Indology And Rationality

Author(s): Johannes Bronkhorst
Publisher: Johannes Bronkhorst

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JOHANNES BRONKHORST
INDOLOGY AND RATIONALITY
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characteristics of an external object. However, Yogacara turned to its idealist position well before Vasubandhu, and there is no reason to think that Vasubandhu expressed the views of those preceding him. It seems far more likely that he "rationalized" the views of his predecessors. Earlier Vijftänavada, it would seem, somehow did not yet face the difficulties inherent in an idealism without God or Absolute. If this is correct, it provides us with a further case where two different levels of reality, the individual and the universe, are confused. Further research may throw additional light on this issue."
elements. The logical proof of prakrti may have been one of them. Another one, I would like to suggest, is that the presence of one material and many spiritual principles can be used as an argument against idealism. This is what is done in Yoga Sūtra 4.15-16 and in the Bhäsya thereon. The Yoga Bhāşya observes that one material reality (vastu) is shared by many minds (citta). This material reality has not been imagined (parikalpita) by one single mind, nor by many minds; stated differently: it is not imagined at all, it is real. It is therefore independent (svapratistha). The text goes on to explain that different minds derive from this single material reality pleasure, sorrow, confusion, or indifference, depending upon the presence in each mind of virtue (dharma), vice (adharma), ignorance (avidyd) or correct insight (samyagdar fana). Material reality and the minds go in this way their separate paths. This is precisely what sutra 4.15 states: vastusāmye cittabhedät tayor vibhaktah panthah. The Bhasya on 4.16 adds that objective reality is common to all purusas and independent, whereas the minds, which too are independent, belong each to one purusa.
Back to Samkhya. I realize that classical Samkhya can no longer be called "nonrational". During its classical period it had become a school of thought which fully participated in the rational developments that were taking place. Indeed, the contributions of Samkhya to Indian logic have been studied, especially by Erich Frauwallner. And there can be no doubt that the classical Samkhyas had become aware of the somewhat contradictory nature of their doctrine. Some, like Paurika, tried to solve it by postulating as many praktis as there are purusas.
Why, then, were the contradictory elements maintained? Why was Paurika's point of view not accepted? Franco suggests that it may have been rejected because admitting a plurality of praktis might be detrimental to its logical proofs, which were based on an opposition between the plurality of the products and the uniqueness of their unmanifested cause. I do not know whether this is the, or a, correct explanation of the situation, but I do think that an explanation, or explanations, must be looked for along such lines. Beside tradition, there must have been internal reasons to the system rational reasons, if you like-which induced the Samkhyas to hold on to such contradictory
By way of conclusion, let me repeat that India has a long rational tradition. The study of this tradition is likely to be rewarding, as I have tried to show with the help of some examples. At least as important is that this shared tradition of rationality, both in India and in the West, should enable researchers to work together rather than against each other. The main characteristic of a rational tradition is that no one can claim to have privileged access to the object of study, that everyone is ready to listen to criticism and to consider it seriously. In the end there is no point of view to be defended, for every point of view should be abandoned in the face of sufficient contrary evidence. Mutual criticism is to be encouraged, for it is the only way to make progress, to move closer towards the aim of our scholarly endeavours, in whatever way we define them.
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Wood, 1991:167. A note (n. 7 on p 257) cites the auto-commentary on Vimfatika 18: sarvegum hi sathnam anyonyaviyapyadhipatyena mitho vijfapter niyamo bhavati yatha yogam/mitha ili parasparatah/ afahamn aravriativitet samtidnintare vrap tivisesa padyate nartavisendit Perhaps the earliest testimony of Mahayana Buddhist idealism occurs in the Pratyulpanna buddha-sammukhavasthita-samadhi Sutra or Bhadrapala Sätra (Schmuthausen, 1973:176 = 1976:247). Harrison (1990.xx) however points out that this formulation of idealism is not representative of the general tenor of the text. Rather, the attitude to phenomena propounded throughout the sutra is one that we might characterise as essentially Sünyavidin Frauwallner, 1958
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It appears that the thinkers of classical Samkhya became aware of the weakness of their system and tried to rectify the situation in various ad hoc ways. An investigation of these
solutions" has now been published under the title "The contradiction of Samkhya on the number and the size of the different lativas" (Bronkhorst, 1999a).
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