________________
Chapter 25 - Anekäntaväda II - Pramäna, Naya and Syädväda
Introduction
Logic broadly means the study of the structure and principles of reasoning or of sound arguments. In the west, it also includes certain other meanings all related to different meanings of a Greek word "logos". Logic is of prime importance in Indian philosophy, to both philosophy and religion. The knowledge of logic is a must for one who wants to understand a religion and its philosophy.
It has been held by almost all systems of Indian Philosophy that no liberation is possible without knowledge and conduct. Thus the theory of knowledge, which includes its conception, sources and classification, becomes an independent branch of philosophy. Some scholars consider 'logic' a part of epistemology also. Whatever the case may be, its importance and history both are recognized since the ancient period.
Jain logic is not only as the lump of all sciences but also helpful for practical affairs and the sustaining principles of religion (Dharma). After all, logic is not an end in itself but a means for the ideal life.
The history of Jain logic and Jain epistemology goes as far back as its canonical literature. We find the doctrines and the discussions as well as reasoning on the doctrines even in the philosophical works by Umäsväti and Kunda-Kundächärya. The Nyäyävatära" by Shri Siddhasen Diwäkar, as far as we know, is the earliest manual on logic composed for the benefit and training of Jain authors who till his time studied Nyäya possibly from other sources available to them. Shvetämbar Ächärya Siddhasen Diwäkar has been accepted as 'the first Jain writer on pure logic'. During the period between 5th and 16th century some noteworthy Jain logicians, from Siddhasen to Yashovijayaji are Mallavädi, Haribhadra, Akalank, Virsen, Vidyänandi, Devasuri, Hemchandra-ächärya, and Yashovijayaji.
Aim and Subject matter of Jain Logic
We can say that the chief aim is to understand the scriptures and the doctrine, which again is not possible without the correct knowledge of Pramänas (total view knowledge) and Nayas, (partial viewpoint knowledge). The subject matter of Jain logic includes all such topics resulting from Jain theory of knowledge and reality. Apart from the Pramänas as sources for knowledge, the 'Naya-väda' and 'Saptabhanga-väda', the 'Dravyästika' and 'Paryäyästika' views, and the enumeration and classification of Naya are some of the quite interesting topics included in Jain logic.
Pramänas Valid knowledge in Jain philosophy is divided into two modes: Pramäna and Naya. Pramäna is knowledge of a thing as it is, and Naya is knowledge of a thing in its relation. Naya means a standpoint of thought from which we make a statement about a thing. Siddhasen Diwäkar in Nyäyävatära writes, "Since things have many characters, they are the object of all sided knowledge (omniscience); but a thing conceived from one particular point of view is the object of Naya (or one-sided knowledge)."It may be noted here that Naya is a part of Pramäna because it gives us valid knowledge of its object. Naya being a particular standpoint determines only a part of its object. A Naya can also be defined as a particular intention or viewpoint - a viewpoint which does not rule out other different viewpoints and is thereby expressive of a partial truth about an object as entertained by a knowing agent or speaker. Nayas do not interfere with one another or enter into conflict with one another. They do not contradict one another. They uphold their own objects without rejecting others' objects.
Naya becomes pseudo Naya, when it denies all standpoints, contradicts them, excludes them absolutely and puts forward its partial truth as the whole truth.
According to The Jain logic, Naya becomes a form of false knowledge as it determines the knowledge not of an object but part of an object. They say that false knowledge is knowledge about something which is not a real object or in conformity to what it is, 'the part of an object and not non-object. The knowledge of an object determined by Naya is valid knowledge from that point of view. It does yield certain valid knowledge about part of the object.
The Pramäna kind of knowledge comprises all the aspects of a substance. Pramäna includes every aspect; and not as understood from any one aspect. Pramäna is of two kinds
JAIN PHILOSOPHY AND PRACTICE - 2
221
