Anthropological Problems In Classical Indian Philosophy

Author(s): Wilhelm Halbfass
Publisher: Wilhelm Halbfass

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WILHELM HALBFASS
In the introduction to his Brahmasūtrabhāșya Sankara tells us that there is no basic difference between human and animal behaviour. Man as well as animals try to obtain the pleasant and avoid the unpleasant; fear and desire govern their actions: "Animals, when sounds or other sensible qualities affect their sense of hearing or other senses, recede or advance according as the idea derived from the sensation is a .comforting or disquieting one. A cow, for instance, when she sees a man approaching with a raised stick in his hand, thinks that he wants to beat her, and therefore moves away; while she walks up to a man who advances with some fresh grass in his hand. Thus men also-who possess a higher intelligence-run away when they see strong fierce-looking fellows drawing near with shouts and brandishing swords; while they confidently approach persons of contrary appearance and behaviour. We thus see that men and animals follow the same course of procedure with reference to the means and objects of knowledge (pramāņaprameyavyavahāra). Now it is well known that the procedure of animals bases on the non-distinction of Self and NonSelf), we therefore conclude that, as they present the same appearances, men alsoalthough distinguished by superior intelligence--proceed with regard to perception and so on (pratyakşādivyavahāra), in the same way as animals do ---" (In his following remarks, Sankara refers to sacrificial activities.) While the commentators40 tend to see this discussion more or less as a pedagogical device, destined to convince us of the all-comprehensive presence of "ignorance in this world, it seems to me that there are more specific references in this passage: It is the Mimāṁsā distinction between men and animals in terms of intelligence and long-term planning, which is rejected here, as being reducible to an insignificant difference in degree. The basic mechanism of action, of wordly practical life remains what it is, whether a higher degree of intelligent thought (citta) and long-term planning based upon the scriptural knowledge of an after-life are involved or not; whatever its specific conditions may be, the basic orientation of vyavahāra is the same. The kind of pragmatic, practical intelligence, which is the criterion of Sabara's distinction between men and animals, is quite inappropriate to account for and explain the access to mokşa, liberation. To be sure, the animals (just as the Sūdras) are excluded from the access to the sources of liberating knowledge, and there are references to natural, empirical, intellectual abilities and disabilities in this connection; the inability of the animals to study and comprehend the scriptures is as obvious and valid for Sankara as it is for Sabara. Yet, in order for man to really be open for mokşa, he has to stop seeing anything particular and privileged in himself as man (homo sapiens). Trying to empirically ascertain and theoretically justify what
39 Brahmasūtrabhāşya, Upodghāta (following the translation by G. Thibaut). 40 E.g. Padmapāda, Pañcapădikā.