Some Amphibious Expressions in Umaswati

Author(s): M P Marathe
Publisher: Z_Pushkarmuni_Abhinandan_Granth_012012.pdf

Page 6

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श्री पुष्करमुनि अभिनन्दन पन्थ : षष्ठम खण्ड ।
there seems to be no reason to preclude ascription of Utpada, Vyaya and Dhrauvyatva to each one of the Tattvas. This problem would of course arise provided Taltvas are Dravyas. If, on the contrary, Jiva and AjTvakayas alone are Dravyas such a problem would not arise regarding every Tattva, Dravya and Sat, but rather with regard to some Tattvas, every Dravya and each Sat. That is, it seems that the problem would still remain with regard to Akāśa, Dharma, Adharma and Pudgala. Instead of pressing this point further, let us, however, turn to the next problem. The reason why the separate de initions of Sat and Dravya are given is perhaps that, it may be argued, although Umāsvāti takes every Dravya to be Sar, he does not seem to take every Sat to be a Dravya. But this prima facie plausible line of the explanation of the weak link in Umāsvāti seems to turn out to be unacceptable one. For, first, Umāsvāti himself does not seem to favour this defence as he seems to take the sets of things which are Sat and Dravya to be co-extensive. Secondly, both of these could plausibly be taken to be definitions of Dravya or Sat itself. Actually, Pajyapāda maintains that, these are not two different things at all. Similarly, he states that these are not two different definitions of different things either. They are the two ways of stating the definition of Dravya itself. But both Umāsvāti and Puiyapāda seem to be silent on the necessity of giving these two definitions of Dravya. Thus Dravya and Sat seems to be another set of amphibious expressions in Umäsväti.
DII
So far we endeavoured to point out two possible sets of amphibious expressions in Umāsvāti. Our inquiry shows that, even after making sufficient allowance to Umāsvāti, there appear certain weak points in bis explanation. Before we close, we wish to draw attention to one more weak point that seems to emerge by way of a corollary. In the commentary on I. 4, Umāsvāti states his intention to explain each one of the Tattvas, Arthas or Padārthas definitionally and stipulatively.27 But in the fifth chapter, while talking about Dharma etc., he states that he would explain their nature definitionally.28 Further, in the same chapter a question is raised : How is one to say that there are Dharma etc.? This question is answered saying definitionally. Now, the two ways mentioned in I. 4 are to be understood conjunctively or disjunctively. On each count, these seems to remain some weakness. If conjunctively understood, Dharma etc., which one is to comprehend definitionally alone, are not to be counted as Tattvas even derivatively. Since Tattva, Artha, Padartha, Dravya and Sat seem to be the same, Dharma etc., cannot be called any of them. Moreover, if stipulation or description is taken as having existential import, then those Tattvas, Arthas, Dravyas etc., which lack this aspect are considered to be so either improperly or metaphorically. Now, if disjunctively understood, the ground for taking each one of them as Tattva, Artha, Dravya etc., seems to be shaky. For, criteria of lakṣaṇatah and vidhānatah respectively may bring to the fore two different sorts of Tattvas, Dravyas etc. Even the contention of Pujyapāda that whereas 'utpädavyayadhrauvyayuktam sar' is a samanya laksana (generic property) while 'rupinah pudgalah' etc., are višeşalaksanas (differentia) of Pudgala etc. too seems to leave a weak link.30 For, while accepting the distinction between two sorts of definitions bringing definienda of both the kinds of definitions under one banner does not seem to be the ground for Tattvas or Dravyas being treated on par. If we are going to count anything as Tativa, Dravya, Sat etc. irrespective of the distinction between those fulfilling and not-fulfilling existential or ontological condition, then we seem to be mixing between them. For, unless Tattvas, Dravyas, etc., are of the same kind, it seems futile to call them to be so. Such way understood there remains a difficulty in the comprehension of Tattvas, Dravyas etc.; for, any mixing up between what is ontological and what is other than ontological seems unreasonable. And therein one is constrained to say that there are certain weak links in Umāsvāti's explanation of Tattvas, Dravyas etc.
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