Dharmottaras Theory Of Knowledge In His Laghupramanyapariksa

SR No.: 269438
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Helmut Krasser
Publisher: Helmut Krasser
Total Pages: 25
Language: English
Classification: Article
File Size: 3 MB

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HELMUT KRASSER
to be similar to Dharmottara's explanation in the Nyāyabindutikā, where he says that a cognition in a dream which grasps at midnight something that has been seen at midday is not correct with regard to that thing which belongs to the time of midnight.20
(c) Incorrect determining of the ākāra aspect: as already mentioned, the term ākāra, appearance, denotes an essential property of that which is capable of producing an effect (arthakriyaksama). And these are only the atoms of colour (varna) but not shape (samsthāna), which is just a property of the image (pratibhāsadharma). Although shape, like all other essential general properties (sāmānyadharma) – for example, momentariness (kşanikatva) – is not really existent in the sense that it is capable of producing an effect, it exists insofar as it is not different from the atoms of colour. Thus shape and other essential general properties can only be grasped (Jgrah-) when the particular (višesa) or individual characteristic (svalaksana) is grasped, but never separately. And they can be determined only in accordance with the individual characteristic grasped (29,5-16. Though appearance is not mentioned again in this explanation, it is this aspect or essential property through which, as can be seen from the following examples, the real thing can be grasped.
Furthermore, due to the fact that the general properties are not different from the particular it is not possible that a cognition that takes a mirage (maricikā) for water, although it is erroneous with regard to water, is not erroneous with regard to its merely being real (vastutvam eva), for there is something existent, namely the sunrays, as an opponent maintains. In that case, Dharmottara argues, the cognition is necessarily erroneous with regard to existent (yod pa) water. Thus the existence of water cannot be ascertained for there is no water present, and the existence (yod pa) of the sunrays can only be ascertained in accordance with the existence of the particular (višeşa) of the sunrays (29,17–21). This obtains also for other imagined common features like being momentary (ksanikatva) or having a material form (murtatva) {41,3–6).
In the same way it is not possible for a cognition which ascertains a white shell as yellow to be partially reliable (avisamvādin), for example, with regard to the shape. For when the whiteness of the shell is excluded from being cognized, its shape, too, is excluded. Therefore, as the appearance (akāra) of the white and the yellow