Sanskrit Manuscript Of Dharmakirtis Pramanaviniscaya

Author(s): Kazunobu Matsuda, Ernat Steinkellner
Publisher: Kazunobu Matsuda, Ernat Steinkellner

Page 10

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The Sanskrit Manuscript of Dharmakirti's Pramāṇaviniscaya
If (it is said): "There is no non-occurrence [of the reason] in similar instances that do not exist. Therefore [the reason] does not occur only in what is not a similar instance (asapakse)" 27, (we answer): When (you say) "(there is) no (non-occurrence)", why do you assume just this non-occurrence of an non-occurrence in (similar instances) that do not exist? 28 "The negation of non-occurrence as occurrence is well extant even in (the similar instance) that does not exist; the negation of occurrence, however, is not possible." He is (indeed) a beloved of the gods with unshaken intelligence, who does not accept a negation referring to something and (at the same time) uses words like "nonexistent, non-occurrence". We further treated this subject extensively in another circumstance 29 (arthāntare), [i. e. the section beginning with the words] "non-occurrence at the non-occurrence" 30. Therefore it is not spread out here.
Furthermore, a self is not non-existent because of the (actual) function of a proof for (its) existence, (but) would be doubtful (only). And it is certainly neither31 so [i. e. non-existent] on account of an inauthenticated assumption in form of (the statement) "The opponent assumes [the self to be] so [i. e. non-existent]" 32, because of undesired consequences. Nor31 is the use of a valid cognition appropriate when similar and dissimilar instances are established (merely) by force of an assumption. For in this case the self would be proven by scripture, it (would) not be proven by inference. Therefore, because this (self) is doubtful, the exclusion (vyatireka) of breath etc. [from the similar instances] would be doubtful even if [according to the Naiyayika] (the reason) is not excluded from non-existent similar instances. For the same reason [the exclusion is doubtful] from the dissimilar instances too. For, if the necessary occurrence in the one case [i. e. the similar instances] is established, the non-occurrence in the other [i. e. the dissimilar instances] would follow; else a doubt would surely occur with regard to [occurrence in] an invisible (case), even if in a certain visible case non-occurrence is established. To wit: we find that certain proper
27 Cf. PV IV 222ab and PVin II 8, 1f. (cf. PVin IIa: 39).
28 Cf. PV IV 222cd and PVin II 8, 13f. (cf. PVin IIa: 40 with note 99). 29 I. e. PVin II 8, 1-10. 1.
30 Cf. PVin II 8, 1; ... med pa la med pa ñid... The final source for the beginning of this section is NV 166, 2f.: asati nāstiteti cāsampradhārya proktam...
31 It seems that the two na ca sentences are connected, which would corroborate the emendation of na ca in line 9.
32 This is only an attempt. The Tibetan says: "If (it is said): 'Because the opponent assumes (it to be) so'".