Definite And Indefinite

Author(s): George Burch
Publisher: George Burch

Page 11

THE DEFINITE AND THE INDEFINITE
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object from the subjective categories which make it definite, we can free the subject from the objective forms which make it definite, or we can free the experience from the subject-object dichotomy which makes it definite. The resulting "alternative forms of the absolute" cannot be judged by any higher standard, for each is the absolute ; cannot be combined into a synthesis including them all, for they arei ncompatible; and cannot be contemplated without preference, for it is preference for the absolute which reveals any one of them behind the pattern of ordinary experience. A predilection for any one alternative can be justified only psychologically, in terms of temperament or attitude—what Kalidas Bhattacharya calls the objective, subjective, and dialectical attitudes. But once the commitment is made, it must be followed. We cannot keep subject and object both and separate unless we lapse into a philosophy of the definite, rejecting the predilection for the absolute.
• There are then at least three alternative forms of the absolute, which K. C. Bhattacharya himself called truth, freedom, and value. His disciples' disagree as to whether absolute objectivity or absolute subjectivity deserves the designation truth, which as Vedantists they apply to the alternative they prefer. This is a philosophical controversy, concerned with evaluation rather than fact. The neutral, unphilosophical fact about the indefinite or absolute is expressed by the formula thou art that. The use of pronouns indicates the absence of concepts, the unintelligibility and ineffability of the absolute. But this formula can be pronounced in any one of three ways. We can stress the that, contemplating the absolute or indefinite object underlying all data of experience-Brahman. We can stress the thou, contemplating the absolute or indefinite subject underlying all acts of experience-Atman. Or we can stress the art, contemplating the absolute or indefinite togetherness of subject and object-Mokşa. Thus we have the three “ alternative forms," or, strictly speaking, three alternative formlessnesses, of the absolute.
The philosophies resulting from these three attitudes toward the indefinite and the philosophies resulting from the three attitudes toward the definite make a total of six alternative philosophies. This analysis is not necessarily exhaustive; the