Apoha And Pratibha

Author(s): Masakki Hattori
Publisher: Masakki Hattori

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MASAAKI HATTORI
have been maintained by Kumarila.32 According to him, the syntactic unity of a sentence is based on mutual expectancy (akánkşa), logical competency (yogyatá) and phonetic contiguity (asatti, samnidhi) of the words constituting the sentence, and by virtue of these three conditions, the meanings denoted by the individual words are related with each other to constitute the meaning of the sentence. In the above-cited statement it is noticed that śāntarakṣita is very close to Kumārila in holding that the meaning of the sentence is nothing other than the conjunction of the individual word-meanings. The ground for advancing this view was prepared by Santarakṣita through the new interpretation of the apoha-theory, according to which the positive images are directly produced by the words constituting the sentence.
With a view to meeting the objections raised by Kumārila, Santarakṣita introduced a modification on the apoha-theory, thereby granting to a certain extent the realist contention that the cognition derived from a word is of positive form. His interpretation of the apoha-theory was criticized by the Bauddha logicians of the later period because of the over-emphasis on the affirmative aspect of the apoha-theory.
Kyoto University
NOTES
PS: Pramāṇasamuccaya, V, k. 1, cited in TSP: Tattvasamgrahapanjika (Bauddha Bharati Ser., 1), p. 539.17-18.
2 Cf. PS, II, k. 13 and Vrtti. The Tibetan text and a Japanese translation are given in H. Kitagawa, Indo-koten-ronrigaku no Kenkyu - Jinna no Taikei -(A Study of Indian Classical Logic - Dignāga's System - ), Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1965, p. 462, p. 112. Cf. also E. Frauwallner, 'Dignaga, sein Werk und seine Entwicklung,' WzKSO, III(1959), p. 102.
3 PST: Visālāmalavati Pramanasamuccayaţika of Jinendrabuddhi, Tibetan version, Sde-dge ed., 2376.7-238a.2 (Peking ed., 269a.3-5): The thing to be denoted by the word (abhidheyártha) has many portions (amsa): satta, jñeyatva, etc. The word, for example, *vrksa' is not inseparably related to all of them. It denotes that (portion of the thing) to which it is (inseparably) related through the exclusion of the other things (arthantaravyavaccheda), just as krtakatva or any other (inferential mark establishes the sádhya through the exclusion of those which do not possess the inferential mark]. This thought is expressed by Dignāga in PS, V, k. 12, cited in Slokavárttikatika (Sarkarikā), ed. Kunhan Raja, Madras 1946, p. 46.7-8: bahudhāpy abhidheyasya na sabdát sarvatha gatih / svasambandhanurupyeņa vyavacchedarthakāry asau //