________________ Prof. Bhattacharya Commemoration Volume It is also possible that all three parts of a cognition, i.e. objective and subjective parts and selfawareness are indicated here (cf. PV III 353 and 357, VETTER 1964 : 823 but this would be contrary to the Tibetan translation and of no import for the meaning of the reference in Santaraksita's context. santaraksita's paraphrase of Dharmakirti's standpoint ends here in my opinion. The following sentence adds a refcrence to Dignaga as a second support for his intentions and does not have to be taken as a reference to Dignaga made by Dharmakirti himself, as according to Lindtner. api is not translated into Tibetan. To my knowledge Digpaga does not consider the concept of distinctness (spastabhata) in his presentation of the terms of relevance here. It seems that santaraksita-following Dharmakirti-equates Digoaga's predication that some sort of cognition "is a perception" (pratyaksa)-e.g. yatraisa kalpana nasii tat pratyksam at the end of his Vitti on PS I 3d (cf. HATTORI 1968 : 25 and note 1.30)-as equivalent with the predication that "it is of distinct appearance", thus identifying the concept of being a distinct cognition with that of being a perception. In this way he can refer to several statements of Dignaga, where perception is defined as nonconceptual, e.g, PS I 3c (pratyaksam kalp napodham, cf. HATTORI 1968 : note 1.25), then the sentence adduced above and the end of his Vitti on PS 1,5 (sarve ir avikalpaka eva, cf. HATTORI 1968 : note 1.44). The whole paraphrase refers to PS I Tab and its Vitti, where Dignaga states that even a conceptual construction (kalpana) is aware of itself and that this awareness is perception (kalpanapi sva samvittavista, cf. HATTORI 1968 : note 1.51). But this is not the case when an external object is conceptualized, i.e. connected with name, genus etc. (narthe, vikalpanat, cf. HATTORI 1968 : notes 1.51 and 52). Saotaraksita reformulates this source in accorda que with his point, namely that even a conceptual cognition can be said to be distinct, and says-on the basis of PS I 7abthat Dignaga taught that a cognition is indistinct, i.e. not a perception, as far as it rests on conceptual constructions, but not as far as its own division into the two parts of an awareness of its objective and subjective parts or even into the three parts of object, subject and selfawareness (cf. above note 36) is concerned.
