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Albrecht Wezler
The warrior taking to fight in fear
lated by the Brahmanas, but rather the idea, still more central to the Indian conception of kingship that (as Manu says at 8.304) <a king who (duly) protects (his subjects) receives from each and all the sixth part of their spiritual merit; if he does not protect them, the sixth part of their demerit also (will fall on him ). For it shows even more clearly that merit and demerit are not at all conceived of as an absolutely inalienable substance if the king, or generally speaking the ruler over a territory, and his duties and rights are taken into consideration. On the contrary, the impression one gathers from even a cursory perusal of the relevant mate. rial is that this idea is notably common in this sphere
As M. 8.304 is clearly based on the idea, almost stereotypically mentioned in connection with kingship, that the king has to render protection to his subjects and that it is therefore only", or primarily because of this, that he has the right to levy taxes, attention is once more drawn to what forms the core of the relation between the master and servant of M. 7.94 and 95: Obviously this is thought of as a contractual relationship, and an essential 'article' of the agreement is that the warrior is obliged to fight valorously in return for the bhrti he enjoys, for the pinda he receives Again one is reminded of Vedic times, viz. the fact pointed out by W. Raul that in the sources he draws upon in his important study the possible legal relations between individuals as well as between groups of men are reduced to just one, and that one of the points of view from which this sole relation is looked at is that of the relation between provider (bhart) and dependent (person) (bharya). The Epos contains evidence showing that in fact the bharty-bharya relation served as the matrix for the conception and development of the relation between king and warrior, and its
various aspects (legal, economic and ethical, though as regards the latter more information would be welcome).
The disloyal act spoken of in the two Manu verses was hence most probably regarded as a most serious breach of contract by which it not only becomes null and void, but must also inevitably have correspondingly serious consequences. In any case it is legitimate, to say the least, to state that M. 7.94 and 95 refer to a sphere of social organisation and its 'ideology which are a matter of everyday experience and should hence have been common, i.e. which were popular at least in the sense of having general currency and being commonly accepted.
4.5.3. But popularity in this sense of the word) I feel justified to ascribe to the particular idea expressed in M. 7.94 and 95 also because I assume that this idea is a particularization of a more general one, viz. that the effects of one's deeds can pass over to other people; and I further assume that this general idea is by itself of a basically popular nature. And this assumption is also suggested by the observation that many a younger colleague, when I told him about these Manu verses, was instantaneously able to adduce similar examples from their own experiences of life and/or fieldwork in India, and Nepal, all of which testify to the fact that the belief in the separability of merit from its rightful owner, and to some extent also of demerit, is (still) very much alive and forms to all appearances a frequent and natural element of the culture of the general public in South-East Asia.
Again, certain observations made by Gombrich in present-day Sri Lanka in connection with studying the concept of pinkamma clearly point in the same direction. It is true that Gombrich himself modifies his remarks about the practice of mataka dane, the dane of the dead, viz. that the popular understanding of
86. Cf. P. V. KANE, op. cit. (fr. 85), p. 140 f. 87. Quoted from Bühler's translation (cf. fn. 2), p. 307.
88. What I have in mind is first of all the material drawn upon or referred to by P. V. KANE, op. cit. (fr. 85), loc. cit., but also passages like that of the Nitimayükha (cf. fr. 72), p. 75.
89. Cf. e.g. Manu 8.307. 90. Cf. fn. 71 and 83. 91. Staat und Gesellschaft im Alten Indien, Wiesbaden, 1957, p. 32 ff. 92. Op. cit. (cf. fn. 70) p. 190.
93. And by no means only an act of ingratitude as contended by Rangasvami Aiyangar in his "Introduction" (cf. fr. 80), p. 74 f.
94. The reference is to a) his article 'Merit Transference in Sinhalese Buddhism: A Case Study on the Interaction between Doctrine and Practice, in History of Religions, 11 (1971-1972). pp. 203-219, and b) to his book Precept and Practice, Traditional Buddhism in the Rural Highlands of Ceylon, Oxford, 1971.
95. Op. cit. (fn. 94 b)), p. 238.