Dignaga On Trairupya Reconsidered

Author(s): Shoryu Katsura
Publisher: Shoryu Katsura
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269439/1

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Dignaga on trairupya Reconsidered: A Reply to Prof. Oetke Shoryu KATSURA 0. Introduction It is most likely that Dignaga was the first Indian logician to employ two new terms, viz. 'inference for oneself' (svarthanumana) and 'inference for others' (pararthanumana). The former stands for inference (anumana) as a means of valid knowledge (pramana) in the Indian epistemological tradition, while the latter corresponds to proof (sadhana) in the Indian debate (vada) tradition. As a matter of fact, in his earlier work on logic, the Nyayamukha (=NMukh), Dignaga still uses the terms 'anumana' (HI) and 'sadhana' ( *), respectively. By renaming the proof and identifying it as a type of inference in the Pramanasamuccaya (=PS), he succeeded in integrating the two different traditions of Indian logic into his new system of epistemological logic. Dignaga defines svarthanumana as "knowledge of an object / a state of affairs (artha) through a valid inferential mark (linga) which possesses three characteristics (trirupa)" (PS II. 1ab: anumanam dvidha; svartham trirupal lingato 'rthadrk ). He defines pararthanumana as "revealing / communicating an object / a state of affairs which has been known for oneself" (PS III. 1ab: parartham anumanam tu svadrstarthaprakasanam /). It is clear that svarthanumana represents a mental process of inferring, which is a private experience of a cognizer, while pararthanu mana is a public act of communicating what he has experienced." Now what are the three characterisitics of a valid inferential mark? There have been many attempts to explain it systematically. In 1994 Claus

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242 Oetke published Studies on the Doctrine of Trairupya (Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde Heft 33, Wien) in which he criticized some of the previous studies, including my own Dignaga on Trairupya". Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, Vol. XXXII, No. 1, 1983), and proposed his new systematic interpretations. I am yet to digest all the implications of Oetke's rather difficult interpretations and far from giving the final opinion on them. However, I feel obliged to answer his criticisms and present my own understanding of the trairupya again. It is to be noted at the outset that my article mentioned above was written in order to show some possible improvements upon previous translations of PS-Vrtti II. Sed, namely, the Japanese version by Hidenori Kitagawa (Indo Koten Ronrigaku no Kenkyu, Tokyo, 1965, pp. 96-100) and the English rendering by Richard Hayes ("Dinnaga's Views on Reasoning (svarthanumana)," Journal of Indian Philosophy 8, 1980, pp. 252-253). The main point of my criticism against Kitagawa's translation is that we should read the restrictive particle eva into both the second and the third characteristics of the trairupya. I also wanted to correct the imprecise renderings of the Tibetan phrase nges par gzung ba; namely, ''(what is to be determined) by Kitagawa and 'requirement' by Hayes. The most likely candidate for its Sanskrit original is avadharana which means 'restriction' and which is the function assigned to the particle eva in Indian Grammatical tradition. When Hayes published Dignaga on the Interpretation of Signs (Studies of Classical India, Vol. 9, Dordecht/ Boston / London 1987), he seems to have adopted some of my suggestions. Apart from my 1983 paper, I have discussed the trairupya on at least two other occassions, namely, "On Trairupya Formulae," (Buddhism and Its Relation to Other Religions, Kyoto 1985), and "Ronri gakuha" (The school of Buddhist Logic), (Iwanami Koza Toyoshiso Vol. 8, Tokyo 1988). In the latter paper I fully discussed the development of the trairupya formulae in some basic texts of Indian or Buddhist logic, but the paper seems to have evaded the attention of Prof. Oetke.

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Dignaga on trairupya Reconsidered: A Reply to Prof. Oetke 243 The controversy between Oetke and me lies in the question whether Dignaga intended to insert the particle eva in the formula of the second characteristic (or 'condition' in Oetke's terminology) or not, the solution of which depends on how we should read PS II. 5cd and its Svavrtti. Therefore, I would like to give the two Tibetan versions of the above texts as well as a new literal translation of my own. 1. PS II. 5cd & Svavrtti 1.1. Kanakavarman's version (Kitagawa pp. 455b-456b) (Peking 111a6-111b1) tshul gsum rtags las zhes gang bstan pa de bshad par bya ste / rjes d pag bya dang de mtshungs la yod dang med la med pa'o // (PS II 5cd) rjes su dpag pa ni cho khyad par can gyi chos can yin te / (a7) de la dus phyis chos kyi spyi'i tshul gyis mngon sum nam rjes su dpag pas mthong ba'o // de'i rigs la yang mtha' dag gam phyogs cig yod pa nyid do / de gang las zhe na / de dang mtshungs pa kho na la yod (a8) pa zhes nges par gzung ba'i phyir yin gyi yod pa kho na zhes ni ma yin no / de ltar na med pa lam (Read la) med do zhes brjod pas mi bya'o zhe na / 'di ni med pa nyid la med pa yin gyi / gzhan pa la'ang ma yin 'gal ba la (111 b1) ma yin no zhes nges pa'i don du 'gyur ro) 'dir tshul gsum pa'i rtags gang las rtags can rtogs pa yin no 1.2. Vasudhararaksita's version (Kitagawa pp. 455a-456a) (Derge 29a4-7=Peking 30a1-5) tshul gsum pa'i rtags zhes gang brjod pa de brjod par bya ste / rjes {P: su} dpag bya dang de mthun la // yod dang med nyid la med pa'o // (PS II. 5cd) rjes su dpag par bya ba ni chos kyi {P: kyis) khyad par du byas pa'i chos can no //

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244 {30a2) de la mngon sum mam rjes su dpag pas mthong gi {P: gis} rjes la de'i rigs dang mthun (D29a5) pa la yang spyi'i tshul gyis phyogs thams cad dam phyogs gcig la yod par grub pa'o | ci'i phyir zhe na de dang mthun pa kho na la yod {P30a3} ces nges par gzung ba'i phyir ro / de dang mthun pa la yod pa kho na'o zhes ni brjod par mi bya ba'i phyir ro || med pa nyid las med pa zhes pas ni slar yang (D29a6) de nyid nges par bya ba'i don du ste / med pa nyid la med pa nyid yin gyi (P30a4} gzhan la yang ma yin la 'gal ba la yang ma yin no zhes pa'i don no {P: to} // bsgrub par bya ba'i rigs dang mthun pa la yod pa dang med pa la med pa nyid do zhes bya ba de dag gis ni gang tshul gsum pa'i rtags las rtags can (D29a7= P30a5) rtogs so zhes bstan pa yin no As Richard Hayes has done in his 1980 paper, I shall translate Kanakavarman's version except for the underlined portion where I followed Vasudhararaksita's because the latter version definitely gives the better reading. The Sanksrit fragments will be supplied in parentheses wherever they are available. 1.3. Translation: "The phrase 'trirupal lingatah' [in PS II. 1] should be explained. PS II. 5cd: [The three characteristics of a valid inferential mark (linga) consist in its] presence in the object to be inferred (anumeya) as well as in what is similar to it (tattulya), and absence in the absence (of the property to be inferred (anumeya) and / or of what is similar to the object to be inferred (tattulya)). (anumeye 'tha tattulye sadbhavo nastitasati)" The object to be inferred is a property-possessor / locus (dharmin) qualified by a propety (which one wishes to know). (dharmavisisto dharmy anumeyah)" After having known, either by perception or by inference, [the presence of an inferential mark] there (i.e., in the object to be inferred=the object of

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Dignaga on trairupya Reconsidered: A Reply to Prof. Oetke 245 inference), we also establish in a general manner [its) presence either in all or some members of the class similar to it (i.e., the object of inference). [Question:) Why is it so (i.e., a valid inferential mark is present in all or in some members of the class, not in all members of the class)? [Answer:) Because we restrict (nges par gzung baravadharana) [the second characteristic] in the way that it is present only in what is similar to it (i.e., the object of inference) (de dang mtshungs pa kho na la yod pa=tattulya eva sadbhavah), not in the way that it is necessarily present in what is similar to the object of inference (yod pa kho na=Page #6
246 Cf. PS-Vrtti [Kanakavarman] 150b8: phyogs kyi chos nyid (=*paksadharmatva) bstan pa'i don du gtan tshigs brjod pa / NMukh (Tasiho p. 2c): 5 f Cf. PS-Vrtti [Kanakavarman] 148b4: de Ita na gtan tshigs mthun pa'i phyogs nyid la yod pa (*sapaksa eva sattvam) dang bsgrub bya med pa la med pa nyid (*sadhyabhave 'sattvam eva) bstan par rus pa yin ../ It is to be noted that there existed several different versions of the trairupya formulae before Dignaga, as I showed in my 1985 paper. The most. standard version seems to be (1) paksadharmatva, (2) sapakse sattvam, and (3) vipakse 'sattvam. The above passages, however, clearly indicate that Dignaga intended to insert the restrictive particle eva in the formulae of the second and the third characteristics. Oetke's Objections 2.1. Objection 1: the meaning of the phrase nges par gzung ba Oetke (p. 58) says: First of all, it is not even certain that the expression nes par gzun ba has the meaning of "must restrict", as assumed by Katsura. It is equally well possible that it represents a Sanskrit expression that means "(must be) recognized with certainty" or "(must be) ascertained" so that the whole sentence could possess the following literal sense: "It is [so] because it must be ascertained / one must ascertain that it (the logical reason) exists only in what is similar to it, but it is not the case that it exists only (i.e. exists without exception) [in this realm]." It is very easy to show that the expression nges par gzung ba is Tibetan equivalent of the Sanskrit avadharana (or niyama) which has the meaning of 'restriction'. In commenting upon the Nyayabindu II. 6: sapaksa eva sattvam Dharmottara states the reason why the second characteristic of a valid

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Dignaga on trairupya Reconsidered: A Reply to Prof. Oetke 247 inferential mark (!) is restricted (avadharana) by the particle eva in that particular manner. sattvagrahanat purvavadharanavacanena sapaksavyapisattakasyapi prayatnanantariyakasya hetutvam kathitam / pascadavadharane tv ayam arthah syat / sapakse sattvam eva yasya sa hetur iti prayatnanantariyakatvam na hetuh syat / (Bibliotheca Buddhica VII, p. 19) It is put into the following Tibetan sentences: yod pa smos pa las sngar nges par gzung ba smos pa ni yod pa yin yang mthun pa'i phyogs la ma khyab pa rtsol ba las byung ba dag kyang gtan tshigs nyid du bstan pa yin no / phyis nges pas (sic!) gzung ba byas na ni don 'dir 'gyur te / gang zhig mthun pa'i phyogs la yod pa nyid de gtan tshigs yin no zhes bya bar 'gyur bas / rtsol ba las byung ba nyid gtan tshigs ma yin par 'gyur ro (Bibliotheca Buddhica VIII, p. 43) Thus, it is quite certain that the expression nges par gzung ba means 'restriction.' Consequently we cannot deny the fact that Dignaga intended to read the restrictive particle eva in the second characteristic of a valid inferential mark. And he was well aware of its implication, namely, the redundancy of the third characteristic. Incidentally, Oetke's rendering of the same expression '(must be) recognized with certainty' or '(must be) ascertained' seems to correspond to Sanskrit niscita which was added by Dharmakirti to each characteristic of a valid inferential mark (See e.g. Nyayabindu II. 7) but which is missing from Dignaga's formulae. Oetke (p. 58) further says: "But it is not even necesary to insist that the expression nes par gzun ba has another sense than the one asumed by Kat ura." He argues that the object of the restriction could be "the logical reason" or "the canon of Trairupya," instead of "the second characteristic" as I assume. However, as the above-quoted passage of the Nyayabindu and many other similar texts support, the context of the argument in PS-Vstti II. 5cd forces us to regard "the second characteristic" as the object of the restric

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248 tion. 2. 2. Objection 2: the purpose of insertion of the particle eva Oetke (p. 59) says: A natural assumption would be that the second and the third condition together guarantee that the logical reason occurs in at least one similar instance apart from the paksa and only there, i.e. never in the vipaksadomain. Furthermore he considers that the formulae of the trairupya presented in PS 5cd: anumeye 'tha tattulye sadbhavo nastita 'sati, namely, those without the particle eva, properly represent the above assumption. According to him it is awkward that Dignaga inserts the particle eva in the second condition, which leads to the redundancy of the third condition--the difficulty to be solved by Dignaga himself. Then Oetke goes on to investigate the possible purposes of Dignaga's insertion of the particle eva. In this connection I would like to give my own understanding of the trairupya fosmulae with and without eva. 2.2.1. The trairupya formulae without eva PS II. 5cd can be re-formulated into the following three formulae: (1) anumeye [lingasya] sadbhavah / (2) tattulye [lingasya] sadbhavah / (3) asati (lingasya] nastita / The first formula is traditionally called paksadharmatva" and the second and the third formula are later called anvaya and vyatireka respectively.) Although Dignaga does not apply the names anvaya and vyatireka in this context, he uses them in order to explain how a word (sabda) expresses its meaning in PS-Vstti Chapter V.

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Dignaga on trairupya Reconsidered: A Reply to Prof. Oetke 249 PS-Vitti ad PS V. 34: sabdasyanvayavyatirekav arthabhidhane dvaram, tau ca tulyatulyayor vrttyavrtti / "Association / continued presence (anvaya) and dissociation / continued absence (vyatireka) are the two ways that a word expresses its object / meaning. They consist respectively in applying to what is similar (tulye vsttih) and in not applying to what is dissimilar (atulye 'urttih)."9) For instance, the word 'cow' is applied to those animals which resemble each other in sharing some common features, viz. a dewlap and others, but it is not applied to those which do not share such features. In the above passage anvaya and vyatireka are formulated in the following manner: (4) anvaya=tulye (sabdasya] vittih / (5) vyatireka=atulye [sabdasya] avrttih / If we compare them with the above formulae (2) (3), we cannot but see a close resemblance in their formulations. Thus it is safe to assume that the second and the third characteristics of a valid inferential mark can be named anvaya and vyatireka respectively. As a matter of fact it is not too difficult to see the reason behind such a correspondence, if we take into consideration Dignaga's fundamental doctrine that a verbal cognition (sabda, discussed in PS V) is only a kind of inference (anumana discussed in PS II) and that a word (sabda) functions exactly in the same way as an inferential mark (linga), namely, by means of 'exclusion of others' (anyapoha / anyavyavstti / anyavyavccheda), in the realm of universals. Now what are the roles of anvaya and vyatireka? Here I would like to refer to Geroge Cardona's thoery expressed in his article "On Reasoning from Anvaya and Vyatireka in Early Advaita."10) Indian thinkers have used a mode of reasoning that involves the related presence (anvaya 'continued presence ') and absence (vyatireka) of entities as follows: (1) a. When X occurs, Y occurs.

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250 b. When X is absent, Y is absent. (2) a. When X occurs, Y is absent. b. When X is absent, Y occurs. If (1a, b) hold in all instances for X and Y, so that these are shown consistently to occur together, one is entitled to say that a particular relation obtains between the two. Either (1a) or (1b) alone will not justify this, and a claim made on the basis of either can be falsified by showing that (2a) or (2b) holds. One relation that can be established by (1) is that X is a cause of Y. A special instance of the cause-effect relation involves the use of given speech units and the understanding by a hearer of given meanings. If (1a, b) hold, the speech unit in question is considered the cause of one's comprehending a meaning, which is attributed to that speech element. Cardona named anvaya and vyatireka the 'Indian Principle of Inductive Reasoning' and considered them to be the means for discovering a certain relationship between two items, such as a causal relation between a fire and smoke and a relation between a word and its meaning. In the case of the trairupya theory, anvaya and vyatireka establish the relation between sadhya and sadhana / lingin and linga / gamya and gamaka; in short, anvaya and uyatireka together are a kind of the inductive method by which we can determine what is a valid inferential mark. In other words, the second and the third characteristics without the particle eva express the necessary conditions for a valid inferential mark. 2. 2. 2. The trairupya formulae with eva and the meaning of the eva restriction In PS-Vstti II. 5cd, as I have shown above, Dignaga inserts the restrictive particle eva at least in the second characteristic of a valid inferential mark in the following manner: (6) tattulye eva [lingasya] sadbhavah /

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Dignaga on trairupya Reconsidered: A Reply to Prof. Oetke 251 In this connection I would like to explain what is the meaning of the 'evarestriction'. Here is an often-quoted paribhasa (No. 131) attributed to a Grammarian Vyadi: yata eva-karas tato'nyatravadharanam (Paribhasasamgraha ed. by Abhyankar, Poona, 1967, p. 43) "When the restrictive particle 'eva' is attached to the word X, the other word Y is restricted." In a sentence {X eva Y} or "vrksa eva simsapa" (simsapa is a tree), the domain of Y is restricted by the domain of X and the domain of simsapas is restricted by the domain of trees. The terms 'avadharana' or 'niyama' express such a restrictive function of the particle eva. X and Y are called 'niyamaka' and 'niyamya' respectively.") If we graphically represent the relation between niyamya (Y) and niyamaka (X), it can be presented in the following two circles: X=niyamaka Y=niyamya The same relationship can be called 'vyapti' (pervasion); namely, the domain of Y is pervaded by that of X when Y is vyapya (the pervaded) and X is vyapaka (the pervader). As a matter of fact, the Nyayakosa, compiled by Jhalakikar and revised by Abhyankar (Poona, 1978), gives vyapti as the first meaning of niyama' and Narayana (ca. 1560-1656) presents 'niyama' as one of the synonyms of 'vyapti' in his Manameyodaya (ed. and tr. by Kunhan Raja and Suryanarayana Sastri, Madras, 1933, p. 50), other synonyms being 'pratibandha', 'avyabhicara', and 'avinabhava'. Dignaga refers to the notion of restriction again in PS II. 21:

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252 linge lingi bhavaty eva linginy evetarat punah / niyamasya viparyase 'sambandho lingalinginoh "The marked (lingin) necessarily (eva) occurs where the inferential mark (linga) occurs, and the latter (i.e. the mark) occurs only (eva) where the marked occurs. If the restriction (niyama) [by the particle eva] is reversed, there is no [proper] relation (sambandha) between the mark and the marked." In the above verse the term lingin is followed by the particle eva in relation to the term linga; therefore, the domain of the marked is restricted (niyata) by that of the mark. Such a relation is regarded by Dignaga as the proper relation (sambandha) between the mark and the marked. Although he does not mention the term vyapti as an equivalent of sambandha in this context (he refers to it in PS-Vrtti IV. 4), I understand that PS II. 21 is the first attempt to define the relation of 'pervasion' in the history of Indian It may be supported by the fact that Dharmakirti phrases his definition of pervasion, following the model presented in PS II. 21. vyaptir vyapakasya tatra bhava eva vyapyasya va tatraiva bhavah | (Pramanavarttika-Svavrtti, ed. by R. Gnoli, Serie Orientale Roma 23, Rome 1960, p. 2) "Pervasion is the pervader (vyapaka)'s necessary (eva) presence in the domain [where the pervaded (vyapya) occurs] or the pervaded's presence only (eva) in the domain [where the pervader occurs]." As I demonstrated in detail in my article "Indo Ronrigaku niokeru Henjugainen no Seisei to Hatten" (The Origin and Development of the Concept of vyapti in Indian Logic, Hiroshima Daigaku Bungakubu Kiyo, Vol. 46, Special Issue No. 1, 1986), it was Dignaga who first introduced the concept of vyapti as the foundation of a valid inference. He was well acquainted with the Indian Grammartical tradition and applied their concept of niyama as the forerunning model of the logical concept vyapti.

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Dignaga on trairupya Reconsidered: A Reply to Prof. Oetke 253 Thus I would like to conclude that Dignaga's purpose of inserting the particle eva in the second characterisitic is to restrict the domain of an inferential mark by that of what is similar to the object of inference (tattulya), which, I believe, gave the way to the formation of the theory of pervasion in Dignaga's logic. In any case, the second characteristic with the evarestriction expresses not the necessary but the sufficient condition for a valid inferential mark; hence, Dignaga felt it unavoidable to explain the necessity of the formulation of the third characteristic. I hope that the foregoing argument makes it clear why I referred to PS II. 21 in my 1983 paper, which has been questioned by Oetke (p. 70). 2.3. Objection 3: translation of the word 'asati' in the third char acteristic Oetke (p. 65) says: Despite the fact that the interpretation of nastitasati in the sense of "absence in what is not similar to it" is linguistically a very natural, perhaps even the most natural one in the given context it should be given up because of the undesirable objective consequences it involves. Thus the expression asati should not be taken as representing a participle of the copula 'to be', but as a negated present participle of the verb 'to be' ='to exist'. Here Oetke is quite right in pointing out my misunderstanding of the expression asati. I simply followed Kitagawa's Japanese translation (p. 96): [ATIC] #3 DICITFLON EVL 53] (absence in what is not (tattulya)), though Hayes (1980: p. 252) correctly translated: "absent in their absence". In my new translation I accepted Oetke's criticism and adopted the meaning of 'in the absence' for asati. Now the question is what is the logical subject of 'absence' in the third characteristic. Hayes seems to take it to be both anumeya and tattulya mentioned in the first and the second characteristics, which is perhaps the most

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254 natural reading, if we expect vipaksa in the third characteristic and if we can identify anumeya and tattulya with paksa and sapaksa, for the universe of discourse in Dignaga's logic is divided into three parts, namely, paksa, sapaksa and vipaksa. Oetke, on the other hand, seems to opt for anumeya as the logical subject of the phrase asati and says (p. 65): Perhaps ... the author of the PS invited the reader to take the word anumeya in two different senses for the interpretation of the verse, first in the sense of 'substratum of the property to be proven' at the beginning of the karika and later in the sense of 'property to be proven' for the supplementation of the logical subject of the existence-predicate represented by asati. Now I would like to support the above interpretation of Oetke as one of the possible meanings of the third characteristic. But his second alternative, to take anumeya (in the first characteristic) in the sense of 'property to be proven', is contradicted by Dignaga's own comment, viz. dharmavisisto dharmy anumeyah. First I would like to show that Dignaga possibly assigned not two but three meanings to the word anumeya. 2. 3. 1. The meaning of the term anumeya When we read Dignaga's texts on logic, we must be careful to distinguish different meanings attributed to the same technical term and to identify different terms which are meant to express the same or similar logical concepts. For example, in NMukh (Taisho p. 1b) Dignaga attributes three distinct meanings to the word paksa ), namely, (1) a proposition consisting of the topic / property-possessor dharmin ( ) and the property to be proven dharma (PS) (e.g. "The mountain possesses a fire"), (2) the property-possessor as the topic of the proposition (e.g. the mountain), and (3) the property to be proven (e.g. a fire).

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Dignaga on trairupya Reconsidered: A Reply to Prof. Oetke Qi Bu Sui Yi Le Suo Cheng Li He Shuo Wei Zong ,Yun He Ci Zhong Nai Yan Zong Zhe Wei Qu You Fa . Ci Wu You Shi . Yi Qi Zong Sheng Yu Bie Yi Zhuan ,Ru Yan Shao Yi . Huo You Zong Sheng Wei Quan Yu Fa . [Objection:] Haven't you in a general manner (in the first karika] called by the name 'paksa' the synthesized [proposition consisting of dharmin and dharma] which somebody wants to prove? Why in this [second karika] do you apply [the same term] 'paksa' only to dharmin (i.e. the topic of the proposition)? [Answer:] There is no such a defect because the word for an aggregate can be employed to express its constituent as well; e.g., the expression 'burned robe' [can be employed even when only a part of the robe is burned]. Furthermore, sometimes the word paksa can be employed only to express [the other constituent of the proposition,] dharma (i.e., the property to be proven). 255 14) In the first karkika of NMukh Dignaga defines 'proposition' (paksa) and in the second karika he enumerates nine possible cases for a reason (hetu) which is defined as a property of paksa (paksadharma).1 In the second karika the word paksa is used in the sense of the topic of the proposition. Dignaga justifies this move by referring to the general principle in Sanskrit semantics that the word for an aggregate (samudaya-sabda) can be metaphorically employed to express its parts (avayava). Consequently, the word paksa can be employed in the three different meanings. In PS III. 10 Dingaga says the exactly same thing about the word sadhya: samudayarthasadhyatvad dharmamatre 'tha dharmini/ amukhye 'py ekadesatvat sadhyatvam upacaryate "Since [the word] sadhya has the meaning of an aggregate (samudaya) [i.e., a proposition consisting of dharmin and dharma], both a simple dharma as well as dharmin, though not the direct meaning [of the word sadhya], can be metaphorically called 'sadhya', because they are parts [of the proposition]."

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256 The word sadhya, which literally means that which is to be proven', too can be employed in three meanings, viz., (1) a proposition to be proven consisting of dharmin and dharma, (2) the property-possesor (sadhya-dharmin) as the topic of the proposition, and (3) the propety to be proven (sadhyadharma). Thus we can conclude that both paksa in NMukh and sadhya in PS III have the same range of meanings and, consequently, they refer to the same logical concept in Dignaga's system of logic. I believe that the word anumeya, which literally means 'that which is to be inferred', also possesses the same set of three meanings, viz. (1) a state of affairs or a proposition to be inferred consisting of dharmin and dharma, (2) the property-possesor or locus to be inferred (anumeya-dharmin), and (3) the property to be inferred (anumeya-dharma), although Dignaga does not explicitly mention this. The reason behind my conviction is that the word anumeya occupies the place of paksa in the first formula of the trairupya. As I mentioned earlier, Dignaga refers to the first characteristic of a valid inferential mark by the traditional expression paksadharmatva in NMukh. In PS II. 5cd, however, he refers to it by his new phrase anumeye sadbhavah, as we have seen above.16) Therefore, it seems quite possible to assume that the word anumeya is employed by Dignaga in the same way as the words paksa and sadhya in NMukh and PS III. The word paksa seems to stem from the old Vada-tradition. In PS Dignaga seems to distinguish between anumeya and sadhya, by employing the former in svarthanumana and the latter in pararthanumana. A similar phenomenon can be found regarding the words referring to a logical reason; namely, hetu (reason) and sadhana (dharma) (a proving property), which seem to stem from the Vada-tradition, are used in parartanumana, while linga (an inferential mark) and anumana (a means of inference), which seem to stem from the Pramana-tradition, are used in svarthanumana. Thus Dignaga would support Oetke's first interpretation regarding the meanings of the word anumeya in the trairupya; namely, it means the sub

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Dignaga on trairupya Reconsidered: A Reply to Prof. Oetke stratum of the property to be proven in the first characteristic and just the property to be proven in the third characteristic. Now, in order to identify the logical subject of the third characteristic, we must have a clear idea about two more technical terms, namely, sapaksa and vipaksa, for I understand that they correspond to tattulya and asat in the second and the third characteristics of trairupya. 257 2.3.2. sapaksa and vipaksa Dignaga first defined sapaksa and vipaksa in NMukh (Taisho 1c-2a) as fol lows: Ci Zhong ,Ruo Pin Yu Li Fa Lin Jin Jun Deng Shuo Ming Tong Pin . Yi Yi Qie Yi Jie Ming Pin Gu . Ruo Suo Li Wu Shuo Ming Yi Pin . Fei Yu Tong Pin Xiang Wei Huo Yi . "In this connection, if an object (paksa) () is close (samipa?) or similar to (samana) the property to be proven (sadhyadharma), it is called 'sapaksa' (F), for any object (artha) () can be called 'paksa'. If [an object] lacks [the property] to be proven, it is called 'vipaksa' ()The latter is neither incompatible (viruddha) (F) with nor different. (anya) () from sapaksa...." In PS III Dignaga gives somewhat different definitions of the two terms: PS-Vrtti [Kanakavarman] 130a: de la don thams cad phyogs su byas pas nye ba'i phyir bsgrub par bya ba'i chos kyi spyis mthun pa'i phyogs so || (Cf.. Nyayabindu II. 9-Nyayapravesa SS2.2: sadhyadharmasamanyena samano 'rthah sapaksah) "In this connection, since any object (don=artha) can be called 'paksa', [an object is called] 'sapaksa' (similar to paksa) in respect of the universal similarity (samanya) which is the property to be proven, for [it is] close to [paksa]." PS [Kanakavarman] III. 19-20a: de las gahan dang de 'gal ba | gnyis po yang mi mthun phyogs ma yin | gtan tshigs med dang 'gal ba las || rnam

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258 par gcod par thal bar 'gyur | de'i phyir mthun phyogs med pa nyid // "That which is different from or incompatible with it (i.e. sapaksa); neither of them is (called] vipaksa. .. Therefore, (vi paksa is) nothing but the absence of sapaksa." In NMukh Dingaga defines sapaksa as any object which is similar to sadhyadharma and in PS III as any object which is close / similar to (paksa] (the topic of a proposition) in respect of sadhyadharma-samanya--though he simply says "nye ba'i phyir", I assume from the context that we can supply the word paksa. I must confess that I cannot make good sense of the definition in NMukh, namely, "any object which is similar to the property to be proven." Incidentally, the idea comes close to the Tibetan translation of the Nyayabindu II. 9: mthun phyogs ni bsgrub par bya ba'i chos kyi spyi dang don mthun pa'o, which influenced the dGe lugs pa's understanding of sapaksa as demonstrated by Tom Tillemans.") If we adopt Tillemans's suggestion (p. 59), the NMukh definition of sapaksa may mean "any object which has the property to be proven", in which case, however, it would be difficult to distinguish between paksa and sapaksa. The PS III definition clearly distinguishes sapaksa from paksa and more explicitly indicates that sapaksa is "any object which has the property to be proven". For example in the proposition: "The mountain has a fire," sapaksa consists of any object which has the property to be proven, in other words, the domain of presence of the property to be proven, i.e., fiery places. The PS III version becomes the standard definition of sapaksa after Dignaga. In NMukh Dignaga defines vipaksa as "an object which lacks the property to be proven", in other words the domain of absence of the property to be proven. If we adopt the above-mentioned definition of sapaksa in PS III, namely, the domain of presence of the property to be proven, then the two domains are complementary to each other and together will make up the

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Dignaga on trairupya Reconsidered: A Reply to Prof. Oetke 259 complete universe of discourse (minus paksa, i.e. the topic under discussion) or what Richard Hayes once called 'induction domain '. 18) In PS III Dignaga defines vipaksa simply as 'absence of sapaksa'. If we follow the above-mentioned definition of sapaksa in PSIII, it should mean 'absence of any object which has the property to be proven', which in the final analysis can be understood as the domain of absence of the property to be proven as in NMukh. In both NMukh and PS III Dignaga emphasizes that vipaksa is neither what is different from sapaksa nor what is incompatible with sapaksa and that it is 'absence' (abhava) of sapaksa. I understand that by restricting the meaning of vipaksa in such a way, Dignaga tried to establish the complemenatry relationship between sapaksa and vipaksa as mentioned above." Now let us go back to PS II. 5cd: anumeye 'tha tattulye sadbhavo nasitasati. As the logical subject of asati we have two alternatives, viz. 'anumeya' and 'tattulya'. If we take the first alternative, the third characteritic means "absence (of the inferential mark] in the absence (asati) [of the property to be inferred (anumeya)]", which corresponds to the NMukh definition of vipaksa (i.e.,.absence of the property to be proven). If we take the second alternative, then the phrase means "absence [of the inferential mark] in the absence (of what is similar to the object of inference (tattulya)], which corresponds to the PS III definition of vipaksa (absence of sapaksa)." Just like Oetke I prefer the first alternative because it fits well with the alternative meanings of the word anumeya as I have explained above.20) Jinendrabuddhi, however, supports the second alternative.21) In any case, I believe that there is no fundamental difference in the interpretation of the trairupya in either alterative. The more I read Oetke's examinations of the trairupya formulae, the more I am inclined to admire his thorough logical thinking. On the other hand, perhaps the problem with his approach is that he tends to rely on a few selected passages of the relevant Indian texts which he analyses minutely

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260 and from which he derives rather bold conclusions. My approach to the problem of trairupya and other subjects is that I try to understand them in the broader context of the whole text under investigation. For example, Oetke (pp. 71-72) questions the relevancy of my reference to PS-Vstti IV. 4. To meet his objection and emphasize my wholistic approach, in a future paper, I shall show the connection between the theory of trairupya and that of sadharmya- and vaidharmya-drstanta, in which I will deal with the role of 'Example' in Dignaga's logic.22) 3. trairupya and Hetucakra In order to strengthen my position that Dignaga intended to insert the restrictive particle eva in the the formula of the second characteristic, I would like to add the following argument. In PS-Vitti II. 5cd Dignaga stated: "...we also establish in a general manner [its] presence either in all or some members of the class similar to it (i.e., the object of inference)." We may assume that he is here alluding to the second and the eighth hetu of the Hetucakra (Wheel of Reasons), where hetu is present in all or some members of sapaksa, respectively. Hetu No. 2: (paksa) anityah sabdah / [hetu] krtakatvat / [drstanta) yatha ghatah, yatha akasam / Hetu No. 8: (paksa] anityah sabdah / [hetu] prayatnanantariyakatvat / [drstanta) yatha ghato vidyuc ca, yatha akasam / Then comes the next question of how we justify the second and the eighth hetu as valid ones. Dignaga answers by means of the restriction of the

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Dignaga on trairupya Reconsidered: A Reply to Prof. Oetke 261 second characteristic. If we restrict it in the way "tattulye (=sapakse) lingasya sadbhava eva", then the domain of the property to be proven or inferred (sadhya / anumeya-dharma) is restricted by the domain of linga. In other words, the former is pervaded by the latter. In that case, linga is deviant or inconclusive (vyabhicarin / anaikantika) in respect to what is to be proven (sadhya) and it cannot be regarded as valid. linga sadhya If we restrict the anvaya formula in the way "tattulya (=sapaksa) eva lingasya sadbhavah", then the domain of linga is restricted by the domain of the property to be proven. In this case, linga is neither deviant nor inconclusive and it is a valid inferential mark. sadhya linga In the case of Hetu No. 2 the domain of sadhyadharma (=anityatva) and the domain of hetu (=katakatva) are co-extensive but at least the domain of hetu does not deviate from the domain of sadhyadharma. Therefore, it can be regarded as a special case of hetu's being restricted by sadhyadharma. In the case of Hetu No. 8 it is quite clear that the domain of hetu (=prayatnanantariyakatva) is restricted by the domain of sadhyadharma (=anityatva). Consequently, it is regarded as a valid hetu.

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262 4. Conlcusion In PS II Dignaga presents two different formulae of the trairupya, one without eva and the other with eva. PS II. 5cd can be divided into the following three formulae: (1) anumeye [lingasya] sadbhavah/ (2) tat (=anumeya)-tulye [lingasya] sadbhavah/ (3) [anumeya / tattulya-] asati [lingasya] nastita/ They correspond to the following traditional formulae: (1) [hetoh] paksadharmatvam/ (2) sapakse [hetoh] sattvam/ (3) vipakse [hetoh] asattvam/ The second and the third formulae are respectively called anvaya and vyatireka, which constitute what Cardona called the 'Indian Principle of Inductive Reasoning'. If we understand tattulya / sapaksa and asat / vipaksa in the above formulae in the sense of 'the domain of presence of the property to be proven' and 'the domain of absence of the property to be proven', then anvaya and vyatireka can be reformulated in the following manner: (1) anvaya (continued presence): in the domain of presence of the property to be proven (sadhyadharma) linga is present; e.g., where there is a fire there is smoke. (2) vyatireka (continued absence): in the domain of absence of the property to be proven linga is absent; e.g., where there is no fire there is no smoke. anvaya and vyatireka constitue the inductive method or process by which we can determine what is a valid inferential mark or reason, and sapaksa and vipaksa make up what Hayes called the 'induction domain' where we can conduct such an induction. In modern terminology, anvaya and vyatireka without eva express the necessary conditions for a valid reason.

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Dignaga on trairupya Reconsidered: A Reply to Prof. Oetke In PS-Vrtti II. Sed Dignaga inserts the restrictive particle eva at least in the anvaya formula: tat (=anumeya)-tulye eva [lingasya] sadbhavah, which can be reformulated as: sadhyadharma-bhave eva lingasya sadbhavah. As a result of the insertion of eva the anvaya formula no more represents the inductive process; it expresses the relation between the domain of linga and that of the property to be proven (sadhyadharma), namely, the former is restricted by the latter; in other words, the former is pervaded (vyapta) by the latter. As far as I can see, Dignaga insisted on inserting the particle eva in order to express the relation of pervasion (vyapti) between linga and sadhyadharma which he considered to be the foundation of any valid inference or reasoning. The fact that he does not employ the word vyapti in this particular context may suggest that he is still in the process of struggling toward a new terminology for his theory of logical proof. Dignaga was well acquainted with the Indian Grammatical tradition. He borrowed from them not only the method of anvaya and vyatireka in order to determine a valid reason but also the notion of 'restriction' (avadharana / niyama) by the particle eva in order to express the proper relation between the valid reason and its object, in short, 'pervasion'. 263 Although Dignaga does not mention the vyatireka formula with eva in PS-Vrtti II. Scd, NMukh and the corresponding passages of PS-Vrtti quoted at the beginning of this paper seem to indicate that he intended to insert the eva-restriction in the vyatireka formula, too. Thus we can reformulate it as: asati [lingasya] nastita eva or sadhyadharma-abhave lingasya nastita eva. In this formulation, the domain of absence of the property to be proven is restricted by that of absence of linga, which is logically equivalent to the anvaya formula with eva. Dignaga seems to be aware of such a logical equivalence and tries to solve problems related to it in PS-Vrtti IV, which I shall deal with in a future paper. Dharmakirti calls anvaya and vyatireka with eva 'niyamavat' (restricted) and apparently regards them as logically equivaHe tries to justify the necessity of both anvaya and vyatireka by

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264 saying that either formula with eva actually expresses both of them at once.2) anvaya and vyatireka with eva singularly express the relation of 'pervasion' (vyapti) of a valid inferential mark or reason by the property to be inferred or proven. In modern terminology, they express the sufficient condition for a valid reason.24) Notes 1) For Sanskrit fragments, see Jambuvijaya, Dvadasaram Nayacakram of Acarya Sri Mallavadi Ksamasramana, Part I, Bhavnagar 1966: Appendix p. 122. 2) For Sanskrit fragments, see Jambuvijaya, op. cit., Appendix p. 125. A differ ent recension: pararthanumanam tu svadrstarthaprakasakam/. Dharmakirti cleverly characterized them as 'knowledge' (jnana) and 'verbal expression' (sabda) in the beginning of the Pramanaviniscaya Chapter II. 4) Sanskrit fragment is found in the Nyayavarttika of Uddyotakara ad Nyayasu tra 1. 1. 5, and many other places. 5) Sanskrit fragment is found in the Pramanavarttikalamkara of Prajnakaragupta (Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, ed. by R. Sankstyayana, Patna 1953), p. 580. 6) Cf. Karnakagomin, Pramanavarttika-Tika, p. 14: kim punah kvacit tarkasas tre drstam niyamartham vacanam ity ata aha / sajatiya evet yadi / tatra yah san sajatiye dvedha casams tadatyaye sa hetur ity (PS III. 22) atracaryiye hetulaksane/ sajatiya eva sattvam ity avadharanena siddhe'pi vijatiyad vipaksad dhetor vyatireke yad etad asams tadatyaya iti sadhyabhave 'sattvavacanam tan niyamartham acaryena vyakhyatam asaty eva nastita yatha syan nanyatra na viruddha iti / tathehapi dharmivacanam bhavaniyamartham asamkyate / (... By the restriction in the second characteristic of trairupya:] "sajatiya eva sattvam" the exclusion (vyatireka) of the reason (hetu) from the dissimilar class (vijatiya=vipaksa) (i.e. the third characteristic) is established, yet the absence of [the reason) in the absence of what is to be proved (sadhya) (i.e. the third characteristic) is stated (again] by [PS III. 22:] "asams tadatyaya" [in the definition of a valid reason). The Teacher (Dignaga) justifies it as having the purpose of restriction (niyama) [of the meaning of the term 'asat' (i.e. sadhyabhava)] by saying "asaty eva nastita yatha syan nanyatra na viruddhe.") Cf. also Sakyabuddhi's Tika (Derge 7b1-b3): yang ci rtogs pa'i bstan bcos la la las grub bzhin du brnan pa'i phyir yang smos pa lta mthong ngam zhe na/ mthun pa kho na la zhes bya ba la sogs pa smos te / slob dpon phyogs kyi glang po'i mtshan nyid ni phyogs kyi chos (d: 7b2] gang zhig mthun pa la yod la de

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Dignaga on trairupya Reconsidered: A Reply to Prof. Oetke 265 med pa la med pa de ni gtan tshigs yin no zhes bya ba yin no / de la ni mthun pa kho na la yod pa zhes bya ba'i nges par gaung ba 'di kho nas gtan tshigs mi mthun pa las ldog pa grub mod kyi / de med pa la med pa zhes bsgrub par bya ba med pa la med pa [763] smos pa gang yin pa de ni med pa kho na la med pa yin gyi 'gal ba la yang ma yin la de las gzhan pa la yang ma yin no zhes brnan pa'i phyir yin te / de lta bas na brnan pa yin par dogs pa bstsal ba'i phyir nye bar btags pa yin no // 7) For references see my paper "On Trairupya Formulae". See for example Jinendrabuddhi's Tika on PS II. 5cd (Derge 93b-94a): de mtshungs la yod gyur (=tattulye sadbhavah) ni rjes su 'gro ba (=anvaya) mtshon par rig par bya ste / ... rjes su 'gro ba ni tshul gnyis pa'o zhes pa'o I... rjes su 'gro ba zhes bya ba ni rtags la rtags can yod pa kho na ste / ... med pa la med pa nyid (=asati nastita) ni Idog pa (=vyatireka) nye bar mtshon par yang blta bar bya'o / Idog pa yang tshul gsum pa'o.../. Cf. also Tarkabhasa (of Moksakaragupta, ed by Rangaswami Iyengar, Mysore 1944) pp. 24-26: anumeye sattvam eva niscitam ... tad ekam rupam paksadharmatasamjnakam / ... sapaksa eva sattvam niscitam ity anvayasaminakam dvitiyam rupam / ... tatra (=asapakse) asattvam eva niscitam vyatirekasamjnakam trtiyam rupam / See my paper "Dignaga and Dharmakirti on apoha", Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition, ed. Steinkellner, Wien 1991, p. 140; see also Hayes, Dignaga on the Interpretation of Signs, pp. 297-298. 10) In: Studies in Indian Philosophy, A Memorial Volume in Honour of Pundit Sukhalji Sanghavi, L.D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad 1981, p. 79. 11) For the function of the particle eva, see Y. Kajiyama, "Three Kinds of Affir mation and Two kinds of Negation in Buddhist Philosophy," Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sudasiens, Band 17, 1973 and Brendan Gillon and Richard Hayes, "The Role of the Particle eva in (Logical) Quantification in Sanskrit," Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sudasiens, Band 26, 1982. For Sanskrit fragment, see Het ubindu-Tika (ed. by Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Shri Jinavijayaji, Gaekwad's Oriental Series CXIII, Baroda 1949) p. 18. 13) N.B.: N.Mukh does not contain such a definition of niyama or vyapti. 14) NMukh k. 2: E RA ## ## # ### ==PS III. 9: sa pakse sann asan dvedha paksadharmah punas tridha / pratyekam asapkse ca sadasaddvidhatvatah / (Quoted in the Nyayavarttikatatparyatika ad NS 1. 1. 35 and PVA p. 580). NMukh (Taisho p. 1b): UA B Quoted in the Nyayavarttika ad Nyayasutra 1.1.35: hetuh tadabhaso va prayah paksadharma eva bhavati. 9) 5 12)

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266 18) Cf. PS III. 8: sadhyadharmo yato hetus tadabhasas ca bhuyasa / tasmat tad vistarah purvam hetvadyarthat pradarsyate | Quoted in the Pramanavart tikalamkara p. 580. 15) Quoted in the Pramanavarttikalamkara p. 580; Hetubindutika p. 11, Dharmot tarapradipa p. 97 reads: samudayasya sadhyatvad dharmamatre ca... 16) As a matter of fact, Dharmakirti went back to the old terminology 'paksa dharma' when he first defined hetu in Pramanavarttika I. 1abi: paksadharmas tadamsena vyapto hetuh. In Nyayabindu II. 5, however, he defines the first characteristic as lirgasyanumeye sattvam eva (niscitam), which echoes the definition in PS II. 5cd. 17) "On Sapaksa", Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 18-1, 1990. See for example Hayes, op. cit., p. 113. 19) It is to be noted that Dharmakirti does not agree with Dignaga's definition of vipaksa. According to him, vipaksa | asapaksa is what is not sapaksa, which includes what is different from or incompatible with sapaksa as well as absence of sapaksa. See for example, Nyayabindu II. 11-12: na sapakso 'sa paksah || tato'nyas tadviruddhas tadabhavas ceti ll. 20) Prasastapada's formulae of the trairupya (anumeyena sambaddham, tadanvite prasiddham, tadabhave nasty eva) seems to support our interpretation of the logical subject of asati. For reference see my paper "On Trairupya Formu lae", p. 163. 21) Jinendrabuddhi's Tika (D94a): 'dir med pa'i sgras de dang mtshungs pa'i med pa brjod par bya ba 'ba' zhig ma yin gyi / 'on kyang de las gzhan pa dang de dang 'gal ba yang ste de'i rnam pas dben pa'i phyir ro zhes rig par bya'o || 22) I have discussed the matter in my paper presented at the XIIth IABS con ference in Lausanne in August 1999. 23) See Hetubindu (ed. by Ernst Steinkellner, Wien 1967, Teil I) p. 34. One final remark on Oetke's book (p. 52): He seems to have some difficulty in identifying the two Chinese expressions which appear in N Mukh (Taisho p. 2c), namely, and they correspond to paryudasa and prasaj yapratisedha, which can be proven from the parallel passage in PS-Vitti IV.3. This fact has been pointed out by Yasunori Ejima, Chugan Shiso no Tenkai-Bhavaviveka Kenkyu--, Tokyo 1980, p. 117. 24) I would like to thank Prof. Jonathan Silk for correcting my English and giving me several important suggestions. (WE WAKIU**)