Jain Journal 1977 01

Author(s): Jain Bhawan Publication
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication

Page 43

Correspondence
Sir, Jain Journal Vol. XI No. 1 July 1976 is before us.
Two articles entitled as 'Theory of Mokşa in Jainism' and 'Omniscience a Fiction or a Fact' written by S. P. Bandyopadhyaya and G. R. Jain respectively certainly attract attention of all ones interested in the subject of axiology. Mokşa is the highest value realizable by the dynamic existence of man, and the omniscience is conceived to be the highest attribute of that realization. Both the concepts are the results of our speculative thinking on the ultimate point of human destiny. Now it is a point of great controversy if these two states of human life are or have ever been a fact. We may conceive so many things by our speculative intellect, but it is not always necessary that they in fact exist also. For example, we measure heat of the human body at 90°F. point and on that basis we may very well conceive of it at zero° or 1°F. in some organic being, but it is factually impossible. Similarly we conceive of the absolute existence of mathematical point and the line, but in actuality we obtain none. In the same way the mokşa and omniscience can be conceived of by our intellect as a highest culminating point or evolute of our progressive life, but to call it an actuality is, to my view, erroneous. Omniscience, howsoever logical value and validity it might have can not be deemed as a fact. As a fact it is an impossibility.
We may controvert the point from another angle also. How can we be sure that we at a certain stage know all? The logical denotation of the term 'all' can not be measured beyond the perview of knowledge. What is within the perview of knowledge is sure to be measured also by any scale whatever, but how on the basis of what we know we may be sure of what we do not know? Howsoever wide-ranged knowledge might there be, we can not certainly claim that there is nothing left beyond our knowledge. The universe that the term 'all' denotes, if it is to be factual, is certainly finite. Thus the omniscience dealing with such a universe is a contradiction in terms. If this universe is assumed to be infinite, it can not be factual and it is a universe of discourse only. In that way omniscience can not be a fact.
Now to deal with the concluding paragraph of Mr. G. R. Jain's article we may not agree with the implication of his scientific discussion of the preceding paragraphs. May it be that the Tirthankaras knew more than what today all the scientists put together know, but do we dare say that the science of today has reached or that of tomorrow will ever reach the point of omniscience. If not so, then we are also not justified to call the Tirthankaras as omniscient beings. They may be regarded as seers or thinkers of highest order whatever we chose, but they can not be called omniscients.
Sept. 29, 1976
yours, etc. P. K. Jain
Government Higher Sec. School
Jeolikote, Nainital