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APPENDIX.
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instead of clearing up the doubts and difficulties of men which is the aim of true metaphysics, they made
"He (Vijnana Bhiksu, the author of a famous commentary on the Sân khyan philosophy) was fully aware of the fact that none of the six Darşanas... ...was, as we have hinted more than once, a completa system of philosophy in the Western sense, but morely a catechism explaining, and giving a reasoned account of, some of the truths revealed in the Vedas and Upanisats, to a particular class of students, confining the scope of its enquiry within the province of Creation, withont attempting to solve to them the transcendental riddles of the Universe, which, in their particular stage of mental and spiritual development, it would have been impossible for them to grasp."
The writer of the preface, no doubt, tries to justify the defects of Hindu philosophy on the ground of the immature sense of its pupils, but in the absence of anything proving the perfection of knowledge in the teacher, the statement can only be taken to have been inspired by faith rather than reason. We are, however, not concerned with the soundness of the justification, but with the merit of the original systems; and as to their insufficiency the admisson is clear and ringing
In respect of the sources of valid knowledge also there is no agreement among these systems, the Vaisheshikas holding direct observation and inference to be the only admissible forms of proof, the Naiyayakas bringing in testimony and analogy in addition to these two, and the Mimânsikâs further adding arthâpatti (corollary. or inference by implication) and, at times, also, anupalabdhi (inference by negation). But analogy is evidently nothing other than a form of anumanâbhâsa (fallacy of inference) pure and simple, while artha patti (corollary) and anupalabdhi are included in the true logical inference. The remaining three, namely, direct observation, inference and reliable testimony, are, broadly speaking, the proper sources of pramana, inspite of the refusal of the Vaisheshikas to admit the last named; for reliable testimony is the sole means of a knowledge of things beyond perception and inference both. The Sankhyan school, no doubt, recognises these three forms of pramâna, but it assumes the infallibility of the Vedas, and its logical processes include inference by analogy, e. g., the conclusion that all mango trees must be in blossom, because one is seen to be in that condition (The
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