________________
232
Karin Preisendanz
macro-structure of the Nyayasutra as known to and commented upon by Vätsyāyana (i.e., under the presupposition that a division into five adhyaya-s was already in place), provide a transition to the fifth book of the text which deals foremost with purely eristic topics, namely, the so-called sophistic objections (järi) and the points of defeat in debate (nigrahasthäna). The sequence in question is obviously taken from some other text belonging to the tradition of debate because the threefold division of debate presupposed in this section, namely, samvada," jalpa and vitanda, terminologically differs from the threefold division as found in the first book of the Nyayasitra. There, in NS 1.2.1-3, three types of debate called väda, jalpa and vitanda are characterized after väda has been mentioned in the programmatic first sutra as a relevant topic, presumably to be understood as a generic term for debate. This terminological deviation regarding the types of debate and their internal classification, that is, the grouping together of jalpa and vitanda as "contentional discourse" (vigrhyakathanam)" which is not addressed at all in the first book, are discrepancies which concern the doctrinal basis of the Nyaya school and thus point at the fact that we are dealing here with a cutout from elsewhere, most probably from a text close to the tradition of debate which is reflected in the section on debate presented in the Carakasamhitä." As has been shown by VIDYABHUSANA," Guiseppe TUCCI" and Erich
NS 4.2.46-47 (cf. nn. 58 and 61) speak of samvada as the "honest truth-seeking and friendly type of debate. According to MEUTHRATH, who considers a "code of conduct for Naiyayikas" including "conversation" as the topic of the sub-section, the use of samvida (translated as "conversation") only alludes to vida as taught in book one; on the other hand, MEUTHRATH speaks of the fact that here a discussion is recommended to be conducted with equal-minded persons only as a reason for the slight modification of the term, a statement which seems to imply that according to her interpretation a specific type of vdda, as taught in book one, is meant by samvada in NS 4.2.46 (cf. MEUTHRATH 1996, 201).
Cf. NS 4.2.50 (quoted below, n. 65).
50 This is not to say that according to the relevant lakṣaṇa-section in the first book, jalpa and vitandd were not conceived to be contentional; the usage of distortions, sophistic objections and points of defeat in debate mentioned as the distinctive characteristic of the two vis-à-vis the first type of debate (cf. NS 1.2.2 and by implication 3) clearly implies their contentional nature.
31 The affinity to the classification and terminology of types of debate as found in the section on debate in the Carakasamhita (Cas) Vimanasthana ch. 8. 55 16, 18, 21-22, 28, is conveniently presented in KANG 1998, 20.
2 Cf. VIDYABHUSANA 1920, 25-35; the presentation as well as the interpretation of the materials in this truly pioneering work have to be approached with caution, of course, and judged more for their merit of having drawn sufficient attention to this important area of research than for their philological precision and historical plausibility. Hakuju Ul's translation and treatment of a large part of the relevant section in the Carakasamhitd in his Studies in Indian Philosophy (cf. Ut 1925,
Debate and Independent Reasoning vs. Tradition
FRAUWALLNER," to mention the names of the three most important pioneers in this connection," the intellectual environment of origin of the Nyaya was related to this tradition of debate.
233
Next to this terminological and classificatory discrepancy, a further remarkable feature has to be mentioned which touches upon the very nature of the first type of debate as described in the section at the end of book four: According to NS 4.2.48, samvada is also recommended if a counter-position is not held by one of the participants in the colloquy (cf. also below, p. 235). In book one, however, an exception to the overall requirement of a position and counter-position in debate" is made only in the case of jalpa which then turns into vitanda." The relevant statement in NS 1.2.3. if interpreted in a strict manner, may point to an even more pronounced classificatory discrepancy between the two sections than assumed above: according to NS 1.2.1-3, debate (vdda) would only be twofold, namely, vada and jalpa, the latter with an acceptable variant called vitandā.
426-471), which is not accessible to me, were certainly provoked by VIDYABHUSANA's work, as was DASGUPTA's inclusion and extensive treatment of the section in his History of Indian Philosophy (cf. DASGUPTA 1932, 373-392). Rudolf ROTH, who already in 1872 (cf. ROTH 1972) drew attention to Vimanasthana ch. 8 up to § 67, still on the basis of manuscripts, unfortunately jumped over the part which from our present-day point of view is of most interest for the history of Indian philosophy. stating in a footnote that the part contains "the enumeration and definition of 24 terms belonging to logic and dialectics, which a disputant must know," but that "their treatment is only peculiar inasmuch as the examples are all taken from medicine" (cf. ROTH 1872, 451 (n. 1]).
53 Cf. TUCCI 1929, 468-469; cf. also the tables in TUCCI 19296, xvi-xxii; xxv-xxvi. 54 Cf. FRAUWALLNER 1984, ch. V.1.
55 Next to KANG 1998, MATILAL 1998, 38-42 (published posthumously, without any references to earlier discussions either by the author himself or by the editors) seems to be the most recent treatment of this material.
56 Cf. NS 1.2.1, translated below, p. 237.
57 Cf. NS 1.2.3: sa (scil. jalpah) pratipakṣasthāpanāhino vitanda. Although RUBEN already noticed this discrepancy, he did not draw further conclusions from his observation (cf. RUBEN 1928, 128: "Sonst pflegt nur beim Wortstreit (vitanda, Ib3) der eine der Gegner auf eine eigene Behauptung zu verzichten...").