Asceticism Religion And Biological Evolution

Author(s): Johannes Bronkhorst
Publisher: Johannes Bronkhorst

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JOHANNES BRONKHORST
ASCETICISM, RELIGION, AND BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION
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from one generation to the next and which may be modified in the process. A religion, being a complex that unites a number of memes, is then a 'memeplex'. In spite of the enormous differences a gene can be chemically identified, the very nature of a meme is difficult to determine; memes essentially depend on the presence of human minds, genes do not; etc.--the evolution of memeplexes can be studied in more or less the same way as that of organisms. Rcligions, being memeplexes, evolve in such a manner that those containing successful memes have better chances to survive. The most enthusiastic users of the notion of memes (c.g., Susan Blackmore 1999: chapter 15) propose that memctic evolution may account for behaviors that are genetically disadvantageous, or even that memes can influence genetic evolution
Theoretically it may be possible that the presence of certain cultural complexes influences genetic evolution. Indeed, we have seen that Deacon explains the enormous development of the human brain as a consequence of the crossing of the symbolic threshold" and the resulting use of language. Genetic evolution could in this case be influenced, even determined, by a cultural change, since the new cultural situation (the use of language) came to accompany our an cestors for such a long time that genetic modifications influenced by it became possible. Language could become a permanent feature of early humans because it greatly augments the chances of survival of those who use it. Cultural features that do not have that effect on the other hand, will not normally stay around for long enough to become hard-wired in the neural system. This is the reason why Deacon argues against the innate nature of UG.
Those who look upon religion as a memeplex that may have had an effect on genetic evolution will have to make clear in what way and to what extent religion increases the survival chances of those who are religious. They will next have to specify what particular invariant aspect of religion has stayed around long enough to make a transfer into the genetic constitution of human beings not only possible but advantageous. Claims of this nature are, for the time being, highly implausible or at best totally speculative, so that we will not pursue this path here.
It is more promising to recall that the memetic evolution of religion will tend to adapt religion to the inbom predispositions of the humans who inherit the religion concemed, that memes will be "parasitically exploiting proclivities they have discovered in the hu
man cognitive-immune system" (Dennett 1998: 120). That is to say, it is the religion that adjusts itself to the human being, and there is little or no question of human beings genetically adjusting to their religion. If, as is being argued in this article, a significant number of religions share the feature studied and specified in the preceding pages, this is because human beings have a predisposition that corresponds to this feature, and this independently of their particular religions. The ascetic instinct, then, has not been created by religion but, on the contrary, has played and still plays a role in the formation and replication of existing religions.
So far the situation is not very different from the one prevailing in language formation. The UG, as Deacon argues, is statistically often present in languages because of the presence of certain predispositions in human beings (.e., the language instinct) that favor its appearance. Similarly, asceticism and the other features dealt with in this article often occur in religions on account of the presence in human beings of the ascetic instinct. There is, however, one important difference: the predispositions that give rise to UG have no discernible effect on the evolutionary fitness of their bearers. The ascetic instinct, on the other hand, has a clear effect on the evolutionary fitness of its bearers, namely a negative one. If the ascetic instinct, as here understood, predisposes to asceticism and sexual abstinence, among other things, then such a counter-productive instinct should have been weeded out long ago by natural selection. How has it been able to stay with us?
We have spoken at some length of the momentous effect that symbolic thinking and language use have had on the evolution of modem humans. Indeed, symbolic thinking and language use are the two features that account for 'humanness' more than any other genetic or cultural features. It is with their help that human beings construct ideas of reality that are beyond immediate evidence, ideas that can then be shared with other language users. Shared, but unverifiable, ideas about reality characterize many if not all religions. Supematural entities could hardly have come to occupy a central position in religious thought without the use of language or at least symbolic reference. Shared ideas about the nature of the self which, as we have seen, recur in a great number of religions, are equally dependent upon symbolic thinking and language. It seems evident, then, that the appearance of religion has some connection with the appearance of symbolic thinking. But what kind of connection?