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Prilosophy of Dr. Radhakrishnan
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dual is born. It regards the past as determined but, at the same time, it points out that the future is only conditioned. Man is not a mere mechanism of instincts The Bhagvata tells us to raise self by the self. We can use the material with which we are endowed to promote our ideals.
Thus, our Karmas connect us with the past in so far as we are forined in thought, emotion and will. An individual has a past as well as a future. Man's past deeds stretching back to an indefinite period of time bind him with the physical and vital conditions of the world. That is to say everything in this universe is the effect of the past and at the same time cause of its future changes. The Karma binds us with the past by giving structure to our self and yet man is free in his actions,
Karma, according to Dr. Radhakrishnan, is not so much a principle of retribution as one of continuity. Good produces good and evil produces evil. Love increases our power of love, and hatred our power of hatred. Man is continuously shaping his own future. The Law of Karma should not be confused with the theory of reward and punishment. The reward for virtue is not a life of pleasure, nor is the punishment for sin pain. Pleasure and pain may govern the animal nature of man but not his human nature. Love which is a joy in itself some. times suffers whereas hatred sometimes stands for satisfaction. Good and evil are not to be confused with material well-being and physical suffering. Pleasure and pain are for the growth of the soul.
The Law of Karma is not inconsistent with freedom. On the other hand, it is implied by it. It tells us that each individual will get the return according to his action. Nature will reply to the insistent call of Spirit. The principle of Karma has, therefore, two aspects : a retrospective aspect and a prospective aspect, i.c., continuity with the past and creative freedom of the self. There is continuity between his desire and purpose and so also he performs such actions.
The problem of human freedom is confused somewhat by the distinction between the self and the will. The will is only the self in its active side and freedom of the will really means the freedom of the self. It is determination by the self, Here,
