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No. 1}
Astinasti Vada
as the affirmative proposition that he lived in the 4th century B. C. would be a valid affirmative proposition. Here the point of view is technically said to be 'time'. Any historical event would be capable of affirmative assertion with reference to its own time or Svakāla and it would admit of negative assertion with reference to Parakala or alien time, not its own.
31
Form:--
Similarly, in the case of the modification of a substance, according to its modification it may be asserted affirmatively or negatively. Speaking of water you may have it as a liquid or solid. Ice is the solid form of water and if you are interested in knowing the nature of ice you have to assert that it is solid from its own Bhava. But, if it is heated, it changes its form, it may become liquid. Then you have to say that ice is not liquid or gas. From its own Bhāva a substance is capable of being described by an affirmative proposition, from the nature of an alien form or Bhava it must be described by a valid negative proposition. You must say that ice is not liquid or gas or vapour. because the form in which you are concerned with is solid.
Interpretation
These are the four points of view which form the foundation of this 'Astinasti Vada' and these are the ways in which an object may be affirmatively described from the point of view of Svadravya, Svakshetra, Svakala and Svabhāva, and the same object may be validly described in the negative from the point of view of Paradravya, Parakshetra, Parakala and Parabhava. When the matter is understood in this way, it is quite obvious why the affir mative proposition will be true and why the negative proposition also will be true with reference to the same object of reality. There is no chance of confusion here and there is no mysterious metaphysical maze to be unravelled. Simply we may say that it is so common-place that we very often wonder why serious thinkers should find it difficult to appreciate this principle of Astinasti Vāda. Here we have to point out that the doctrine is applicable only with reference to a real object, Take the following example. A cow ordinarily has horns. The cow, when it was an young calf, cer.
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