Abhidharma And Jainism

Author(s): Johannes Bronkhorst
Publisher: Johannes Bronkhorst
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269419/1

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Abhidharma and Jainism*
Johannes Bronkhorst
It has been known for a long time that Buddhism and Jainism (the latter in the form preached by Mahavira) originated more or less at the same time and in the same region of India. The early Buddhist texts in particular describe various encounters between the Buddha and Jainas (called nirgrantha/ nigantha in these texts), they know Mahavira (Nigantha Näthlaputta) and report his death. It is not therefore surprising that Jainism has exerted an influence on Buddhism in its early phases. The question whether and to what extent Buddhism has influenced Jainism has not so far received much attention. This question will be addressed in this paper.
We begin with a passage in Süyagada I, one of the oldest canonical texts of the Svetämbara Jainas, which shows familiarity with Buddhism. Süyagada 1.1.1.17 speaks of the five Buddhist groups (skandha) which join up for a moment (khana.joiksemawagin). This passage clearly is not just acquaint. ed with the early Buddhist notion of the five skandhas, it also knows the much more recent theory of momentariness. The chronological and other implica tions of this fact deserve attention.
Momentariness did not characterize Buddhism from its beginning. The earliest clear references to it appear to occur in the (Maha-) Vibhāså of the Sarvåstivāda tradition, composed several centuries after the beginning of the common era. This does not necessarily imply that it did not exist before that date. Indeed, it seems likely that the theory of momentariness finds expression in the so-called samskylalakines of the Pancavastuka, which may go back to the middle of the second century before our era. The above-cited passage from the Süyagada must date from that period at the earliest.
This is not the only conclusion we can draw. Momentariness appears to be indissociably linked to the systematization of Buddhist doctrine carried out
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probably been adopted from Jainism. He argues that this determination of the moment fits better into the context of Jainism than in that of Buddhism. because it presupposes that empty space is subdivided into spatial atoms. This is indeed the Jainas' point of view, but not that of the Buddhists (with some exceptions pointed out by Rospatt). He further emphasizes that the specification of the moment's duration by movement is at odds with the Buddhist theory of momentariness according to which all conditioned things exist for too short a time to allow for any movement at all. Rospatt's argument is convincing and makes it probable that this particular way of defining the moment, and of linking up samaya and pradesa, belonged to Jainism before they found their way into Buddhism. It has however no bearing on the question which of these two currents of thought developed the notion of a minimal unit of time first. This last question is answered by the acquaintance of the Süyagada with the Buddhist theory of momentariness, well before the idea of moments had been introduced into Jainism. It seems plausible to assume that Jainism borrowed this idea from Buddhist Abhidharma.
in Sarvästivada Abhidharma, and to the development of the Pancavastuka in particular. Acquaintance of Suyagada I with Buddhist momentariness must therefore mean: acquaintance with Sarvästivada or related Abhidharma. It will be useful to recall some fundamental features of this important develop ment in Buddhism
The doctrine of momentariness is but one aspect of the general analytical approach that characterizes this form of Buddhism. Not only was time divided into its ultimate units, the same was done with regard to the world in general. Its ultimate constituents are the dharmas, fully enumerated and extensively discussed in the texts. And just as time is nothing beyond a succession of moments, composite objects are nothing beyond the dharmas they are constituted of. In the end only momentary dharmas really exist; the objects they may constitute do not really exist. The composite object par excellence is the person, often called pudgala: Its existence is denied by many Buddhists for this very reason.
When we now return to the Jaina canonical texts that are younger than the Süyagada, we are struck by their familiarity with the notion of a shortest unit of time. The moment (Nm ) as the smallest unit of time appears to occur for the first time in the Uttarajjhayana. It occurs in this sense in the late 36th chapter, probably in chapter 34 which is also known to be late, and in chapter 29. Utt 36.9 speaks of time as a succession (santal/Skt. santali), an idea and expression familiar from the Buddhist texts that accept momentariness.
The idea that one thought occupies one moment is perhaps for the first time met with in Thāna 1. This same chapter enumerates samaya, pradeša (the smallest unit of space) and paramanu (atom) and states that they are single. These three are characterized as indivisible, indestructable etc. in chapter 3. The same is said in Viyahapannatti 5.8, where it is shown that the atom
Parandapoggala) and the objects (paggala) that occupy one unit of space (ega-poes 'ogadha), last one unit of time lega-samaya-thitya) and possess one degree of one property resp. prove to be indivisible from the ... points of view of substance, place, time and condition)".
Rospatt has pointed out that in Jainism the moment (samaya) is some times defined as the time taken for the movement from one spatial point to the next. This specification of the moment's dimension, he continues, can also be found in Buddhism (where the moment is called ksana), but has there most
The second half of the verse from the Süyagada which shows familiar ity with the Buddhist notion of skandhas and the theory of momentariness, studied above, has not received the attention it deserves. It betrays acquaintance with the Buddhist concept of the person. It reads, in Bollée's slightly adjusted translation: "Die Seelel ist weder verschieden, noch-so lehren sie -nicht verschieden (von den skandhas), wohl und nicht aus einer Ursache entstanden." Bollée is no doubt correct-as was, before him. Jacobi: both follow in this respect Silanka-in thinking that this half of the verse concerns the soul, or the person, of the Buddhists. We can be more precise: the char acterisation of the soul/persoa as neither identical with nor different from the skandhas agrees in all details with what we know about the Buddhist Pudgalavădins.
Recall that Buddhism, as pointed out above, developed a concept of the person conceived of as a collection of skandhas which, because it is such a collection and therefore a composite entity, was not recognized to exist. No composite entities were considered to exist by these Buddhists, and the rejection of the person was but one example, even though the most significant one, of this attitude. Other Buddhists, the so-called Pudgalavadins, disagreed.
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They did not reject the existence of the person, even though they, too, appear to have looked upon it as a collection of skandhas. Yet they believed that the person does not disappear when the skandhas disappear. They maintained that the person is neither identical with nor different from the skandhas. This, as we have seen, is the conception of the person which the Söyagada attributes to the Buddhists.
The chronological and other consequences of this fact, too, will have to be considered. The Vätsiputriyas, who represent the earliest form of Pudgalavāda, are supposed to have separated themselves from other Buddhists after a schism which took place some two hundred years after the death of the Buddha. This is not in conflict with our earlier conclusion, according to which this verse of the Süyagada must have been composed after the middle of the second century B.C.E.
The acquaintance of the Süyagada with the Buddhist concept of the person, and therefore with Buddhist ideas relating to composite entities, raises various questions. The first one concerns the subsequent Jaina attitude with regard to composite objects. Did the Jainas undergo Abhidharma influence in this respect? We have seen that the Sarvāstivādins rejected the existence of composite entities. What is the position of the later Jaina canonical texts with regard to this for the Buddhists important issue? Several passages show that they are aware of the distinction between composite entities and their parts, and that they accept the existence of both.
Uttarajjhayana chapter 36 accepts the existence of wholes in v. 11: "Compound things and atoms occur as individual things and apart (or different) (from each other" (egattena puhattena khandha ya paramdnano). The Viyahapan natti speaks repeatedly of aggregates (khandha) as existing things; aggregates are formed when atoms are united into one guy shari = katah semhanyante). Elsewhere the same text states that "aggregates occupying two space units (dwesir khandhal... 111 possess dialectical) reality if they are considered from the point of view of their own (properties) ... [2] do not possess that reality if they are considered from the point of view of the properties of another object ... [3] one cannot say that they possess or do not possess reality if they are considered simultaneously from both these points of view... [4] the aggregate simultaneously possesses and does not possess reality is part of it is considered from the point of view of its inherent
properties and the other part from the point of view of alien properties; and, in conditions the reader can easily deduce for himself. (5) the aggregate simultaneously possesses reality and one cannot say that it possesses or does not possess reality, or [6] it simultaneously does not possess reality and one cannot say etc." and similar things about larger aggregates. All these passages show that they were composed at a time when the philosophical issue of whether or not an aggregate exists besides its component parts was felt and discussed in Jainism. Since this issue is closely connected with the develop ment of the Buddhist Abhidharma theory, there is a certain plausibility in the assumption that the Jainas had taken over this question from the Buddhists and then gave a diagonally opposite answer to it.
An important further argument supporting the idea that the Jainas were influenced by the Buddhist notion of the person as a composite entity is their peculiar use of the word pudgala. This is the word which the Buddhists used to refer to the person conceived of in that manner. The Jainas came to use it in the sense of "material object (including atoms)" (MW). How did they arrive at this peculiar meaning?
Note to begin with that pudgala (Pkt. puggala/poggala) does not always have this sense in the oldest Jaina canonical texts. The Sayagada has the following verse: pannamadam ceva tavomadam ca ninname goyamadam ca bhikkha/astuagam ceva caittham āhu se pandie ultamapoggale sell. Jacobi translates: "A monk should combat pride of genius, pride of sanctity, pride of birth, and (pride of good) living, which is enumerated as the fourth; such a man is wise and of the right stuff." The phrase uttamapoggale se is no doubt in an effort to stick to the meaning 'material object' for poggala, translated as "The is) of the right stuff". But obviously the translation "he is the best person" is to be preferred. This shows that the meaning person was not yet lost at this early period.
We know that the Sarvāstivada and Pudgalavada Buddhists looked upon both the person and other macroscopic objects as aggregates, but that they used the word pudgala only for the aggregate which is the person, not for other aggregates. Yet the Sarvāstivādins in particular had a tendency to treat all aggregates in the same manner: they denied the existence of all of them. In some of the early Jaina texts we find the word pudgala used for aggregates other than the person. Consider the following passage from Ayara II: abhiky:
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mkhasi me dam javalyam, lavatyam poggalam dalaydhi, md affhiydi. Jacobi translates (p. 115): "if you want to give me a portion of whatever size, give it me; but not the bones", and this is no doubt correct. Poggala here means 'portion, quantity' and refers therefore to a composite entity, an aggregate (of meat, in this case)
All other passages in the Ayåra and Suyagada that use the word paggala/poggala are ambiguous as to its precise meaning. Yet the above two passages show that a development of the meaning from person' to 'material object is conceivable if we take as point of departure the Buddhist use of pudgala. Passages in later canonical Jaina texts show that pudgala (or its Prakrit equivalents) went on referring to macroscopic material objects, and therefore to aggregates, besides acquiring the meaning 'material atom', some times called paramanupoggala. Thāna 2 recognizes, for example, two sources for the production of sound, the second of which is breaking poggalas; no need to explain that atoms cannot be broken. Viy 5.8 uses the word for both atoms and aggregates. It here states that "Objects (Doggala, JB... are either divisible (sopaesa), indivisible (a.p.) or infinite (ananta). Moreover, ... they may be at the same time [indivisible] from one and (divisible] (or (indivisible)) from another point of view. There is, however, one restriction: poggalas that are [indivisible) as to substance (scil. atoms) always are (indivisible) as to place, and poggalas that are [divisible) as to place always are (divisible) as to substance (scil. aggregates)." The Thāna refers to the same distinction where it states that there are two kinds of pudgalas, the atomic and the non-atomic, the subtle and the coarse ones. We must assume that the semantic develop ment has passed through the following phases: 'bodily aggregate' - material aggregate in general' - 'material object/matter'-the ultimate constituent of matter, material atom! The end point of this development (which never replaced the preceding element) is, ironically, the exact opposite of its beginning, because atoms are precisely not aggregates.
Ayara and the Suyagada-contain little information about the soul. Dalsukh D. Malvania rightly pointed out that "(from the very first sentences of the Acaränga it is clear that the migration of the soul is accepted". He draws in this connection also attention to Ayara 176, which describes the soul in the following terms: "It is not long nor small nor round nor triangular nor quadrangular nor circular; it is not black nor blue nor red nor green nor white: neither of good nor bad smell, not bitter nor pungent nor astringent nor sweet: neither rough nor soft; neither heavy nor light; neither cold nor hot; neither harsh nor smooth. It does not have a body, is not born again, has no attachment and is without sexual gender. While having knowledge and sentience. there is nonetheless nothing with which it can be compared. Its being is without form, there is no condition of the unconditioned. It is not sound nor form nor smell nor flavour nor touch or anything like that." Citing the phrase "neither long nor short" (se na dthe na krasse), Malvania comments: "this goes against the Jaina theory, found in the later texts, that the soul is the size of the body in its mundane existence, and occupies, when liberated, two thirds of the extent of the last body". This ancient concept of the soul, be it noted, was apparently still held at the time of Süyagada II, for it is there criticized by others, who maintain that body and soul are identical, as characterizing the position of those who believe that body and soul are different. The passage is important enough to be cited at some length: 'Those who maintain that the soul is different from the body, cannot tell whether the soul (as separated from the body) is long or small, whether globular or circular or triangular or square or sexagonal or octagonal or long, whether black or blue or red or yellow or white, whether of sweet smell or of bad smell, whether bitter or pungent or astringent or sour or sweet, whether hard or soft or heavy or light or cold or hot or smooth or rough.... Thus I have treated of the first man (as one who believes that) soul and body are one and the same thing."
Malvania and following him Paul Dundas are of the opinion that the soul at that early period was defined under the influence of the Upanisads, and Malvania cites in support of this view Ayara 171: "That which is the soul is that which knows, that which is the knower is the soul, that by which one knows is the soul." This opinion may or may not be correct. Malvania certainly appears to be right in suggesting that much of what came to be known as Jaina philosophy was developed later, and was not created in the
At this point we must address a particularly important question: has the classical Jaina concept of the soul been created under the influence of Buddhist Abhidharma?
Note to begin with that the texts that are mainly on linguistic and metrical grounds, looked upon as the oldest ones of the canon-primarily the
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days of Mahavira. This looks like a plausible assumption, all the more so since we know that something quite similar happened in the case of Buddhism: much of what came to be known as Buddhist philosophy was created long after the Buddha. It does however raise the question how and why new ideas were developed after the time of Mahavira. We will consider the somewhat more recent, but still canonical, Jaina conception of the soul in some detail.
The notion of a body sized soul may for the first time be presented as an orthodox position in a verse of Uttarajjhayana chapter 36 which states: "The dimension of perfected (souls is two-thirds of the height which the individual had in his last existence". Since this verse occurs in a section dealing with various kinds of souls tva; v. 47-48), we must assume that the height which the individual had in his last existence" also belonged to his soul. The Viyahapannatti is more elaborate: soul Gla) and matter (poggala) are tied to each other, touched by each other, etc. Viy 7.8, referring to the Rayapasenalja, compares the soul, which may cover the volume of an ele. phant or of a louse, with a lamp that lights up the space in which it is placed, sometimes a hut, sometimes the space determined by a cover. A short reference to the body.like size of the soul is also found in one of the concluding stanzas of the Uvavaiya.
The Jaina notion of a body sized soul is far from identical with the Buddhist concept of a person as a composite entity consisting of the five skandhas, yet they have one important point in common: both have a spatial extension that coincides with that of the physical body. In the case of the Buddhist pudgala this does not cause surprise, for that is how it is conceived. The body-like size of the Jaina soul is more puzzling. It cannot be explained as being "primitive": anthropological literature provides many examples of concepts of a soul that is far smaller than the body, but few, if any, of souls that are coextensive with it. Moreover, we have seen that early Jainism appears not to have held such a concept of the soul. The classical concept is therefore in need of explanation, and the fact that the Jaina soul comes to have the same size as the Buddhist pudgala, combined with the fact that the Jainas are known to have been acquainted with this latter concept, invites the conclusion that the Buddhist concept has influenced the classical Jaina one,
It is however obvious that the Jainas cannot simply have borrowed the Buddhist concept of the person. The Buddhist pudgala did not become the
Jaina soul. Jainism has maintained right from the beginning that there is a soul that transmigrates, and that is therefore presumably different from the body. Accepting the existence of aggregates, even such as unite bodily and psychological factors, would not be enough for the Jainas to account for the soul. Indeed, by insisting that there is a soul besides the bodily aggregate, what was left for the latter was nothing but being a material aggregate, with all the consequences which we have seen for the word pudgala. Yet it can be argued that in an important way the Jaina soul was, in spite of this, modeled on the Buddhist concept of the pudgala.
The notion of a body sized soul owed no doubt part of its attraction to the convenient way it allowed to visualize its relationship to karma. Note first, as already pointed out by K.K. Dixit, that Ayara I and Süyagada lpresumably the oldest texts of the Jaina canon-do not tell us "how the Karmic physical particles get attached to a soul and how they get loose from it". Dixit continues: "As a matter of fact, on this question our texts hardly say a thing that would not be endorsed by the Brahmin or Buddhist theoreticians." Is seems indeed likely that the classical karma doctrine of Jainism, which conceives of karma as atomic particles, is a later innovation, which may have come into being at the same time as that of the atomic nature of time and space, and that of the body-sized soul. Uttarajjhayana chapter 33 may contain the earliest mention of karma as being atomic (provided Jacobi is right in translating paesagga = pradesagra as 'number of atoms').
The expression "karma body" occurs already in Ayara I, but it is doubtful whether it has here the technical meaning it acquires later. Later canonical texts distinguish five kinds of bodies, among them the karma body, without giving much information as to their nature. Schubring observes: "The established list leading from ordliya (earthly)] over veuwvliya (of transforma tion)], aharlaga (of transposition), leylaga (fiery)to kamm laga ) sarira sur: gests the gradual increase in fineness and, simultaneously, in density of material units". The karma body may therefore be the finest of the five. More important for our present purposes is that living beings-specified are hell beings, elementary beings and animals, human beings, and gods and goddesses
-attract particles to build their bodies. Deleu summarises in the following words the way the Viyahapannatti describes the formation of the body: "The discussion starts with the paoga-bandha (junction effected by an impulse. JBI of
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the earthly body (specification for the different kinds of beings). Each of these bandhas arises with the appearance (udaya) of the karman of the same name. ... The same questions regarding the bodies of transformation and transposition, the fiery body and the karmic body." This means, as becomes clear from the text, that the junction that gives rise to the earthly body arises with the appearance of the karma called oraliyasayirappaoga Cordliyasartrappangrandma kommal, and similarly for the other junctions. The particles concerned are attracted by the soul, and fill up the space it occupies.
The net result of this way of conceptualising soul and body (or rather: bodies) combined is much closer to the Buddhist notion of the pudgala than the Jaina concept of the soul by itself. All functions, both bodily and mental/ spiritual, are in this way united in the space of the body, as they are in the case of the Buddhist pudgala.
The assumption that the Jainas adopted their body-sized soul and the exis. tence of aggregates in response and opposition to Buddhist Abhidharma has the advantage of explaining why they accepted these beliefs, and why they accepted both of them together. We have already seen that chronology constitutes no obstacle to this assumption. The Buddhist theory of momentari ness, which may not have come into existence before the second century B.C. E, is already known to the Suyagada, as is the notion of the Buddhist pudgala. The Buddhist theory of momentariness was but one aspect of the tendency, which initially may have been strongest in the Sarvāstivāda school, to reject the existence of all composite objects, whether extended in space or in time The Buddhist notion of the person as a composite entity dates at least from that same period, and therefore pre-dates, as far as we can tell, the Jaina notion of a body-sized soul.
und Glossar von Walther Schubring. Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1910. 4) Anga
Suttoni I. ed. Muni Nathamal, Ladnun: Jain Viswa Bharati, V.S. 2031. Samataya (= Samantylna Satra), 1) Thanamgasuttam and Samandangasattam.
ed. Muni Jambūvijaya, Bombay: Shri Mahavira Jaina Vidyalaya, 1985 Jaina Agama Series No. 3). 2) Sthand ngasiyam and Smaudyd gasitram, with the Vytti of Abhyadeva, ed. Sågaranandasuri, re-edited with appendices etc. by Muni Jambūvijaya, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 1985 Lala Sundarlal Jain Agamagranthamālā II). 3) Ang Sutrani Ied. Muni Nathamal, Ladnun: Jain Viswa Bharati, V.S. 2031 Sarvadarsanasangraha of Sayana Madhava, ed with an original commentary in
Sanskrit by Mahamahopadhyâya Vasudev Shastri Abhyankar. Third edition Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. 1978. Government Oriental Series, Class A. No. 1.) Siyagada (= Satraklariga Satra). 1) Siyagadangasuttar, ed. Muni Jambūvijaya.
Bombay: Shri Mahavira Jaina Vidyalaya, 1978 (Jaina-Agama-Series No. 2 (21). 2) A carangasätram and Satrakatangasätram, with the Niryukti of Bhadrabah and the commentary of Stlanka, ed. Sagaranandasūri, re-edited with appendices etc. by Muni Jambüvijaya, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978 (Lala Sundar lal Jain Agamagranthamala 1). 3) Anga Sultani 1. ed. Muni Nathamal, Ladnun: Jain Viswa Bharati, V.S. 2031.4) Part of the text has been edited by Willem B. Bollée (Studien zum Savagada. Die Jainas und die anderen Weltanschauungen vor der Zeitenwende. Textteile. Neutti, Übersetzung und Anmerkungen, Frans Steiner Wiesbaden, 1977 & 1988 (SSAI, 24 & 31). Thana (= Sthandige Satra). 1) Thanamagasattam and Samatayangasattan, ed. Muni Jambovijaya, Bombay: Shri Mahāvira Jaina Vidyalaya, 1985 Jaina Agama-Series No. 3). 2) Sthanangasatram and Samandydigastran, with the Vyti of Abhayadeva, ed. Sagaranandasūri, re-edited with appendices etc. by Muni Jambūvijaya, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 1985 (Lala Sundarlal Jain Agamagranthamala II). 3) Ange Switani I. ed. Muni Nathamal, Ladnun: Jain Viswa Bharati, V.S. 2031. d have also consulted another edition of Thananga brought out by Muni Nathmal (Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati. 1976) which contains
Sanskrit and Hindi translations) Uttarajjayana/Uttarajdy! (Ullun yana Satru). 1) The Uttaradhyayanasätra
An introduction, text, critical notes and a commentary, by Jarl Charpentier. 1914, reprint New Delhi: Ajay Book Service, 1980. 2) Nava Suttoni V. ed. Yuvácārya Mahaprajna, Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati. 1987. 3) Dasaveyaliyasuttam, Uttarajhayandim and Avassayasuttam. ed. Muni Punyavi. jayaji and Pt. Amritlal Mohanlal Bhojak, Bombay: Shri Mahavira Jaina
Editions referred to: Aydra (= Acara Salve). 1) Aydranga Sottam, ed. Muni Jambūvijaya, Bombay:
Shri Mahavira Jaina Vidyalaya, 1977 Jaina-Agama-Series No. 2 (I)). 2) A card vigastram and Satraktigastram, with the Niryukti of Bhadrabahu and the commentary of Silike, ed. Sagaranandasūri, re-edited with appendices etc. by Muni Jambuvijayaji. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978 (Lala Sundarlal Jain Agamagranthamala. 3) Acananga-Satram, Erster Srutaskandha, Text, Analyse
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Mhbh
MW
Vidyalaya, 1977 Vaina-Agama Series No. 15). Uvaudiya (= Aupapatika Satra). 1) Das Aupapatika Satra, erstes Upanga der Jaina,
1. Theil. Einleitung, Text und Glossar, von Ernst Leumann, Leipzig 1883, repr. Kraus Reprint, Nendeln, Liechtenstein, 1966. Vivdhapannatti (= Vyakhyararlapti). 1) Bhagavat Vidhapannatti, ed. Muni Nath amal, Ladnun: Jain Viswa Bhārati, V.S. 2031 (Anga Suttani, 2). 2) Viydhapanna. ttisultan, ed. Bechardas J. Doshi and Amritlal Mohanlal Bhojak, Bombay: - Shri Mahavira Jaina Vidyalaya, 1974-1982, 3 parts (Jaina-Agama-Series, 4). 3) Bhoparvall Satra, Prakrit text with English translation and notes based on the commentary of Abhayadeva Sūri, by K.C. Lalwani 4 vols. (Satakas 1-11), Calcutta: Jain Bhawan, 1973-1985.
PEFEO Pkt. PTS
Mahabharata, crit. ed. V.S. Sukthankar et al., Poona 1933 ff. (BORI) Monier Monier Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary. Oxford 1899 Pāņinian sūtra Publications de l'Ecole Française d'Extrême-Orient, Paris Prakrit Pali Text Society, London ed. Schubring Samavāya Schriftenreihe des Südasien-Instituts der Universitat Heidelberg, Wiesbaden, Stuttgart Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik Sūyagada Svetāśvatara Upanişad Uttarajjhayana/Uttarajjhāya Vivāhapannatti värttika
Sam SSAI
StII Süy SASUP Utt Viy
AS
Notes:
I thank Paul Dundas for comments and encouragement. The following abbrevi. ations are used in this article: AAWL
Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, Mainz, Geistes. und Sozialwissenschaftliche
Klasse ANIST
Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien, Hamburg Asiatische Studien, Etudes Asiatiques, Bern
Bombay edition Bareau, SBPV
André Bareau. Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule, Saigon 1955 (PEFEO 38) ed. Charpentier
Delhi edition DPPN
G. P. Malalasekera, Dictionary of Pali Proper Names, 2
vols., London 1937-1938 IAMD
An Illustrated Ardha-Magadhi Dictionary, by Shatava. dhani Jain Muni and Shri Ratnachandraji Maharaj, 5 vols.. Indore 1923 (reprint, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1988) Indologica Taurinensia, Torino tr. Jacobi
Jahrgang KathUp
Katha Upanişad
Ladnun edition Lalw
ed. tr. Lalwani Maha-bh
Patanjali, (Vyākarana-)Mahābhāşya, ed. F. Kielhorn, Bom bay 1880-1885
1) DPPN s.v. Nigantha-Nata(Nätha--putta and Nigantha. 2) See, eg. Johannes Bronkhorst, The Two Traditions of Meditation in
Ancient India, second edition, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1993. p. 78 ., where the influence of Jaina-like practices and ideas is described 3) This question is to be distinguished from the one about common elements in the two traditions, which receives a fair amount of attention in the secon dary literature. 4) Cp. Hermann Jacobi, Jaina Sätras, translated from the Prakrit, Part 1:
Acaranga Satra, Kalpa Sūtra, Oxford University Press, 1884 (reprint: Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1980) p. xli f; Walther Schubring. The Doctrine of the Jainas, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1962, reprint 1978 (Translation by Wolfgang
Beurlen of Die Lehre der Juinas, Berlin and Leipzig 1934) $ 42 p. 81. 5) The passage reads: pamca khandhe vayamtege bala k hanajoghino. Willem B. Bollée (Studien zum Stygade. Die Jaixes und die anderen Weltums chauungen vor der Zeitenwunde. Textteile, Nijutti. Obersetzung und Anmerkungen. Franz Steiner, Wiesbaden, 1977 (SSAI. 241) translates (p. 72): "Einige. Toren, reden von fünf Komplexen (skandhas), die sich nur einen Moment lang verbinden." Walther Schubring (Worte Mahaviras. Kritische Übersetzungen aus dem Kanon de Jaina, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1926) had translated the same pas.
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sage as follows (p. 1231: "Funf Elemente des Seins nennen Einige, Toren, die eine Kette von Augenblicken behaupten." Silanka proposes a third interpreta tion for thana jor: which exist for but one moment, he paraphrases (p. 17): le.
skandhah ... kanayoginah, ksamamdirdasthayin ity arthah. 6) Alexander von Rospatt, The Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness. A
survery of the origins and early phase of this doctrine up to Vasubandha Franz Steiner, Stuttgart, 1995 (ANISI, 47). p. 15f. 7) Johannes Bronkhorst, review of Rospatt, The Buddhist Doctrine of
Mownfariness, AS 1912). 1995, pp. 513-519. 8) Johannes Bronkhorst. "Die Buddhistische Lehre," Heinz Bechert u. a., Der Buddhismus: Der indische Buddhismus und seine Verzweigungen (Die Religionen der Menschheit, vol. 24.1) W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 2000, pp. 23-212. esp. p. 97ff. 9) W. B. Bollée "Buddhists and Buddhism in the earlier literature of the Svetām.
bara Jains," Buddhist Studies in Honour of I. B. Horner, D. Reidel, Dordrecht Boston, 1974, pp. 27-39), too, is of the opinion that "the early contacts of the Jains must have mainly been with that current of interpretation which was
represented by the Sarvästivadins" (p. 28); see below. 10) Utt 36.14-15 IC p. 250/36.13-14 (L p. 2271/36.1465-66 (B p. 297-98). Since references to Jaina canonical texts are often hard to trace for non-specialists, I will regularly give references to all the editions and occasionally translations
and summaries) to which I have had access. 11) Utt 34.33 (C p. 244, L p. 221/34.1403 (B p 288), 34.49-50 (C p. 245, L p. 222-231/
34.1419-20 (Bp. 291), 34.54-55 (C p. 246. L p. 223)/34.1424-25 (Bp. 291). Cf. Ludwig Alsdorf, The Arya Stanzas of the Uttarajhayd. Contributions to the text history and interpretation of a canonical Jaina text, Steiner, Wiesbaden, 1966 (AAWL, Jg. 1966 Nr. 2. pp. 153-220). p. 214f. 12) Utt 29.71 (C p. 211/29.72 (L p. 2011/29.1173 (B p. 257), 29.73 (C p. 2111/29.74 (L
p. 2011/29.1175 (Bp. 258). 13) Utt 36.9 IC p. 250)/36.9 L p. 226)/36.1461 (B p. 297). 14) Thana 1.31 (p. 4/1.41 (D p. 13. L p. 490): ege mane deudsuramanwyd same
tamsi lasi samayamsi. 15) Thana 1.36 (Bp. 41/1.44.45 (D p. 161/1.48-50 (L p. 491); ege samae/ege paese
ege parumanal. 16) Thana 3.2.173 (Bp. 671/3.2.165 (D p. 90/3.2.328-335 (L p. 568): tato acchejja
pannattal formalit: sumayr. pades, parum euam abhejja, ada jha, agujhd,
anaddha, amajjhd. apaesd, avibhatima/. 17) Viy 5.8.5 (Bp. 220-21/5.8.203 (L p. 224-258/5.8.144 (Lalw II p. 212); Jozef Deleu,
Vrydhapannatti (Bhagaud): The Fifth Arge of the Jaina Canon. Introduction, critical analysis, commentary & indexes, Brugge, 1970 (reprint: Motilal Banar sidass, Delhi, 1996 (Lala Sundar Lal Jain Research Series, 10)). p. 116. Note Jozef Deleu's ("Lord Mahavira and the anyatirthikas." A. N. Upadhye et al. (eds.). Mahavira and His Teachings, Bhagavan Mahavira 2500th Nirvana Mahotsava Samiti, Bombay, 1977, pp. 187-193) observation to the extent that "the Buddhists have not been mentioned by name in the Viylāhapannatti) and it is rather difficult to decide whether any of the dissident views exposed in that work may be pinned on them" (p. 191). 18) Rospatt, The Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness, p. 103 with note 233. 19) Even without Suy 1.1.1.17 it would be possible to argue that the theory of
momentariness originated in Buddhism, on the basis of the structural develop ment of Buddhist thought. Süy 1.1.1.17 saves us the trouble of having to work
out this argument here. 20) Say 1.1.1.17 (ed. Bollée): anno ananno 'evdhu heuyam ca aheuyam. Tr.
Bollée, Studien zum Sayagada I. p. 72. 21) Hermann Jacobi, Jaina Satras, translated from the Prakrit, Part II: Uttar
adhyayana Sätra, Sátraktänga Sätra, Oxford University Press, 1895 (reprint:
Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1968) p. 238. 22) Cp on all this Bronkhorst, "Die Buddhistische Lehre," pp. 91-93. 23) Bareau, SBPV p. 114 f. 24) Utt 36.11 (C p. 250, L p. 2271/36.1463 (B p. 297); tr. Jacobi, Jaina Sutras II.p.
208, modified. 25) E.g. Viy 2.10.11 (Bp. 116)/2.10.139 L p. 118/2.10.66 (Lalw I p. 215): je ravi
[ajtua) le calliha pannatta, tam jahd: khamdhd, khandhadesd, kham dhapadesa, paramdrupo gala, cf. Deleu, Viydhapannatti, p. 94, Viy 5.7.11. (Bp. 210 f.)/5.7.150f. (Lp. 216f.)/5.7.109f. (Lalw II p. 1931.). cf. Deleu, Viyahapannatti.
p. 113. 26) Viy 12.4.2. (Bp. 572 6.)/12.4.691. (L p.552 (.), cf. Deleu, Viyahapannatti. p. 183. 27) Viy 12.10.28 1. (Bp. 611 13/12.10.218 f. IL p. 584 1.); Deleu, Viydhapannatti. p.
191-192 28) Padmanabh S. Jaini (The Jaina Path of Purification, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi,
1979, p. 101) refers to the traditional explanation of this term ("The Jaina term pudgala is traditionally said to be derived from pre-joining) plus gela (break ing)"), but this can no more be accepted as a historical explanation than the one offered in the SarvadarSanasangraha (p. 72. ch. 31. 254) Parayanti galantiti
pudgalah. 29) Sãy 113.571 (Bp. 103)/1.13.15 (D p. 158; L p. 334;). This may be the oldest
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attestation of purgala/poggala in the Jaina canon. 30) Jacobi, Jaina Satras II, p. 322. 31) TAMD s.v. poggala gives for this passage the meaning "soul". 32) Ayara II.1.1.10.404 (Bp. 140)/II.1.10.58 (D p. 236)/II.1.10.135 (L p. 115)/II.1.10. 6 U); the reading follows the Ladnun ed. Note that Ayara II is considered to
be younger than Ayāra L. 33) None in Ayāra I; cp. Moriichi Yamazaki and Yumi Ousaka, Ayaranga.
Word Index and Reverse Word Index, Chuo Academic Research Institute,
Tokyo, 1996 (Philologica Asiatica, Monograph Series 8). 3) Thána 2.3.73 (3 p. 231/2.3.81 (D) p. 42)/2.3.220 (L p. 516): bhijjamianam ceva
poggala nam sadduppde siya. 35) Viy 5.8.205 (L. p 225)/5.8.7 (Bp. 2211/5.8.144 (Lalw II p. 213); Deleu, Viydhapan
natti, p. 116. 36) Thana 2.3.75 (B p. 245/2.3.82 (D p. 421/2.3.228-29 (L p. 517): duviha poggala
pannatta, paramanupoggala ceva, nopoggala ceva; duviha poggala pannatta, tam
jaha: suhuma ceva, baward ceud. 37) Dalsukh D. Malvania, "Beginnings of Jaina philosophy in the Acaranga,"
Klaus Bruhn and Albrecht Wezler (eds.). Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhis. mus. Gedenkschrift für Ludwig Alsdorf. Franz Steiner, Wiesbaden, 1981 (ANISt. 23). pp. 151-153. esp. 151. 38) Ayara 1.5.6.176 (Bp. 56-571/1.5.6.170 (D p. 153 1.3/1.5.6.4 (S p. 261/1.5.6.127 f. (L p. 47): se na dthe na hasse na nafte na tamise na cadiranse na parimandale na kinhe na nile na tohle na halidde na sukkile na surabhi-gandhe na durabhi. gandhe na titte na kadue na kasde na ambile na mahure na kakkhade na malle na garue na lake na sle na unhe na niddhe na lukkhe na kaa na ruke na sange na ittht na purise na annahd parinne sanne muamd na vijjal, antul satta, apayassa payam n'atthi, se na sadde na rive na gandhe na rase na phase
icc.eduanti. (the reading follows ed. Schubring). 39) Tr. Jacobi, Jaina Sūtras I. p. 52, emended as in Paul Dundas, The Jains,
Routledge, London and New York, 1992 (The Library of Religious Beliefs and
Practices), p. 38 40) Malvania, "Beginnings of Jaina philosophy in the Acaránga" p. 152. 41) Súy II.1.649, 653 (B p. 130. 1337/II.1.16, 22 (L p. 351, 3537/II.1.9 (D p. 184-851/II.
1.15, 19 (Bollée. Studien zum Siwwida I. p. 25-26: J): jesim tam sw.yakkhayam bhaval, anno bhavaljivo annam sariram, tamha te evam no vippadiveenti: ayam duse aw dihetti whasse ili na parimandaletti vaffetti wa tamise ti vd calivamise Ili wd dyaye ti d chalamuse ti va affhamsettind kinheiti od ntle iti wa lohiyahaliddetti ud sukkiletti d subbhigandhe Ati u dubbhigadhe ti
titte tti vd kadue li va kasde Ili wd ambile li ud mahure iti va kakkhade Ilie malle ti wa gurue tri u lahuetti v sfetti ud usine ili ud niddhe ti wa lukkhe Iti wa/...tti padhame purisajāe tajjivataccharirae ti ahie/. Tr. Jacobi. Jaina Satras II. p. 340, 342. For a discussion of this difficult passage, see Bollée,
Studien zum Sayagada 1. p. 143 f. 42) Ayāra 1.5.5.171 (Bp. 55)/1.5.5.165 (D p. 151)/1.5.5.5 (Sp. 25)/1.5.5.104 (L p. 45):
je ayd se vinnäyd, je vinnavi se aya, jena vijanai se dyd (the reading follows ed
Schubring). Tr. Dundas, The Jains, p. 38. 43) Utt 14.19 (I. p. 133; p. 121: JX/14.460 (Bp. 1511) is not clear in this respect, but
suggests that the notion of a body-sized soul may not yet have existed at that time: "[The soul] cannot be apprehended by the senses, because it possesses no corporeal form, and since it possesses no corporeal form it is eternal. Its binding is determined because of the things connected with the soul, and this binding is called the cause of worldly existence" (no indiya.ggejjha amutta bhaud, amuttabhaud vi ya hoi niccolajjhattluheun niyay'assa bandho, sdraheum ca wayanti bandham//tr. Jacobi, Jaina Satras Il. p. 64, modified in accordance with K. R. Norman, "Kriyāvāda and the existence of the soul." originally published in: Harish Chandra Das led.), Buddhism and Jainism, Part II, Cuttack, 1976, pp. 4-12, reprint: Collected Papers II, PTS, Oxford. 1991. pp 99-112, esp. p. 104f.: "Uttarajjhayana-sutta XIV: Usuyårijjam." Aspects of Jainology, Pl. Dalsukh Bhai Malvania Felicitation Volume. Vol. 3, Varanasi 1991, pp. 16-26, reprint: Collected Papers III, PTS, Oxford, 1992, pp. 244-256. esp. p. 249f. The reappearance of elements of this verse in later Jaina works such as the Paramātmaprakāśa (Norman. "Kriyavāda and the existence of the
soul," p. 105f.) will be dealt with in a future study. 44) Utt 36.65 (C p. 255: J)/36.64 (L p. 2301/36.1516 (B p. 303): usseho jassa jo hui
bhavammi carimammi u/tibhand tatto ya siddhd nogahand bhave//. Tr. Jacobi.
Jaina Satras II. p. 212, modified. 45) Viy 1.6.26 (B p. 48-49)/1.6.312-13 (L p. 52/1.6.226-227 (Lalw 1 p. 98-99); cf.
Deleu, Viyahapannatti, p. 81 (1.6.61. 46) Tr. E. Leumann, "Beziehungen der Jaina Literatur zu andern Literatur
kreisen Indiens," Actes du Sixième Congres International des Orientalistes low en 1883 a Leyde, Troisième Partie, Section 2: Aryenne, E. J. Brill, Leyde, 1885. Pp. 467-564, esp. p. 521. 47) Viy 7.8.2 (B p. 301)/7.8.158-159 (L p. 297-981/7.8.134 (Lalw III p. 62): cf. Deleu.
Viyahapannatli, p. 139. 48) Uvavaiya 171: dtham ud huressam va jam carina-bhave havej samthanam.
Latto ti-bhaga-hinam siddhan 'ogahana blaniya.
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49) The notion of a soul having the size of the thumb is not unknown to early Indian literature either; cp. KathUp 4.12-13; 6.17; SASUp 3.13; 5.8-9; Mhbh 3. 281.16; 5.45.24 (angusthamatra purusal Jiva). Note however that Patanjali's Mahabhasya distinguishes between a bodily self and an inner self: Sariratma tat karma kuroti yenantaratma sukhaduhkhe anubhavati (Maha-bh II p. 681.21-22, on P. 3.1.87 vt. 10). The view that early Vaisesika accepted a body sized soul is far from certain, and may indeed be mistaken; cp. Johannes Bronkhorst, Studies on Bhartrhari, 5: Bhartshari and Vaisesika," AS 47(1), 1993, pp. 7594, esp. p. 871. 50) K. K. Dixit, Early Jainism, L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, 1978 (L. D. Series, 64), p. 9. Cp. Dundas, The Jains, p. 84: "The notion of karma as a substance pervading the universe and being attracted to the jiva by the latter's actions was unknown to the earliest Jain teaching" (diacritics added). 51) Utt 33.16-17 (L p. 218; J p. 194-95)/33.1361-62 (B p. 283). 52) Ayara 1.2.6.99 (B p. 29)/1.2.6.99 (D p. 95)/1.2.6.163 & 5.3.59 (L p. 27 & 43)/1.2.6. 3 & 5.3.5 (S p. 12, 23; J): muni monam samayaya/'yae dhune kammasariragam (the Bombay and Delhi editions have at the second occurrence of this line (1.5.3.161 (B p. 51)/1.5.3.155 (D p. 142)) sariragam instead of kammasariragam). Jacobi simply translated body': "A sage, acquiring sagedom, should subdue his body" or "A sage adopting a life of wisdom, should treat his body roughly". The Jaina tradition itself, by reading the second time sariraga (unacceptable for metrical reasons), appears to have accepted this interpretation. 53) So Thana 5.1.23-31 (L p. 684)/5.1.395 (B p. 175; D p. 196); Thana 6.11 (L p. 719)/ 6.483 (B p. 206; D p. 236); Sam 152 (B p. 457; D p. 94)/Prakirnaka 158-171 (L p. 934). 54) Schubring, The Doctrine of the Jainas, p. 137. 55) Viy 8.9.366 f. (L p. 376f.)/8.9.24 f. (B p. 383f.)/8.9.303 f. (Lalw III p. 242f.); Deleu, Viyahapannatti, p. 155-56. 56) According to the Tattvartha Sutra (2.42) two types of body-the karma body and the fiery body-accompany the soul from beginningless times, also between births. Interestingly, the Yoga Bhasya on sutra 4.10 (cp. Johannes Bronkhorst, "Patanjali and the Yoga sutras," Stil 10, 1984, 191-212, esp. p. 207) refers to others" who ascribe a similar function to the mind-complex (citta). The fact that this mind-complex is said to have the size and the form of the body and is in this connection compared to a lamp which fills the space in which it is placed, just like the soul according to Viy 7.8 and the Rayapase. naijja referred to above, suggests that this notion did not arise independently of the Jaina notion of the soul. (Professor, Universit de Lausanne) 581 (30)