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GEORGE BURCH
Indian and Western. In the outward objective attitude "object is apprehended as other than subjectivity and referred to by it." In the inward subjective attitude knowledge is apprehended as "the centre from which all reference starts" and over against which stands the object. Difficulty arises when these two opposed attitudes, each of which rejects the other, are united, but this union is just what experience, which is knowledge of object, requires.
The opposition between them is analyzed in the second chapter. Knowledge and object cannot be united conjunctively, but they can be united disjunctively, disjunctive unity of alternatives being itself a form of unity. Either alternative rejects the other as false, but in different ways. There are two types of falsity, illustrated by perceptual correction, where a false appearance is rejected as illusion, and inferential correction, where the false appearance persists in immediate feeling but is dismissed from the social world as error. Knowledge rejects object, but object merely ignores knowledge. Subjective and objective philosophies are equally adequate, but mutually inconsistent, and so are alternatively valid. Besides conjunctive and disjunctive unity, however, there is another sort of unity, dialectical unity, which means negation of one alternative not as rejected or ignored but in such a way that the other alternative "regains itself in an enriched form." There are thus three possible, though mutually incompatible, attitudes-subjective, objective, and dialectical. As there is no transcendental reason for preferring one to the others, there is absolute alternation between them.
This logical study of the alternative standpoints is continued by a psychological study in the third chapter, where the "three fundamentals of psychology"-cognition, feeling, and conationare analyzed. There are three levels of cognition-perception, imagination, and thought. Each stage is more subjective than the preceding, with a progressive rejection of objectivity. The ideal of cognition, perhaps never actually attained, is to enjoy selfrevealing subjectivity through complete rejection of object. Cognition, then, is identical with the subjective attitude. Feeling also has three levels-emotion (including pleasure and pain), aesthetic creation, and aesthetic appreciation. Here the levels are increasingly objective, with progressive ignoring of the subject, and the
