Dignaga On Trairupya Reconsidered

SR No.: 269439
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Shoryu Katsura
Publisher: Shoryu Katsura
Total Pages: 26
Language: English
Classification: Article
File Size: 2 MB

Page 5

Dignāga on trairūpya Reconsidered: A Reply to Prof. Oetke
245
inference), we also establish in a general manner [its) presence either in all or some members of the class similar to it (i.e., the object of inference).
[Question:) Why is it so (i.e., a valid inferential mark is present in all or in some members of the class, not in all members of the class)?
[Answer:) Because we restrict (nges par gzung baravadhāraņa) [the second characteristic] in the way that it is present only in what is similar to it (i.e., the object of inference) (de dang mtshungs pa kho na la yod pa=tattulya eva sadbhāvah), not in the way that it is necessarily present in what is similar to the object of inference (yod pa kho na=<tattulye) sadbhāva eva)].
[Objection:) If so, it will be useless to state (the third characteristic, i.e.,] absence in the absence [of the property to be inferred and / or of what is similar to the object of inference] (nāstităsati).
[Answer:] It is [stated) in order to determine / restrict that [the inferential mark is) absent in the absence [of the property to be inferred and / or of what is similar to the object of inference), not in what is other than or incompatible with (what is similar to the object of inference).
Thus we understand the marked (lingin, i.e., the property to be inferred) through the inferential mark (linga) which possesses the three characteris
tics.”
1.4. Comment
Throughout Dignāga's works this is the only place where he discusses the theory of trairūpya at length. This seems to indicate that the theory had been well established at least among Buddhist logicians before the time of Dignāga, as I demonstrated in my 1985 paper, and that he did not feel it necessary to elaborate upon it. As a matter of fact in NMukh Dignāga did not even formulate the trairūpya in one place, though it is certain that he knew and presupposed such a theory. I would like to point to the following two passages in NMukh: .
NMukh (Taisho p. 3a):
AFTERBEN