Jain Journal 2012 07

Author(s): Satyaranjan Banerjee
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication

Page 33

324
JAIN JOURNAL: VOL-XLVII, NO. 1-IV JULY.-JUNE 12-13
In this
Here, 'a' stands for any object (subject) and 'F' for any predicate. way, the sevenfold predication can be applicable with respect to each and every attribute of any substance or reality. And indeed, Mallisena remarks in the Syādvāda Mañjarī that, ...pratiparyam vastuni anantam api saptabhangīnām eva sambhavat' i.e., there is the 'possibility of even infinite seven modes with regared to a single thing for each state'28 B.K. Matilal summarizes it, 'Add a 'syāt' particle to the proposition and you have captured the truth' 29.
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To indicate the basis of mentioning these seven predication ācāryya Hemacandra in his book Anyayoga-VyāvacchedaDvātrimśikā says, "anantadharmākameva tattvamatoanyathā sattvamsupapādam "i.e., reality is essentially possessed of innumerable characters or of an endless number of attributes; it is not possible to explain it in any other way30. A.B. Dhruva, the editor of Mallisena's Syādvāda Mañjarī comments that, 'when integrated, reality is without characters, when differentiated, it is without a substance'. So we must fully see, Dhruva further says, 'the truth of seven modes which is expressed according to different points of view'.
It should be noted, according to Dhruva that, the Jaina doctrine of syādvāda is not a statement of the absolute identity of Being and Non-Being, but only a statement of their relation to the same subject (object of knowledge) from different viewpoints32. Thus, a thing is (sat) from one viewpoint and is not (asat) from another viewpoint, Mark that according to this explanation Being and Non-Being are not implicitly contained in each other and so reconcilable, but are to be referred to different aspects of the thing, and so there is no contradiction whatsoever.
Impossibility of Further Combinations 33:
The predication of any attribute or property to a real is bound up with its denial if it is possible to judge 'the pot exist (syat ghata asti)', the judgment (that) 'the pot does not exist' is also possible. The Jaina philosophers however exclude the possibility of making any