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JANUARY, 1987
83
The Materialists (Carvakas) view that, consciousness is product of combination of different material elements which is neither identical or different from each of these, is acceptance of manisided aspects of consciousness only. It really means, in some respects, it is identifiable with material elements and in some respects, different from them. Madhyamamarga or Madhyamapratipat of the Buddhists, which is accepted as middle way between two extreme views of eternalism and non-eternalism, bears the same significance as the word anekānta. Madhyamika philosopher's view of reality, that, “it is neither existent nor non-existent, nor both nor neither', is a form of anekāntavāda only.42 Even, the view of Vijnanavada Buddhists, according to which this world is transformation of eternal, non-dual consciousness 43 (vijñana), is acceptance of pariņāminityatā of anekāntavāda. The Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers apply this anekāntavāda without being aware of it. These philosophers in stating that atoms constituting a material 'pot' are eternal while the pot as a product and a passing phase of matter is non-eternal, are practically admitting the anekānta position, which is that a 'pot' is non-eternal in some respects (as a mode of matter) and that it is eternal also in some respects 44 (i.e. in respect of its constitutive substance). Again, while describing anyonyabhāva, the Vaisesikas point out like Jainas that 'pot' is real as ‘pot' not as cloth.45 Earth (prthivi) is both eternal as well as non-eternal. Citrarūpa is a conglomeration of several mutually exclusive rūpas which belong to a single substance.46 Even though Nyaya-Vaisesikas have accepted the generality and particularity as two idependent categories, they are not able to discard the path of anekāntu. Vatsyayana mentions that both contradictory elements can exist in one and the same place.47 Jāti is, again, both general as well particular. 48 Amongst the two kinds of universals, (i.e. parā and aparā) aparāsāmānya is both, general as well as particular. 49
The Sankhya doctrine of evolution of prakrti according to which prakyti is neither absolutely eternal nor absolutely changing, but eternalcum-change is in no way different from the Jaina doctrine of pariņāminityatā. The difference between the two view is that the Sankhya doctrine
42 Sanmati-Tarka, Introduction, p. 138. 48 Trimsika I, Vijnaptimatratasiddhi, ed. Svami Mahesvarananda, Pub : Gitadharma
Karyalaya, Varanasi, 1962, p. 3. 44 S.M.V., p. 17. 46 Vaisesikadarsand, with Upaskarabhasya, I-I-4-5, see Darsan aur Anekantavad, p. 82. 48 S.M. V-20. 67 Nyayadarsana, I-I-41, p. 160-162. 48 Ibid., IL-1166, p. 424. 49 Vaisesika Darsana, with Prasastapadabhasya, I-II-5; IX-II-3, see Darsam aur
Anekantavad, pp. 78-80.
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