Prabuddha Jivan 2014 Year 62 Ank 01 to 12

SR No.: 525999
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Dhanvant Shah
Publisher: Mumbai Jain Yuvak Sangh
Publication Year: 2014
Total Pages: 700
Language: Gujarati
Classification: Magazine, India_Prabuddha Jivan, & India
File Size: 19 MB

Page 85

FEBRUARY 2014
PRABUDDH JEEVAN
41
is mortal, as he is irritable.' You can as well prove: 'Man
and from the Mimāmsaka view according to whcih vais immortal, as he is capable of knowledge. You con- lidity is self-evident but invalidity is due to external tradict the Middle irrelevantly. You don't prove anything.
causes. (4) Reasoning by an Unproved Reason (Sadhyasama).
If then knowledge according to Nyāya is not selfIt gives a reason which is not different from that which
established how are we to know that cognitions correis to be proved, which itself requires proof, e.g. spond to Reality? The Naiyāyika is a pragmatist; this Shadow is a substance, as it has motion' or 'Man is
we are to know by reference to action. Those ideas mortal, because he is a centaur.' This one is 3TH. (5)
1 114.)
whic
which lead to successful actions are the ideas which The Mistimed Reason (acticia) is the name given when
correspond with Reality. the phenomenon stated as cause is not cause, as it is
Error, says Nyāya, is the apprehension of an object affected by lapse of time, e.g., Sound is durable, as it
as other than what it is (Anyathākhyāti). This view conis manifested by union as a colour.' Here sound is pro
trasts with the Madhyāmika view that all perception is duced after the union of the stick and drum, but colour erroneous: it is only nonexistent silver which manifests is produced simultaneously when there is union of Light
itself to us; Knowledge is nonexistent (Asatkhyāti). The and the jar. Because colour is durable, therefore sound
Naiyāyika says: no, the error of seeing silver in a shell is' does not follow; it is a mistimed Reason. Sometimes
is not produced by nothing, but by something in the afera is mentiomed. The aifea is the non-inferentially
shell itself; the error is perceiving silver where it is other contradicted middle. Man is immortal, as he is a Being. than silver. The Advaita view, on the other hand, is: Being immortal is contradicted by actual experiences
Error is undefinable: erroneous Knowledge is inexpli
Error and so it is alfer.
cable Knowledge (Anirvachaniya Khyāti). When I see The Nyāya arose in an atmosphere of disputes and
silver instead of shell, my cognition is neither real nor debates, and has supplied a whole terminology of points
unreal, nor both real and unreal, i.e., therefore, inexpliand devices in disputations; e.g., the Tarka, the Nirnaya,
cable. the Vāda (Thesis), Jalpa (Wrangling), Vitandā (Destruc
The Nyāys theory of Knowldege is Realstic. It is the tive Criticism). Hetvābhāsa (False Middle), Chhala (In- Correspondence theory that in Knowldege, our ideas tentional Misrepresentation of the opponent's position,
correspond to things. Its defectiveness is in the sharp to defeat him), Jāti (Raising false issues), and
contrast of the ideas and the things. We cannot comNigrahasthāna (Points of Self-Contradiction). One must
pare Knowldege with Reality, since the latter is exterknow this art, for if he does not, his faith cannot be
nal to the former. It is the mechanistic conception of protected. Nyāya Theory of Knowledge : Truth and Error:
the Universe like that of Locke. The pluralistic view acAccording Nyāya the knowledge we get through the
cording to which the many reals are unrelated is not four Pramānas is valid. Vatsyāyana urges that the
true: the unrelatedness of things is only apparent. Madhyamika view that we don't know the essence of
The Soul : its Destiny: Salvation : The Soul acthings, but only ideas, is not correct. If the Real did not cording to Nyaya is a Substance having as its qualities exist there would be no difference between Truth and desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain and cognition. Error; nay, without the existence of a sensible world. It is permanent; the permanence is implied in my dream states could not exist.
cognising diferent impressions as mine. If the Soul were Further the Nyāya school holds that the validity of not permanent, every cognition would be distinct and Knowledge is not self-established (it is not svatah unrelated. The view that consciousness is a property prāmāṇya) but is established by something else of the Body is rejected by Nyāya. If it were a quality of (pratahprāmānya). If every cognition were self-evident, the Body, it would exist in various parts of the body. there would be no likelihood of doubt. Validity is proved Again if consciousness were an attribute of the body, by reference to facts - to something existing indepen- all matter having the same nature as body would be dent of the cognition itself. Thus Nyāya differs from Bud- conscious. At best body is an instrument of consciousdhism according to which invalidity belongs to all cog- ness. nitions and validity has to be established otherwise. It The Soul is eternal and is partless. It is all-pervaddiffers from the Sankhya view which says that validity ina, but it cannot know many things at a time, for the and invalidity are both self-established in the cognition, Manas is atomic.