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JAIN JOURNAL : Vol-XXXIII, No. 3 January 1999
occurs anywhere as its own modification and knowledge shares in the illumining character of the soul of which it is a modification. As the Jaina repeatedly tells us that knowledge is soul in knowing. So in so far as the Jaina insists that soul and in an intimate and in separable relation to each other, and that knowledge is both self-revealing and also revealing its object as a parināma or evolution of the self-luminous soul he...clears of the difficulties of the separatist view or dubious view of the other Indian systems of thought as noted above, and thus seems to have struck the keynote of the proper relation that should subsist between the soul and its knowledge.
Apart from the above mentioned fundamental problem of Logic, the Jaina has contributed many others which bring to the forefront their dialectical acumen in contrast with those of the orthodox logical thinkers of contemporary India and these together make up that glorious history of Indian dialectical thought which any country may feel proud of.
3. In the sphere of systemic logic Siddhasena Divākara's contributions seem to be the most outstanding. His Nyāyāvatāra and Sammatitarka Prakarana reveal the height of logical thought and still stand unparalleled. Compelled as we are to confine our statements within certain limits we would do well to mention only a few of their outstanding logical and epistemological contributions to the dialectical thought of India. The Jaina divides Pramāņa or valid knowledge into Pratyakşa and Parokşa: Pratyakşa with the Jaina is that form of direct valid knowledge which marks itself out from the pratyakşa of the orthodox Indian systems by the very fact that it underlines their common concept of Indriya Sannikarsa or constant of the senses with the object of perception. The Jaina with his fundamental stand that all Pramāna is constituted by Svaparabhasijñāna points out that it is a knowledge whose character is that it always illumines itselfand its other, the object, it does not require any element which is other than conscious. The senses and the object in perceptual knowledge being jaţa came to have any direct determining part to play in the art of perception, though they may have a secondary roles in the completion of such knowledge. Manikyanandi tells us that pratyakşam is Visadam as apposed to Parokşam which is avisadam Its character of Vaisadiem consists in its distinctness and clearness due to immediacy. Immediacy to him means its independence of any other condition. All the varieties
such as samarana anumāna and Pratyavijñāna. lack this independence to ensure its validity depending, as they all do, upon some other factors which enter into them for their validity. This contention in their distinction between Pratyaksa and Parohksa which
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