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The Content of Indian
phy
Johannes
that its author had not understood, and had perhaps no knowledge whatsoever of the arguments used by the Sarvistivdins to justify their position. The Sarvistivdins held that past and future exist, and their argumentation, as we have seen, was built on their fundamental belief that no two mental events can simultaneously occur in one person. The author of the Kathavatthu presents instead an argument that is totally nonsensical 12 The Kathavatthu, then, is a text which criticises the positions of others without being properly informed about them (at least in this case). No need to say that its uninformed criticism carried little weight. The Sarvistivaidins did not, and did not need to change their views as a result of the criticism expressed in this Theravida text. What is more, the Theravaidins felt no need to tighten up their own views and develop them into a coherent whole. The question is why? The answer I propose is that the Kathavatthu was written in a part of India where public debate had not yet forced its author of authors to introduce coherence in their own thought, and had not yet urged them to inform themselves with regard to the details of the opinions they disagreed with. The authors of the Kathavathu were under no pressure to do all this, and the result of this is visible in their text.
Regarding the tradition of debate, our information about it is only lacunary, and I have already given expression to the desirability of further research in this domain. It seems yet clear that this social institution was during some periods more active, more alive, than during others. In order to illustrate this, I return once again to the philosopher and grammarian Bhattoji Diksita, discussed at the beginning of this lecture. I have told you already that this thinker lived in Benares, around the year 1600 CE. Bhattoji and his nephew Kaunda Bhatta are known for the new development in the so-called "philosophy of grammar" which they initiated. In this philosophy they made use of a new technical terminology that had been created some centuries earlier by thinkers of the Navya Nyaya, i... "New Logic", school of thought. Bhattoji and Kaunda Bhatta introduced this terminology into grammatical thought, from where another school of thought, that of Vedic Hermeneutics (Mimams), appears to have borrowed it to use it for its own purposes
The question that presents itself here is the following. Why did it take several centuries before the new technical terminology was taken over by grammarians and Vedic Hermeneuts? And why was it then taken over by both grammarians and Vedic Hermeneuts, almost simultaneously, in the city of Benares? The new terminology was apparently used for several centuries inside one school, with hardly anyone bothering to take notice (even though Prof. Wada informs me that certain Vedantins may have started using it somewhat earlier than the grammarians and Vedic Hermeneuts). How can this be explained? The answer, as I see it, lies in the fact that Benares around the year 1600 was a centre where debate between representatives of different schools of thought had been revived, for reasons which are too complex to analyse bere at present For some centuries before this time, philosophical schools existed and even flourished in a certain sense. However, they remained largely isolated from each other. A new centre and a new political and social situation were required to oblige these philosophers again to take serious notice of what happened in other schools of thought
during this life? Was this claim mere lip-service to a high ideal without practical consequences, of did Indian thinkers combine the study of philosophy with other activities they believed were necessary to reach the highest goal?
It is not possible to answer these questions in general terms that are valid for all Indian philosophers. The seriousness with which thinkers dedicated themselves to the attainment of liberation may have differed from one school to the next from one person to the other. In many cases it is extremely difficult, or even impossible to find information that may allow us to answer these questions. It is for this reason all the more interesting to refer to some recent studies that throw light on the practical commitment to liberation among Buddhist monks of northwester India during the first centuries of the Common Era. I am referring to the studies of Gregory Schopen, more specifically to those that have recently been brought out in a collection called Buddhist Monks and Business Matters (2004). Many of these studies are based, at least in part, on a detailed analysis of portions of the large collection of monastic rules known by the time Milasarvstivada Vinaya, which appears to date from that period. It is not possible to do full justice to Schopen's volume here. All I can do is quote a short passage which contains a clear statement about the issue that interests us:
Forty years ago André Barcau said not just about the Malasarvestivida Vinayal but about all Buddhist monastic Codes: "It is true that the Vinayapitakas ... do not breathe word about the numerous spiritual practices, meditations, contemplations, etc., which constituted the very essence of the Buddhist religion'." And although this is something of an exaggeration, still it should have given pause for thought. Our Code, for example, does refer to asoctic, meditating monks, but when it does so in any detail, such monks almost always appear as the butt of jokes, objects of ridicule, and not uncommonly sexual deviants. They are presented as irresponsible and of the type that give the order a bad name. There are texts in our Code where, for example, ascetic, cemetery monks manage only to terrify children; where ascetic monks who wear robes made from cemetery cloth are not even allowed into the monastery, let alone allowed to sit on a mat that belongs to the Community, tales whose only point seems to be to indicate that meditation makes you stupid, texts about monks who meditate in the forest and cannot control their male member and so end up smashing it between two rocks, whereupon the Buddha tells them, while they are howling in pain, that they, unfortunately, have smashed the wrong thing they should have smashed desire, and a tale about another monk who meditated in the forest and, to avoid being seduced by a goddess, had to tie his legs shut. The goddess being put off by this then flung him through the air, and be landed still legs tied on top of the king, who was sleeping on the roof of his palace. The king, of course, was not amused and made it known to the Buddha that it would not do to have his monks being flung around the countryside in the middle of the night. The Buddha then actually made a rule forbidding monks to meditate in the forest Texts and
tales of this sort are numerous in our Code. Remember that these remarks are made about the Malasarvistivida Vinaya, an expression which Schopen translates either the Original Vinaya of the Sarvistividins" or "the Vinaya of the Original Sarvistividins" (p. 25). Either way a link with the Sarvistividins is implied by its very title. The Sarvaistividins, you may recall, where among the first systematic philosopbers of India
I think I have said enough about the changeability of the context in which Indian philosophy began and developed. To conclude, I would like to very briefly touch upon an aspect of Indian philosophy which is claimed to be central to it. I had occasion to point out that most schools of Indian philosophy agree that philosophy is necessary to attain liberation from the cycle of rebirth. How practical was this claim? How serious were Indian philosophers about Teaching this sim
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