Book Title: Nagarjuna Logic
Author(s): Johannes Bronkhorst
Publisher: Johannes Bronkhorst

View full book text
Previous | Next

Page 4
________________ 34 JOHANNES BRONKHORST Nagarjuna s Logic This is not however the case. It seems justified to think that the correspondence principle covers all cases also covered by OETKE's theorem, but not vice-versa. For any sentence of the type "A is the condition of the existence of) B"- which expresses the realm of applicability of OETKE's theorem-falls automatically in the realm of the correspondence principle, which concerns all sentences whatsoever. Sentences that are not of the type "A is the condition of (the existence of) B", on the other hand, are not covered by OETKE's theorem, yet they fall within the realm of the correspondence principle. I have already drawn attention to the fact that the correspondence principle has the distinct advantage of fitting in well with what we know was a generally held belief among the Buddhists of the time, the belief that there is a close connection between words and the objects of the phenomenal world. In this it contrasts sharply with OETKE's theorem, which makes one wonder why anyone should have accepted such a counterintuitive statement. We have seen that OETKE himself gave expression to similar doubts. In order to strengthen the case for the correspondence principle even further, we will discuss some cases where this principle offers a direct and obvious explanation of Nagarjuna's argument, whereas OETKE's theorem is either of no help, or is of help only in a roundabout, non-obvious manner. These cases, be it noted, do not prove that OETKE's theorem is somehow incorrect. On the contrary, this theorem, as it seems to me, is confirmed and strengthened by the circumstance that it appears to constitute part, a special case, of a wider principle accepted by Nagarjuna. A case where OETKE's theorem does not appear to be applicable occurs in the second chapter of the MMK, which proves the impossibility of going. Verse 5 reads: If there is a going of a road) that is being gone, there would be two goings that by which the (road) is being gone, and again the going on it. Underlying this argument is some such sentence as "(the road) which is being gone, is being gone" (gamyamānam gamyate; cp. MMK 10: gamyamanam na gamyate); Nagarjuna appears to think that it is well-formed. In the situation described by this sentence, there must be two goings, for two words that refer to going figure in the sentence. This is what verse 5 says, and this is what we expected on the basis of the correspondence principle. This example, more than most others, demonstrates the close connection that exists for Năgărjuna between language and reality. It seems to me unlikely that OETKE's theorem can explain this verse, and I would be surprised to see it satisfactorily explained by any theorem or principle that does not take the close connection between language and reality into account. The theme of the two goings comes up again later on in the same chapter, this time in connection with the sentence "the goer goes" (gantd gacchati). Verses 22 and 23 read: The going by which the goer is manifested, that he does not go, because he is not prior to going. For someone goes something. Another going than that by which the goer is manifested, he does not go, because two goings cannot occur at one (single) goer. Seen from the point of view of the correspondence principle, the problem described in these verses is clear. Two words referring to the act of going occur in the sentence "the goer goes", so there should be two acts of going. Since this is impossible in the case of one goer, we have to decide which of the two the goer goes: is it the one that gives him his name 'goer'? or is it the other one? The one that gives him his name has to precede him. But the going he goes must follow him, "for someone goes something". Interestingly. OETKE discusses these same two verses, too. According to him, "It seems that the mechanism involved here consists in a remodelling of the symmetrical relation of bilateral implication into a non-symmetrical dependence relation between particulars." In a note he admits that such a transformation is not immediately obvious in the case of these two verses, and in his main texts he points out that it would need a thoroughgoing analysis of the whole chapter to substantiate his statements "which cannot be taken up here". It is a pity that DETKE does not discuss the use of his theorem in the case of these two verses, for they might constitute a case where the relative merits of his theorem and of the correspondence principle could be compared. Another case is MMK 7.17, which reads: If any unproduced entity is found anywhere it could be produced. Since that entity does not exist, what is produced? This verse could be illustrated with the sentence "The jar is being produced". Since this phrase does not, as far as I can see. refer to two obiects, one of which could be the condition of the other, OETKE's theorem would seem to be inapplicable here. The correspondence principle, on the other hand, is applicable, and requires that words of this sentence must correspond to objects in the phenomenal world. But of course there is no jar in the situation described by the sentence "The jar is being produced". Having argued that the correspondence principle appears to give expression to Nagarjuna's more or less consciously held beliefs, it is necessary to point out "MadhK(de) 2.22-23: garyd yayajyate gantā gatim tām sa na gacchati yasman na gatipurvo 'sti kascid kimcid dhi acchari garyd yayājvate gantá tato 'nyām sa na gacchari garf dve nopapadyete yasmād eke tu gantari tr. OETKE. 12 MadhK(de) 7.17: yadi kascid anu panno bhavah samvidyate kvacit utpadyeta sa kim tasmin bhava utpadyate 'sati. This translation follows OETKE (1992 (p. 203; cp. p. 210f.]). who discusses and rejects the possibility of a logical error in this verse. 10 MadhK(de) 2.S: gamyamdharya gamane prasaktam gamanadvayam APVA manmanam punah yena tad gamya

Loading...

Page Navigation
1 2 3 4 5