Dharmottaras Theory Of Knowledge In His Laghupramanyapariksa

SR No.: 269438
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Helmut Krasser
Publisher: Helmut Krasser
Total Pages: 25
Language: English
Classification: Article
File Size: 3 MB

Page 13

DHARMOTTARA'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
259
(18,1f.). As mentioned above, an object of correct cognition is restricted (niyata) in terms of space, time and appearance, for these are the characteristics that differentiate things from each other {25,9-12). Thus a cognition that determines an object incorrectly in one of these aspects is incorrect, because it determines a completely different thing. And an object of this kind is not real and cannot be obtained. As all kinds of incorrect cognition can be explained by a false determining of either deśa, kāla or akāra, these three aspects may serve as criteria to distinguish them.
(a) Incorrect determining of the deśa aspect: this is illustrated by a cognition that takes the shine of a jewel which can be seen through the keyhole of a door to be a jewel that is located in the keyhole itself. As the jewel in reality is connected with a place other than the keyhole, it is not the object of a valid cognition. And it is also not possible for only a jewel as such (-mătra) without any peculiarities to be determined. For the object of activity has to be determined in terms of space, time and nature, and a mass as such (pindamatra), not being specified, cannot be determined and therefore also cannot be obtained (25,14-26,5).
Other kinds of erroneous cognition which deviate with regard to space are the one in which a rapidly swung torch appears as a circle of fire and the cognition when in a desert one ascertains someone small as being tall. In the first case it is easy to understand that a torch cannot be in all places at the same time. The second kind is interesting insofar as a cognition that takes something large to be small is classified as a correct cognition because extension (parimāna) is said to be only a property of shape (samsthānadharma), and thus this kind of error does not contradict the thing itself (cf. above p. 257). In accordance with this, a cognition which takes someone small to be tall is not explained as erroneous because it ascertains the extension incorrectly, but because it comprehends the tall person as being situated in a different place to where he is in reality, that is in a closer place. Moreover, the tall person also appears to be occupying parts of the ether (ākāśa) because he exceeds the limits (sima) of the small person. This, too, constitutes an error {33,17–34,16}.
(b) Incorrect determining of the kāla aspect: regarding a thing that is ascertained as being connected with a different time, the text of the Prāmānyaparikṣā {29,1—4} is corrupt but the meaning seems