Abhidharma And Jainism

SR No.: 269419
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Johannes Bronkhorst
Publisher: Johannes Bronkhorst
Total Pages: 10
Language: English
Classification: Article
File Size: 2 MB

Page 2

probably been adopted from Jainism. He argues that this determination of the moment fits better into the context of Jainism than in that of Buddhism. because it presupposes that empty space is subdivided into spatial atoms. This is indeed the Jainas' point of view, but not that of the Buddhists (with some exceptions pointed out by Rospatt). He further emphasizes that the specification of the moment's duration by movement is at odds with the Buddhist theory of momentariness according to which all conditioned things exist for too short a time to allow for any movement at all. Rospatt's argument is convincing and makes it probable that this particular way of defining the moment, and of linking up samaya and pradesa, belonged to Jainism before they found their way into Buddhism. It has however no bearing on the question which of these two currents of thought developed the notion of a minimal unit of time first. This last question is answered by the acquaintance of the Süyagada with the Buddhist theory of momentariness, well before the idea of moments had been introduced into Jainism. It seems plausible to assume that Jainism borrowed this idea from Buddhist Abhidharma.
in Sarvästivada Abhidharma, and to the development of the Pancavastuka in particular. Acquaintance of Suyagada I with Buddhist momentariness must therefore mean: acquaintance with Sarvästivada or related Abhidharma. It will be useful to recall some fundamental features of this important develop ment in Buddhism
The doctrine of momentariness is but one aspect of the general analytical approach that characterizes this form of Buddhism. Not only was time divided into its ultimate units, the same was done with regard to the world in general. Its ultimate constituents are the dharmas, fully enumerated and extensively discussed in the texts. And just as time is nothing beyond a succession of moments, composite objects are nothing beyond the dharmas they are constituted of. In the end only momentary dharmas really exist; the objects they may constitute do not really exist. The composite object par excellence is the person, often called pudgala: Its existence is denied by many Buddhists for this very reason.
When we now return to the Jaina canonical texts that are younger than the Süyagada, we are struck by their familiarity with the notion of a shortest unit of time. The moment (Nm ) as the smallest unit of time appears to occur for the first time in the Uttarajjhayana. It occurs in this sense in the late 36th chapter, probably in chapter 34 which is also known to be late, and in chapter 29. Utt 36.9 speaks of time as a succession (santal/Skt. santali), an idea and expression familiar from the Buddhist texts that accept momentariness.
The idea that one thought occupies one moment is perhaps for the first time met with in Thāna 1. This same chapter enumerates samaya, pradeša (the smallest unit of space) and paramanu (atom) and states that they are single. These three are characterized as indivisible, indestructable etc. in chapter 3. The same is said in Viyahapannatti 5.8, where it is shown that the atom
Parandapoggala) and the objects (paggala) that occupy one unit of space (ega-poes 'ogadha), last one unit of time lega-samaya-thitya) and possess one degree of one property resp. prove to be indivisible from the ... points of view of substance, place, time and condition)".
Rospatt has pointed out that in Jainism the moment (samaya) is some times defined as the time taken for the movement from one spatial point to the next. This specification of the moment's dimension, he continues, can also be found in Buddhism (where the moment is called ksana), but has there most
The second half of the verse from the Süyagada which shows familiar ity with the Buddhist notion of skandhas and the theory of momentariness, studied above, has not received the attention it deserves. It betrays acquaintance with the Buddhist concept of the person. It reads, in Bollée's slightly adjusted translation: "Die Seelel ist weder verschieden, noch-so lehren sie -nicht verschieden (von den skandhas), wohl und nicht aus einer Ursache entstanden." Bollée is no doubt correct-as was, before him. Jacobi: both follow in this respect Silanka-in thinking that this half of the verse concerns the soul, or the person, of the Buddhists. We can be more precise: the char acterisation of the soul/persoa as neither identical with nor different from the skandhas agrees in all details with what we know about the Buddhist Pudgalavădins.
Recall that Buddhism, as pointed out above, developed a concept of the person conceived of as a collection of skandhas which, because it is such a collection and therefore a composite entity, was not recognized to exist. No composite entities were considered to exist by these Buddhists, and the rejection of the person was but one example, even though the most significant one, of this attitude. Other Buddhists, the so-called Pudgalavadins, disagreed.
597
[14]
(15)
Abhidharma and Jainism
596