Logical and Historical Significance of Jaina Philosophical Tradition

Author(s): K K Dixit
Publisher: Z_Mahavir_Jain_Vidyalay_Suvarna_Mahotsav_Granth_Part_1_012002.pdf and Mahavir_Jain_Vidyalay_Suvarna_

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24 : SHRI MAHAVIRA JAINA VIDYALAYA GOLDEN JUBILEE VOLUME
transcendentalist. Thus he maintained that an empirical phenomenon is describable in as many as seven ways, viz.
(i) by pointing out what this phenomenon is, (ii) by pointing out what this phenomenon is not, (iii) by first pointing out what this phenomenon is and then
what it is not, (iv) by confessing that it is impossible to simultaneously point
out what this phenomenon is and what it is not, (v) by combining the attitudes (i) and (iv), (vi) by combining the attitudes (ii) and (iv), (vii) by combining the attitudes (iii) and (iv).
In this rejoinder of the Jaina against the transcendentalist three points are noteworthy.
(1) The Jaina suggests that to point out what an empirical phenomenon is is to describe it as existent while to point out what it is not is to describe it as non-existent. Thus the transcendentalist who asserts that an empirical phenomenon is describable neither as existent nor as non-existent is sought to be silenced by the Jaina by his counter-assertion that it is describable both as existent and as nonexistent. An impartial reader should nevertheless take note of the rather technical character of the Jaina's description of an empirical phenomenon as non-existent (i. e. of his description of it not as something utterly non-existent but as something different from the phenomena that are other than itself).
(2) The Jaina suggests that to confess that it is impossible to simultaneously point out both what an empirical phenomenon is and what it is not is to confess that this phenomenon is indescribable. This might seem to be a concession in favour of the transcendentalist who is of the view that an empirical phenomenon is utterly indescribable. As a matter of fact, the Jaina simply demonstrates to the transcendentalist the only possible sense in which (according to the Jaina) an empirical phenomenon can be said to be indescribable; he is thus forestalling the latter's extravagant claims in this connection. In any case, an impartial reader should take due note of the rather technical character of the Jaina's admission that an empirical phenomenon is also somehow indescribable.2
2 There is also another sense-not intended in present context-in
which the Jaina admits an empirical phenomenon. to be indescrib