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Karin Preisendarz
Debate and Independent Reasoning vs. Tradition
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Vatsyayana's assertions in his Nyayabhasya are introduced and motivated by a reproach formulated by a real or imaginary opponent; the latter criticizes the composition of Myayasutra (NS) 1.1.1" inasmuch as the separate enumeration of the dialectical-eristic items or relevant topics (padartha)", that is, doubt, etc., next to the initial mention of means and objects of valid cognition (pramana, prameya) is useless because the former are included in the latter." Vätsyāyana concede this point, but continues that the four sciences (vidya), among which the examining or investigative science (dnviksiki), the science of Nyaya, counts as the fourth, are taught for the sake of living beings." inasmuch as they, that is, the sciences, proceed in different ways. To the science of Nyaya belong doubt, etc., inasmuch as it has its separate procedure (prasthana)" in this way", without the explicit mention of these relevant
topics it would be a mere science concerned with the Self (adhyatmavidyamatra), as are the Upanişads. Therefore it is set into motion, i.e., propagated by its founder, with doubt, etc., as its special method." In his following remarks, too, Våtsyāyana aims at the identification of the Nyāya with anviksikl, the investigative science, this time in an argumentative way. First he defines Nyaya as "the examination of things by means of the means of valid cognition." Here he refers obviously to the school's characteristic mode of proceeding as the definiendum, that is not to the school or tradition called Nyaya, but to a specific method (nyaya), namely, that of inquisitive thinking, or, already more specifically in view of the immediate context, to methodical thinking or reasoning, also called nyaya.This nyaya is further determined as the act of inferring, literally: "subsequent judging" or "measuring" (anumdna)", based
MISHRA 1966, 17; THAKUR 1975, 41; JUNANKAR 1978, 114-115.
1 pramånaprameyasamayaprayojanadrstdntasiddhantdayavatarkanirnayaddajalavetandihervabhasacchaladninigrahasthandndim tarafdnan wiltrasadhigamah
1) In the Myawasarra itself the term padartha is not used in this sense; cf. also HALRFASS 1992, 85 (a. 39).
M Cf. Mydyabharya (NBA) p. 2.13-14: tatra santaydindprthagracanam anarthakam. Jamsayddayo hiyathasambhava pramaneru prameyesu cantarbhavanto na vatriyanta in. This criticism is introduced after Vitsyayana's comments on the second topic object of valid cognition" (prameya). Compare also Mydyamarjarl (NM) p. 23.1-2: samlayddayas tu paddirthd yathdisambhaway pramdnesu prameyeu cantarbhayarito pi.... It should be noted that THAKUR's ms. J. I.e., the Jaisalmer ms., reads prameye ca instead of prameyeru ca, a reading which is supported by the corresponding passage of the Mydyamarjarl as it appears in the editio princeps (in principle referred to in MM with the siglum kha); cf. NM (VSS) p. 9,20. As Vitsyāyana uses the word pramrya in the immediately preceding passage in the singular (cf. NBh p. 2.9) and prameye is also found in Uddyotakara's paraphrase of the relevant sentence in Midyavarmnika ) p. 14,6 (samlayddayah prameye 'rutarbhavantini prthak te na vdcydh; cf. also NV p. 20.26 with variant 12 transmitted in ms. J), I consider it to reflect the original reading.
15 Compare NM p. 9,7: hyam endevikikl catasnam vidyanan madhye rydyavidyd ganyate...
1 On this motivation to teach on the part of trustworthy persons (apta) cf. NBH (CalSS) P. 566,1-4 (on 2.1.68 = NS 2.1.66; the passage is translated and commented upon in FRANCO 1991 30-33).
I would like to conjecture prthaprasthanäydh, as a bahuwrthi-compound relating to tarydh (cf. the text given in n. 19). The variant prthakprashanam recorded by THAKUR in ms. J (cf. his variant 6. obviously followed in MATILAL 1986, 71) seems to be a lectio facilior as compared to prthakprasthand of all editions known to me, which I myself cannot construe and understand (cf.. however, OBERHAMMER 1992, 248 where prasthana is obviously assumed to be a masculine noun: for this solution sec already JACOBI 1911, 734). For a corroboration of this conjecture compare the obvious bahuvili-compound in NBh p. 2,15 (cf. again n. 19) and MM p. 10.4: prthakprasthånd himd vidydh. As to my interpretation of prarthana as procedure, it is supported by Vicaspati Mišra's paraphrase of the term with yydpåra in the Mydyawarttilaidsparyan (NVT) p. 65.23. Cf. also APTE
1957, .., 6: method." and JUNANKAR 1978,114; 456: "method of treatment." HACKER'S (unjustified) translation and interpretation of prasthana as "Gegenstand" (cf. HACKER 1958, 65; 73 and already JACOBI 1911, 734; see also OBERHAMMER 1964, 309: "formal object," "object, corrected to "methodisches Vorgehen" and "methodisches Element" (to relate prthaprasthandh, as a karmadhdraya-compound, meaningfully to the plural padarthah) in OBERHAMMER 1992, 248, MATILAL 1986, 71: subject matter") is mainly responsible for his not very favourable judgment on Vatsyayana's statements; cf. also the polite criticism in HALBFASS 1988, 275. DASGUPTA (1922, 277) speaks of doubt, etc., as the separate branches of the Nyayavidya, PERRY (1998, 451) of "basis.
Compare Mp. 23,1-2: sambayadayas tu padārthah... ydyapratniherundir prthag upodisyante.
"Ct. NBh p. 2,14-18: saryam ram etar. imas tu catasto vidydh prthakprasthandh prdna blirdim anugrahdyopadifyante ydsm caturthiyam anviksiki mydyavidya. tasydh pythakprasthand<yd>h samlaydayah paddythdh, tesdi prthagwacanam artarenddheydtmavidydditram yam sydd yathopanişadah, tasmdt sambayadibih padarthath pathak prasthapyate.
The context is provided by Vitsyayana's brief exposition of the relevant topic "rootive, purpose" (prayojana).
2Cf. also OBERHAMMER's distinction of nyaya, in the sense of method," from Nyāya in OBERHAMMER 1964, esp. 309 and 317, although he also speaks of the method of rydya. In OBERHAMMER 1992 he even argues for the fact that Vatsyayana was responsible for the self-designtion of his philosophical school as Nyly, on the basis of his re-interpretation of the term rydya, in the sense of "leading principle, as found in the exegetical tradition of the Mimamsa. This interesting claim certainly deserves to be taken up in a more detailed historical examination. PERRY (1998, 451) distinguished "reasoning (mydya) and Nyaya.
That is, if one considers the word to be a derivative of the root mi, to account for the fact that Vatsydyana connects the terms pramdry, pramdina, prameya and pramiti, which should be long to the same root as anundry, anumana, etc., with the verbal form praminoti (cf. NBhp. 1,10) which cannot be a present tense form of vmd ("to measure"), but only of Vmi ("to fix, set up") (cf. WERBA 1997, mu). For this root, a derived meaning "to judge, cognize, perceive" is assumed (cf. BOHTLINOK and ROTH 1868, s.v. 1. m, 3). However, it is highly doubtful that midna is a derivative of this root (cf. MAYRHOFER 1993, s.v. MAY'). From the semantic point of view, a confusion of V with md can be observed, according to MAYRHOFER (loc. cit.), in "younger texts," a fact