Jinamanjari 1998 09 No 18

Author(s): Jinamanjari
Publisher: Canada Bramhi Jain Society Publication

Page 18

Samantabhadra (c.120 - 185 C.E.) repcats in his Āptamīmāṁsā which consists of 114 stanzas, and a stanza makes the following effect :
“Those who hate the system of syādvāda maintain the absolute dualism which is self-contradictory. On the other hand those who maintain absolute inexpressibility could not express that something is inexpressible. (verses 13, 32, 55, 70, 74, 77, 82, 90, 94, 97)
He further proceeds to elucidate it as follows:
'Syādvāda is the assertion of an entity by some way or other (kimvrtta-cit=katham-cit) by discarding 'absolutism in every respect' (sasrvathaikānta). It depends on seven-fold formula (saptabhanga) and view-point (naya), and ascertains what is to be taken and what is to be rejected. (v.104) And right knowledge (pramāna) or the knowledge of reality is of two kinds ; one manifests the whole aspect of an object simultaneously, and the other does successively: thus it is adorned with syādvāda and naya. (v.101) Syādvāda and omniscient knowledge (kevala-jñāna) manifest the whole truth, but the distinction between the two lies in its intuitive and non-intuitive natures respectively. And any knowledge other than these two is false knowledge. (v105)'
He further explains as follows : Even the absolute view (ekānta) is of two kinds ; one is false absolutism (mithyaikānta) which accepts one particular aspect only, totally discarding other aspects, while the other is true absolutism (samyag-ekānta) which holds fast to one aspect, without rejecting the other, each representing [su-]naya and durnaya respectively. The former is, to a certain extent, a true knowledge so long as it conveys the true nature of an object. And finally the right knowledge (prumāna) or its expression is accepted as valid, which is the view of non-absolutism or anekāntavāda qualified by the term <syā>. (vs.108,112)
Siddhasena Divākara (c.550 - 600 C.E.) 'describes in his Nyāyāvatāra as follows:
'Object of omniscient knowledge is composed of infinite attributes, while that of nuya (knowledge based on particular stand-point) consists of a single aspect. And since the naya, rolling on the course of the scriptural knowledge (śruta), determines partial aspect of object, the
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