Nirgrantha-2

SR No.: 522702
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: M A Dhaky, Jitendra B Shah
Publisher: Shardaben Chimanbhai Educational Research Centre
Publication Year: 1996
Total Pages: 326
Language: English, Hindi, Gujarati
Classification: Magazine, India_Nirgrantha, & India
File Size: 14 MB

Page 29

Vijay Pandya
Nirgrantha
of naya, it is ekānta. So, anekānta is anekānta as well as ekānta. As noted earlier, naya is a partial point of view. Naya has been explained as TREAT CUTET Threrfage: 74: 1 Naya grasps only a part of an object cognised by pramāņa. Or naya leads an entity to its partial nature excluding various other characteristics as Devasena (c. early 10th cent. A. D.) held : TK 2: R Tafir mynd a tecilfa 72: 111 So, naya is neither pramāņa nor apramāņa. Naya is a part of a pramāna. Naya cognises a thing only partially and not wholly. Thus Naya is a pramāņa as well as apramāna. Similarly, Anekāntavāda is also anekānta as well as ekānta. Anekānta reconciles all differing partial positions. So, Anekāntavāda or śyādväda boldly faces and does not shy away from facing its own logical consequences.
En passent, it may be remarked that the Jaina system of thought is not anxious to prove their padārthas any more than the Vedāntin is inclined to prove the Brahman. The existence of the padārthas depends upon the authority of the Āgama as a Vedāntin would depend upon the Śruti. Of course, there is a difference, too, between the two systems. As God, the Creator of the Universe, is disrecognized and hence unavailable to the Jaina system of thought, as they do not believe in the creation and hence the Creator of the Universe, God does not lend any authority to the Agamas. But, Sańkarācārya, too, does not lay much stress upon this argument. As noted in the beginning of this essay, Sankarācārya's main thrust is against the Syādvāda. What is more, Sankarācārya finds fault with one of the Saptabhanginaya i.e. Pil t: About this, Sankarācārya remarks that, if it is inexpressible, it cannot be expressed and if it is expressible, or expressed, it is not inexpressible : 7 9 474f7199 card hafa | 37 | 324 g oue fa fayfafest 115 But Sankarācārya forgets at that moment that his conception of the Māyā is also open to the same charge.
Thus, it will be seen that sankarācārya has not been able to do justice to the multilinked splendour of Syādvāda. It is quite likely that the great ācārya as he was, he might have been led by contemporary considerations (and compulsions) of his days, which were the days of great upheaval, affecting as it did the destiny of an entire nation. But, the Jaina system of thought, and especially its main plank the Syādvāda, is a distinct contribution to the Indian thought. In its Syādvāda tenet, the Jaina system of philosophy appears most vital and resilient. It can be said to be relevant even today, and Sankarācārya's refutation of it had a little impact on the subsequent course of Indian thought*
* Paper originally presented at the National Seminar (Sponsored by Indian Council for Philosophical Research, New Delhi) on Jaina Logic and Epistemology at Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, Poona, from 27th to 29th March, 1995. With some revisions it is presented here for the JCJ commemorative issue of the Nirgrantha.
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