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PIOTR BALCEROWICZ
IS INEXPLICABILITY OTHERWISE OTHERWISE INEXPLICABLE? 355
Then another problem arose: how can we know the avindbhava relation with certainty, 'because just by seeing two things together in some cases it is not proved that one of them) does not occur without the other one in all cases"? It does not suffice norto observe two things together to have negative example, either". Like the Buddhists, the Jainas rejected the idea of repeated observation (bio-darsiana) of either co-presence or co-absence of two particulars as the basis for our inference, propounded by the Mimarnsaka" because repeated observation, like repeated practice does not warrant any certainty, and as such could not be classified as valid form of inference.
The problem concerns the extrapolation from individual cases to a universal rule:
planation of
We find
YA 49, p. 122.20-123.2: tatha canyarhanupapannana-n/yamanescaya-laksanár sadhand the logical reason the characteristic of which is the determination of the invariant rule "inexplicability otherwise, see n. 23) implies that he apparently equates vyapti with anyathamupapannana. The interpretation depends on how we construe the compound anyarhanupapannana-nyama, which I would naturally construc as a karma-dharauanyarhamapapanahunamah). Only if we took the compound to be a tar-pura (anyuthmppannan niyama), we could infer that Vidyananda was no exception.
A question arises whether what the principle of 'inexplicability otherwise' amounts to is our inability to offer any other explanation of a particular event apart from the one to which we find no other alternative? In other words, does anyathamupaparti express that out of a range of possible explanations of a particular event we chose the one which still remains unfalsified after we have eliminated all other rival answers that have proved unsatisfactory? That would be tantamount to saying that by anyathanupapatiwe choose the solution which we are only able to conceive of, but this solution does not have to be the correct one: we may simply not know the proper answer, and the answer we favour has so far not been falsified. The implication would be that the rule of 'inexplicability otherwise' merely points to most likely answers and expresses probability, but warrants no certainty. This is precisely what would seem the case to be at this stage of analysis. To overcome the problem of mere likelihood, the Jaina logicians had to combine it with an invariant relation, viz. that of avindbrava, that aimed at revealing not only the most probable but the only legitimate explanation, thus securing the veracity of our cognitions.
Since inseparable connection is a relation, and it is preceded by grasping two relata, and these two relata are two separate particulars, how then it is possible to grasp (their) invariable concomitance as something which applies to everything?
The Jainas tried to solve the dilemma in the following way:
...the invariable concomitance is possible as indeed something which applies to everything (when we take it as a relation that relates) two particulars characterised by (sc typifying) the universal. Therefore, the fault of infinite regress etc. does not find room here."
4. Tarka
The Jainas had now the new logical reason (hen). Its sole defining characteristic (laksana) was 'inexplicablity otherwise (anathamupapan), which replaced the three characteristics of the het The invariable concomitance (ap), or the invariant rule (numa, sambandha) which relates the inferable property (said wa) and the logical reason (sadhana), assumed, in its turn, the role of inseparable connection (avindband), and thus it replaced the idea of the Buddhist relations of essential identity (Radarwa) and of causality (rad-parti).
In other words, classes of individuals are tokened by their actual particular representations. This move was possible due to the Jaina ontology that recognised that that the notions of the particular and the universal are mutually dependent", and that manifold particulars are grounded in the universal (homogeneity)". Accordingly, at the moment of perceiving a particular, we cognise the universal in which this particular is grounded.
But this still does not solve the question how to know that two separate universal-tokened particulars are related in a necessary way. Repeated observation (Awo-darsiana) does not suffice, because it entails a number of problems, pertaining both to the issue of universally binding validity and to the possible method of arriving at such an extrapolation. We cannot know the invariable concomitance (dpi) either by prabayaone of the reasons is that the wapi associates different times and places, which is impossible in case of pranasa or by anumana, because that would lead to the faults of mutual dependence (anyonisrawa), lack of foundation and wastha) or regressus ad infinitum). The conclusion is that we must accept a special cognitive criterion called farta to be able to cognise the vipi.