Jain Journal 1990 01

Author(s): Jain Bhawan Publication
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication

Page 30

Determinism and Indeterminism in Anekanta Philosophy
S. C. JAIN
The theories of determinism and indeterminism have been attracting the attention of almost all the thinkers on the problems of philosophy. In spite of their being so old they have not lost their bewildering nature, and have been taking newer turns with the advance of time. By determinism we generally mean that all the events in the world-process are absolutely determined. Regarding the determining factors of an event the answer takes three shapes. First, the events in the world process are determined by their substantial causes; secondly, they are determined by their helping causes and thirdly, they are the joint effects of their substantial and helping causes. So the general belief is that there is perfect determinism in the world. On the other hand there are thinkers who do not like to uphold such a theory of determinism. According to them this type of determinism is extremely fatal to the ethical concept of moral accountability. If an agent is not free to choose and act, his actions cannot be made subject to moral judgment and he cannot be held responsible for them. If the life-history of jiva is totally determined then it is no use of preaching him principles of Ethics and Religion as the events will turn as they are ordained to turn. So in the sphere of morality freedom of will has been admitted by some as a foundational concept. Not only ethically but also metaphysically indeterminism comes out to be a fundamental aspect as reality.
On analysis determinism turns out to be a theory of causation. 'Causality is a relation of determination." To say that there is determinism in the world means that the events in the world process are determined by their antecedent causes. So the theory of determinism pre-supposes relationism; that is, the entities in the world admit of relations. If the elements in the world process are absolute discrete, the events in the world process will be absolutely different from each other, and the question of their relation of causation and hence of their determination falls to the ground. Dr. Mookerjee observes: "Relations cannot be held between absolutely distinct or absolutely identical facts. Identity and difference both are pre-suppositions of relation." These relations are
1 S. Mookerjee, Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism, p. 212.
2 Ibid., p. 197.