Early Tibetan Ideas On Ascertainment Of Validity

Author(s): Ernst Steinkellner
Publisher: Ernst Steinkellner

Page 9

Early Tibetan Ideas on the Ascertainment of Validity (nges byed kyi tshad ma)
265
Khyung bases his argument on a consideration of the object (yul) of the cognition.52) And the second argument, possibly Gangs pa she'u's, is based on a consideration of the nature (ngo bo) of cognition.53)
In his answer to these two objections Sa paņ makes the point that they both are irrelevant because they confound the functions (byed pa) of perception (mngon sum) and conception (rtog pa)") and thereby do not take into consideration that only perceptual cognitions are possible items where the validity is extrinsically determined.
In his clarification Sa pan first recalls the definition of perception: "A perception is a valid cognition only because of the fact that it is) non-conceptional and non-erroneous"55), and then offers a statement that can be taken as his formula of defining both intrinsical and extrinsical ascertainment.56) He says: "If a certain cognition (nges shes) can be produced immediately by force of the perception only, (this perception) is ascertained [as valid] intrinsically; and (a cognition) for which a certain cognition cannot be produced immediately by force of the perception and (therefore) has to be ascertained [as valid) later by another valid cognition is ascertained extrinsically."57)
To sum up: if Sa pan correctly interprets both objections as being directed against the possibility that one cognition can be ascertained as valid by another cognition, it can be assumed that both Khyung and Gangs pa she'u deviate from rNgog Lotsāba's original opinion as attested by a paraphrase of Skākya mchog Idan.58) Because there rNgog Lotsäba is said to have clearly distinguished between the ascertainment of the nature of a valid cognition which is only intrinsic 9) and the ascertainment of the valid cognition to be defined which is both intrinsic and
52) It is presented by Sa pan in the following form: Rang 'grel 101b2f.: nges bya'i tshad ma dang nges byed kyi tshad ma gnyis yul
gcig na nges byed kyi Ishad ma gryis pa bcad pa'i yul can du 'gyur la yul mi gcig na yul gzhan dngos por grub pas / gzhan ji ltar dngos por grub - ces zer ba dang ...("When both, the valid cognition to be ascertained and the valid cognition ascertaining, have one and the same object, the second valid cognition which ascertains would refer to an object (already) determined (bcad pa). And when they have different objects, another object is established as real [for the later, ascertaining cognition). How then is the first (gzhan) [i.e. the object of the cognition to be ascertained] established as real?"]
This refutation is already attested in gTsang nag pa br Tson 'grus seng ge's Pramanaviniscaya commentary (bsDus pa 26a7f.: tshad ma mams ni rang nyid kyis grub pa yin te / blo mnams yul mi gcig pas gzhan gyis nges pa mi rung ba'i phyir ro zhes zer ba ni /...).
Van der Kuijp in his recent publication changed his earlier calculation of 1171 for the year of g Tsang nag pa's death (Kuijp 1983: 83) to after ca. 1185 (cf. Kuijp 1989: 2).
Several other paraphrases of his objection, mostly in connection with the second objection are extant, e.g. in Shakya
mchog Idan's Rol mtsho 618,6f., Go ram pa's rNam bshad 133a6f., Mus rab 'byams pa's Rab gsal 169,2f. 53) Rang'grel 101b3f.: yang kha cig-gzhan las nges pa thams cad kyis kyang de'i tshe sgro 'dogs ma chod na Ishad ma nyid ma yin pas
gzhan nges su 'ang mi thad la / sgro 'dogs chod na rang las nges su gyur ro // des na guhan las nges kyi tshad ma gtan mi srid do - zhes zer ro // ["(A cognition) is certainly not a valid cognition, if the wrong superimpositions (sgro 'dogs) (on its object)" are not excluded even by all extrinsical ascertainment at its own time. Therefore no extrinsical ascertainment is possible at all. And when the wrong superimpositions are excluded, (the cognition) would be intrinsically ascertained (as valid). Thus a valid cognition extrinsically ascertained (as valid) is absolutely impossible."]
* CF. Rol mtsho 619,1: rang gi 'jug la sgro 'dogs, rNam bshad 133b3: rang yul la sgro 'dogs.
For other paraphrases ct. Rol mtsho 618,71.. rNam bshad 133b3, Rab gsal 169,31. 54) Rigs gter VIII 570-58a: de dag gis ni mngon sum dang/ riog pa'i byed pa 'dres par zad / 55) Rang'grel 101b4f.: mngon sum rtog bral ma 'khrul ba tsam gyis ishad mar 'gro la /... 56) Such definitions of the two ascertainments are later usually given in the introductory sections of the theme (cf. e.g. Go
ram pa, rNam bshad 130a4ff. or gSal byed 57b6ff.) and already in the fragment from rNgog Lotsāba referred to above (cf. note 51) they are found at the beginning (cf. Pham byed II 366,6f.). But Sa pan states them only here
parenthelically in a refutation. 57) Rang 'grel 101b5f.: mngon sum nyid kyi rang stobs kyis de ma thag tu nges shes 'dren nus na rang las nges yin cing/mngon sum
gyi rang stobs kyis de ma thag tu nges shes 'dren ma nus pa / phyis tshad ma gzhan gyis nges dgos la / gzhan las nges yin pa'i... 58) Pham byed II 366,6–367,5. Cf. above note 51. 59) Pham byed II 367,3–4: Ishad ma yin na rang nyid gang la tshad ma yin pa'i don de la rang las nges yin dgos te / tshad ma yin na
rang gi gzhal bya bden par nges dgos la de nges pa na rang nyid mi bslu bar shugs la nges nus pa'i phyir /["If (a cognition) is a valid cognition the ascertainment with regard to that meaning (don) of a valid cognition which is (its) nature must be intrinsical. For, if (a cognition) is a valid cognition, its respective cognitional object must be certain as real, and when this is certain the (cognition's) reliable nature can be ascertained by implication.")