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Journal of the American Oriental Society 102.2 (1982)
cultural context could be justified in order to render its argument clearly and coherently, I think a translator cannot reserve any area of freedom for the interpretation of the reader. A translator has to present the original in his chosen language in a manner which is at once truthful to its original meaning, and dear to its new readers. That is all. The reader's freedom has to be limited -- as far as possible-by presenting the meaning of the original. Whether the translator has to resort to writing footnotes or rather prefers other means to achieve such limitation, is another question.
Sprung's concise introduction to the thought of the Middle Way as presented by Candrakīrti is informative about the main concepts, and it offers intersecting statements with regard to the Madhyamika's concept of reality (23). Regarding the translation itself there is only one question to be asked: "is it truthful to the original?" The reviewer shares Sprung's ideal of translating in the plainest, most intelligible way, but the criteria determining what would in fact be "plainest" always depend on the particular original translated.
The Prasannapada is one of the best-known Madhyamaka texts. Since Louis de La Vallée Poussin's edition of the text (1903-1913) various scholars have published partial translation of either the original Sanskrit or the Tibetan translation in one or another European language. And our understanding of the basic ideas of the school has improved over the last decades, because there have been a number of systematic studies which were based largely on Candra kirti's commentary. Recently the material basis, the Sanskrit-text, too, has been improved (J. W. de Jong "Textcritical Notes on the Prasannapada." IIJ 20, 1978, 25-59, 217-252).
Sprung's translation was ready before de Jong's notes appeared, but one may agree with Sprung that the earlier philological work, even prior to de Jong's contribution, has been sufficient for the Prasannapada to be presented at last to the general reading public. One would hope, however, that the level of interpretation gained by the labours of previous interpreters was to be put to good use, or, at least, not lost again. Unfortunately, this is often not the case in Sprung's translation.
Another cause of distress is the fact that Sprung. while trying to convey the meaning of Candrakirti's often lengthy sentences in readable English, often dissolves the syntactical units of the original for the sake of the English medium. In itself this is a legitimate, even a desirable procedure in translating. In splitting up the clauses, however, Sprung docs not always preserve the logical sequence implicit in the syntactical form of the original. This logical structure of the original's sentences necessarily has to be preserved in a translation, irrespective of the syntactical convention adopted by the translator. Sprung also tries to find new and often interesting translations for a number of terms with more or less success. The problem is that he does not follow his own proposals consistently. To exemplify these points I take at
random the translation of the beginning of chapter XVIII (atmapariksa). p. 165-168 (below I refer to La Vallée Poussin's edition).
340,61.: Sprung frequently translates the term ahamkāra as "I-ing." mamakāra as mine-ing." An English speaking philosopher might accept this, but later on the same page he will find the notion "1." and three pages further (167) hell find "the sense of 1." Will he not imagine that conceptual differences are being indicated?
340.6: -asesavast vanupalambhena: Sprung translates "through ceasing to take anything whatsoever.... as real in its particularity. He thus interprets the term anupalambha as an intentional act of abstaining from conceiving something as something. In the parallel passage of 347,13ff. he translates anupalambhår "because he no longer has any sense of them (cf. also the glossary). That means that he tends to emphasize the intentional, subjective aspect of the meaning of anupalambha, while Candrakirti rather emphasizes its nonintentional side. This is particularly clear when Candrakirti paraphrases 348, 1f. samăt from v.2d by anu pādād anupalambhär. The Madhyamika has a non-perception in mind that is the result of non-existence, and not-as Sprung evidently thinks- a non-existence that results from non-perception. After all, anupalambha is the cognition of the real way of things" (Tarrva) and only as such of soteriological importance. When Sprung translates these are not allowed to arise because he (the Yogin) no longer has any sense of them." Sprung fails to understand that both terms are given as synonymous explanations of samåt, and he thus literally devaluates the Yogin's soteriologically crucial cognition as merely an idle thought. Springs Teversal of the foglcat sequence has led him further not to translate the ablative of anulpādāt at all. to introduce instead the notion of an "allowance." This is necessary to his interpretation, but certainly not implied in the word anutpäda. Sprung, moreover, does not follow his own interpretation consistently as one can see from his translation of a manupalambhal (346,1) by "because they do not directly experience the self." In.short, I still prefer de Jong's simple and clear translation par la non-perception de toute chose..." (p.1). Such a translation leaves room for a possible conceptual nexus of non-perception with non-existence. One must admit that such a nexus cannot be taken for granted, because there has not yet been a careful study of the Madhyamaka concept of anupalambha. Such a nexus is, however, suggested in the Prajñāpäramita-tradition (cf. Lamotte's Traité p. 2146: "C'est parce que les dharma n'existent vraiment pas qu'ils ne sont perçus, et non point à cause de la faiblesse du savoir." In reference to Sprung's translation that one does not wish to see the dharma any longer, is not the reason they fail to be perceived.)
340.10: In the quotation from the Madhyamakāvatāra buddhvă is translated by having inseen." This, however, is the wrong place to suggest some "higher" sort of cognition,
