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The Concept of Time and its Relationship to Change in...
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One of the most interesting premises for further research inspired by the early Jaina definitions of time, like Kundakunda's, is the application of the definition of a substance as a changing entity to kāla. The theory of kāla being, like the other five substances, subject to change, is perhaps a pioneering theory in Indian philosophy. The Nyāya and Vaiseșika schools, for example, also accepted time as a substance, but in their ontologies kāla is immutable, comparable to god, space and other eternal nonchanging substances. Jainism on the other hand retains a formal relationship between all the substances, be it a soul (even liberated), matter or time, as they share a similar ontological structure consisting of elements of identity and change. With this distinction Jainism retains its uniqueness within Indian philosophical understandings of time.
References: 1. The author would like to thank the organizers of the ISSJS for
making the publication of this paper and the research leading up to it during the ISSJS 2010 possible. Newly gained insights will be incorporated into studies carried out by the research project Philosophical Relevance of Death and Dying funded by the Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology of the
Republic of Slovenia. 2. Is time independent of a changing entity? Is time independent of the
observer? Does only present time exist? Is there continuity? Is time
finite or infinite? 3. Y. J. Padmarajiah numbers several names that are used to refer to
the identity component. Beside those already introduced, several others should be mentioned: substratum, non-difference, continuity, continuance, unity, oneness, the continuant, statism, endurance,
persistence. (Padmarajiah, 1963, 127, f.n. 2) 4. Other terms that are sometimes used for change are: modification,
discreetness, plurality, manyness, manifoldness, the occurrent and
dynamism. Ibid. 5. Nathmal Tatia suggests that it is better to use the term persistency
rather than staticity for the Jaina concept of substance, since that allows a distinction between a persistent flow of the former and the