Nyayavatara and Buddhist Logical Works

Author(s): Alex Wayman
Publisher: Z_Nirgrantha_1_022701.pdf and Nirgrantha_2_022702.pdf and Nirgrantha_3_022703.pdf

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Alex Wayman
a concordant example is used for teaching purposes.
So, even though the author had labelled as 'useless' (vyartha) an external example, he himself found it useful to mention the 'concordant example' (sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta) (in N. A. 18) and the 'discordant example' (vaidharmya-drṣṭanta) (in N. A. 19). Before comparing Ratnākaraśānti's position on Antarvyāpti with that of the N. A. it is well to refer to his approximate dating. Because he is well-established in the field of Buddhist Tantra, I included him in my Sarnath, Varanasi, seminar contribution on "An Historical Review of Buddhist Tantras"." Here I explained why his dating is tied in with that of the great Tibetan translator Rin-chen Bzang-po, born A. D. 958 and that he would be a junior by about 20 years, hence born about A. D. 978. Hence he lived several decades after the author of N. A. It follows that Santi-pā (as the Tibetans call him), in defending the theory of Antarvyapti, does not directly depend on the Jaina work N. A., even though this latter work may contain the first use of the term antarvyapti. Santi-pā's treatise is subtle and difficult. When I translated it, using the text edited by Haraprasad Shastri1s compared with the Tibetan translation, I found editing mistakes both in the Sanskrit edition as well as in the Tibetan rendition.
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I believe that Shastri's introductory comments are quite appropriate and insightful. To put it in my own words, the usual examples given for the theory of pervasion (vyäpti), or invariable concomitance, are illustrated by the 'syllogism' of claiming that there is fire on that mountain, giving as reason that we notice smoke there, as in the case of the kitchen. Hence, the generality of inferences is based on prior experiences, and there is a constant appeal to previous experiences in a given culture, which justifies the example that has been popularly experienced. Hence, one could not argue against the claim that the pervasion in such cases requires inclusion of the example.
Nirgrantha
But then Śanti-pā claims that in some cases of a thesis and reason, which he terms sattvahetu (reason for a real or existent thing), it is not possible for an example to be part of the pervasion. In illustration, if the Buddhist argues, "What exists is momentary," and the various sects of India have their own theses (on Atman, Brahman, etc.) of similar declaration-it does not help to say "like a pot", since being momentary does not add a quality to the sattva as does the color 'red' to a pot, nor is a pot a paragon for what exists. Therefore, Buddhism has doctrinal reasons for the assertion "What exists is momentary," which presumably appeal to the followers of the lineage which so asserts. The various philosophical and religious schools of India all have their own declarations, giving reasons that appeal to the followers of such schools, and usually not providing any example that is popular and accepted by people at large. Now, presuming that various of those "reasons for an existent thing" are reasonable and acceptable, it must be that the pervasion was just between the thesis and the reason and does not extend to an example. Hence, even if an example is provided