Warrior Taking To Flight In Fear Some Remarks On Manu 7 94 And 95

Author(s): A Wezler
Publisher: A Wezler
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269579/1

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- ALBRECHT WEZLER THE WARRIOR TAKING TO FLIGHT IN FEAR SOME REMARKS ON MANU 7.94 AND 95 (Beitrage zur Kenntnis der indischen Kultur und Religionsgeschichte IIT) 0. While examining materials on the laws of battle >>, in the course of a study of the ideas about the right to kill in selfdefence in ancient and mediaeval India, I chanced upon the verses Manu 7.94 and 95 and these have arrested my attention for quite some time now. For they are not only highly interesting in them. selves, but invite closer inspection also because in commentaries on them we find an explicit reference to a philosophical author. A further consideration of no little importance is that these verses involve the problem of << transfer of merit which has been a concern of quite a number of colleagues in recent years. 1. The verses at issue run thus: yas tu bhitah paravettah samgrdme hanyate paraih / bhartur yad duskatam kimcit tat sarvam pratipadyate // 94 // yac casya sukstam kimcid amutrartham uparjitam / bharta tat sarvam adatte paravyttahatasya tu // 95 Il. These are statements apparently so simple and clear that one should not expect anybody to be in doubt as to their meaning and reject eg. Buhler's rendering? 1. This is the term used by E. W. HOPKINS, The Social and Military Position of the Ruling Caste in Ancient India as Represented by the Sanskrit Epic, in JAOS, 13 (1889), p. 227 ff., cf. also fn. 9. 2. The Laws of Manu in Sacred Books of the East - XXV, Oxford, 1886 (repr. Delhi-Varanasi-Patna, 1964, etc.), p. 231.

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392 Albrecht Wezler The warrior taking to flight in fear 393 But the (kshatriya) who is slain in battle, while he turns back in fear, takes upon himself all the sin of his master, whatever (it may be) : < And whatever merit (a man) who is slain in flight may have gained for the next (world), all that his master takes ! Though in the absence of a critical edition of the Manusmrti which fully deserves this designation it is not possible to say anything definite about the transmission of the two verses, it seems that there is just one variant to be taken note of, as stated by Jolly, viz. (paravstrahatasya) ca at the end of 7.95, attested in manuscripts containing the mula text together with Medhatithi's and Govindaraja's commentaries. And this ca looks, to be sure, very much like the original reading, whereas tu may well be explained as having originated in order to remove an apparent redundance; but be that as it may, the meaning as such is practically not affected at all by this textual difference. 1.1. To the author of the anukramani. verses 1.111 ff. M. 7.94 and 95, if they were at all known to him, form an integral part of the general subject of the seventh adhyaya, viz. the exposition of & the whole duty of a king >> (cf. rajnas ca dharmam akhilam at 1.114 c); and, to quote a rather modern example, Laxmanshastri Joshi' similarly failed to see any reason for not subsuming the two verses under the heading of dharmayuddha - which in its turn is a subsection of his long chapter on yatrd, <Page #3
Albrecht Wezler The warrior taking to fight in fear 395 But even if the two groups of verses in this part of the 7th adhyaya, viz. 90-93, on the one hand, and 94 together with 95, on the other, are in this manner - and, I think, quite justly - kept apart from each other, one cannot fail to observe and duly admit that the person responsible for juxtaposing them originally or later, as the case may be, had a remarkably good feeling for what can be put together. For the transition from enumerating those not to be killed in battle to pointing out the rather unpleasant consequences a warrior has to take on himself if he turns back in fear on the battlefield, seems in fact to be quite smooth, espe. cially as the keyword paravetta is mentioned already in verse 93 It appears almost natural that immediately after referring along with others to one who has turned back in battle and has to be spared like the others, attention is now focussed on this particular type of combatant, although not any longer with regard to the manner in which he should be treated by the other warriors, but with a clear shift of perspective to his own conduct and its unavoidable consequences On the other hand, M. 7.93 and 94 f. stand in contrast with, nay even in contradiction to each other: According to the former a pardvytta is not to be killed that is to say, saves his skin - whereas the latter two verses deal with the consequences a pardurtta has to reckon with if he is slain by the enemy in battle (samgrame hanyate paraih)! One feels hence tempted to object: If a pardvetta is not to be killed and is therefore in fact also not killed, the question of what happens to him when he is killed should not at all arise! But there is a reply to this objection and it is one which suggests itself quite naturally at that: In some cases, and they are rare, a paravTtta actually may be killed inspite of the dharma rule according to which his life has to be spared; and it is to account for these cases that verses 94 and 95 are taught. - However, this could hardly pass for a convincing explanation, and this for various reasons: Firstly, one expects that, if not only then at least also, something is said about the consequences which this flagrant infringement of the laws of dhar mayuddha cannot but have 15. Secondly, a question one cannot but put oneself remains unanswered, viz. whether a pardvytta if he is in fact not killed in most cases really gets away with his mean conduct. And, thirdly, one could at least think of arguing along the following lines against a hypothetical common author of M. 7.93 and 94/95: If according to him the killing of a pardvetta brings the master an advantage and a disadvantage to the pardvrtta killed, then some sort of a 'discount should also be given to a person who is a pardvera and though still avadhya is nevertheless slainin case, of course, that we assume that his action is considered not to remain without consequences for him" What these deliberations ultimately lead to is the view, if it is not arrived at even earlier, that what forms the subject of M. 7.93 - and the verses preceding it - are but rules about an ideal, humane and chivalrous soldierly conduct, i.e. normative prescriptions (as in fact most of the material contained in Dharmasastra texts), whereas M. 94 and 95 refer to the real world, to what does really happen in many cases to a warrior who turns back in fear, viz. that he is killed, and this not only in India and not only in the times of the wars of the two Epics". And this difference is after 14. ndyudhavyasanapraptar ndrtar natipariksatam/ na bhitari na parduritasard dharmam arusmaran// (scil. hantyde). In view of the context in general and the repetition of the negation in par ticular there cannot be the least doubt that what is referred to by bhlia here is a person different from that designated as paravatta. The distinction is clearly stated eg, by Medhatithi in explaining hita mukhardgddind vijfidya Sastrasamirkham api / pardvrtiam pratydvrtya sthitam : similarly at Kauf. AS 134.52 a pardrimukha is recognized as separate from a bhayavirapa, one who is pale from fright, in an enumeration of people to whom abhaya is to be given. In M. 7.94, on the other hand, the attributes bhita and pardytta clearly refer to the same person, i.e. a warrior who turns back in fear, and not for any other reason. 15. Cl. Nandana on 7.94: ayodhyasya paravritas ya dosarri dha yas tu bhita iti/ (bhartuh sydminah . 16. Raghavananda seems to have a similar feeling: cf. fr. 32. 17. Cf. Medhatithi on 7.94, below 12. 18. Cf. the api added to ... Satrubhir hanyate by Govindaraja (cf. also n. 30). 19. I happen to recall eg the Tamil poem Puram 278, cf. A. K. RAMANUJAN, Poems of Love and War... New York, 1985, p. 182. On the other hand, it should be noted that e.g. at Malavikagnimitra 5 10/11 the expression pardt mukhibhdra is used simply to denote a person who has been put to flight and that it does not necessarily imply that he was also slain (cf. fn. 71 and $ 1.4).

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396 Albrecht Wezler The warrior taking to fight in fear 397 all also clearly expressed in the text itself, viz. by the opposition between the optative or rather prohibitive (na ca hanydt), governing all the accusatives from 7.91 to 93, and the indicative forms in verses 94 and 95. It is therefore no overstatement to speak of a gulf between the two groups of verses which is in fact not easily bridged: 7.91-93 are addressed to the ideal warrior who observes the laws of battle and does not hence attack those who are traditionally considered to be avadhya, including the paravrtta; in contrast to this what is stated in 7.94 and 95 exclusively refers to a warrior who turns back in fear, but it starts from the fact that he is killed in battle and it is restricted to the description of the 'metaphysical' consequences of his misdeed. What is at issue in the former group of verses is the warning not to disregard warrior ethics, whereas the latter is solely concerned with the loyalty a warrior owes to his master and with the consequences if he does not behave as he ought to. The ideal warrior is directly and expressly warned, but the statement of 7.94 and 95 contains a warning only indirectly and implicity in that it intimates that if a warrior wants to avoid such consequences he should be loyal come what may. The admonitory aim, clearly discernible in 7.94 and 95 too, then is common to both the groups; but this feature is not only quite an abstract one, but also one generally to be expected in a work of this class. 1.2. In turning now to the commentators of the Manusmrti", it is Medhatithi (= Medh.) who will be given preference here and not because of his relative priority in time, but for other reasons which will presently become clear. His Manubhasya on 7.94 runs thus (IV 76.23-28) : naivam mantaryam 'pardvetto yadi hanyate tadal.] dusktt ahatas tu na' iti; kim tarhi? pardvettamatranibandhanart dosavacanam / kim ca na pardvettahateneyat buddhih kartavyd 'anubhatakhadgapraharo "smy annah krtabhartykytya'iti/ tathavidhah prahard na kasmaicid arthayeti dosatifayadarsanena darsayati bhartssambandhidusktam iti [/] yac ca vacanam uttaratra tadiyasukstagrahanam iti, tad arthavddah / na hy anyena kytam subham asubham vanyasya sambhavati na ca sukstasya nasah, kintu mahata duskytena pratibandhe cirakalabhavita sukytasya phalasya ucyate //. It should not be thought that [a warrior) is characterized by evil if he is killed in battle but that he is not [characterized by evil) if he is not killed (i.e. this verse should not be taken to mean that a pardurtta has to take on himself these consequences only if he happens to be slain) ". - What [does the verse) really (mean]? - (It contains] a teaching regarding an offence prompted only by the turning back (in fear and not also by the fact of being killed). Further, [the man) killed after having turned back should not believe that he has paid what he owes to his master, [i.e.) has fulfilled his duty to him, merely because he has suffered a fatal sword wound. (For] such wounds do not serve any purpose at all: this is shown [by Manu) by pointing out the high gravity of the offence [involved]. [What is said in the present verse) regarding the master's sin [falling upon the servant), as also (what follows] in the next 20. Cf. the discussion in Medhatithi's Bhlsya on 793 about the status of this and the preceding verses leading to the conclusion: purusdrthah pratisedhah 'na kalajar bhaksayer'itivar / tatha hinarlo mukhydrthavrtita bhavari 21. Of the nine commentators whose works are available in print it is only Ramacandra who does not say anything on the two verses under discussion. As for the remaining eight, for obvious reasons I cannot deal with the explanations given by all of them. 22. Reference is (here and in the following) to the (new) edition of J.H. DAVE, Manu-Smrti with Nine Commentaries ... IV (Part 1: Adhyaya 7). Bombay, 1985. As a rule the text is reproduced exactly as printed there in order to allow the reader to form for himself a clear idea of the deplorably poor quality of the work done by Mr. Dave who seems to have copied earlier editions without rhyme or reason. Quite in contradistinction, it is worth the trouble to look for a verse of Manu's in the Dharmakosa because the text of at least the more important commentaries is given there, too, yet evidently by an editor who has tried hard to understand each and every word of them. In the present case, eg the misleading comma after tada and the danda after duskrtam iti are quite correctly absent in the Dharmakosa, the puzzling sandhi duskrtyahatas is justly dissolved for the sake of clarity and a danda is added after darsayati, as is proper. 23. G. Jha's translation of this sentence (Manusmrti. The Laws of Manu with the Bhasya of Medharithi, Vol. III, pt. 2, Calcutta, 1924, p. 343) is entirely off the point in that he fell a prey to the sandhi duskreyahatas: . It should not be thought that if the man is killed after having turned back, he does not die after having committed a sinful deed': (because the offence lies in his having turned back). Apart from that, however, it is quite correct so that I accept it by and large.

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398 Albrecht Wezler The warrior taking to flight in fear 399 (verse) regarding (the master) taking his (i.e. the servant's) merit(all] this is (purely) an explanatory statement (and hence not itself a vidhi, injunction). For what is done by one (man), be it good or bad, cannot accrue to another; nor can there be a total annihilation of a meritorious act, but (all that is possible is that). when there is an obstruction caused by a serious wicked deed, the fruition of the meritorious act is considerably delayed. (This it is that] is taught (in this verse, and nothing else). After this rather detailed explication Medh. can, of course, afford to be brief in commenting on 7.95. In fact all he says (apart from analysing the compound amutrartham) is (IV 77.23): ... tad apy asya nisphalam bhavati, this i.e. what has been earned by him for some purpose to be fulfilled in the next world), too, becomes fruitless for him . What Medh. says on the two verses is so clear that it does not seem to call for any comment. Nevertheless it still leaves some thing to be desired in that the reader is not given an answer to the question he cannot but put himself, viz. how he should, according to Medh., understand the wording of 7.94 and 95, even granting that they are only arthavddas. Ultimately one cannot but find it amazing how convenient a label 'arthavdda' can be for a commentator of Dharmasastra (and similar) texts: If for some reason or other he is not willing to take a statement at its face value, and in its literal sense, categorizing it as an arthavada suffices to cope with the problem and to contend that what is meant by it is in reality something quite different - which is however in keeping with his own conviction. And in the present case, Medh. does not leave his readers in the dark about his reason or basic conviction. For he states in express terms that the meaning the two verses would have if they were to be taken literally is not possible, i.e. that any 'transfer of merit', any taking of the duskyta of somebody else as well as any deprivation of one's own suksta is quite inconceivable. That he speaks his mind so freely, that he declares himself so openly a follower of this particular, rigorously individualistic, conception of karma has on the other hand the advantage of giving the modern philologist a still better handle against him; for it becomes thus quite easy to reject his interpretation of the two verses as evidently dictated by heavy prejudices, not to speak of Medh.'s incapacity to admit, even in theory, the possibility that the idea expressed in them belongs to another ambiance (with which he is perhaps not really familiar) or to another age. Nonetheless, Medh. is not the only one among the commentators who wants us to believe that M. 7.94 and 95 are nothing but arthavadas. 1.3. Thus Bharuci, too, is obviously of the same opinion, although this can only be inferred from the little that is preserved of his explanations on these verses, in particular from the term ninda used by him which is, however, revealing enough (67.6 - 8) : rajno 'nyasyapi danda-purusasya pardvettasya ninda Sloka-dvayenokta, yukta ca tan-ninda yad-artham asau hriyate tad akurvan pratya[vety eva). This is translated by Derrett thus : In these two verses a deprecation is uttered against a man who turns his back, including any members of the forces even apart from the king himself. This deprecation is proper. He was taken for a particular purpose, he has failed to perform this and certainly sins thereby>>. This is, no doubt, a fairly correct rendering; there is, however, one point where I disagree: I find it revealing that English past tense forms are used to translate the present forms of the Sanskrit; the conclusion suggested by this observation cannot but be that hriyate in the text as received is corrupt and that it has to be emended 24. In fact Medh. offers two alternative explanations, viz. (1) artho sydstily arthah / arsaddirydd (cf. Pan. 5.2.127] ac/amutra () musmir loke yat prayojanar tad arjitam (read: prayojanavad arjitam...?1 / tad apy ..., and [2] amutrartho'syeti vdmurdthat vyadhikararo bahuvihir gamakatvdt prayojakalvdc ca/ 25. The edition referred to is, of course, Derrett's (cf. fn. 3 and 4 - which one would have liked to indicate the number of the adhydya and verse above the type page. - The text as given in Dave's Manu-Smrti (cf. fn. 22) is apparently taken from the MS. itself and Derrett's edition has been ignored by him much to his disadvantage. 26. Op. cit. (cf. fn. 3), p. 62. 27. The reservation is due to the fact that api has also been misunderstood; this part should rather be rendered: against a member of the forces who turns his back, even if it is somebody other than the king

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The warrior taking to flight in fear 401 400 Albrecht Wezler to bhriyate, echoing the expression bharts of the verses: He is kept for a particular purpose [and] if he does not perform this he certainly sins. 1.4. Next it is Govindaraja (= Gov.) who deserves attention; for he makes the following remarks (77.12 - 16): yo bhitah pardrmukhibhutah samgrame satrubhir hanyate 'pi yadi tathapi prabhor yat. kincit papam tat sarvam praproti papam tasya bhavati hy etavad atra vivaksitam / anyam vd kathayati apape prabhau papabhavaprasangena ca prabhor eva tat prdyascittam tendsau duskytat pramucyate bhartygrahandd amatyasyapi pardvartanddidosa (or: pardvar tanadi dosa?) eva, na prakrtasyaiva rdjnah //. This is evidently corrupt in part. Thus one has clearly to read ... bhavatity etavad ... Instead of anyam vd etc. the Dharmakosa has (IV 2780 a 14): anyatha kathamcit apape prabhau papabhavaprasangena ca.... which is, no doubt, a better reading, but is still not completely satisfactory. Unfortunately, however, neither of the two 'editors' gives any information about the reading(s) as found in the manuscript(s)-if their text is at all directly based on any such source , and a critical edition of Govindaraja's Manvasayasarini is, and will most probably remain for quite some time, a tool one can only dream of. Hence all that can be achieved in a case like the present one is mere guesswork. Accordingly I cannot do more than propose to read instead: anyatha kathamcid (or: katham apy?) apdpe prabhau papabhdvaprasango na ca prabhor eve tat prayascittam yendsau skrtat pramucyate. Taking these emendations as a basis the passage as a whole could be translated as follows: < [A combatant) who has, frightened, become one with the face turned away (and has taken to his heels] ", acquires, even if he is killed in battle by the enemy, all the evil that may have been done by [his] master. What is intended in this [verse] is not more than that evil arises for him (i.e. the person who turns back) [from his cowardly conduct). (For), in the other case (i.e. if the verse were to be taken literally) the absence of (any] demerit (for the pardvetta] would be the consequence (of this proposition), if the master were [himself] somehow free from sin. And [what is suggested in this verse is also] not an atonement (performed) by the master on his part by which he (would) free himself from the evil [done by himself, and, to be sure, this interpretation would suggest itself if what is said in the verse were to be taken literally). Since the expression 'master (lit. 'one who maintains') is used in the verse], the offence of turning back etc. certainly (pertains) to a minister also, [and] not only to the king under discussion (in the present context of the Manusmrti). The explicatory phrase papam tasya bhavati is not explicit enough for us to decide already at first sight what precisely Gov. has in mind; and, to be sure, his remark on 7.95 lacks even more in clarity". The subsequent clause, however, viz. etavad atra vivaksitam, seems to indicate that what is said in 7.94 is according to Gov. nothing more than that the offence of turning back in battle - naturally - entails some dusksta for the warrior who commits it. The question immediately suggesting itself, viz. why this duskata is given the attribute bhartuh, is significantly ignored by him , though in the last sentence he himself refers to this 31. For it reads thus: yad iti / asya ca pardrimukhahatasya yar kiricit paralokartham arjitam asti tat sarvat prabhor bhavati // 32. According to Raghavananda (- / bhartu Sastrabharanayogyasya vdnyasya yat pdpam far pardukhaghatakandip bhaved iti Govindardjah /...) Gov. takes bhartr to mean one who is able to carry weapons. But there is nothing in Gov's commentary on 7.94 (or 95) which would support this view, on the contrary, what Gov. says on the expression bhartt (see $ 1.4) clearly precludes such an interpretation. In fact it is quite impossible to find even a part of the view which Raghavananda ascribes to Gov. in the latter's text itself, eg. that what M. 7.94 is about is the punishment of those who inspite of the corresponding 'law of battle' kill an enemy who has taken to flight. The matter was (unnecessarily) further obfuscated by Burnell and Hopkins (The Ordinance of Manu, London, 1884, p. 160 fn. I) as is rightly pointed out by G. Jhn, op. cit., loc. cit. (cf. fn. 11). 28. This is also the reading found in V. N. MANDLIK, The Commentary of Govindardja on Manava-Dharma Sastra, Bombay, 1886, as well as in the Dharmakosa (IV Pt. 4, 2780). 29. Both of them mention Mandlik's edition, but no manuscripts. 30. See fa. 18, i.e. note that Gov's - clearly forced - explanation (... api yadi tathapi ...) seems to be provoked by the view that being killed forms already quite a severe punishment for an illoyal warrior.

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402 Albrecht Wezler The warrior taking to flight in fear 403 expression. Instead what he does is to put forward an argument of the prasanga type; that is to say, he confines himself to pointing out an allegedly - absurd implication the verse would have if it were taken in its literal sense and hence to mean that the dusksta which a paravitta necessarily acquires by his disloyal act really is that previously done and accumulated by his master which is now only transferred to him. And it should be noted that this argument is valid for the second verse (7.95), too". with regard to which it could equally well be pointed out that the master would in a similar manner come off empty-handed, as it were, if the pardvyfta happened not to have accumulated any merit at all. Though the exact wording of this sentence remains uncertain, the argument as such can, I think, be grasped quite distinctly, especially since it is repeated in substance by Sarvajnandrayana The situation is a little different in the case of the sentence immediately following upon it, i.e. that in which the expression prayascitta occurs. In all probability what is said in it amounts to the additional argument that it is not conceivable either that a << master should be freed from his own duskria by the turning back of one of his warriors or that he can free himself of his demerit only if he performs the necessary atonement. In any case this much seems to be sufficiently clear: Gov. continues here to adduce reasons against a literal interpretation of M. 7.941 Taken together his remarks hardly leave any doubt that it is this view that he endeavours to show to be untenable. What he apparently has in mind in rejecting a literal interpretation is the first of the three essential conditions generally accepted by the later Alamkarika's for assuming a laksana, viz. the inapplicability or the unsuitability of the primary meaning in the context, (mukhyarthabadha) - and philologically this is in fact the nub of the problem. Yet the question is whether Gov. by adducing these arguments tells us the whole truth, i.e. really discloses his true motive. The prasanga type of argument is not so strong after all. On the other hand it is possible that what Gov. says comes close to the idea so clearly and impressively stated by Medh., viz. that any form of 'exchange of dusksta and suksta substance between two individuals is impossible. But one cannot, of course, be absolutely sure that Gov. shares this rigorously individualistic conception of karma, particularly since it is not at all easy to explain why he did not also state it in express terms, but confined himself to adducing another reason. Yet, if both these commentators should really not agree on the idea of the absolute inaliena. bility of karma, this much at least is common to them, viz. that they decidedly refuse to take M. 7.94 - and 95 - in their literal sense. Nevertheless it is possible that they differ as to their respect. ive interpretations of the wording of these verses. The concluding sentence of Gov.'s commentary on the former verse is noteworthy, too: One is puzzled by the 'adi" added to pardvartana' and wonders which other offence Gov. could have in mind. Does he think of other possible illegal acts of a minister or did the <>. But this sentence is, of course, interesting first of all in that it shows that Gov. by reading this into the expression bhart 33. Though Gov. does not bring it forward in his commentary on 7.95 (quoted in fn. 31) which taken by itself could easily be understood to mean that the master really acquires the sukta accumulated by his servant. It may be noted in passing that the argument in question would be valid in both cases also if the two verses were interpreted as teaching that the illoyal warrior acquires only a duskrta quantity equal to that of his bharts, and the master a suksta quantity equal to that his servant has succeeded in accumulating. 34. Viz. 76.29-30: bhartur yad du skrtam iti bahutaraduskstot pa. dopalaksanart na tu mukhyartham aduskrte bhartari tadabhavdparten //. 35. Quoted from K. KUNJUNNI RAJA, Indian Theories of Meaning (Adyar Library Series 91), Adyar, Madras, 1963, p. 231. 36. Cf. also Raghavananda's avatarana to 7.94 and 95, viz. 77.4: sarigrame pardrimukhader dosam dha yas tv iti dvdbhydm.

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404 Albrecht Wetler The warrior taking to fight in fear 405 evidently starts from the assumption that the subject of the finite verb forms pratipadyate and adatte in 7.94 and 95 cannot but be that of the verses preceding these two, and this is allegedly king, Gov. thus draws our attention to another element of incoherence, not yet discussed above (cf. 1.1): for it is difficult enough to agree with him that the subject of na hanydt in 7.90 and 91-93 should be one of the mahiksitah mentioned in verse 89 - at best this would be acceptable if this expression were taken to cover all ksatriyas or all members of the forces, but agreeing with him becomes definitely impossible when it comes to what he takes to be the subject of 7.94 and 95; for the subject should rather be determined, contrary also to Bharuci's explanation (cf. SS 13 above), as any member of the forces other than the king and for this the opposition between the agent of pratipadyate/Adatte and the concept of bharty is sufficient proof. Besides it would be more than strange if what is stated in these two verses would refer only to a 'vassal' king, and not to any kind of warrior serving in an army whom we quite naturally assume to be loyal to his master. 1.5. Gov.'s interpretation of 7.94 is referred to among others" by Kullaka (= Kull.) to whom we have, however, to turn now, first of all because he not only advocates an opinion diametri cally opposed to that of Medh, and Gov., but also because he enters into a discussion with both these predecessors of his. For, what he in his turn says is (76.31 - 77.3): yas tu yodho bhi tah pararmukhah san yuddhe satrubhir hanyate sa posanakartuh prabhor yad dusk tam tat sarvam praproti Sastrapramanake ca sukstaduskote yatha Sastrasartkramayogya (read with e.g. the NSP-edition: yathasastram samtkrama', and, of course, "yogye) eva sidhyatah ata evopajfvyasdstrena badhandn na pratipaksanumanodayo 'pi / etac ca sasthe 'priyesu svesu sukstam' [6.79] ity atraviskstam asmdbhih / pardnmukhahatasya syat papam etad vivaksitam / na tv atra prabhupapar sydd iti govindarajah / medharithis tv arthavadamatrametan nirupayan (read (against all MSS?]: nyardpayan (?) manye naitad dvayam vyuktam (read: yuktam) vyaktam anvarthavarjanat / anyadiyapunyapape 'nyatra samkrameta iti (read: samkramete itt) sastraprdmanyad vedantasatrakta badardyanena nimito 'yam artha iti yathoktam eva ra. manlyam // The warrior who, turning back in fear, is slain by the enemies acquires all the evil done by [his] master, [i.e.) provider. And merit and demerit for which there is the authority of the sastra are both established as certainly capable of passing over [from one locus to another) in accordance with the teaching of the) sastra. Therefore an inference, too, which contradicts it does not operate because it is sublated by the sastra on which the Dharmasastra) rests. And this has been clearly shown by me (in commenting) on the verse 6.79. Govindaraja [is of the opinion] that what ought to be meant [by 7.94) is that the person who is killed after having turned back has demerit, but that it is not the master's demerit (which is spoken of] here. Medhatithi, however, states this [verse] to be nothing but an arthavada. I think that both these [interpretations) are not correct because the literal meaning is clearly abandoned. On the basis of the authoritative statement of the sastra according to which merit and demerit of one (person can pass over to another (person), this matter has been decided definitively by Badarayana, the author of the 40. I should like to thank my friend L. Schmithausen for drawing my attention to the fact that the text contains slokas, viz. pardrimukhahatasya sydf papam etad vivaksiram/ na tv atra prabhupapan sydd 37. Bharuci's and Gov's interpretation is most probably not only based on the concatenation of the Manu verses as understood by them, but is also inspired by the fact that one king (along with his forces) may serve another, whatever the cause and the nature of the service. 38. As for Raghavananda's reference, sce fn. 32.. 39. Cf. fn. 22. medhat this tv arthavddamatram elan vyaktam anvarthavariandi // 41. That is to say, I assume that the phrase pararmukhahatasya syde pdpam stands in the focus of the subsequent etad vivaksitam - as if it were connected with it by an iti.

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406 Albrecht Wezler The warrior taking to flight in fear 407 Vedantasutra; therefore the interpretation) as given [by me at the very beginning) and no other is appealing (i.e. correct). This is an entirely unequivocal explanation speaking for itself; nevertheless it is perhaps not totally superfluous to add the remark that what is referred to by the term Sastra, used here more than once by Kull., is clearly the Veda, or rather, to be precise, the fruti, i.e. that means of instruction of which the Dharmasastrins are firmly convinced that it forms the root (mula) of their own sastra and which is hence, quite interestingly, called the upajivyasastra of the Dharmasastra by Kull". As for Kull.'s interpretation of this verse and his criticism of Medh, and Gov., we shall presently come back to them; for, it is clearly advisable to start with his reference to his - probably even more detailed - discussion of the problem involved in his commentary on 6.79 and with his reference to Badarayana: The significance they have within the framework of his argumentation cannot be overlooked. 2. In the course of his treatment of samnyasa, starting with 6.33, Manu, of course, also touches upon the subject of the ascetic's death. It is in this narrower context that he states: priyesu svesu sukstam apriyesu ca duskstam / visriya dhydnayogena brahmabhyeti sandtanam //79/7. << Making over (the merit of his own) good actions to his friends and (the guilt of) his evil deeds to his enemies, he attains the eternal Brahman by the practice of meditation 2.1. This verse is explained by Kull. thus (III 246.25 - 247.7): brahmavid Atmiyesu priye su hitakarisusuktam apriyes v ahitakarisu duskstam niksipya dhyanayogena nityam brahmabhyeti brahmani tiyate / tatha ca srutih 'tasya putra dayam upayanti suhrdah sadhukrtyam dvisantah papakrtyam' iti / apard srutih 'tat sukstaduskpte vidhunute tasya priya natayah sukstam upayanty apriya duskstam' (Kaus U 1.4] " iti / evamadini eva vakyany udahrtya sukstaduskrtayor hanimatrastavane 'py upayanam pratipattavyam iti brahmamimamsayam "hanau tupayanasabdasesatvat kusacchandastutyupagdyanavat tad uktam' [BS 3.3.26] ityadisatrair badardyanena nirandyi / nanu paraklyasukstaduskatayoh katham paratra samkrantih? ucyate / dharmadharmavyavasthayam sastram eva pramanam, samkramo 'pi tayoh sastrapramanaka eva / atah sastrat sam'kramanayogydy etau sidhyatah / atah sastrena badhan na pratipaksdnumanodayah suci narasirahkapalam pranyargatvat Sankhadivad itivat / medhatithigovindardjau tu svesu priyesu kenacit krtest dhydnabhydsendtmiyam eva sukstam tatra karanatvendropya evam apriyesv api kenacit kstesv atmiyam eva prdgjanmarjitam duskrtam karanatvena prakalpyoddhrtya tatsampadayitarau purusau ragadvesakhyau tyaktva nityam brahmabhyeti brahmasvabhavam upagacchatiti vydcaksate / tan na visriyeti kriydydm sukstam dusktam iti karmadvayatyagena tatsampadayitarav ity asrutakarmadhydhardt karmadvave Gca frutakriyatyagena karanatvena prakalpyetyddyasrutakriyadhyanardt / kim ca vyasavyakhydtavedartham evam asya manusmrten / manye na kalpitam garvad arvacinam vicaksanaih Il. * He who knows the brahman for ever goes to the brahman, [i.e.) is absorbed in the brahman by the practice of meditation after having delivered the merit of his own) good actions to his own friends, [i.e.) those who have done him a service, and the demerit of his] evil deeds to [his] enemies, [i.e.) those who have done him a disfavour. And accordingly [it is said in) the Lai cao 41a. One might recall here (but cf. also $ 2.1) Jayatirtha's explanation of the term Sastra, viz. Sisyate yathasthitarrt praripddyate tattvam anteneri sastram, Nyayasudha, Bangalore, 1982, Vol. I, p. 61. 42. Cf. M. 1.114 and 6.86. 43. Quoted from Buhler, op. cit. (see fn. 2), p. 212. 44. This sruti passage has been included by B. Ghosh in his Collection of the Fragments of Lost Brahmanas, Calcutta, 1947, 97 (Fragment L). The closest parallel in an extant Vedic text is JaiB 1.18 and 150 on which cf. H. OERTEL, in JAOS, 18 (1897), p. 46 and H. W. BOOKWITZ, Jaiminlya Brdhmana I. 1-65 ... Leiden, 1973, p. 55. 45. Note that the reading preferred by editors of the Upanisad is dhunute. 46. The NSP-Edition reads arvdcinair and this is quite evidently to be accepted as the correct reading.

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408 Albrecht Wezler Sruti: 'His sons enter upon his inheritance, [his] friends upon [the effects of his] good conduct, [his] enemies upon [the effects of his] bad conduct' ". Another [relevant passage of the] sruti [runs] thus: 'With it he shakes off [his] good deeds and [his] bad deeds. Thereupon those of his relatives who are dear [to him] inherit [the merit of his] good deeds [and] those who are not dear [to him the demerit of his] bad deeds'. Having quoted precisely these and similar sentences as examples it has been decided definitively by Badarayana in the Brahmamimamsa by means of sutras like [3.3.26] that it has to be accepted that [others can] inherit [the effects of good and bad deeds] even if [the sruti itself] explicitly mentions only the abandonment of [the effects of] good and bad deeds. But how can [the effect of] the good and bad deeds of one [person] pass over to somebody else? [To this objection] I reply: Regarding the decision about dharma and adharma (ie. about what is dharma and what is not) there is but one authority/ means of valid cognition [and this is] the sastra [of the Veda]; the passing over of these two (i.e. merit and demerit)" is [definitively] guaranteed only by the authority of [this] sastra. Therefore, because of [relevant statements in] the sastra both are established as capable of passing over [from one person to another]. Hence an inference contradicting it does not operate because it is sublated by the sastra, [namely an inference] like the following one: 'A human skull is [ritually etc.] pure because it is part of a living being just like a conch-shell' "". Medhatithi and Govindaraja, however, interpret [this verse] as follows: Attributing, by the practice of meditation, everything 47. My translation of this quotation closely follows that given by Bodewitz, op. cit., loc. cit. (s. fn. 44). 48. The masculine is rather puzzling here, for what should be referred to is, just as in the preceding sentences, sukrtaduskrte! Therefore one would expect the neuter samkramanayogye, corresponding to samkramayogye in Kull.'s commentary on 7.94 (cf. SS 1.5). 49. Since the human skull-bowl was the 'trademark of the Kapalikas as rightly stated by D. N. LORENZEN (The Kapalikas and the Kalamukhas. Two Lost Sivaite Sects, Delhi, 1972, p. 80), there is every likelihood that Kull.'s example is a dig at them. Cf. also Sankaradigvijaya 15.13 where Krakaca, the foremost of the Kapalin teachers, asks Sankara reproachfully: Suci samtyajya Sirahkapalam etat / vahathaluci kharparam kimartham ... //. The warrior taking to flight in fear pleasant rendered him by somebody [else] to that very merit as its cause which is in fact his own, and assuming similarly that the demerit accumulated in previous births which is in fact his own is the cause of everything unpleasant rendered him by somebody [else], he relieves the two [types of] persons who bring them (i.e. what is pleasant to him and what is unpleasant) about of [his] love and hate 30 [i.e.] gives [them] up (i.e. ceases to feel love and hate for them) [and then] goes forever to the brahman, [i.e.] becomes one whose nature is brahman. This [interpretation] is not [acceptable], for [it implies] that a [grammatical] object not actually stated [in the verse], [viz.] 'the two who bring them about', is supplemented to the verb [form] 'making over' by neglecting the pair of [grammatical] objects [actually mentioned in the verse], [viz.] 'merit' [and] 'demerit', and [it implies further] that a verb [form] not actually present [in the verse], [viz.] 'having assumed... as a cause', etc., is supplemented to the two [grammatical] objects by neglecting the verb [form] which is in fact mentioned [by Manu]. And besides I regard the contents of this Smrti of Manu's [to be] that of the Veda as explained by Vyasa, [and do] not [think highly of] what [ever] clever people of later times out of conceit fancy [to be its contents] >>. - 409 2.2. Already at this stage, i.e. after having barely taken note of what Kull. says on 6.79, it is clear that it was indeed worth the trouble to follow up his reference to this portion of his Manvarthamuktavali; for his remarks on 6.79 cannot only justly be regarded as elucidating his comment on 7.94 in that they are much more explicit and detailed, but this Manu verse is also highly interesting and of palpable importance both by itself as 50. The text as given by Dave though in this case it agrees with that of the NSP-edition cannot be correct here: The two persons who bring them about>>, i.e. by whom he is rendered something pleasant or unpleasant, cannot be said to be called love and hate (ragadves akhyau); apart from the context itself it is e.g. Gov.'s own commentary that is to be taken note of here, viz. 247.24: tatsampadayitaram purusam prati ragadvesabhavan (nityam brahmabhyeti... //. Assuming a graphical error I suggest the reading ragadvesabhya.

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410 Albrecht Wezler The warrior taking to flight in fear 411 well as by the relation in which it evidently stands to its Vedic source(s) "I But it is equally patent that Kull.'s remarks on 6.79 also call for a thorough analysis, and this in various regards (not all of which can be dealt with by me in the present essay). This analysis may be conveniently started by noting that Kull. cannot be denied to have given on the whole a quite correct report of what forms the gist of Medh.'s and Gov's explanations of M. 6.79. No doubt, not a few interesting observations could be made if a full comparison between the two originals and Kull.'s 'summary' could be undertaken here. I have, however, to confine myself to merely adding that Kull. clearly amalgamates what his two predecessors have said, and, I think, this is fully justified; but this apart, he also makes their interpretation more explicit, and this he partially achieves by following Gov.'s rather than Medh.'s formulation. Before turning to what matters most, viz. the general character and the 'logical structure of Kull.'s commentary on 6.79 as a whole, a further digression cannot be avoided in that the reference to Badardyana, met with here, too, and in a more ela. borate form at that, needs clarification first. 2.3. To repeat BS 3.3.26: hanau tupayanasabdasesatvat kusacchandastutyupagdnavat tad uktam. This is thus translated by Thibaut: Where the getting rid (of good and evil) is mentioned (the obtaining of this good and evil by others has to be added) because the statement about the obtaining is supplementary to the statement about the getting rid of), as in the case of the kusas, the metres, the praise and the singing. This (i.e. the reason for this) has been stated in the Purva Mimamsa) . This is clearly quite correct a translation as it agrees not only with Sankara's interpretation, but also meets the intention of the Satrakara himself. Now, one cannot fail to observe that the author of this satra does not by any means << quote, here even a single sruti passage as an example, otherwise than Kull. contends (...udahrtya ...); at best he can be said to clearly have in mind passages like the two quoted by Kull. himself on M. 6.79; 51. This - and similar passages of the Manusmrti have also to be taken into account when dealing with the problem of the relation between * Veda and Dharma, which cannot be regarded as definitively solved by J. C. Heesterman (cf. his essay of the same name in The Concept of Duty in South Asia, ed. by W.D. O'Flaherty and J.D. M. Derrett, Delhi, 1978, pp. 80-95). 52. This cannot be said of Buhler, cf. his foot-note, op. cit. (cf. fn. 2). p. 212. Medh.'s Bhasya reads thus (246.16-20) (note that my emendations here and in En. 54 are only sporadic, and I do realize that the texts are still beset with difficulties; but this is, of course, calculated to show the quality of the editions we have so far): pritiparitapaktas cifrasarksobho harsasokddilaksano 'nenopdyena parihartavyah / 'yat kielt priya karoti tant mama sukrasya visisyate (= <Page #12
412 Albrecht Wezler the expressions hani and upayana, at least taken together, indeed seem to indicate that what Badarayana has in view here is Kaus U 1.4 and similar passages where in contradistinction to Kaus U 1.4 only the getting rid of is explicitly mentioned; but Kaus. U 1.4 is actually found quoted along with other relevant Sruti material, only by Sankara in his Bhasya on BS 3.3.26! What Kull. says about the purport of this sutra, viz. that according to it it has to be accepted that [others can] inherit [the effects of good and bad deeds] even when [the sruti itself] explicitly mentions only the abandonment of [the effects of] good and bad deeds>>, on the other hand, fully agrees with the original; for Sankara is evidently right when he paraphrases the first part of the sutra, supplying elements left out in the sutra itself, as follows (804.15): hanau tv ekasyam kevalayam api sruyamanayam upayanam samnipatitum arhati tacchesatvat. In a similar manner, the etc. added by Kull. to his quotation of BS 3.3.26 (... ityadisutrair) is also fully justified; for the subsequent sutra in fact continues the discussion of this topic. But when Kull. in his final remark on M. 7.94 maintains that this matter has been decided definitively by Badarayana>>, one cannot again but help remonstrating that this is at least not done explicity- whereas Sankara in his turn e.g. states (in connection with clarifying that Kaus U. 1.4 is an arthavada meant as a glorification of the Upanisadic vidya) at 805.3-5: ittham mahabhaga vidya yatsamarthyad asya vidusah sukrtaduskrte samsarakaranabhute vidhuyete, te casya suhrddurhrtsu nivisete iti, << glorious indeed is that knowledge through whose power the good and evil deeds, the causes of the samsara, are shaken off by him who knows, and are transferred to his friends and enemies. << 57. Reference is to the NSP-edition, viz.: The Brahmasutra Sankara Bhasya. with the Commentaries Bhamati, Kalpataru and Parimala..., ed.... by MM. Anantakrispa Sastri... Bombay, 1938. 58. Quoted from Thibaut's translation (cf. fn. 55), p. 226. Significantly, the glorificatory function of the so-called updyanavdda is used by Sankara to infer that there is no need to rack one's brain too much about the question how the merit and demerit of one person can be 'inherited by others (805.10 f. vidydstutyarthatvac casyopayanavadasya katham anyadiye sukrtaduskrte anyair upeyete iti nativabhinivestavyam/). To all appearances, S., too, is not in favour of 'merit/demerit transfer'. The warrior taking to flight in fear Of course, Kull.'s commentary on 7.94 has to be read in the light of what he has said on 6.79, especially since he himself refers back to it; but still in view of his expression udahrtya the general impression remains that he not only lets himself be led by Sankara in working out what the Sutrakara aims at, but that he also does not clearly distinguish between the two authors, Badarayana and his most famous commentator, or at least that this distinction is of no importance to him. If this should be true, i.e. if Kull. really sees the Brahmasutra through Sankara's eyes, this observation would deserve some attention with regard to the history of the reception of the latter's Bhasya. But, this is admittedly nothing but an hypothesis, proposed ad hoc, which has still to be verified with the help of the further references to Badarayana in the Manvarthamuktavali of. which there is no shortage ". And to be sure such a study would certainly also contribute to our still rather limited knowledge about the relation between the Dharmasastra and the various philosophical traditions". 413 Nevertheless, the single instance of a reference to the BS which has been examined here is sufficient evidence for the extraordinary significance this text has according to Kull. For fortunately it is precisely this problem on which he explicitly gives his opinion in his commentary on 6.79, viz. in the verse which he adds at the end by way of conclusion and summing up, as it were: vyasavyakhyatavedartham evam asya manusmrteh / manye na kalpitam garvad arvacinair vicaksanaih //. Though this can hardly be styled an unambiguous statement, Kull. apparently means to say, if I am not mistaken, that he is of the opinion that the meaning of the Manusmrti is not different from that of the Veda, i.e. the jnanakanda, as explained by Vyasa, i.e. Badarayana. Most 59. It should, however, be noted that the corresponding entry in the index attached to the NSP-edition of the Manusmrti (ed. by Narayan Ram Acharya Kavyatirtha>>, Bombay 1946), i.e. the Manvarthamuktavalyuddhrtagrantha-granthakrnnamasuci>>, is not complete. 60. Kull. himself gives but little information on it, viz. in arambhasloka 3 of his commentary: mimamse bahu sevitasi suhrdas tarkah samastah stha me vedantah paramatmabodhaguravo yuyam mayopasitah / jata vyakaranani balasakhita yusmabhir abhyarthaye prapto 'yam samayo manuktavivrtau sahdyyam alambyatam //.

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414 Albrecht Wezler probably he does not by this want to contend a total identity of the two works, but rather an essential doctrinal agreement. And in this manner he, no doubt, hopes to support by a general and fundamental conviction his own interpretation of M. 6.79; to say it more precisely, he hopes to vindicate the fact that he has taken. recourse to the Brahmamimamsa argumenti causa, i.e. has cited Badarayana as witness of the view that the good and bad deeds of one person can indeed pass over to somebody else. 2.4. This leads us back to the question of the 'logical' structure of Kull.'s commentary on 6.79, i.e. the succession, interrelation and function of the various arguments brought forward by him: He quotes the two sruti passages evidently in order to show that what is said in 6.79 is in full agreement with certain statements of the Veda. Thereupon he draws upon the Brahmasutra, and this clearly because he deems it necessary to guard his own interpretation of these sruti passages against possible objections by pointing out that it does not differ at all from that given by an authority like Badarayana. The doubt which some people may still entertain as to the possibility of one person inheriting the effects of the good and bad deeds done by somebody else, is then dispelled by him; yet significantly enough not by offering what could be called a true, and perhaps even convincing explanation of this passing over, the procedure, its causes etc.; instead he emphatically conjures up, as it were, the supreme authority in all matter of dharma and adharma, the Veda, and adds the remark, redundant though it is to some extent, that this sastra in fact contains statements to the effect that merit and demerit pass over from one person to another. Not unexpectedly he then winds up this part of the discussion by reminding his opponents, or readers, that an inference contradicting it>>, i.e. the Veda as the foremost means of valid cognition,<< does not operate because it is sublated by the sastra>>, not without adding an illustration which is at once both convincing as well as deterrent. It should be noted here, though in passing only, that Kull.'s statement about the relative force and authority of Veda and inference is similar to the view held by Sankara regarding the relation between reason and revelation 1 of which one can convince The warrior taking to flight in fear 415 oneself by looking into Halbfass's comprehensive and exemplary Studies in Kumarila and Sankara>>; on the other hand, however, it need hardly be mentioned that the rejection of reasoning which is opposed to the Veda is not a specific trait of Sankara's philosophy but is, of course, equally characteristic of the Purvamimamsa 62 To continue with the analysis of Kull.'s comment. He then gives his brief report of the interpretation of his two predeces. sors, but only in order to refute it thereafter uncompromisingly; and it is here that he finally adduces philological arguments in that he puts his finger on the sore point of the supplementations Medh. and Gov. have to make at the cost of the actual wording of the verse. Kull.'s argument hence basically amounts to vigorously pleading for the in fact more natural assumption that M. 6.79 has to be taken as it stands. And thus Kull.'s final argument reminds us of a similar one he brings forward in his commentary on 7.94 which clearly presupposes that on 6.79, examined just now. 3.1. Returning to what Kull. says on M. 7.94 it becomes immediately evident that the structure of the argument is on the whole the same except for the reference to the Vedantasutrakrt which is here placed at the end. However, it should not be overlooked that approximately at the point where one would have expected this reference, Kull. directs his readers' attention to the fact that the question at issue has been discussed by him in his commentary on 6.79. In addition, it has to be taken into account that Kull. concludes the latter comment with the verse vyasavyakhyatavedartham etc., i.e. that he in this case, too, plays the card of Badarayana. Nevertheless, his commentary on 7.94 is arranged in such a manner that it is two guns which are brought by Kull. into position against Medh. and. Gov., viz. a philological (... vyaktam anvarthavarjanat) and another one, religious-cum-philosophical authority, which latter is in its turn based on the (unquestionable) authority of the Veda. One wonders in which relation the two arguments stand to each other or which of them Kull. may 61. Reinbek, 1983, p. 40 et passim. 62. Cf. W. HALBFASS, op. cit., p. 93. As for the differences between Sankara's view and the Mimamsa, see p. 42 ff.

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416 Albrecht Wezler The warrior taking to fight in fear 417 have regarded as the major one. Since we do not yet know enough about the exegetical methods and devices of the Dharmasastra commentators in general and Kull. in particular, it is not possible to offer more than suggestions: By the expression manye (naitad dvayam yuktar) Kull. seems to relativize his own position by characterizing it as a subjective one; but this may well be an erroneous impression, and this also because no expression corre. sponding to it is found in his commentary on 6.79. In all probability what the two arguments amount to is a type of circumstantial evidence: Madh.'s and Gov.'s interpretation is not acceptable because it contradicts a statement of Badarayana's which is in its turn sanctioned by the fruti, and because it is, philologically speaking, forced, i.e. based on unwarranted, or at least quite unnecessary supplements. 4.1. The Western reader will, of course, find the philological argument decidedly more appealing, nay even quite convincing, even though he will not fail to give the reference to the Brahmasutra, and indirectly to Sankara, its due. For there is indeed no indication whatsoever in M. 7.94, or 95, that it is not to be taken in its literal sense. Evidently only a highly biased reader can hit upon the odd idea of abandoning the literal meaning(anvartha. varjana); and, as has been shown, Medh. for one is not only heavily prejudiced, but also expresses his prejudice quite frankly, with the ring of true conviction. This conviction obviously was a widespread one, and that not only in the times of Medhatithi. There is every likelihood that the strictly individualistic karma doctrine forming its core was still the predominant one during Kull.'s own times, or that it was at least still of considerable influence. For nobody taking notice of what Kull. says on M. 7.95, and 6.79, too, and of the manner in which he argues can help gathering the strong impression that he is palpably speaking with strong emphasis: The conclusion suggesting itself is that he was well aware that it would not be easy to gain acceptance for his own interpretation, that special efforts had to be made to overcome the resistance of those who follow Medh. or in any case agree with him in substance. And it is not illegitimate to assume that it is mainly because of this 'opposition' that Kull. resorts to Badarayana and the Veda as a source of help. 4.2. It is highly regrettable that Kull. does not himself disclose his motives for entering the ring in this case and in this manner. For the arguments which he explicitly adduces cannot unfortunately be regarded as illuminating in this regard, though it would certainly be unfair to cast on him the suspicion of being just a know-all or to insinuate that he gainsays only for the sake of gainsaying. Yet, whatever his true motives may have been, this much is, I think, quite clear: it was not (ultimately) historical considerations which made him hit the target: for, that he did hit it, i.e. that he does in fact give a faithful interpretation of M. 7.94 f., cannot be seriously disputed. Considerations of a historical nature are the domain of the Western philologist who will not, however, therefore cease, in the present case, to feel himself in essential agreement with the Indian commentator, cease to have affection for him or even admire him to some extent for having arrived at the correct conclusion albeit probably by insufficient means. For the matter is in fact different from what Medh. takes it to be: Kull.'s interpretation is the only acceptable one precisely because it is, in contradistinction to Medh.'s own, not framed so as to achieve a neat harmony with the strictly individualistic karma theory. In other words: The fact that it is in flagrant contradiction with this theory, nay even seems to clearly defy it, practically furnishes a guarantee for its being correct. The coexistence of divergent or even mutually irreconcilable ideas is a well-known feature of Indian culture, particularly of Hinduism, and attempts of various types to reconcile such differences have been noted and described more than once. There are two explanations which are generally offered in such cases, and both are in principle of equal plausability, viz. that the ideas in question are of different historical origin or that they belong to different 63. Among the pioneers of this field of research it is only G. Mazzarella whom I should like to mention here since he continues to be overlooked inspite of J.D.M. Derrett's noble endeavour to call attention to his work (cf. Juridical Ethnology: the Life and Work of Giuseppe Mazzarella (1868-1958) in Z.V.R., 71/1 (1969), pp. 1-44 [ Essays in Classical and Modern Hindu Law, Vol. II, Leiden, 1977, pp. 424-468]).

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418 Albrecht Wezler groups of people, sections of the population, social strata, etc. Yet, before we can examine which of the two models of explanation applies in the present case, it is necessary to recapitulate what has become clear so far regarding the meaning of M. 7.94 and 95. 4.3. Both verses have to be taken in their literal sense. In this connection it should also be mentioned that Yajn. 1.325 cd " exactly corresponds to M. 7.95 (in that it reads thus: raja sukrtam adatte hatanam vipalayinam //), but that it has apparently never been given the attention the two Manu verses have received: for Visvarupa's remark": yuddhartham hi tatsamgrahad yuktam evaitat, i.e. the fact that he deems it necessary to explicitly declare this statement to be justified, does not seem to be provoked by the questions that gave considerable trouble to Medh. and his colleagues. The parallel from the Yajnavalkyasmrti is interesting from another point of view also, viz. because it lacks a statement corresponding to M. 7.94. However, the main interest lies in the fact that it stands in a different context; for the first half of this Yajn. verse reads thus: padani kratutulyani bhagnesv avinivartinam /, and this is explained by Apararka as follows": nijarajasainikesu satrubhayat palayanaparesu bhagnesu ye na nivartante kim tu satrum pratyabhimukha yanti tesam padani kratubhir yajnais tulyani pade pade yajnaphalam labhanta ity arthah /. That is to say, what Yajn. envisages is the situation of an imminent or actual defeat of an army in battle, and in such a situation the only choice open to a warrior seems to be that between an honourable or a dishonourable death. One need 64. As for further parallel material, cf. P. V. KANE, History of DharmaSastra, Vol. III, Poona, 1973, p. 211 f. and fn, 68a. 65. The Yajnavalkyasmrti with the Commentary Balakrida of Visvarapacarya, ed. by T. Ganapati Sastri, Delhi, 1982, p. 188. 66. Apararkaparabhidhaparadityaviracitatikasameta Yajnavalkyasmrtih.... (ASS 46) 1903-04, p. 582 1. 3-5. 67. It is no surprise that death is considered to be particularly honourable if it is met with in attempting to recover the property of Brahmahas (ApDhS 2.26.2); note that this sutra is quoted (though in a heavily distorted form) in Mitramisra's Viramitrodaya, Rajanitiprakasa, Benares, 1916, p. 407 and Bhatta Laksmidhara's Krtyakalpataru, Rajadharmakanda, Baroda, 1943, The warrior taking to flight in fear not, therefore, in the present case wonder that what is said about the warrior taking to flight is based on the assumption that he is in fact slain and that an escape is almost out of question. It is hence tempting to consider the possibility that this is the original or true context of M. 7.94 and 95, too, i.e. that what is stated in these two verses likewise refers not to a battle in general, but to the particular situation of a lost or almost lost battle when for the warriors who face defeat the chances of survival are but small even if they were to seek refuge in flight", i.e. when the risk to be killed is extremely high. 419 But be that as it may, there can hardly be any doubt that M. 7.94 and 95 take it for granted that a warrior taking to flight is, in most cases at least, slain by the enemy. At any rate their author decided to consider this case alone and to call attention. to it only; and, one cannot help adding, the final aim of what he says is as clear as one could wish (as is indeed also the type of person whom he addresses): He wants to motivate warriors, perhaps even all members of the force", to fight bravely, to rather p. 133 f.; note too that in this sutra death in battle is (still?) considered a yajna, but that the idea is (still?) absent that such death is equivalent to the merit gained by a (certain number of) particular sacrifice(s). 68. As, of course, many nevertheless do, among them e.g. Duryodhana whom Arjuna therefore addresses (Mbh. 4.60.16 ab): vihdya kirtim vipulam yasas ca yuddhat paravrtya palayase kim /. 68a. The fact that besides taking to flight other forms of disloyalty have been taken into account by the authors of Dharmasastra texts is e.g. shown by the Krtyakalpataru (cf. fn. 67), 134 fl. (cf. also Viramitrodaya [cf. fn. 671, p. 407 ff.): In a verse ascribed to Paradara the members of the force are warned not to abandon their svamin in battle when he is patita (the latter expression apparently meaning fallen down [form his chariot or animal used for riding], gone down; cf. Kaut. AS 13.4.52); or a bhrtya who does not accompany his king, set out on an expedition, is said to go to hell in a passage quoted from the Adityapurana. 69. Cf. SS 1.3; the fact that in a passage only ksatriyas or even particular, outstanding members of this varna, are mentioned, should not, of course, lead to the assumption that the persons ultimately intended as those admonished to fight bravely, etc., are only the(se) ksatriyas and not all the members of the force. In this connection it should be noted that already Kautalya (AS 9.2) speaks of various troops, including vaisya and sudra armies which when having great numerical strength are considered by him to be equal to a ksatriya army trained in the art of weapons >>.

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420 Albrecht Wezler die on the field of honour than to even consider the alternative of taking to flight. Rulers, military leaders, etc., of all times and countries obviously can't seem to avoid giving considerable thought to the methods by which they could make their armies as effective in combat as possible and eradicate what they find particularly annoying, viz. lack of courage, taking to flight and desertion. And naturally Mand is no exception to this ", as can be seen e.g. in the Arthasastra" and in the yodhopadesa section of the Nitimayukha". 70. Hopkins, however, maintains that no low man gets a reputation for bravery or even cowardice. He is but a brick in a row (The Social and Military Position of the Ruling Caste in Ancient India as Represented in the Sanskrit Epic in JAOS 73 (1889), p. 185 and 189, fn. 5). 71. Viz. 10.3.27 ff. Cf. also P. V. KANE, History of Dharmasastra. Vol. III, 1973, p. 211 f. The second of the two verses quoted (apiha slokau bhavatah... iti) at 10.3.30-31, viz. navam saravam salilasya purnam susamskrtam darbhakrtottariyam/ tat tasya ma bhan narakam ca gacched yo bhartrpindasya krte na yudhyet II. has provoked quite some discussion as it is also found in the Pratijnayaugandharayana ascribed to Bhasa, viz. at 4.2, and with minor variants only at that (salilaih supurnam and sa (gacched)); cf. N. P. UNNI, New Problems in Bhasa Plays, Trivandrum, 1978, p. 213 ff. I do not want to continue this discussion here, but a few remarks seem relevant. What Kane says (op. cit., loc. cit., fn. 277) about the verse in the play, viz. that there it also appears to be a quotation being introduced with the words srvantu bhavantah is nonsense; for, the prose introduction is quite clearly only meant to attract the attention of those whom Gatrasevaka wants to address at this point. As for the Arthasastra, there is no doubt that the two verses form genuine quotations; but R. P. Kangle's opinion (The Kautilya Arthasastra, Pt. II. Bombay, 1963, p. 509 fn. on paragraph 28) that they are a later addition deserves careful consideration (although one will hesitate to agree with him that AS 10.328 and 329, too, are part of this later addition). Nevertheless, I think H. Scharfe is right in stating (Untersuchungen zur Staatsrechtslehre des Kautalya, Wiesbaden, 1968, p. 4) that one cannot be sure that the play of Bhasa is the source. Further, it should be noted that Kangle's interpretation of navam saravam, etc., viz. (op. cit., loc. cit.) that it clearly refers to the vessel from which libations of water are offered to the deceased, is to be preferred to that given by T. Ganapati Shastri (The Arthasastra of Kautilya with the commentary "Srimala "... repr. with an elaborate Introduction by Dr. N. P. Unni, Delhi-Varanasi, 1984, Vol. III, p. 116), according to whom the verse means: sardvam patravisesah / tad dhy udakapurnam mantrabhimantranasamskarayuktam darbhasamvitam yuddhajayabhyudayakalikam prabhrtam bhartrpindartham ayudhyamanasya labhyam na bhavati, narake ca sa patati..... The warrior taking to flight in fear 421 And one of the methods adopted to keep a warrior from doing what he should not, is to threaten him with punishment; and logic demands that this punishment be such that it really has a preventative effect. It is equally understandable that the punishment is not confined to this world, the remaining span of life; for, in the case of a warrior it is but realistic to extend the threat to the period after death". In fact, M. 7.94 and 95 refer to this period exclusively in so far as they deal with a warrior taking to flight who has been slain by the enemy >> and completely disregard the possibility of a successful though disgra ceful escape " Not correct is also Unni's remark (op. cit., loc. cit) that according to a commentator of the Arthasastra viz. Madhava Yajvan, as one is forced to find out on one's own after no little search the quotation is from the Manuniti through it cannot be traced; for, the passage referred to in the Nayacandrika (Arthasastra of Kautilya. A New Edition by J. Jolly... and R. Schmidt, Vol. III, Lahore, 1924, p. 180) runs thus: manunitav api manugitataya purano 'pity arthah; it is not at all clear to which word or sentence of the mula text this refers and what it is that is predicated as being purana; if in fact it refers to the two verses, or rather the prose sentence preceding them, it could be taken to mean that the idea expressed in these verses is old as it is found in the Manusmrti (not uncommonly called Manuniti in the South) also, and this would then be an implicit reference to Manu 7.88 and 89, on the one hand, and to 7.94 and 95, on the other. Finally, attention may be drawn to an article of V. Raghavan's, viz. Kalidasa and Kautilya in Proceedings of the All India Oriental Conference Nagpur, 1946, pp. 102-108, in which it is rightly pointed out that the verse quoted at AS 10.3.31 helps in reaching a full understanding of Malavikagnimitra 5 11/12 where the king tries to console a parivrdjikd whose brother has been slain in battle by addressing her thus: bhagavati tanubhrtam idrst lokayatra / na socyas tatrabhavan saphalikrtabhartrpindah (... by whom the lump of food received from his master has been made fruitful, i.e. who has in not turning to flight duly paid back what he has received from the king); cf. also the expression niskrtih svamipindasya in the passage from the Adityapurana quoted at Viramitrodaya, Rajanitiprakasa, Benares, 1916, p. 408. 72. Niti Mayakha by Nilkanth Bhatta, ed. by M. G. Bakre and V. R. Lele, Bombay, 1921, p. 100 ff., contained also in the reprint entitled Bhagavantabhaskara, Delhi, 1985, Vol. I. 73. This is richly evidenced by the material drawn upon by P. V. KANE, History of Dharmasastra, Vol. III, Bombay, 1973, p. 211 and the relevant portions of Nibandha texts like e.g. Mitramisra's Viramitrodaya, loc. cit. (cf. fn. 71). 74. Cf. e.g. the passage quoted by E. W. HOPKINS, op. cit. (cf. fn. 70), p. 186.

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Albrecht Wezler The warrior taking to fight in fear 423 The punishment with which he is threatened is according to Manu the evidently irreversible - loss of whatever merit of his good deeds he may have accumulated so far, and this loss is effected by its being taken away by' his master; but the master is not only given this recompense for the detriment he suffers because of the warrior's disloyal act, but he has, at least according to M. 7.94, the additional advantage of getting rid of the effects of his own deeds which pass over to his disloyal servant. The latter is really bad off now: there is nothing left him but dusksta, i.e. a probably considerable quantity of adharma substance, viz. his own plus that of his master passing over to him in its entirety. Significantly enough, in the verses themselves the possibility has not been taken into account that the master or the warrior may lack any suksta or dusksta; for, the probability or rather improbability of such a lack apart, this shows again that all that matters to the author is not to tackle academic questions but - to emphatically impress loyalty upon the warrior (who cannot in fact ever reckon with the possibility that his master is by chance free of any duskyta: and as for his own, he will himself know that the is not by any means 'undefiled' or entirely lacking in merit). The result of this punishment is hence that the master has, at this particular point of time, only sukta whereas his servant carries a more or less heavy burden of duskyta only. Nevertheless, it would not be justified to call this twofold passing over of the effects of deeds an exchange of the corresponding substance: for, the parting of his suksta by the warrior, and even that of his duskita by the master, cannot be said to be a volitional or even conscious act. Even the verb adatte of 7.95 does not necessarily imply that the acquisition concerned is a deliberate, conscious act : it may equally well mean no more than that the master gets this sukyta as the result of a passing over of which he is entirely ignorant, not to speak of having willed it. 4.4. Now it is clear that only a person who - if he does not also himself believe in some kind of afterlife, then at least can be sure that the warriors in their turn believe in it can hope to really threaten them with such a punishment. The question, however, is the precise nature of these ideas about life after death. And it is clearly also connected with that raised above (cf. end 5 4.2) regarding the correct explanation of the coexistence of the two divergent conceptions of karma, e.g. in the times of the various commentators of the Manusmrti. In contradistinction to M. 6.79, the idea expressed in 7.94 and 95 cannot itself be traced back, to all appearances, to Vedic texts. But it does not require hard thinking in order to realize that this idea bears close resemblance to that of M. 6.79, or its Vedic sources, and, to be sure, not only as regards the basic substantialism common to both. For clearly in both cases the effects of good and bad deeds are regarded as a (subtle) substance which can pass over from the person to whom it originally belongs to somebody else. It is, therefore, rather tempting to assume that the idea expressed in M. 7.94 and 95 goes back likewise to the period of the Brahmanas and early Upanisads; and I should like to propose this hypothesis with the important reservation, however, that all I want to say is that the general idea of the effects of one's deeds as something capable of passing over belongs to that period. Now M. 6.79, or rather its Vedic sources - as referred to by Badarayana and quoted by Sankara - are part of a stratum of literature which documents the beginnings of the theory of rebirth, and that of karma closely connected with it. i.e. which belongs to a period when these theories were still far from being generally accepted. Therefore, it is legitimate to see whether the idea expressed in M. 7.94 and 95 could similarly date from the same time, i.e. whether it has anything at all to do with the theory of rebirth. There is only one way to try to answer this question, viz. to test this idea as to whether it presupposes or implies the theory of rebirth. The result cannot but be that neither this idea as such nor by 75. This is why Buhler's rendering of pratipadyate in M. 794 (cf. $ 1) takes upon himself is not acceptable after all. 76. The substantialism, etc., being presupposed by me.

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Albrecht Wezler The warrior taking to fight in fear 425 its efficacy as means of threatening presupposes or implies the theory of rebirth and karmic retribution as connected with it. All it presupposes is, as has already been stated, the belief in an afterlife and, of course, in its being influenced or even entirely framed by the effects of one's own good or bad deeds (including ritual activity), and such an afterlife can be, and was in fact in early Vedic times, conceived of as a single one. On the other hand, it has to be admitted that the idea expressed in M. 7.94 and 95 does not entirely preclude the possibility of being nevertheless based on the theory of rebirth. In any case, and this is of essential importance in this connection, it was open to an interpretation, or re-interpretation, along the lines of this theory, at least in so far as the 'result' is concerned, i.e. the fact of one's having a certain quantity of duskyta or sukta, - not, of course, as regards the manner by which this was 'gained'. But as it is clearly the procedure on which emphasis lies in the two Manu verses, and not so much on consequence(s), it remains difficult to regard the latter interpretation, though theoretically possible, as also probable, and the radical solution chosen by Medh. etc." seems to confirm this doubt. ests itself hence is the assumption that if at all the idea expressed in M. 7.94 and 95 continued to be an effective threat in later times, then this was possible first of all because the group to which it was addressed regarded, or continued to regard, the cffect of good and bad deeds as something which can pass over from one person to another in toto or perhaps also partially, i.e. that this group did not share the view of karma as a strictly individual and unalienable possession, or at least did not regard it as valid in each and every case. In this connection one cannot but recall the particular ksatriya form of faith in life after death, viz. that of going to the indraloka upon falling in battle. Though apparently attested in its elaborate form in the Epics only, clearly this belief has its origin in Vedic ideas about heaven; indeed, it was still a living faith in far later times as can be seen e.g. in the Niti mayakha, and there is no indication whatsoever that it was then taken only metaphorically or allegorically. There is therefore some likelihood that the group of the ksatriyas was markedly 'conservative' also as regards their ideas about the consequences of a disloyal act such as taking to flight in fear, that they kept to their own 'sacred tradition and that this is the reason why we find these ideas stated in M. 7.94 and 95. In passing it may be noted that the relation to the indraloka conception deserves attention for another reason also; for M. 7.94 and 95 seem to answer the question what happens to those who - otherwise than the ideal warrior - are not slain in battle and do not hence go to heaven, but are slain while taking to flight". Perhaps this is also the clue to a full understanding of the fact that the two verses only consider the death of a paravitta, and not his escape 4.5. It remains to be seen whether this ksatriya traditionalism is somehow connected with the old rivalry, or rather antagonism, between the warriors and the Brahmins. The difficulties one is confronted with in gaining a clearer understanding, historically or otherwise, are considerable at this point, and this is partially so because there is a gap in our knowledge; for the fact is that, as far as I can see, not much research has been done as to the general problem of the most probably various and complex) reasons which led an Indian group to stick to a particular 'old' idea although the idea has elsewhere and even generally become obsolete, i.e. has been virtually superseded by a 'new' one. There fore all I can offer in the present essay are a few suggestions which may prove useful to further research on this problem. If my proposal is accepted that the idea expressed in M. 7.94 and 95 is originally of ksatriya provenience and continued to appeal 79. Loc. cit. (cf. fn. 72); see also KANE, op. cit., loc. cit. (cf. fn. 73). 80. On this ksatriya ideal see e.g. HOPKINS, op. cit. (cffr. 70), p. 186 ft., K. V. Rangaswami Alyangar's 'Introduction p. 73 t. to his edition of the Krtyakalpataru, Vol. XI: Rajadharmakanda, Baroda, 1943 and P.V. KANE op. cit. (cf. fn. 73), P. 57 f. 81. According to some sources (cf. e.g. P.V. KANE, op. cit., p. 211 and cf. also fn. 68a) they go to hell, and this it is which M. 7.94 and 95 also ultimately amount to in all probability, 82. It is of some consequence also for the question (discussed in $1.4) as to what is the grammatical subject of M. 7.94 and 95. T1. Not to forget Sankara's apparent uneasiness, on which see fn. 58 78. A particularly well-known piece of evidence for this idea is Nalopakhyana 2.15 t. (=Mbh. 3.51.15 f.).

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426 Albrecht Wezler to warriors in particular, it becomes possible to frame another hypothesis, viz. that it is because of its 'class character' that this idea is not attested in texts older than the Manusmrti: It belonged to a social stratum other than that which has almost exclusively produced and transmitted the older literature. And the two models of explanation for the coexistence of divergent, or even mutually exclusive ideas (cf. the end of SS 4.2) can be combined. The idea expressed in M. 7.94 and 95 is older than the strictly individualistic karma theory, but it also belonged to a particular group of people, and this fact is responsible for its comparatively late, and sporadic, presence in brahmanical literature. The idea expressed in the two verses is not only clear-cut and catchy, but also rather simple: To cheat one's <Page #20
428 Albrecht Wezler The warrior taking to fight in fear lated by the Brahmanas, but rather the idea, still more central to the Indian conception of kingship that (as Manu says at 8.304) Page #21
430 Albrecht Wezler The warrior taking to flight in fear 431 what goes on ... is rather different * .... The donor is ... understood to be giving the gods his merit as a quid pro quo, as if he were buying their protection for cash; for he adds that what I have just called 'the popular understanding' is actually not explicit: When questioned people either confess ignorance or give the ortho dox explanation. The view of merit as spiritual cash is affective belief only... And it is also true that Gombrich explicitly states that the only sense in which it is accurate to describe these beliefs and practices as 'popular' is the everyday one of *widely liked' or 'prevalent'. But if so used 'popular' no longer distinguishes merit transference from, say, the Four Noble Truths or alms-giving But it is he, too, who most convincingly points to the > as forming the psychological starting point and basis of this practice; who explains the doctrine of merit transference as an ingenious legitimation of the practices of those people (i.e. everybody, or nearly everybody) who could not accept a particular consequence of the intentionality doctrine, namely that they could do nothing for their dead relatives ; and who thereby implicitly emphasizes that what he calls the << reified concept of merit is a wide-spread and deep-rooted albeit unconscious or unreflected mode of thought of common people in Sri Lanka. 5. This leads us now to the final problem to which I should like to call attention in the present essay. A considerable part of the studies on the transfer/transference of merit - also called << merit transfer/transference - (referred to in the introduction [cf. 0])is devoted to materials from Buddhist texts, and the discussion alluded to by me centres by and large on the problem of the correct interpretation of relevant passages in Pali sources in terms of the history of ideas: Quite a number of these passages are con * troversial, and taken together they raise the important question whether they testify, as Bechert thinks", to semi-mahayanistic tendencies in Theravada Buddhism or not. Much of the subject matter of this discussion does not have a direct bearing on the analysis of M. 7.94 and 95; nevertheless it is noteworthy because it clearly shows that O'Flaherty's contrasting of the << very materialistic >> karma transfer in Hinduism with the spiritualized one of Buddhism is a hazardous simplification; for there are quite evidently common traits in both, and they are of such a nature that it is highly questionable if the category of an influence exercised by one on the other, and vice versa, is at all applicable. i.e. if the similarities observed are not more plausibly explained by assuming that both the religions are to some extent fed by, or at least not completely insulated against, the ground-water of popular ideas about the effects of deeds and their not being inseparably connected with their rightful owner Yet, I find these studies still more instructive as regards the term 'transfer of merit' itself: The use of this term, I feel, should strictly be confined to the idea of an intentional act by which one's own merit is really transferred to another person for the sake of his well-being or even salvation. To use it inflationarily as a ready-made label for each and every phenomenon, however faintly similar to it, does not by any means contribute to sharpening our eye and deepening our understanding of the individual ideas, their cultural context and historical setting. But I do not want to enter here into a detailed critical discussion with contemporary scholars: instead let me conclude by adding that already Luders seems to have used the term << Uber 96. The emphasis is mine. 97. Loc. cit. (fn. 94 a)), p. 216. 98. Loc. cit. (in. 94 a)), p. 206. 99. Op. cit. (In. 94 b)), p. 319; the subsequent quotation is found ibid., 101. Cr. his essay Buddha Feld und Verdienstubertragung: Mahdydna Ideen im Theravdda-Buddhismus Ceylons in Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres et des Sciences Morales et Politiques, S. serie, tome LXII (1976), pp. 27-51. 102. See her "Introduction" (p. XIX) to the book edited by her: Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions, Berkeley.Los Angeles-London, 1980. 103. As to how Buddhist thought came to terms with such ideas and where it was unable to accept them, cf. first of all L. Schmithausen's article Critical Resportse in Karma & Rebirth. Post Classical Developments, ed. by Ronald W. Neufeldt, New York, 1986, pp. 203-230, particularly p. 211 ff. 104. Varunta. Aus dem Nachlass hrsg. v. L Alsdorf, Bd. II, Gottingen, 1959, p. 657. p. 323. 100. Op. cit. (fn. 94 b)). p. 251.

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432 Albrecht Wezler tragung (der guten Werke) >> in a manner which does not bear closer scrutiny; for, the verb used in the crucial passage (AiB 8.15) is vrj A., and one has, of course, clearly to distinguish between the two following actions: On the one hand that the king in taking an oath at the mahabhiseka declares his assent to the priest's << turning towards himself >> his (i.e. the king's) own good deeds (in the case of his cheating the priest out of his daksina), on the other that a person with a view to helping somebody else (deliberately) transfers the effects of his good deeds to him. But apart from this inexactitude, Luders's observations on the Indian oath are highly interesting if connected with the two Manu verses discussed here: For in (Epic) formulas of oaths the evil one wishes others above all is << not to partake of the world of the fathers >> or << to be deprived of the merit obtained by sacrifices and good deeds a 105, i.e. one wishes that one's enemies do not attain heaven 106, and this together with M. 7.94 and 95 warrants the conclusion that the idea of the passing over of suksta and particularly of duskyta is, if not necessarily then at least often, connected with that of punishment if the offence committed consists in some form of untruth and if, at the same time, the culprit cannot be prosecuted because it is he who in reality has the political power (like the king of the AiB passage) or because he (like the paravstta of the two Manu verses) has already been slain by the enemy: Obviously the punishment with which one tries to threaten becomes the more severe and the more 'metaphysical' the greater the feeling of helplessness is as regards one's own capacity of calling the offender to account! And, to be sure, not to fight for the benefit of one's master, but to take instead to flight has in fact been considered by the Indians to be a breach of contract and thus ultimately an infringement of truth. 105. Quoted from LUDERS, op. cit., p. 656. 106. Cf. fn. 81.