sophisticated analysis of the Sanskrit language as we encounter it in full bloom in Panini's famous grammar, where analysis is augmented by the achievement of the creation of an artificial language. Also reaching back to the Vedic period is the practice of public or semi-public debate on initially only religious, later also philosophical and other topics, a practice which led to the development of special cristic and dialectical traditions, this development in turn was closely interwoven with the development of the systematic philosophical traditions of the classical period. As these traditions evolved in mutual dialectical interaction, their epistemology and logic being continuously refined in the course of philosophical analysis, reason and religious tradition assumed a relationship of actual or potential confrontation, at times even one of opposition, or at least such was supposed by some.
The orthodox" brahmanical tradition now had to react to this situation and first of all define its attitude towards the employment of the various refined instru ments and methods of reasoning as well as towards those who employed them -
orthodox" being used here as a convenient abbreviation to differentiate from the 50called heterodox traditions. i.e.. the Buddhist and Jain traditions. The thinkers of the
1 am indebted to Eli Franco for his careful reading of this paper and his valuable construc tive criticism, and to Anne MacDonald for her insightful remarks.
CE. OLDENBERG 1919. Cf. most recently STAAL 1995, 101-109
Festschrift Minoru Hara (2000), S. 221-251

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philosophical traditions, for their part, especially those who considered themselves followers of the orthodox" tradition in general, had to reflect on their respective school's relationship to tradition and to determine the role of reason, in the sense of their specific methods of reasoning and analysis, in this light. As can be expected, the position of the orthodox tradition varies considerably, not only for the different schools but in some cases also for the different historical stages of a given school, as does the more specific understanding of the nature of tradition itself; the intensity of reflection on the relation between tradition and reason, on the other hand, reflects the degree of importance of the tradition for a specific school, be it the importance of the tradition as such for the school's doctrinal self-understanding, as exemplified to a high degree in classical Vedānta, or its importance as the focal point and decisive factor in the attempt to locate the school safely in the orthodoxy," in the wider sense of the dominant and prestigious cultural milieu shaped by it.
The classical philosophical tradition of Nyāya provides a prominent example for vigorous reflection on the role of reason and its own methods of reasoning vis-àvis the orthodox tradition, belonging to the second type just outlined. Of fundamental importance in this connection is the famous exposition by Paksilasvamin Vatsyayana, the earliest Nyāya author whose work has come down to us in its entirety, in his commentary on the programmatic first sūtra of the Mydyasárra, an exposition which has been treated by a number of Indian and Western scholars not only in the present context, but also in the related context of the question about the ancient Indian term for philosophy and about the Indian notion of philosophical thinking. In the following I want to indicate just the most important names in chronological order.
The first substantial treatment was undertaken in 1911 by Hermann Jacob in his well-known article on the early history of Indian philosophy' which was translated into English by his Indian student V.A. SUKTHANKAR and published in the Indian Antiquary in 1918. On the Indian side, Satish Chandra VIDYABHUSANA, two years
later, in his then pioneering and fundamental History of Indian Logic which was published posthumously,' utilized Vätsyiyana's statements, obviously unaware of JACOBI's contribution, for his idiosyncratic, but interesting reconstruction of the early history of Indian philosophy and logic as well as the early history of the Nyaya school. He was almost immediately followed in 1922 by his countryman and fellow native of Navadvipa, Surendranath DASGUPTA, in his still widely read History of Indian Philosophy, who rightly criticizes aspects of JACOBI's interpretation of Vatsya. yana's statements concerning the self-understanding of Nyaya, but does not touch upon the main problem of JACOBI's article. His own interpretation, although disputable from the point of view of the history of the Nyaya school proper brings us closer to an understanding of Vätsyāyana's historical and hermeneutic situation.' Essential progress in this respect was made by Paul HACKER in his 1958 article on Anvikșiki,' in which he also engaged in extensive criticism of JACOBI's central claim. Wilhelm HALBFASS, for his part, continued HACKER's criticism and provided, in his characteristic and erudite way. Vätsyāyana's exposition with the hermeneutic perspective of Nyaya self-understanding in a much more comprehensive manner by addressing the general issue of the opposition of reason and tradition as evidenced in Indian intellectual history; he also placed the discussion in the philosophical context of the question about the very nature of philosophy. In my following brief analysis and interpretation I will confine myself to the most essential features of Vätsyayana's self-representation of his school, not without deviating from the earlier interpretations" in my understanding of details and emphases.
C. JACOBI 1911, 734-736; 741.
CF. JACOBI 1918. Although it could be suspected that V.A. Sukthankar, at the time writing from Indore, is identical with the famous V.S. Sukthankar, and although the information provided by S.M. KATRE in the latter's obituary on his stay in Germany and subsequent retum to India (cf. KATRE 1943, 129-131) would allow for a brief period of study also with Jacobi at Bonn, all the more conceivable because of Jacobi's involvement, together with Heinrich Lüders, in Moriz Winternitz's project to critically edit the Mahabharata presented to the International Association of Academies and Learned Societies around the turn of the century, Helmuth VON GLASENAPP's obituary for Jacobi mentions a doctoral student of Jacobi's named Vasudev A. Sukthankar who must be the translator in question (cf. VON GLASENAPP 1938, 6). -I am indebted to my colleague Chlodwig H. Werba for the
reference to the obituary by KATRE.
VIDYABHUSANA died suddenly before he had seen all of the book through the press; cf. the Preface by LJ.S. TARAPOREWALA in VIDYABHUSANA 1920, xi.
Cf. VIDYABRUSANA 1920. 5: 40.
? There is no need to comment further on DASGUPTA's otherwise superficial and slightly confused treatment.
* CF. DASGUPTA 1922, 277-278.
Cf. HACKER 1958, 65-71; 73.
10 CF. HALBFASS 1988, 275-276 (on his criticism of some of HACKER's opinions cf. pp. 283286); HALBFASS 1991, 24, 27-28. HALBFASS also points out the earlier criticism of Jacosi's article by Moriz WINTERNITZ, unknown to HACKER (cf. WINTERNITZ 1929).
"Among further, more extensive treatments one may mention OBERHAMMER 1964.308-310: 316-317 and 1992, 246-252; NARAIN 1983, 72-81: MATELAL 1986, 70-73 (who, despite his "Western" context and orientation, is unfortunately unaware of JACOBI's and HACKER'S contributions); PERRY 1997, 450-452. Briefer references are to be found, e.., in KEITH 1919, 12;

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Vatsyayana's assertions in his Nyayabhasya are introduced and motivated by a reproach formulated by a real or imaginary opponent; the latter criticizes the composition of Myayasutra (NS) 1.1.1" inasmuch as the separate enumeration of the dialectical-eristic items or relevant topics (padartha)", that is, doubt, etc., next to the initial mention of means and objects of valid cognition (pramana, prameya) is useless because the former are included in the latter." Vätsyāyana concede this point, but continues that the four sciences (vidya), among which the examining or investigative science (dnviksiki), the science of Nyaya, counts as the fourth, are taught for the sake of living beings." inasmuch as they, that is, the sciences, proceed in different ways. To the science of Nyaya belong doubt, etc., inasmuch as it has its separate procedure (prasthana)" in this way", without the explicit mention of these relevant
topics it would be a mere science concerned with the Self (adhyatmavidyamatra), as are the Upanişads. Therefore it is set into motion, i.e., propagated by its founder, with doubt, etc., as its special method." In his following remarks, too, Våtsyāyana aims at the identification of the Nyāya with anviksikl, the investigative science, this time in an argumentative way. First he defines Nyaya as "the examination of things by means of the means of valid cognition." Here he refers obviously to the school's characteristic mode of proceeding as the definiendum, that is not to the school or tradition called Nyaya, but to a specific method (nyaya), namely, that of inquisitive thinking, or, already more specifically in view of the immediate context, to methodical thinking or reasoning, also called nyaya.This nyaya is further determined as the act of inferring, literally: "subsequent judging" or "measuring" (anumdna)", based
MISHRA 1966, 17; THAKUR 1975, 41; JUNANKAR 1978, 114-115.
1 pramånaprameyasamayaprayojanadrstdntasiddhantdayavatarkanirnayaddajalavetandihervabhasacchaladninigrahasthandndim tarafdnan wiltrasadhigamah
1) In the Myawasarra itself the term padartha is not used in this sense; cf. also HALRFASS 1992, 85 (a. 39).
M Cf. Mydyabharya (NBA) p. 2.13-14: tatra santaydindprthagracanam anarthakam. Jamsayddayo hiyathasambhava pramaneru prameyesu cantarbhavanto na vatriyanta in. This criticism is introduced after Vitsyayana's comments on the second topic object of valid cognition" (prameya). Compare also Mydyamarjarl (NM) p. 23.1-2: samlayddayas tu paddirthd yathdisambhaway pramdnesu prameyeu cantarbhayarito pi.... It should be noted that THAKUR's ms. J. I.e., the Jaisalmer ms., reads prameye ca instead of prameyeru ca, a reading which is supported by the corresponding passage of the Mydyamarjarl as it appears in the editio princeps (in principle referred to in MM with the siglum kha); cf. NM (VSS) p. 9,20. As Vitsyāyana uses the word pramrya in the immediately preceding passage in the singular (cf. NBh p. 2.9) and prameye is also found in Uddyotakara's paraphrase of the relevant sentence in Midyavarmnika ) p. 14,6 (samlayddayah prameye 'rutarbhavantini prthak te na vdcydh; cf. also NV p. 20.26 with variant 12 transmitted in ms. J), I consider it to reflect the original reading.
15 Compare NM p. 9,7: hyam endevikikl catasnam vidyanan madhye rydyavidyd ganyate...
1 On this motivation to teach on the part of trustworthy persons (apta) cf. NBH (CalSS) P. 566,1-4 (on 2.1.68 = NS 2.1.66; the passage is translated and commented upon in FRANCO 1991 30-33).
I would like to conjecture prthaprasthanäydh, as a bahuwrthi-compound relating to tarydh (cf. the text given in n. 19). The variant prthakprashanam recorded by THAKUR in ms. J (cf. his variant 6. obviously followed in MATILAL 1986, 71) seems to be a lectio facilior as compared to prthakprasthand of all editions known to me, which I myself cannot construe and understand (cf.. however, OBERHAMMER 1992, 248 where prasthana is obviously assumed to be a masculine noun: for this solution sec already JACOBI 1911, 734). For a corroboration of this conjecture compare the obvious bahuvili-compound in NBh p. 2,15 (cf. again n. 19) and MM p. 10.4: prthakprasthånd himd vidydh. As to my interpretation of prarthana as procedure, it is supported by Vicaspati Mišra's paraphrase of the term with yydpåra in the Mydyawarttilaidsparyan (NVT) p. 65.23. Cf. also APTE
1957, .., 6: method." and JUNANKAR 1978,114; 456: "method of treatment." HACKER'S (unjustified) translation and interpretation of prasthana as "Gegenstand" (cf. HACKER 1958, 65; 73 and already JACOBI 1911, 734; see also OBERHAMMER 1964, 309: "formal object," "object, corrected to "methodisches Vorgehen" and "methodisches Element" (to relate prthaprasthandh, as a karmadhdraya-compound, meaningfully to the plural padarthah) in OBERHAMMER 1992, 248, MATILAL 1986, 71: subject matter") is mainly responsible for his not very favourable judgment on Vatsyayana's statements; cf. also the polite criticism in HALBFASS 1988, 275. DASGUPTA (1922, 277) speaks of doubt, etc., as the separate branches of the Nyayavidya, PERRY (1998, 451) of "basis.
Compare Mp. 23,1-2: sambayadayas tu padārthah... ydyapratniherundir prthag upodisyante.
"Ct. NBh p. 2,14-18: saryam ram etar. imas tu catasto vidydh prthakprasthandh prdna blirdim anugrahdyopadifyante ydsm caturthiyam anviksiki mydyavidya. tasydh pythakprasthandh samlaydayah paddythdh, tesdi prthagwacanam artarenddheydtmavidydditram yam sydd yathopanişadah, tasmdt sambayadibih padarthath pathak prasthapyate.
The context is provided by Vitsyayana's brief exposition of the relevant topic "rootive, purpose" (prayojana).
2Cf. also OBERHAMMER's distinction of nyaya, in the sense of method," from Nyāya in OBERHAMMER 1964, esp. 309 and 317, although he also speaks of the method of rydya. In OBERHAMMER 1992 he even argues for the fact that Vatsyayana was responsible for the self-designtion of his philosophical school as Nyly, on the basis of his re-interpretation of the term rydya, in the sense of "leading principle, as found in the exegetical tradition of the Mimamsa. This interesting claim certainly deserves to be taken up in a more detailed historical examination. PERRY (1998, 451) distinguished "reasoning (mydya) and Nyaya.
That is, if one considers the word to be a derivative of the root mi, to account for the fact that Vatsydyana connects the terms pramdry, pramdina, prameya and pramiti, which should be long to the same root as anundry, anumana, etc., with the verbal form praminoti (cf. NBhp. 1,10) which cannot be a present tense form of vmd ("to measure"), but only of Vmi ("to fix, set up") (cf. WERBA 1997, mu). For this root, a derived meaning "to judge, cognize, perceive" is assumed (cf. BOHTLINOK and ROTH 1868, s.v. 1. m, 3). However, it is highly doubtful that midna is a derivative of this root (cf. MAYRHOFER 1993, s.v. MAY'). From the semantic point of view, a confusion of V with md can be observed, according to MAYRHOFER (loc. cit.), in "younger texts," a fact

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and much later the Naiyayika Bhasarvajña add here - inasmuch as it is being differentiated by its special relevant topics, pramana, etc., from all other sciences, ** "has been examined in the instruction on the sciences as the lamp of all sciences,
on sense perception and tradition which thus necessarily precede this activity in their respectively different ways. This subsequent judging" or "measuring." bowever, is an investigation, literally: "a subsequent viewing" (anviksaņa, anviks) of what has already been seen by means of sense perception and tradition. By means of this very activity proceeds the investigative science (anviksiki). Thus, Anviksiki is nothing but the science of methodical thinking (yayavidya) as, of course, represented by the Nyaya school - which has not only specifically adopted this procedure but also made it an essential concem; and it is nothing but the teaching of methodical thinking (nyayafdstra), teaching" in the sense of a doctrinal corpus, i.e., the whole of the tenets of the Nyaya school as laid down in its basic treatise.
Våtsyayana's concluding remarks to his brief exposition of the sixteen relevant topics of Nyaya make it sufficiently clear that in this context of defining the identity of his own philosophical school by way of its method and position he accommodates it within the framework of the four sciences which are mentioned in the introductory part of Kautilya's or Kautalya's Arthafästra; as is well known since JACOBI's seminal article was published, in these concluding remarks Vätsyayana also integrates a slightly modified version of a verse which occurs - probably taken from an older source - in the very same context in the Arthafastra. He states that the investigative science - that is, the science of nyaya or Nyaya, as his commentator Uddyotakara
Cf. the quotation of the introductory sentence to the verse (cf. the text given in n 31 below) in Midyabhisana (NB) p. 71,12-14. The addition of gydyavidyd, which once more clarifies Vasyiyana's identification, also occurs in the Mydydydatke on this passage (d NV p. 21.1) and may have crept, in the course of transmission, into the quote in the Mahabharana, the opposite scenario, the loss of this clarification in the course of time, is not so easily explained. Vacaspati Misra clearly understands nydyavidya as part of the explanatory sentence in the Varrika (s. NVT P 67.8). The addition is also lacking in the corresponding quotation in Cakradhara's Nydyamarjarigranthibharga (NMGBA) p. 6,3-4. - The supplement vidyd found in the Sarwadaranasangraha (SDS) p. 245.1 is in any case secondary
Here I follow the variant pravibhayamand (as opposed to vibhajyamdnd) as found in NBA p. 71.12, NMGBA p. 6,4 and SDS p. 245.2, which would exclude an interpretation of the phrase to the effect that a "division of the science by means of," i.e., "into the relevant topics was intended (cf. c.g., HACKER 1958, 71). an interpretation which seems less plausible in the present context. Also the remarks which follow the quotation of this introductory phrase in the Mydyartika point to the understanding adopted by me: the means of valid cognition, etc., are not found in the other sciences, namely, inasmuch as these sciences do not make them thelt special toples. Cf. also the corresponding interpretation by Phanibusana TARKAVAOISA as reported in CHATTOPADHYAYA and GANGOPADHYAYA 1967, 28
With some hesitation I adopt the reading partid, reported by THAKUR as preserved in m.), which is also found in a number of quotations of this verse from the Mahabhagyd, namely, in MM p. 28,14-15. NBha p. 71,13-14 and SDS p. 94,4-5; it is confirmed in AMGBH p. 6,6 and Srikantharippanska (SKT) p. 65,32.As opposed to the reading prakiritd, it would make the reference to the entire relevant section in the Arthaldsira, where anviks ki is indeed - although only briefly - examined (cf. AS p. 4.8-10), more specific, assuming that Vityayana modified the verse himself, it also would imply his superimposition of his notion of the three fástrapratis employed in the Nylya (c. the introduction of the Mydyabharya to NS 1.1.3) because in the Arthaldstraitself the sub section is designated dvijikisthapand. The reading praktita ("praised") would correspond better to the wording in the concluding verse as given in the Arthaastra by offering some kind of equivalent to safvar...mard ("always considered"). However, I think it highly implausible that the predicate "praised" would have been replaced by the less laudatory (but well attested) "examined" in the course of the tradition - In Sivaprasad BHATTACHARYYA's quotation of the verse gariyasi is to be found at this place, a variant not known to me from other sources; cf. BHATTACHARYYA 1956, 50 (n. 6). MATILAL'S translation is obviously based on Vätsyayana's version of the verse but does not take either reading into account ("It is thus enumerated in the list of the branches of learning) (MATILAL 1986, 73! Similarly, THAKUR's comment that Vatsyayana was "mentioning the fact that they (ie, the first three feet) are taken from the Vidyoddesa section of the Arthaldstra of Kautalya (cf. THAKUR 1975, 41) does not point towards a decision for either variant
In the Arshadstra, the section is called vidydsamuddela, Bot vidyoddess. This change had to be introduced here probably metri causa unless Vatsylyana did not modify the verseas found in the Arthalastra himself, but quoted it from an original context where it was connected with a vidyoddesa (cf. n. 26 above).
which could also explain Vatsyayana's praminoti. In this case, he would after all have understood pramdna and anumda as referring to a "(subsequent) measuring, as has traditionally been assumed in modern scholarship
Compare NM p. 9,9-10 praryaksdgamdbhyam kitarydvkagam anvikramdam ty arthah tadyurddakam astram dnevnik. Cl. also Ksirasvamin on Amarakola 1.6.5 as quoted in HACKER 1958, 77.
*C. NBA p. 3,5-8: kah punar ayam wydyah? prandair arthaparikanom. pratyakadamd. Iritam odundan, s viksa, praryaksdgamdbhyam ikgitary/drtharyanvianam vid. fayd pra variata ity ani wydavidya nyaya dstram. C1. on this passage, already translated in JACOBI 1911, 735, especially HALBFASS 1988, 275; cf. also OBERHAMMER 1992, 250, PERRY 1997, 451.
2 On the use of "Kautalya" instead of the equally attested "Kautilya" cf. SCHARFE 1968, 82 83. Obviously, SCHARFE could no longer take into consideration KANGLE's detailed argumentation for "Kautilya" and against "Kautalya" (cf. KANGLE 1965, 109-113).
25 Cf. Arthalstra US) 12.12. According to SCHARFE 1968, 4, both texts may quote from a third source. RUBEN, on the other hand, seems to assume that Vatsyayana himself would have quoted the verse correctly and therefore concludes that he must have taken the already changed verse from some "metrical excerpt" (cf. RUBEN 1926, 354). MATILAL has not noticed the deviation at all (cf. MATILAL 1986, 72; similarly DASGUPTA 1922, 278).

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as an aid for all undertakings, as the foundation of all norms. The other three sciences are, according to the Arthasastra, the Vedic science, the science of material acquisition and the science of government.In this way, the author of the Mydyabhasya equates his philosophical tradition with one of the four royal sciences of the Arthasastra, namely, the science - or rather methodology - which
"investigating the strength and weakness of these three sciences) by means of reasons (hetu), assists the sentient world, strengthens the intellect in distress and in good fortune, and causes confidence in (one's
own) understanding, speech and action." This amounts to the establishment of the Nyaya in the framework of a scheme which may not be an orthodox brahmanical scheme, but which nevertheless can be assumed to have been generally accepted in the dominant cultural milieu of Vatsyayana's time and place, and to have carried with it considerable prestige.
However, Vatsyayana adds to his modified quotation of the verse that adequate understanding stattvajlana) and the attainment of the highest good" have to be understood according to the specific science. For the science of Nyaya, inasmuch as it is
a science concerned with the Self (adhyāmmavidyd)**, adequate understanding consists in the understanding of the soteriologically relevant objects of cognition, among which the Self figures prominently, whereas the attainment of the highest good consists in the obtainment of liberation. Thus, after Våtsyāyana has first distinguished the science of Nyaya from a mere science concerned with the Self, such as the Upanişads, on the basis of its specific procedure, that is, its method, he now affirms and stresses that the Nyaya is indeed an adhyatmavidya as regards its content, as well as its final aim and purpose. Concerning the content of the science or its central objects of understanding. Vatsyayana, as already earlier on in his commentary. brushes aside the fact that there are, next to the objects of valid cognition, after all 15 additional relevant topics mentioned in the programmatic first sútra as objects of adequate understanding, an understanding which is claimed there to lead to the attainment of the highest good. Although all of these topics constitute the special method of the Nyaya and thus - according to Vätsyāyana - account for its nature as the investigative science par excellence, and although their adequate understanding is indeed of importance for the adequate understanding of the Self, etc., Våtsyayana probably does not mention them here explicitly as the content of the science because they do not have direct metaphysical and soteriological significance, and are thus devoid of the status of real objects of adequate knowledge;without them the agreement of the Nyaya with tradition in content as well as in final aim can be presented more convincingly. As regards the agreement in content, it has been referred to by Vatsyayana already in the preceding, with a brief sentence complementing his identi fication of the Nyaya with the investigative science by way of its characteristic procedure of inference; in this connection he added that an inference which stands in contradiction to sense perception and tradition just seems to be an instance of the application of the outlined method of inquisitive thinking, is only an apparent instance
Cf. NBhp. 5,14-17: seyam amiksiki pramanddibhi prawibhajyamdnd pradāpah sarvavidydnam updyah sarvakarmanám/
dfrayah sarvadharmande vidyoddese parīkşitā // iti. The text as given by THAKUR has vibhajyamana and prakirtind; cf. n. 28 and 29 for an explanation of my preference for the above readings. -The last pada reads differently in the Arthastra: savad dvikla mard
CF. AS 1.2.1: anvikraki trayi warna dandantifceti vidydh
» A$ 1.2.11: ... baldhale caitas henbhir aviksamin lokaryopokaroti, yasane "bhyudaye ca buddhim awasthapayati pravilyakrydwaidradyam ca karoni. On the pronounced neutral aspect of the al l in Kautilya's presentation, evident especially in this passage, cf. HALBFASS 1988, 278; 284; PERRY 1997, 451, with n. 16.
The reading found in NBh (CalSS), nifreyarddhigamdrtham, instead of nitreyasddhiga malca, is also found in the editions of the text in VSS, ASS and SS (vol. 10, with Sudarsankarya's Prasarvapada, ed. Dwarika Das SHASTRI, Varanasi 1986) and solves the problem that veditavam (n. nom. sg.) (cf. the text as quoted in n. 37) seemingly has to be construed with fand am (n) and insteyasddhigamah (m.). However, it is also possible to take fod idam as the subject of the sentence, veditavam as its nominal predicate, and the two problematic nouns as appositions placed after the subject: "The following, namely, ... and ... is to be understood.... The reading chosen by THAKUR, which is also accepted in the KSS edition of the Midyabhasya, is confirmed by NV p. 21,94 and NVT p. 68,9
WHN RANDL states that Vatsyayara defines the Nyaya as an ammavidyd; however, as he refers to the VSS edition of the text which reads, as all other editions available to me, ad ydmavidyd, this must have been a slip of pen (cf. RANDLE 1930, 11 (n. 2. continuing from p. 10]).
* The text of the Midyabhasya according to ASS, KSS, VSS and SS reads demdditatrvaja nam, instead of dmddidnam, which, however, is contradicted by NV p. 21, 17.
» CE NBA p. 5,18-20: tad daw tatrvalidnam nifreyasddhigamal ca yatha widyart vedita vyam, iha v adhydrmavidydydm dmddifanam tartvajnanam, nifreyasddhigamo 'pavargaprdprir in Cf. also OBERHAMMER 1964, 309, PERRY 1997, 452.
"Ct. Nhp.2.9: drmddeh khalu prameyasya tatuajtanan nitreyasadhigamah
Cf. also HALBFASS 1988, 275-276.

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of the employment of the terms yama and niyama," but also puts the Self explicitly at the centre of the activities mentioned and, one can assume, recommended:
“For this purpose (1.e., for the purpose of release)" the Self (amman) is prepared with (general) restraint and (specific) discipline, and also on account of yoga with means (prescribed) for the practice concerning the Self (adhyatmavidhi).
of methodical thinking or reasoning (nyayabhasa). It is implied there that such a procedure does not have its place in the science of Nykya.
We can thus observe that Vatsyayana, next to anchoring his philosophical tradition in a prestigious secular classification of science and in the most excellent position to boot, is concerned to accommodate it with the established religious tradition and place it, so to say, in line with the Upanişads. The Nyayasūtra itself does not address the topic specifically and explicitly, the only source which may tell us something about its compilers' attitude, or about the attitude of one of its compilers, as regards the position of the Nyaya vis-à-vis the science concerning the Self, are the concluding sutra-s of the fourth book of the Nydyasútra, starting with sutra 4.2.38. The whole section, reaching up to 4.2.50 and thus comprising 13 sūtra-s." begins rather abruptly with an argumentative reference to the continuous repetition or practice of a specific concentration (samddhi). that is, to a yogic exercise, an interpretation corroborated by NS 4.2.41, a sutra following upon two objections, which speaks of the practice of yoga tyogábhyasa) in the wilderness, in caves, on sandbanks or islets, etc. One would not originally connect yogic practices with a philosophical school that developed out of a tradition of debate, but even if the compositional history of the sequence of stras concerned has still to be studied in detail," it is clear that in both cases we are dealing with siddhantasütra-s. This is also the case with NS 4.2.45 which not only strengthens the connection to yogic practices because
After the discussion concluded with sutra 45, a discussion which evidently touches upon aspects of the Nyaya which could corroborate its designation as an adhyatmavidya, there follows a sequence of five siddhantasitra-s which, within the
"Cf. also JACOBI 1929, 163
* The reference of the anaphoric pronoun tad is anything but settled. RUBEN (cf. RUBEN 1928, 127) supplies three referents in his translation, 1.c., concentration, true cognition and release, obviously, because he could not reach a decision among the three contextually justifiable possibilities. As she considers 38-45 to constitute an originally independent (although composite) sub-section on the topic of meditation, MEUTHRATH supplies only "Versenkung" as the referent of rad- (cf. MEUTHRATH 1996, 198). Vatsylyana, whose interpretation I follow preliminarily, clearly interprets tad-to refer to release (apawarga) (cf. also JACOBI 1929, 163, JUNANKAR 1978, 471 and OBERHAMMER 1984, 123 (n. 2287: the term occurs first in the purwapakasara 4.2.42 and concludes the immediately preceding siddhantasma 4.2.44. Bhisarvaja, who quotes the sutra in NBhi p. 445,2728, seems to follow this interpretation: although he does not gloss tadartham, the fact that the quotation follows immediately after his statement that dharma produced with pure means, such as devotion to God and the limbs of yopa, is nothing but a cause for the highest good frihreyasa) - and does not also lead to suffering in an indirect way - (cf. on this passage OBERHAMMER 1984, 77, 96), suggests that he understood tad to refer to hireasa, i.e., apavarga. Furthermore, his introduction to his partial quotation of 4.2.45 earlier on in the text (cf. Noha p. 10.19-20: tatha cdiomddindim pramdropapanaram pratipdidya "adhydomavidypdyairly witam materialet follows upon the concluding statement... to the effect that a circumspect person, who is free of uncertainty after having determined that everything which has been stated in the Upanisad-s, etc. (i.e., and in other teachings of yoga, c. line 12) is indeed true, will attain release inasmuch as he (then) cats the means which is well established there ... yenopanigaddiyabham saram sathyam velicinya ninakarya prekvatar saprasiditham vopchamanthato'paverpaprapair bhavarit). This sequence of concluding statement, introduction and partial quotation also implies that tad should refer to release according to Bhisarvajda (for another partial quotation of 4.2.45 cf. NBM 584,11: yordc cddydavidhypdyah, on the whole passage see also OBERHAMMER 1984, 122-123)
It may also be considered to connect this sara with stro-s 39-40, assuming the interpolation of 41-44, because an answer to 40 has not been given and 41 does not provide its answer to 39 in the more straightforward way as is typical for the standard dialectical style of the stras. ad would under this assumption relate back to sandchimesa) in 38: the compound would thus mean for the purpose of the special concentration)." with the implication for the purpose of counteracting the disturbances of the special concentration mentioned by the opponent in 39 and 40."
NS 4.2.45: tadartham yamaniyambhyam dimasauskaro yopdc addhydomavidyapiyal
Cf. Noh p. 3.8:yat punar anumanam pratyakşdgamavindham rydydbhasah sain. This sentence is quoted in MM p. 293,15. Cf. also HALBFASS 1988, 277 (with reference merely to kudratarka in n. 62, i.e., to NM p. 9,13); MATILAL 1990, 24
*RUBEN rightly suggests that two sub-sections have to be assumed here, consisting of sutra-s 38-45 (i) and 46-50 (k): cf. RUBEN 1928, 125-128. See also, from the point of view of stratification of the Nydyasara as a whole, MEUTHRATH 1996, 196-203: MEUTHRATH speaks of two independent sub-sections, one on meditation, the other on the code of conduct for Naiydyikas," which have most probably been joined together by the redactor of NS 4.2 who was also responsible for linking the other originally independent sub-sections of NS 42
CF. NS 4.2.38: samadhivierabhyasar.
Cr. NS 4.2.41: aranaguhpuliddişu yogdbrydsopadedah
"A first, not yet detailed and sufficiently argued attempt has been presented in MEUTHRATH 1996, 199, MEUTHRATH considers 38 and 45 to be the oldest sitros of this sub-section, and the intervening objections, replies and explanations to be later accretions. For a possible grouping together of 38-40 and 45 see below, n. 46. Individual sütros, together with Väsyāyana's comments, have been treated, from the perspective of hermeneutics of religion, in ONERHAMMER 1984; c. pp. 8-9. 24-25 and 55-56 on NS/NBH 4.2.38. p. 20 on NB 4.2.41, p. 24 on NS/NBH 4.2.42, pp. 21, 2324 and 30 on NS/NBH 4.2.45, pp. 56-57 and 123 on NS/NBH 4.2.46.
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macro-structure of the Nyayasutra as known to and commented upon by Vätsyāyana (i.e., under the presupposition that a division into five adhyaya-s was already in place), provide a transition to the fifth book of the text which deals foremost with purely eristic topics, namely, the so-called sophistic objections (järi) and the points of defeat in debate (nigrahasthäna). The sequence in question is obviously taken from some other text belonging to the tradition of debate because the threefold division of debate presupposed in this section, namely, samvada," jalpa and vitanda, terminologically differs from the threefold division as found in the first book of the Nyayasitra. There, in NS 1.2.1-3, three types of debate called väda, jalpa and vitanda are characterized after väda has been mentioned in the programmatic first sutra as a relevant topic, presumably to be understood as a generic term for debate. This terminological deviation regarding the types of debate and their internal classification, that is, the grouping together of jalpa and vitanda as "contentional discourse" (vigrhyakathanam)" which is not addressed at all in the first book, are discrepancies which concern the doctrinal basis of the Nyaya school and thus point at the fact that we are dealing here with a cutout from elsewhere, most probably from a text close to the tradition of debate which is reflected in the section on debate presented in the Carakasamhitä." As has been shown by VIDYABHUSANA," Guiseppe TUCCI" and Erich
NS 4.2.46-47 (cf. nn. 58 and 61) speak of samvada as the "honest truth-seeking and friendly type of debate. According to MEUTHRATH, who considers a "code of conduct for Naiyayikas" including "conversation" as the topic of the sub-section, the use of samvida (translated as "conversation") only alludes to vida as taught in book one; on the other hand, MEUTHRATH speaks of the fact that here a discussion is recommended to be conducted with equal-minded persons only as a reason for the slight modification of the term, a statement which seems to imply that according to her interpretation a specific type of vdda, as taught in book one, is meant by samvada in NS 4.2.46 (cf. MEUTHRATH 1996, 201).
Cf. NS 4.2.50 (quoted below, n. 65).
50 This is not to say that according to the relevant lakṣaṇa-section in the first book, jalpa and vitandd were not conceived to be contentional; the usage of distortions, sophistic objections and points of defeat in debate mentioned as the distinctive characteristic of the two vis-à-vis the first type of debate (cf. NS 1.2.2 and by implication 3) clearly implies their contentional nature.
31 The affinity to the classification and terminology of types of debate as found in the section on debate in the Carakasamhita (Cas) Vimanasthana ch. 8. 55 16, 18, 21-22, 28, is conveniently presented in KANG 1998, 20.
2 Cf. VIDYABHUSANA 1920, 25-35; the presentation as well as the interpretation of the materials in this truly pioneering work have to be approached with caution, of course, and judged more for their merit of having drawn sufficient attention to this important area of research than for their philological precision and historical plausibility. Hakuju Ul's translation and treatment of a large part of the relevant section in the Carakasamhitd in his Studies in Indian Philosophy (cf. Ut 1925,
Debate and Independent Reasoning vs. Tradition
FRAUWALLNER," to mention the names of the three most important pioneers in this connection," the intellectual environment of origin of the Nyaya was related to this tradition of debate.
233
Next to this terminological and classificatory discrepancy, a further remarkable feature has to be mentioned which touches upon the very nature of the first type of debate as described in the section at the end of book four: According to NS 4.2.48, samvada is also recommended if a counter-position is not held by one of the participants in the colloquy (cf. also below, p. 235). In book one, however, an exception to the overall requirement of a position and counter-position in debate" is made only in the case of jalpa which then turns into vitanda." The relevant statement in NS 1.2.3. if interpreted in a strict manner, may point to an even more pronounced classificatory discrepancy between the two sections than assumed above: according to NS 1.2.1-3, debate (vdda) would only be twofold, namely, vada and jalpa, the latter with an acceptable variant called vitandā.
426-471), which is not accessible to me, were certainly provoked by VIDYABHUSANA's work, as was DASGUPTA's inclusion and extensive treatment of the section in his History of Indian Philosophy (cf. DASGUPTA 1932, 373-392). Rudolf ROTH, who already in 1872 (cf. ROTH 1972) drew attention to Vimanasthana ch. 8 up to § 67, still on the basis of manuscripts, unfortunately jumped over the part which from our present-day point of view is of most interest for the history of Indian philosophy. stating in a footnote that the part contains "the enumeration and definition of 24 terms belonging to logic and dialectics, which a disputant must know," but that "their treatment is only peculiar inasmuch as the examples are all taken from medicine" (cf. ROTH 1872, 451 (n. 1]).
53 Cf. TUCCI 1929, 468-469; cf. also the tables in TUCCI 19296, xvi-xxii; xxv-xxvi. 54 Cf. FRAUWALLNER 1984, ch. V.1.
55 Next to KANG 1998, MATILAL 1998, 38-42 (published posthumously, without any references to earlier discussions either by the author himself or by the editors) seems to be the most recent treatment of this material.
56 Cf. NS 1.2.1, translated below, p. 237.
57 Cf. NS 1.2.3: sa (scil. jalpah) pratipakṣasthāpanāhino vitanda. Although RUBEN already noticed this discrepancy, he did not draw further conclusions from his observation (cf. RUBEN 1928, 128: "Sonst pflegt nur beim Wortstreit (vitanda, Ib3) der eine der Gegner auf eine eigene Behauptung zu verzichten...").

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However, even if the five relevant siddhantasütra-s do not have their original place at the conclusion of book four of the Nydyasūtra, I feel justified by their very inclusion at this place to use them for my present purpose as representing the point of view of early Naiyayikas prior to Vätsyāyana and at the time when the compilation of the Nydyasútra came to its close. The first of these sūtra-s, 4.2.46,"interpreted in its present context, proclaims two more activities conducive to release in addition to the preparation of the Self (atmasamskāra) by means of yogic discipline and practices
concerning the Self, the activity mentioned in the preceding sútra. These two are (1) the continuous engagement in the grasping, that is, firm comprehension (rahana), of knowledge (Nana)," and (2) the colloquy (samvada) with experts. A type of debate is thus placed in the context of the final aim of liberation and of soteriologically relevant adequate knowledge. The following sutra, naming those persons with whom one should conduct a colloquy, evokes strong traditional connotations: it mentions disciple (sisya) and teacher (guru), fellow-students of the orthodox tradition (sabrahmacarin), learned authorities (sista)" and those who (equally?) strive for the supreme good (Sreyorthint). And although a colloquy, as a type of debate, normally would presuppose a position and a counter-position, it may - according to the next sútra - also alternatively, or even preferably(?). be conducted without a counter-position, in case one asks for it(?) for the sake of the specific aim, which presumably would be, in the present context of the surra, knowledge and the highest good resulting from it. Even the remaining two types of debate, which are classified as constituting
SCI. NS 4.2.46: jäänagrahandbhydsas tadvidyalt ca saha sartuddah.
* It is conceivable that the sentence NS 4.2.46, before the incorporation of the sequence 4650 into the Midyardera, contained a characterization of the first type of debate called Sadda: "The colloquy with experts is (i.e., constitutes) a continuous repetition/practice of grasping of knowledge." This would imply that ca, which links the two nouns and thus induces the understanding of an aw varthi of tadartham in 4.2.45, to provide for a Dominal predicate to which the juxtaposed nouns could be related as subjects, is an interpolation. This interpolation could have occurred even after 46-50 had become part of the Mydyasutra because sutra 46, at the beginning of the sequence in question, could have introduced the topic of the fifth book even without a while at the same time, even if not immediately and syntactically linked to 45, it would relate debate back to the preceding discussion on the means for obtaining adequate knowledge and their practice. In any case, the reading of cais firmly grounded in the gloss on this sätra in the Mydyabhagya (cf. also the quotation of the strain the Nudyavdtrika and the Mydyawarmikatärparyarid ad loc.). RUBEN correctly reports the lack of ca in James R. BALLANTYNE's edition of the Mydyastra accompanying his 1850 translation (with volume three published in 1854), as well as in two old editions of the satra-text together with the Madrastraveti, of which one dates from 1828 (d. also the edition heading the list appended in HALL 1897, 203, probably to be identified with the undated Calcutta edition by Nilmani VIDYALANKARA
ni) used in the mi edition in the Nydyadarsanam (Preface, p. 8, cf. NB! (CalSS)), although the editor's name appears as Nimicandra Siromani in my copy, this edition, published by the Calcutta based Education Press, is missing in POTTER 1995 which mentions as the earliest available printed text a 1821 edition by Kasinath TARKAPANCANANA in Bengali characters (cf. POTTER 1995, 101, item 48.1.1), which, however, is a Nagar and Bengali-script edition and a translation into Bengali of Visvanatha (Nykya-JPacanana (Bhattacarya)'s Bhdsdpariccheda, with the author's name appearing as Vivanatha Tarkalankana (Viswonath Turkaluncar!), supplemented by a Bengali commentary from the pen of the editor/translator and published under the English title & System of Logic written in Sunscrit by the Venerable Sage Boodh, and Explained in a Sunscrit Commentary by the very Learned Viswanath Turkaluncar by the Calcutta Mission Press) the other edition mentioned by RUBEN is from 1919 (cf. RUBEN 1928, 127). Certainly, BALLANTYNE's pioneering work was very much influenced by the Mydyaslaytl, the only commentary available in print during his time, and probably the only one current among the pandits he consulted: the text of the Mydyanita itself was then only known through two editions of the Vrti (I have not the other pre-BALLANTYNE edition from Paris (1841). mentioned by POTTER under 48.1.2). BALLANTYNE's text does therefore not constitute independent evidence next to the reading as found in the sutra-text printed in 1828 together with the Vrtti. I could not check all editions of the Vreri as recorded by POTTER, at least the editions available to me all have the reading ca. However, it is quite improbable that an original reading not known to Vitsyayana could have survived in some underground" tradition and reemerged in some mss of this late commentary, and the rather simple gloss on the two juxtaposed nouns in the Virl does not rule out that Visvanatha had a reading ca before him after all
Obviously following RUBEN 1928 (cf. also JUNANKAR 1978, 471), MEUTHRATH translates the first compound as if its final member would be a dwandva-compound ("Erfassen und Wiederholen der Lehre": "Lehre" for jāno also goes back to RUBEN's translation, probably influenced by Vitsyiyana's paraphrase with atmavidyddstra in NBh (CalSS) p. 1097,2) (cf. MEUTHRATH 1996, 200). However, the masculine nom. sg. case-ending is difficult to explain in this case.
a. NS 4.2.47 tom fisyaguriabrahmacarifvisistatreyorshibhir anaslyubhir abhyupyur. On my emendation of the text as compared to the sutra as edited by RUBEN cf. below, n. 62.
Although the sätra is quoted, as edited in RUBEN's edition, with the reading -viistein Ayurvedadipica (VD) p. 631,24-25 on Cas Vimanasthana ch.8. 18, the carefully weighed testimony of the Nydya artikararparyart on this sutra as well as the quotation in the Mydyabharana (p. 70,8-9) speak very strongly in favour of an original reading sisa, also supported by Bhattavigisvara's Gautami yasdiraprakaila (ed. Kisbor Nath JHA, Allahabad 1979; to be placed chronologically between the Tarparyard and Udayana's Parifuddhi), a reading which seems to have been replaced not only in the modern editions of the basic text, the Varrika and the Tätparyarika itself, but also in the mss. by-wisista
This tentative interpretation of api w follows Joachim Friedrich SPROCKHOFF's recent observations on the usage of apid in the ritual Sotras (cf. SPROCKHOFF 1999). The occurrences studied by SPROCKHOFF are sentence-initial, with one exception adduced from the Valkasatrautasutra. If it could be demonstrated that also in the philosophical stra-literature api vd is used in the meaning "or better - to suggest the best, preferable alternative - proposed by him, apid in NS 4.2.48 would strengthen the hypothesis that the sequence 46-50 is taken from elsewhere, more speci fically from a context where another statement preceding the sentences preserved in the Mydyasútra would declare the less preferable alternative, i.e., a colloquy in which positions and counter-positions are held.
Cf. NS 4.2.48: pratipaksahinam api wa prayojanartham arthirve.

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contentional discourse in the concluding sätra of the fourth book," are placed in the service of protecting the soteriologically relevant determination of the true nature of things, namely, verbal contest (alpa) and vitanda, i.e., - if it is assumed that the term is used here in the same way as in the first book - a dispute in which only one of the participants attempts to prove a particular position. Although the basic hostility and aperessiveness which characterizes them is not denied, a dispassionate disputant, when using them in this beneficial and meritorious function, is free of moral reproach, as one can infer from the illustration "just as one screens off sa plot of land) by means of thorny branches for the sake of protecting the development of seeds. *** The similarity of this example with the example used apologetically at the very beginning of the Buddhist text on debate known as Upayahrdaya," which is unfortunately only preserved in a Chinese translation datable to 472 AD,"points towards the fact that the cutout inserted here between books four and five of the Mydyasútra conserves material belonging to a related tradition of debate, which shared its intellectual environment of origin with the Nyaya, close to the related tradition as reflected in the Caracasamhitd, but also in some respects close to a Buddhist tradition of debate partaking of this very environment to a degree - material that found its way into the Nyayasútra at the time when the basic tenets of the Nyaya school, developed from an older tradition of debate within the common environment, had been fixed into a manual, now sheltered in books one and five, and gradually supplemented and rounded off with the dialectically structured books two, three and four
To sum up for those early Naiyāyikas who were responsible for the insertion and phrasing of the two sequences 38-45 and 46-50 at the conclusion of Mydyasútra 4.2, the Nyaya is indeed a science concerning the Self due to its inclusion of Selforiented yogic practices (cf. the keywords samddhivisesa, yoga and demasamiskdra). practices which are meaningful activities directly and indirectly aimed at achieving adequate knowledge and release through it. The foundational Nyāya activity of debate in its three accepted varieties, which forms a central topic and concern of the school, is not in contradiction to these activities and their purpose; on the contrary, the latter are vigorously supported by it in more than one way. The closeness to the orthodox tradition where the practice concerning the Self (adhyatmavidhi) is authoritatively anchored and cultivated is also warranted by the fact that the basic type of debate, the colloquy, is meant and envisioned to take place between persons who identify and comply with this tradition. Now, this justification of debate is at the same time a justification of its means and the intense occupation with them; their refinement eventually serves the achievement of soteriologically relevant adequate knowledge. A glance at the characterizations of the three types of debate provided earlier on in NS 1.2.1-3, in the portion of the Mydyasútra sheltering the typically Nyaya manual of debate, reveals that the various components of debate include the most important among the 16 relevant topics of the school. This applies especially to the characterization of the basic type of debate, there simply designated as udda:
Debate consists in the taking up of a position and a counter-position in which proof and censure are accomplished) through the use of the means valid cognition (pramdna) and reasoning (tarka), which is not in contradiction to established tenets, and which is endowed with the five parts (of proof). **
CF NS 4.2.50: tábhyan vigshyakathanam
66 RUBEN, followed by MEUTHRATH, understands the compound differently similar to the case of 4.2.46 (cf. above n. 60) he interprets adityawadyasamuralsand as a dvandve-compound: however, I wonder how one could protect (or defend) the truth in the sense of the true nature of things cama) (cf. RUBEN 1928, 128 and MEUTHRATH 1996, 201). MATILAL speaks more adequately of the protection of one's learning, restricting, however, this function of the two types of debate to the young beginner (cf. MATILAL 1990, 15).
C. NS 4.2.49: tatryddhyavasdyasamraksandtham jalpavisande bljapraroharapraksandtham kantakadikhdaranavat. This stora is quoted e.g., in Mydyakunudacandra (NKC) p. 319.2 and in Prandnamimdmsd (PM) on sutra 30. p. 63,21-22, in the latter with the variant reading paricaranya. Bhisarvajfia quotes only the first compound in NBA p. 11,8.
"Cf. Updyahrdaya (UH) 23b, retranslated into Sanskrit in Tuca 1929b, Part 1, Upayahrdaya, p. 3; see also KANO 1998, 38.
TUCCI refers to Prabodh Baccu's Le canon bouddhique en Chine, Vol. I, Paris 1927, for an earlier translation by Buddhabhadra belonging to the Eastern Tsin dynasty (who died in 429 AD according to BAGCHI, P. 344) that has been lost (cf. TUCCI 1929b, xi), a piece of information obviously not taken up by Yuichi KAITYAMA (cf. KAIYAMA 1991, 107)
At the heart of debate we thus find the means of valid cognition, four in number according to NS 1.1.3 and including verbal communication (Sabda) which comprises tradition as the instruction of a trustworthy person". Reference to tradition thus appears as an integral part of debate. Of equal relevance as the pramdna-s in the characterization of debate is reasoning (tarka), which just as the pramdņa-s and the five parts of proof constitutes a separate relevant topic of the Nyaya; it is character
CINS 1.2.1:praninatarkasddhanopdiambhah siddhandviruddhah parovayavopaparnah paksapratipokaparigrahovdan
a. NS 1.1.7.

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distinguishes Kautilya's investigative science (anviksiki) (cf. above, p. 228), thus opening the way for Våtsyayana's explicit identification of the Nyaya with the anvi kşiki while stressing at the same time its aspect as an adhyatmavidyd.
ized in the first book of the Myayasūtra in the following manner:
"Reasoning consists in deliberation (üha) with regard to a thing/event whose true nature is not (yet) known, aiming at [its) adequate knowl
edge on the basis of the appropriateness of reason(ing)s. *** The distinctive feature of reasoning as described here and further explained in Våtsyāyana's commentary on this sūtra is its hypothetical aspect implied in the phrase "deliberation on the basis of the appropriateness of reasoning)s (karanopaparritah... ahah) - thus the familiar translation of tarka in the Nyaya context as "hypothetical reasoning." That is, the reasoning person tries to find out if the individual reason(ing)s kårana)" which could be adduced under the assumption of certai tradictory, still to be proven properties of the thing or event in question, are ap propriate or suitable in the light of their conformity with other basic assumptions. Reasoning thus examines reason(ing)s and in the course of this examination itself operates with reasons, in this way preparing the ground for the application of the means of valid cognition which alone effect the definitive ascertainment of the true nature of a thing or event.
As another important element of debate one can isolate the most crucial component of proof among its five "limbs," namely, the reason (hetu).
The central component tarka, together with the five parts of proof, is also assumed for the remaining two types of debate as characterized in the Mydyasútra." This means that if the early Naiyayikas found at work at the end of book four of the Nydyasútra claim that debate as such is a meaningful and important activity in company with other practices and objectives to be connected with an adhydmavidyd, this claim certainly includes the activity of examination with reasons - which again
The position which I have attempted to uncover above for early Nyaya prior to Vatsyayana can be compared to the attitude displayed in a group of chapters called Vårsneyadhyatma in the Mokşadharma section of the Mahabharata" which simply presuppose that examination with reasons is not in contradiction with the concern about the Self, and thus with an adhyamavidyd. The chapters present a path charac terized by examination and consideration leading to the elimination of faults as the cause for the liberation of the Self. Among the keywords in this context one first notices "understanding" (buddhi),"clearly preferred to "knowledge" (vidyd). Further more, there occur a number of verbal derivatives of pari-Vikş which evoke one of the three ways of the proceeding of the teaching" (fdstrapravstri) evidenced according to Vatsyayana in the Mydyasutra, namely, the third one which is called "examina tion" (parlkşd)". Even if the term parīksä itself in this specific methodological sense is not used in the Nyäyasútra, other derivations of parliks figure in the characterization of two relevant topics in the first chapter of the first book and testify to the fact that the notion of examination belongs to the older strata of the Nyaya school. This is corroborated by the frequent employment of derivatives of parliks in the section on debate in the Carakasamhita, Vimanasthana chapter 8, which, as already mentioned above (cf. p. 232.), reflects an older tradition of debate in whose environ
2 Cf. NS 1.1.40: avindratattverthe kdranopapatitas tatuajdndotham has tarkah
On the usage of drana (cause") in the sense of reasoning), which is rather unusual in philosophical texts of the classical period, d. Vaisesikasara (VS) 9.20 heur apadeso lingam nimiftam pramdam kdranam iry anathintaram
. The pramina "inference" functions with reasons according to the classical Nylya after the time of the compilation of the Mydyasdera. In the Nydyardtraitself, however, there is insufficient evidence as to whether reasons are employed in inferences. Thus, the usage of inference, as a pramdna, in debate as characterized in NS 1.2.1 does not necessarily constitute another instance of the application of reasons in debate.
Cf. yathoksopaparnah in NS 1.2.2 (characterizing jalpa), also to be applied to 1.2.3 (vitanda).
"On Vasudeva's affiliation to the Vrsni tribe belonging to the Yadava clan cf. BHANDARKAR 1982, 5; 11-12, and for a more extensive discussion MATSUBARA 1994, 60-61; 121-122.
1 Chapters 203-210 are translated on the basis of the Bombay edition (B) (chapters 210-217) in DEUSSEN 1906, 244-270.
cr. Mahabharata (MBA) 12.205.3, 26a (quoted in n. 88): 256.
Cf. MBH 12.205.33d.
NCY, MRh 12.205.18ab... samyak parikseta dosdn afnasambhaydn: 24: dogdndmevam dindim parlkya guruld ghavam/virded dumasamushdndmekalkamansaniatam Il. 206.20: indtydndrajayeva prabhavapralaydy bha / parlky scared vididayathvac characaktusdil.
On examination as a fastapravrtic. PRESENDANZ 1994. 202-203; 692-693.
C NS 1.1.25 (on illustration"); pariksaka, and 1.1.31 (on a sel tenet): aparika, pariksana

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ment the Nyaya tradition may have developed. The affinity of the medical tradition with this older tradition of debate finds its expression in the strikingly copious usage of these derivatives also in those parts of the relevant chapter of the Vimanasthana which surround the sections relating to debate proper.
Of terminological interest in the Vårşneyadhyatma chapters are also the verbal derivates of vimpson - consideration (vimarsa) functions essentially in the characterization of the relevant topic "doubt" in the first chapter of the Mydyasútra, and is also referred to in this very section as preceding the decision, another relevant topic. Moreover, the employment of reasons (het) appears in a decidedly positive light according to one Vårşneyadhyatma half-verse which concludes that "due to intellectual vision (indnacakşus) so much (ie, the preceding teaching) can be proclaimed as being endowed with reasons (hetumat)." The use of the term jrianacakşus, which I understand literally as "faculty of vision which is nothing but knowlodge," implies that knowledge which provides matters with reasons is acknowledged to have the same status as the most powerful sensory perception. The following question of the disciple, asked of his instructing teacher, is related to the statement just translated; it carries with it strong associations with the characterization of the dnvikşikl's procedure I have already adduced from the Arthasästra (cf. above, p. 228) because the disciple asks: "The strength and weakness of which [faults] should the wise consider with (their) understanding by means of reasons?"" The anviksiki for its part investigates the strength and weakness of the other three sciences) with reasons (heru)."
established sciences or branches of knowledge including the sacred tradition". At the beginning of the yuga the great sages received the Veda-s together with the traditional narratives frihasa) which had been hidden at the end of the previous yuga. The Bhagavat knew the Veda-s, Bphaspati pronounced the "limbs of the Veda (vedânga) and Bhargava the teachings relating to government and politics (nitifdstra), Narada the science of music (gandharvaveda), Bharadvaja archery (dhanurgraha) Gargya the deeds of gods and sages (devarsicarita) and Krspitreya medicine (cikitsita). After this enumeration, the text continues:
"By all these (sages) individually, when engaged in debate (vadin), many basic models/rules of methodical thinking (nyayatantrani) have been taught. What has been taught with reasons (hetu), tradition
(agama) and good conduct (sadācāra), that is resorted to. ** Taken in this way, that is considering its immediate context, the verse thus implies that methodical thinking or reasoning on the part of the great sages accompanies the various sciences mentioned, being voiced or expressed specifically in the context of
In the first chapter of the Varsneyadhyatma we even encounter, in a macrocosmic context, methodical thinking (rydya) on an equal standing with a group of well
To my knowledge, the classification presented here has not yet been included in studies of the brahmanical vidydistdna-s and related concepts.
Cf. MBh 12.203.17-20.
The Kumbhakonam edition of the Mahabharata adds a verse in which Gautama, as the authority on the Nyayatantra, Dvaipayana, as having scized or apprehended Vedanta and Karmayoga, and Bhrgu, responsible for the Silpalastra, are mentioned. This is certainly an interpolation as the association of the name Gotama/Gautama with the Nykya and Its Sotra occurs, to my knowledge, in the preserved Nyaya literature itself first in the Mydyabhasana (referring to the gaudamamata), that is, only from the tenth century onwards; the name is connected implicitly with the Nyaya in the wellknown satirical verse quoted e.g., NBR p. 594,18-19, Mydyadtrikardtparyapar buddhi (NVTP) p. 90,22-23 and SKT P.1584. Explicit, maybe earlier associations are found at a few places in the Puranic literature.
C. MBh 12.203.20: Hydyata trdny anekdini rais sair wadni ddibhin/herdgamasaddcd. rair yad kam tad updrale II. This verse (corresponding to B 12.210.22) is quoted also in VIDYA BHUSANA 1920, 39, and referred to ibid., p. 7(as proof for VIDYABHUSANA's claim that the Anviksi I was called Hetuškstra or Hetuvidyd) and p. 42 (used by VIDYABUSANA as evidence for the use of gydya in the sense of logic in the Mahabharata); cf. also VIDYABHUSANA's introduction p. xviii, to his translation of the Mydyasira as published in VIDYABHUSANA 1930 (original introduction p. xv). Further references to this verse have been made in MISHRA 1966, 9, and THAKUR 1974, 404 (as evidence for the existence of different Nyaya schools and treatises; cf. also THAKUR 1975. 39 and 43 [with wrong reference in n. 8D. All authors mentioned follow readings not adopted in the critical edstion; most relevant for differences in their interpretations are hendgamasamdarah and yad yuram in the second part of the verse. HALBFASS obviously sees a continuation of the classification of
orthodox sciences in the reference to the various systems of logic, as he interprets nydyatantramy anekani (cf. HALBFASS 1988, 539 [n. 60); cf. also DAHLMANN 1895, 225).
... do bid...
cf. in the initial exposition concerning the practice of debate (sambhdavidhi) $ 18 (5 instances), and in the treatment of the topics (pada) relevant for debate $$ 37 (on the settenets, 3 instances), 46 on inquisitiveness, instances, the topic Add itself is determined as pariksd), 52 (on critical inquiry. I instance), and 67 (concluding remarks, 1 instance)
wa MBH 12.205,24cd: impied dimasanuddin eksikam arsantatam (for the full verse cf. L. 80). cf. also 26b, quoted in n. 88
CL, NS 1.1.23
CE. NS 1.1.41 "CrMBA 12.209.20ab: hetume chakyam Akhydum etdva Adnacakud.
MBA 12.20526ab: ked scil. dardnom baldbalam buddhyd hetubhir vinted
used by VIDVABITUSANA'S IBU stroduction p
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debate. Moreover, according to the second part of the verse employment of reasons goes hand in hand with reference to tradition and appropriate behaviour.
From the historical point of view I would certainly consider it mistaken to claim that in the Värṣṇeyädhyatma chapters we encounter a developmental stage of the Nyaya preceding the stage represented by the final compilation of the Nydyasutra. However, one could characterize these materials as presented in the Mokṣadharma (1) - using Vätsyāyana's terminology - as reflecting an adhyatmavidya which works as an investigative science (anvikṣiki) relying on examination and consideration by means of reasons, and (2) as belonging in this latter aspect to, or having drawn from, the intellectual milieu concerned with debate out of which the Nyaya developed as a philosophical school and of which further traces, touching upon other distinctive features of this milieu, remain in the Epic. Of more specific relevance in the present context, however, is the fact that apologetics do not figure in these philosophically and at the same time soteriologically and theologically oriented materials. I want to place them therefore at a time and in a climate when tradition did not yet feel seriously threatened by the employment of reasons and dialectical-eristic means vis-à-vis its specific topics, and those employing them did not think it absolutely necessary to counteract these feelings.
Nonetheless, elsewhere in the Epic, and not excluding the Mokṣadharma section, we do find some rather pronounced attacks against the use of reason and reasons in matters concerning the Self or the tradition as such, reflecting or even parallelling historically the extreme caution, suspicion and even hostility to be observed in general towards the free employment of reasoning in the Dharmaśästra literature - in contradistinction to the attitude displayed in the Dharmasutra-s. In the context of the present essay it suffices to adduce briefly two examples from the Mokṣadharma. The first one refers to reasoning under the term tarka discussed above as an essential activity and one of the relevant topics of the Nyaya (cf. p. 237f.). A secret teaching leading to the knowledge and understanding of the Self and meant for students of the Veda who have completed their training" should not be communicated to, among others, a person who has been "burnt," that is, destroyed completely, by the (or: a) teaching concerning reasoning (tarkasästradagdha)". The second example attacks
93 Cf. MB 12.238.13 ( B 12.246.13): rahasyam sarvavedänām... dtmapraryayikam sastram idam... anulasanam, 15cd (= B 16ab): sndtakānām idam śästram... anusäsanam; 18a-c (= B 19a-c): idam... rahasyadharmam....
Debate and Independent Reasoning vs. Tradition
reasoning, referring to it with an array of related terms. God Indra, appearing in the form of a jackal, narrates in a warning tone to the wise, but deeply distressed Brahmin Kasyapa how his own birth in the form of this despised, impure animal came about:
"I was a little pandit, busy with reasons (haituka) [and] censuring the Veda, devoted to the useless investigating (änvikṣiki) science of reasoning (tarkavidya); I made bombastic speeches about reasons (heru) and spoke, equipped with reasons, in the assemblies. I abused twice-born [persons] and snapped [at them] in the context of [their] statements on brahman. I was a [heretical] denier (nästika) and an all-doubting fool who deemed himself a scholar. "95
The jackal adds that should he ever be reborn as a human being, he would wish to know only what one should and may know, and would avoid what is to be avoided." Taking also into consideration the usage of the alarming term nästika, the words of the jackal can be understood as a warning to the developing orthodox philosophical traditions with their growing emphasis on logic and increasing distance from the Veda, at their head the Nyaya.
The resulting precarious position of the Nyaya is articulated in the Skandapurāna in the form of a legend about Gotama, as the legendary founder of the Nyaya school is called there," linked with the episode of the jackal in the Mokṣadharma and expressing the continuing ambivalent attitude of the orthodox tradition vis-à-vis reasoning in an almost anecdotical manner:
243
Cf. MBH 12.238.17c (= B 12.246.18c); na tarkasästradagdhaya... (K: na hetuvācamugdhāya; D1: na tatkuästradandaya; G: na tacchästravidagdhaya). Cf. also DAHLMANN 1895, 224; VIDYABHUSANA 1920, 8; 37, and 1930, xvi (original introduction p. xii); WINTERNITZ 1929, 7 (n. 18); THAKUR 1974, 403 and 1975, 42 (266 should be corrected to 246).
•
II.
95 Cf. MBh 12.173.45-47ab ( B 12.180.47-49ab): aham asam panditako haituko vedanindakaḥ?!
anviksikin tarkavidyám anurakto nirarthikām // 45 //
hetuvädän pravadita" vakta samsatsu hetumat
akroştă cabhivakta ca brahmayajñeşu vai dvijän || 46 11
nästikaḥ sarvasanki ca mürkhah panditamánikaḥ
For the relevant variants and further details cf. the appendix relating to this sequence.
96 Cf. MBh 12.173.49cd ( B 12.180.51cd): jñeyajñdid bhaveyam vai varjyavarjayitä tatha
"On this name cf. above, n. 91.

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"Gotama, however, inasmuch as he destructively tore apart (matters] here and there with his reasoning, was finally cursed by the wise and reborn as a jackal. And [later) again he was favoured (by them, with the words): Your teaching should be of assistance to the whole world (inasmuch as it proceeds) from revelation, the established tenets [of the
tradition) and reasoning. ** In this way, within the foundations of Gotama's teaching after his rehabilitation reasoning (tarka) has been relegated to the last place.
yo 'wamanyeta te müle hetusästrāśrayad dvijah /
sa sadhubhir bahihkáryo năstiko vedanindakah // (on this verse see also KEITH 1919, 12; VIDYABHUSANA 1920, 7 and 1930, XY (original introduction p. xiii); WINTERNITZ 1929, 4; HALBFASS 1988, 279; PERRY 1997, 450; quoted in Balakrida (BK) p. 89,20 on Yajnavalkyasmrti 3.223).
K: anvikșikim; K, B, D.. Dgi: anviksikim; D., D., T., G änviksaki
änviksakim; G:
*D.: pratita; De: pravadată
Appendix on MBh 12.173.45-47ab (-B 12.180.47-49ab):
cāti(K: vi)vaktä сa; D: ca dvijātinām;
K. V., B27.9. D .D., T, G. 2, M. s Do: cativaktānam: Gy: atikrostàtivaktă ca
aham asam panditako haituko vedanindakah' / drviksikim tarkavidyām anurakto nirarthikam // 45 // hetuvadān pravadita' valud samsatsu hetumat/ akrostä сabh/vakid ca brahmayainesu vai dviján // 46 // nastikah' sarvasanki ca mürkhah panditamdnikah /
For the present purpose the following variants are of relevance: Ś, K., D., G: hetuko
I translate brahmavākyeşu following B 12.180.48d and the reading found in Dal, D, D, M, C; D., T., G, 3,6 M.: -Midyeşu; Tz, Ms: -vadyeşu; G: -vidyesu; C: jñeyesu. Although brahmavākya is not attested in the dictionaries, the reading -vädya seems to support this choice and the interpretation of the situation as one comparable to the situation in which brahmodya-s are voiced, i.e., in which statements relating to brahman are pronounced for comment and discussion. brahmayajesu, i.e., "in the context of their) recitation and study of the fruti," does not fit the context well because these activities are not necessarily performed publicly and in interaction with others.
2 K read vddanindakah ("censuring in debate"); G,: devanindakah ("censuring the gods"). Although with censuring in debate" the connection between reasons and disputation would be addressed already at this point, this reading seems to presuppose a rather unusual type of dissolution of the compound; cf. also Manusmrti (MS) 2.11:
M : năstitah
G: parisanki
*Cf. Skandapurdna, Kalikakhanda 17. quoted and referred to in VIDYABHUSANA 1920, 8; 17:37, 48, and 1930, xvi (original introduction p. xiii):
gotamah svena tarkena khandayar tatra tatra hi / fapro 'tha munibhis tatra sárgálim yonim rcchati // punas cenugrhito 'sau frutisiddhantatarkarah/
sarvalokopakardya tava sastram bhavisyati // I have not yet succeeded to locate these verses in the editions of the Skandapurana accessible to me THAKUR (1975, 42 (n. 5]) reproduces the reference as Kalikakhanda 7 (cf., however, 41 (n. 4: Kaliki 17).
12.173.45cd is quoted in Madhva's Brahmasútrabhâsya (BSBh) p. 80,8 on 2.2.17 (I am indebted for this reference to my colleague Roque Mesquita; cf. Mes QUITA 2000, 56 (n. 24]). On the entire sequence cf. also DAHLMANN 1895, 219 and the references in VIDYABHUSANA 1920, 8; 36-37, and 1930, xv (original introduction p. xiii); WINTERNITZ 1929, 4; MISHRA 1957, 462 and 1966, 9; THAKUR 1974, 404 and 1975, 42 (conflated with the anecdote about Gautama's birth as a jackal in the Skandapurana, cf. above, p. 243f.): HALBFASS 1988. 278-279; PERRY 1997, 450.

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Elements of the jackal's self-description are taken up in a speech on honourable and dishonourable persons by Bhisma directed to Yudhisthira in the Anušāsanaparvan; the Veda-censuring Brahmin who is described there is equated with a dog in this context. Cf. MBh 13.37.11-14:
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apramanyam ca vedänām fästrāṇām cätilanghanam sarvatra canavasthanam etan nāśanam ātmanaḥ // 11 // bhaver panditamani yo brahmano vedanindakaḥ/ anviksikin tarkavidyam anurakto nirarthikām // 12 // hetuvädän bruvan satsu vijetā hetuvädikaḥ akroştă câtivaktă ca brāhmaṇānām sadaiva hi // 13 // sarvabhisanki müḍhaś ca balaḥ katukavāg api/ boddhavyas tādṛśas täta naravanam hi tam viduḥ // 14 // 13ab is interpreted differently in MESQUITA 2000, 126 (n. 215). For the situation of 12.173.46ab cf. 14.87.1 (= B 14.85.27):
tasmin yajne pravṛtte tu vägmino hetuvädinah' / hetuvädän bahan prähuh? parasparajigisavah II Relevant variants:
1M: brahmavadinaḥ
2D,: devavädän
3Dc: hetuvädänukälät tu
Cf. again VIDYABHUSANA 1920, 39 and 1930, xviii (original introduction p. xv); THAKUR 1974, 404. Cf. also Rāmāyaṇa (R) 1.13.14:
karmântare tada viprå hetuvädän bahan api / prahuḥ suvänmino dhirah parasparajigiṣayā //
and MBh 2.33.3-4.
AŚ
ĀVD
25 3 2 2
CalSS
NBhů
NM
NM(VSS)
NMGBh
દૂર દૂ
Debate and Independent Reasoning vs. Tradition
NBh (CalSS) Nyayabhäşya, in Nyayadarsanam with Vätsyāyana's Bhasya, Uddyotakara's Värttika, Vācaspati Misra's Tatparyafika & Visvanatha's Vṛtti, Vol. I, ed. TARANATHA NYAYA-TARKATIRTHA and AMARENDRAMOHAN TARKATIRTHA, Calcutta 1936; Vol. II, ed. AMARENDRAMOHAN TARKATIRTHA and HEMANTAKUMAR TARKATIRTHA, Calcutta 1944.
NVTP
247
ABBREVIATIONS
Arthasästra, as edited in R.P. KANGLE, The Kautilya Arthasästra, Part I, Bombay 1960.
Ayurvedadipika, in The Caraka Samhita of Agnivesa... With the AyurvedaDipika Commentary of Cakrapanidatta, ed. GANGASAHAYA PANDEYA, Varanasi 1983 (KSS 194, actually a remake of the 3rd Nirnaya Sagar Press edition, ed. JADAVAJI TRIKAMI, Bombay 1941).
Anandāśrama Sanskrit Series.
*Upayahṛdaya, Taisho ed., Vol. 32, No. 1632.
Kashi Sanskrit Series. Calcutta Sanskrit Series. Carakasamhita, see AVD.
Nyayakumudacandra of Prabhacandra, ed. MAHENDRA KUMAR, Vol. I. Bombay 1938.
Nyayabhasya, in Nyayadarsana of Gautama with the Bhasya of Vatsyayana, the Värttika of Uddyotakara, the Tätparyafika of Vacaspati & the Parisuddhi of Udayana, ed. ANANTALAL THAKUR, Vol. I: Chapter I, Darbhanga 1967.
Nyayabhaṣaṇa of Bhasarvajña, ed. YOGINDRANANDA, Varanasi 1968.
Nyayamañjarī of Jayantabhatta with Tippani - Nyayasaurabha by the Editor, ed. K.S. VARADACHARYA, Vol. I, Mysore 1969.
The Nyayamanjari of Jayanta Bhatta, ed. GANGADHARA SASTRI TAILANGA, Part 1, Benares 1895.
Cakradhara's Nyayamañjarīgranthibhanga, ed. NAGIN J. SHAH, Ahmedabad 1972.
Nyayavārtika, cf. NBh.
Nyayavarttikatätparyafika, cf. NBh.
Nyayavärttikatätparyaparituddhi, cf. NBh.
Nyayasutra, as edited in RUBEN 1928.
Pramaṇamimämsä of Hemacandra, ed. SUKHALALJI SANGHAVI, MAHENDRA KUMAR SASTRI and DALSUKH MALVANIA NYAYA TIRTHA, 2 edition, Ahme dabad 1989.

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Debate and Independent Reasoning vs. Tradition
BSB
MBH
Bombay edition of the Mahabharata. Balakrida, in The Yaravalky asmrti with the Commentary Balakrida of Viswanipdcharya, ed. T. GANAPATI SASTRI, Trivandrum 1921-1922. Madhva's Brahmasarabhasya, in Sarvamula Granthah, Vol. 1: Prasthanatrayi, ed. SRI ANANDATHIRTHA BHAGAVATPADA, Udipi 1969. Mahabharata, ed. VISHNU S. SUKTHANKAR et al., Poona 1933-1966. Manu-Smrti with nine commentaries ..., Vol. I, ed. JAYANTAKRISHNA HARIKRISHNA DAVE, Bombay 1972. The Valmiki-Ramdyana, Vol. 1. ed. G. H. BHATT, Baroda 1960. Vaišeşikasūtra of Kanada with the Commentary of Candrananda, ed. MUNI SRI JAMBUVUJAYA, Baroda 1961. Vizianagram Sanskrit Series. Srikantharippaņakam by Srikanthācārya, ed. ANANTALAL THAKUR, Calcutta 1986. Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha of Sāyana-Madhava, ed. VASUDEV SHASTRI ABHYANKAR, 34 edition, Poona 1978. Sudhi Series.
A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, Cambridge. DEUSSEN, Paul (together with Otto STRAUSS) 1906 Vier philosophische Texte des Mahabharatam, Leipzig. FRANCO, Eli 1997 Dharmakinti on Compassion and Rebirth, Wien. FRAUWALLNER, Erich 1984 Nachgelassene Werke, Vol. 1: Aufsätze, Beitrdge, Skizzen, ed. Ernst Stein
kellner, Wien. GLASENAPP, Helmuth von 1938 "Hermann Jacobit".
in: Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 92, 1-14. HACKER, Paul 1958 *Anvīksiki," in: Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens 2, 54
83.
LITERATURE
APTE, Vaman Shivaram 1957 Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary, revised and enlarged edition, ed. P.K.
Gode and C.G. Karve, Poona. BHANDARKAR, R.G. 1982 Vaisnavism, Saivism and Minor Religious Systems (reprint from his collected
works), Vol. IV, Poona. BHATTACHARYYA, Sivaprasad 1956 "The Neo-Buddhist Nucleus in Alankāraśāstra," in: Journal of the Asiatic
Society 22/1, 49-66 BOHTLINGK, Otto and Rudolph ROTH
Sanskrit-Wörterbuch, Fünfter Theil, St. Petersburg. CHATTOPADHYAYA, Debiprasad and Mrinalkanti GANGOPADHYAYA 1967 Ndya Philosophy, Part I: First Adhyāya, Calcutta. DAHLMANN, Joseph 1895 Das Mahabharata als Epos und Rechtsbuch, Berlin, DASGUPTA, Surendranath 1922
A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1. Cambridge.
HALBFASS, Wilhelm 1988 India and Europe, Albany. 1991
Tradition and Reflection, Albany. 1992 On Being and What There Is, Albany. HALL, Fitz-Edward 1897 A Rational Refutation of the Hindu Philosophical Systems by Nehemiah
Nilakantha Sastri Goreh, 2 edition, London/Madras. JACOBI, Hermann 1911 Zur Frühgeschichte der indischen Philosophie," in: Sitzungsberichte der
Königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 732-743. 1918
"A Contribution Towards the Early History of Indian Philosophy," in: Indian
Antiquary 47, 101-109. 1929 "Mimamsă und Vaišeşika," in: Indian Studies in Honour of Charles Rockwell
Lanman, Cambridge/Mass., 145-165. JUNANKAR, N.S. 1978 Gautama: The Myaya Philosophy, Delhi. KATYAMA, Yuichi 1991 "On the Authorship of the Upayahrdaya," in: Ernst Steinkellner (ed.).
Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition, Wien, 107-117. KANG, Sung-Yong 1998 Zur altindischen Tradition der Debatte gemäss der medizinischen Überliefe
rung. M.A. thesis, University of Hamburg (to be published in the series
Philosophica Indica. Einsichten - Ansichten, Reinbek). KANGLE, R.P. 1965 The Kautilya Arthafastra, Part M, Bombay.

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250 Karin Preisendanz Debate and Independent Reasoning vs. Tradition 251 KATRE, S.M. 1943 "In memoriam Vishnu Sitaram Sukthankar," in Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute 24, 123-135. KEITH, Arthur Berriedale 1919 Indian Logic and Atomism, Oxford, MATILAL, Bimal Krishna 1986 Perception, Oxford. 1990 Logic, Language and Reality, 2nd ed., Delhi. 1998 The Character of Logic in India, ed. Jonardon Ganeri and Heeraman Tiwari. Albany. MATSUBARA, Mitsunori 1994 Pancaratra Samhitas and Early Vaisnava Theology, Delhi. MAYRHOFER, Manfred 1993 Etymologisches Worterbuch des Altindoarischen, II. Band, Lieferung 14, Hei delberg. MESQUITA, Roque 2000 Madhva: Visnutattvanirnayah, Wien. MEUTHRATH, Annette 1996 Untersuchungen zur Kompositionsgeschichte der Nyayasutras, Wurzburg/ Altenberge. MISHRA, Umesha 1957 History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, Allahabad. 1966 History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, Allahabad. NARAIN, Harsh 1983 Facets of Indian Religio-Philosophic Identity, Varanasi. OBERHAMMER, Gerhard 1964 "Paksilasvamin's Introduction to his Nyayabhasyam," in: Asian Studies 2/3, 302-322. 1984 Wahrheit und Transzendenz, Wien. 1992 "Der fruhe Nyaya: Bemerkungen zur inneren Gestalt seines Denkens," in: B. van den Hoek, D.H.A. Kolff and M.S. Oort (eds), Ritual, State and History in South Asia: Essays in Honour of J.C. Heesterman, Leiden/Koln, 244-258. OLDENBERG, Hermann 1919 Die Weltanschauung der Brahmana-Texte, Gottingen. PERRY, Bruce M. 1997 "Early Nyaya and Hindu Orthodoxy: anviksiki and adhikara," in: Eli Franco and Karin Preisendanz (eds), Beyond Orientalism: The Work of Wilhelm Halbfass and its Impact on Indian and Cross-Cultural Studies, Amsterdam Atlanta, 449-470.. POTTER, Karl H. 1995 Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Vol. I: Bibliography, 3rd edition, Delhi. PREISENDANZ, Karin 1994 Studien zu Nyayasutra III.1 mit dem Nyayatattvaloka Vacaspati Misras II., Stuttgart. RANDLE, H.N. 1930 Indian Logic in the Early Schools, Oxford. ROTH, Rudolf 1872 "Indische Medicin. Caraka," in: Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft 26, 441-452. RUBEN, Walter 1926 "Zur Fruhgeschichte der indischen Philosophie," in: Willibald Kirfel (ed.), Beitrage zur Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte Indiens (Festschrift Hermann Jacobi), Bonn, 346-357. 1928 Die Nyayasutra's, Leipzig. SCHARFE, Hartmut 1968 Untersuchungen zur Staatsrechtslehre des Kautalya, Wiesbaden. SPROCKHOFF, Joachim Friedrich 1999 "api va 'oder auch / or also' - oder was? Vom Fehlgriff bei der Wahl in einer Alternative: Erster Versuch," in: Indo-Iranian Journal 42, 141-156. STAAL, Frits 1995 "The Sanskrit of Science," in: Journal of Indian Philosophy 23/1, 73-127. THAKUR, Anantalal 1974 "The Mahabharata and the Nyayasastra," in: Proceedings of the All-India Oriental Conference (27th session) - Kurukshetra University, December 1974, 403-408. 1975 "Gautama," in: V. Raghavan (ed.), Founders of Philosophy, Delhi, 39-54. TUCCI, Guiseppe 1929a "Buddhist Logic before Dinnaga (Asanga, Vasubandhu, Tarka-sastras)," in: Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 451-488. 1929b Pre-Dinnaga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources, Baroda. UI, Hakuju 1925 Studies in Indian Philosophy (in Japanese), Vol. 2, Tokyo. VIDYABHUSANA, Satish Chandra 1920 A History of Indian Logic, Calcutta. 1930 The Nyaya Sutras of Gotama, rev. and ed. Nandalal Sinha, Allahabad. WERBA, Chlodwig H. 1997 Verba IndoArica, Wien. WINTERNITZ, M. 1929 "Anviksiki und Atmavidya," in: Indologica Pragensia 1, 1-8.