Jain Journal 1983 04

Author(s): Jain Bhawan Publication
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication

Page 17

APRIL, 1983
121
as absolute Reality. Really speaking, holds Jaina thinkers, from the point of view of attributes (gunas) the world is nitya or eternal and from the point of view of modes (paryāyas) the world is changing. So, Jainism believe in anekāntavāda, in the doctrine of many-sided-ness of Reality.4
On the issue of the nature of the concrete world the Advaitism of Sankara is almost opposed to the Jaina metaphysics. While criticising vijñānavāda theory that the external world is a manifestation of the consciousness only, Sankara maintains the difference between purely imaginary world of dream and the concrete world of sense-perception. There he holds that the difference in the psychic ideas are intelligible only on the suppostion that psychic images are direct effects of permanent objects in reality. But Sankara drops this faith in external world when he propounds his own theory of māyā according to which the whole external reality is converted into a dream world of unreality. So, māyāvāda theory is completely incompatible with Jaina metaphysics because according to Jaina metaphysics the acetana (unconscious) entities are also existing permanently like cetana (conscious) entity, stated above.
On the issue of the origin of the concrete world Kundakunda is opposed by Sankara. According to Sankara's Advaita Vedanta the concrete world is the result of the manifestation of ultimate Reality, Brahman. It is vivarta (appearance) of Brahman. Jaina metaphysics holds that from the niscaya (real) point of view the cetana self (jiva)5 and acetana world (pudgala) are distinct and independent to each other. Thus it follows that to obtain one from the other is quite impossible. At this Jaina philosophers hold that if the doctrine of the identity of the nature of cause and effect is accepted, which Sankara does accept, these two self contradictory effects-cetana self (jiva) and acetana nonself (pudgala) cannot be had from the same cause, the Absolute or Brahman which is according to Upanişads, a cetana (conscious) entity. How can cetana (conscious) Brahman produce acetana (unconscious) non-self. If Sankara has once accepted the difference between cetana (conscious) and acetana (unconscious) entities while describing adhyāsa in his introduction to Brahmasūtra, how can he concede to derive acetana non-self (pudgala) from cetana-self (Brahman). Jaina philosophers comment and doubt that perhaps Sankara forgot his above mentioned principles while defending Vedantic panthiesm.
Sankara holds that Brahman or supreme Self is attributeless. He is nirguna. No category can be applied to him. Vedantins place the
Syadvadamanjari, sloka 26. cetanalaksana jivah, Gunaratna's commentary on Saddarsana Samuccaya, 47.