Jaina Political Thought

Author(s): G C Pandey
Publisher: Prakrit Bharti Academy

Page 95

have, therefore, argued that the theory of Anekanta is a necessary postulate of the commitment to action? This also made it imperative to evolve detailed norms and prescriptions for the guidance of the common man. The negative advice to avoid evil can be practised only in the context of doing things, which needs a code of duties. The Anuvratas, thus came to be gradually filled in with more and more elaborate advice and the upasaka-dharma or sravakaras developed into a detailed code which could be an alternative to the smrti code. It is this which made it possible to evolve a Jaina version of niti. This version did not require a reformulation of institutions which arose from natural and historical reasons. Actual political conditions were common; they were not Brahmanical, Buddhist and Jaina, although there were Brahmanical, Buddhist and Jaina philosophies and ideas of how these conditions should be understood and what should guide one's response to them. The modern idea of deliberate and large-scale institutional change was not current in ancient times not merely because ancient thought did not regard societiesasprime instances of independent and rational being and their history as the prime form of destiny, but also because th sweep of socio-historical change was much more limited in classical times in India. It does not, therefore, make sense except the Jaina version of niti to be original in any sense except that of orientation. The tradition of niti was in its classical form realistic, not speculative. It arose as part of a process of historical development which necessitated a new organizing effort parallel to the new conditions of livelihood, administration and war.
The ideal of ahimsa in politics can only be interpreted relatively, not absolutely, and the search for realizing the ideal must be for concrete ways of reducing himsa. The effort to achieve this kind of thinking, at once practical and idealistic is exemplified in the Jaina tradition. It is bound to disappoint those who search for absolutes in life, for radical extremes of thought and action in ethics and politics. It has, however, the compensating virtue of achieving something in actuality. The Buddha could possibly stop Nalagiri and Angulimala by sheer moral force but Devadatta remained impervious to his influence. Neither was the Roman governor amenable to the universal love of Jesus nor was Godse influenced by Gandhiji's aura of ahimsa. Buddha and Mahavira did not even seek to intervene in the war between Magadha and the Licchavis. Nor did they ever seek to become Righteous Rulers themselves. How, then, can one speak of the Righteous Ruier as one who rules by righteousness alone without any force ? Such an ideal will surely lie beyond the bounds of practicability. Asoka perhaps sought to practise the ideal of peace more seriously than
82