Jain Conception of Logic Some Comments

Author(s): M P Marathe
Publisher: Z_Kailashchandra_Shastri_Abhinandan_Granth_012048.pdf

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The Jaina Conception of Logic: Some Comments
Prof. M.P. Marathe, Poona University When one begins to investigate the Jaina Conception of Logic and methodology, a two-fold task seems to invite one's attention : (a) to spell out suggestions of the Jaina Logical Analysis for formal studies of conceptual and methodological framework, and (b) to bring out some important hints of the Jaina investigations towards conceptual foundations of social sciences-especially the Jaina Action Theory and analysis of the concept of action it offers. A detailed account and analysis of both these issues is a matter for a monograph on the subject. We do not wish to embark upon such a massive investigation here. Instead we wish to highlight some useful hints important in the study of the kind. Background Remarks
In any methodological and/or conceptual investigation into Jaina thought certain problems and issues need to be clearly formulated. For, a clearer formulation and understanding of them is likely to help us in more than one way in a methodological study. It is no use neglecting paying due attention to them on the ground that they are either too general or perhaps ambiguosly considered. Some of them are : (1) The Jaina view seems to be bipolar in its perspective-Darsana (Philosophy) and Dharma (way of life). It needs to be investigated how far, deep and wide this bipolarity is. A study of this kind is likely to shed some light on the Jaina Action Theory, granting that it has one (2): Jainism does not accept the world to be merely permanent but benefit of change. Nor does it take the world to be merely changing but lacking permanence. It rather accepts change and continuity both to be important features of the world. It needs to be examined whether they are considered to be structural features of the world or functional ones and the possible grounds of considering the case to be so need to be spelt out. Moreover, implications of the acceptable view need to be brought out. (3) Jainism accepts two main kinds of reals : Jiva (living) and Ajiva (non-living). It needs to be studied whether these kinds are merely commonsensical or whether they really are non-discontinous and independent ones. Likewise, the grounds of their being taken to be so need to be explained and examined. (4) It also
*Substantial part of this paper, under the same title, was presented to the Einstein Seminar on Jain Logic and Philosophy of Science' organized by the Department of Philosophy, University of Poona in April, 1979,
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