Is Inexplicability Otherwise Otherwise Inexplicable

Author(s): Piotr Balcerowicz
Publisher: Piotr Balcerowicz
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269212/1

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PIOTR BALCEROWICZ IS 'INEXPLICABILITY OTHERWISE (ANYATHANUPAPATTI) OTHERWISE INEXPLICABLE?" In the 8th century we can observe a sudden change in the Jaina epistemology. This was brought about by the introduction of a new model of inference (anumana), based on a new interpretation of the logical reason (het). The logical reason has been from now on defined as 'inexplicability otherwise' (anyathanupapatti, anyathanupapannatva), and its sole feature is its inseparable connection (avindbhava) with the inferable property (sadhya), which is known though suppositional knowledge (tarka, uha). This triple innovation is found in Siddhasena Mahamati's Nyayavatard, Akalanka's Laghiyas-trayd, Vidyananda's Yukty-anusasana-tika and in Manikyanandin's Pariksamukha-sutra, just to mention but a few.. 1. Patrasvamin, the innovator? The way (i.e. with the word iritam) Siddhasena Mahamati in his Nyayavatara (which would seem at first to be the original source) refers to the idea of anyathanupapatti indicates that he was not the innovator (NA 22ab: anyathanupapannatvam hetor laksanam iritam/). These innovations apparently go back to a certain Patrasvamin3, as it is attested by Santaraksita, who mentions a Patrasvamin as the source of the idea, see TSa (1).1364 (p. 405.1): anyathety-adina patrasvamimatam asankate... This is further attested also by Jaina sources, in particular by Vadideva-suri. Apparently the treatise in question is the lost Tri-laksana-kadarthand, conceived to refute the Buddhist idea of tri-laksana-hen, and apparently the only available fragments of the work are to be found in Tattva-sangraha 1364-1379 (pp. 405-407). [1364] If "inexplicability otherwise" is there, then [the logical reason] is seen to be the correct logical reason: if it is not present, then also the triple [logical reason] is not [the correct logical reason]. Therefore, the three characteristics (of the logical reason] are impotent. [1365] What possesses "inexplicability otherwise" is accepted as [the correct] logical reason. This [correct logical reason) is something possessed of one characteristic [only], not [something] possessed of four characteristics or of any other [number]. [1367] The relation of inseparable connection is not at all [present] in the tree forms of [the logical reason]; [the relation] is observed exclusively in Journal of Indian Philosophy 31: 343-380, 2003. 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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344 PIOTR BALCEROWICZ logical reasons that possess [only] one constitutive element [in the form] of "impossibility otherwise" (= "inexplicability otherwise"). [1368] Only that which possesses "inexplicability otherwise" is the [proper] logical reason. [It does not matter if] both types of the example can be [cited] or not, because [the example] is not any basis (for inference]. [1369] Where there is no "inexplicability otherwise", what is the need of the triplet (of characteristics the logical reason]? Where there is "inexplicability otherwise", what is the need of the triplet [of characteristics the logical reason]? [1371] As regards this, the logical reason which is possessed of one characteristic is free from two types of the example: [somehow] existence and non-existence consist in being (are real in a qualified sense), because they are somehow comprehended.... [1379] Therefore let first of all the logical reason be for us that which leads to the comprehension; but what is the use [of other pointless conditions of the logical reason] falsely conceived [by others), such as the presence of a property in the locus, etc.?!" A number of examples of valid inference, offered by Patrasvamin, are meant to demonstrate that we can infer correctly, even though none or some of the trainipya-conditions are not fulfilled: 1) only the condition of paksa-dharmata (inherence of a property in the locus) is satisfied, but there are no positive (anuaya) and negative (yatireka) instantiations of the logical reason in the form of sadharma-distanta or vaidharmya-distanta respectively (TSa 1371); 2) no example based on similarity (sadharma-dranta) can be cited (TSa 1372-4, 1377); 3) no example based on dissimilarity (vaidharma-dranta) can be cited (TSa 1375-6); 4) the condition of paka-dharmata is not fulfilled (TSa 1378). Moreover, according to Patrasvamin the inference can be invalid, even though it fulfils the three conditions of valid logical reason (trairupya), which is exemplified by the case of the fallacious proof: ris dark-complexioned, because .r is the son of y, like the other [sons] of (TSa 1371ab: sa yamas tasya putratvad drstah syama yathetare) 12 It is not important whether these verses are exact quotations or not. What is decisive is that at least the ideas the verses quoted in TSa express are (1) authentic and (2) ascribed to a particular representative of Jaina tradition prior to Santaraksita and Kamalasila. On the other hand, even though Santaraksita and Kamalasila do not always offer quotations in the form we know them from extant text editions," their account is as a rule quite faithful to the original ideas. That Santaraksita's account seems authentic-at least when it comes to IS INEXPLICABILITY OTHERWISE OTHERWISE INEXPLICABLE? 345 the essence, not necessarily to the wording is corroborated by at least three factors: 1) At least one of the verses (TSa 1369) is quoted in other works as well; 2) Kamalasila in his Panjika on TSa 1369 explicitly mentions that Santaraksita interchanged the padas ab with cd (p. 406.7: anyathanupapannatvam yatrety asyanantara nanyathanupapannety asyardhasya pathah kartavyah); 3) Furthermore, the ideas ascribed by Santaraksita and Kamalasila to Patrasvamin are in complete agreement with Jaina accounts that directly follow Patrasvamin (e.g. NA, LT, YAT, for details see below) as well as with later elucidations" pertaining to the issue of anyathanupapatti and trainpya. Even if Santaraksita and Kamalasila alter slightly the wording, their account seems very reliable. Methodologically, in my examination I shall never refer to Patrasvamin's account in TSa alone. Instead Patrasvamin's ideas found in TSa will always be additionally supported by 'authenticated' Jaina sources. Some features in Patrasvamin's model of logic in the above account, based on 'inexplicability otherwise', deserve special emphasis: 1) There is no need for any additional characteristic of the logical reason other than anyathanupapatti 2) No additional instantiation (drama) is necessary to have valid inference (TSa 1368); 3) The definition of 'inexplicability otherwise' as impossibility in any other way: anyathanupapatti anyathasambhava (TSa 1367c); 4) The correlation of the notion of 'inexplicability otherwise' (anyathamupapatti) with the relation of the inseparable connection (avindbhava) (TSa 1367), which is the inseparable connection of the logical reason with the inferable property (nadhydvindbhava). I do not intend to evaluate the idea of 'inexplicability otherwise' and its logical rigidity or to demonstrate how far it was accurate or inaccurate, or logically sound or not. My intention is to show how this concept developed and what motives prompted Patrasvamin and other Jaina logicians to introduce it. 2. Anyathamupapatti Let us first analyse some other earliest Jaina accounts of the notion of anyathanupapatti. A series of the karikas of the Nyayavatara (c. 620-800) are in agreement with other accounts:

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346 PIOTR BALCEROWICZ (5) Inference is regarded traditionally to determine the probandum on account of the inferential sign, which is inseparably connected with the probandum.... (13) Such an utterance that demonstrates the logical reason as inseparably connected with the probandum is the inference. for others, whose essence are propositions, like the thesis, etc..... (22) The definition of the logical reason has been proclaimed [to be] inexplicability otherwise... 16 Akalanka (8th century) in his Laghiyas-traya characterises the basis for inference as follows: *Inference is the comprehension of the sign-possessor through the inferential sign, which has [as its] the sole characteristic the determined cognition of [its] inseparable connection with the inferable property. Its result is "the faculty of avoidance etc." And he adds in his auto-commentary: *For it is impossible to know the relation of essential identity and relation of causality without the suppositional knowledge of "inexplicability otherwise": [and] because [the logical reason is also operative] precisely without these two [relations of essential identity and of causality], this is the proof that [the logical reason] has a sole characteristic. For a tree etc. [from which we infer its shadow" is neither the essential nature nor the effect of the shadow etc." Vidyananda (c. 850) also avails himself of the idea of anyathanupapatti in his Yukty-anusasana-tika, while commenting on Samantabhadra's Yukty-anusasand: And accordingly, what [Samantabhadra] revealed [in the verse] amounts to the following: the persuasion (based on] logical reasoning (se anumana) is the description (sc. comprehension) of the object tobe-inferred on the basis of the logical reason the characteristic of which is the determination of the invariant rule "inexplicability otherwise". [This is so] because what is not contradicted by what is perceived or by testimony [would] otherwise [be] inexplicable. The above has been determined adequately enough" in holy scriptures etc. 23 All the above accounts of Patrasvamin, Akalanka, Siddhasena Mahamati and Vidyananda are unanimous as regards at least two crucial point points: 1) The correct logical reason has only one defining characteristic (laksana), which is a single notion of 'inexplicability otherwise' (anyathinupapart) (TSa 1364d, TSa 1365c, TSa 1379, LTV 2.12, NA 22ab) 2) The logical reason (het) in based on the relation of the inseparable connection (avindbhava) (TSa 1367, NA 5a, NA 13a, LT 2.11. IS 'INEXPLICABILITY OTHERWISE OTHERWISE INEXPLICABLE? 347 TSVA p. 203), which is the inseparable connection of the logical reason with the inferable property (sadhydvinabhava). 3) Occasionally we also find the idea that valid inference requires no instantiation (dranta) (TSa 1368, NA 20 and LT 2.16, however absent, or at least not stated explicitly, in YAT) Since Patrasvamin, Akalanka, Siddhasena Mahamati and Vidyananda avail themselves of well-established terms familiar from other systems, the Jaina idea of inference must clearly have been conceived after the triple condition of validity of the logical reason (het) and the notion of inseparable connection (avindbhava) had been formulated by Dinnaga. Furthermore, they could not have failed to know the Mimamsaka usage of anyathanupapatti. The term anyathanupapatti is by no means a Jaina invention, and it is generally associated with presumption (arthapatti), the fifth cognitive criterion (pramana), accepted by the Mimamsaka. Locus classicus for the idea is Sabara's commentary: *Also presumption (is a cognitive criterion (pramana); it is) an assumption of (another) object (in the form]: "an object either seen or heard is not explicable otherwise." For instance, as regards Devadatta, who is alive, the assumption of [his] being outside, which is unseen, on the basis of seeing his absence at home." Kumarila specifics: 'A case [of reasoning) in which an object, which [is already] known through [any of] the six cognitive criteria, could not occur otherwise, [and on the basis of it] another unseen [object] is assumed, is called presumption. The similarity between the Mimamsaka notion of presumption and Jaina notion of 'inexplicability otherwise' is not only superficial, based on the occurrence of the same expression anyathanupapatti. There are some deeper similarities. According to the Mimamsaka, in arthapatti we presume either some other object (Sabara: artha-kalpana) or something unseen (Kumarila: adrstam kalpayed anyam) on the basis of something grasped directly (by perception-Sabara: drstan) or indirectly (by testimony-Sabara: sruta), or on the basis of any valid piece of knowledge we have (Kumarila: pramana-satka-vijnato 'rha), because we could not otherwise explain the situation we are confronted with. In the section on anumana, Akalanka says": "[Even] common people [not to mention the experts!] comprehend the absence of invisible [events, grasp the existence of] consciousness of

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348 IS INEXPLICABILITY OTHERWISE OTHERWISE INEXPLICABLE? 349 PIOTR BALCEROWICZ other people etc. either through their form (sc. on the basis of symptoms that accompany such events) or through their dissimilarity (SC. contrary symptoms), because these events are otherwise inexplicable In Maya-Kumuda-candra, Prabhacandra explains that even ordinary people infer things which they do not perceive directly, such as imperceptible things, consciousness of other people, both other people's mental disorders (lit.'possession by ghosts', bragraha) and physical diseases on the basis of something directly perceind, i.e. from symptoms sensed directly such as fever etc., the presence of which is not explicable without assuming those unseen events." This idea is also expressed by Siddharsigani. According to him we can infer whether a creature is alive or dead i.e. we are able to conclude that the material body of a creature is inhabited by the soul, jing, that is imperceptible, or not on the basis of external symptoms: .... It is an empirical fact that sa person can be known to be alive or dead-even though there is no (lit, there might be the harm of) perception that could) grasp directly the living elements soul) due to presence or absence, respectively) of (such) characteristic marks of the living element (like) breathing in and breathing-out, etc. these characteristic marks are concluded with the help of the relation of inexplicability otherwise in all cases. Otherwise that would lead to the undesired consequence that no everyday practice (could take place among people".. However, the fact that the Mimamsaka and Jaina use of the term anyathanupapati is not coincidental is confirmed by a series of similar examples of reasoning which we find both in MSV, either as untypical (i.e. lacking paksa-dharmata, sapaksa or vipaksa) cases of inference (anumana) or as instances of presumption (arthapatti), and in Jaina sources, as instances of inference (anumana) based on 'inexplicability otherwise' (amatdapatti): 1) From the rise of the constellation of m e we infer the rise of another constellation: MSV 54 (A mina panicchada) 13ab (249): itu dilakurdidatti- k uran instace of inference concerning individual cases, see n. 74), LT 2.14 (p. 459): bhavour pratat fakatuwiddo, NAV 5.2: pide chaladiyyaa. 2) On the basis of linguistic convention that stipulates that any word that is synonymous to candid, eg the natural satellite of the carth', refers to the moon, one infers that the moon is spoken of, or else one knows that, say, 'the natural satellite of the earth is not something which is different from the moon: MSV 5.4 (anumangpariechnd) 64od-65ab (p. 261): candra-saddi tidheanan sasino wredhan/a sare fotodden candra fianena budhatel. and TSa 1372 (Patrasvamin's section"): cadranendradrandin Mdcandrat Basie dichanah/. 3) When we determine that a particular person is in a particular place on the basis of one of his aspects (eg. voice), we infer that he is nowhere else: MSV 5.7 (artpam parieched) 46 (p. 327): purwa karona yad etapalamdanam masydnyarha na siddhet piddiy aruan ndall "But if there is perception of a man as a whole in one particular place, it is proved that he cannot be otherwise; hence (we infer) his absence in other places],' as well as MSV 5.4 (arumine parlech ) 66cd-67ab (p. 261), TSa 1377: nudijo v prvemasih a matebildaska pisadanu mund te domani 4) Such things as words or lamps, etc., have communicative or revealing powerpaksa dilaka): MSV 5.4 (anumisperico ) 670 (p. 261): lahen d uell, TSa 1378 ('Patrasamin's section"): areshauppafu sinhala-dipadidi w...rstaka Another similarity between the Mimarnsaka and the Jaina accounts is that the basis for inferring something beyond our perceptive reach is something else grasped either through perception or through testimony." Presuming something unseen or unspoken on the basis of something seen or heard is certainly not the sole invention of the Mimarsaka, for we find it in the Nyaya tradition as well, but also much earlier in Kaunilovaartha-slastra. "Something unspoken which is arrived at through the meaning for rather more general: due to circumstances), that is presumption That is why this feature, viz acquiring knowledge of something beyond our senses on the basis of any valid piece of available evidence, does not prove that there is any direct link between the Jainas and the Mimarisa. In fact, presumptive model seems to be quite a natural element of our reasoning, naturally embedded in our language and argumentation 18 The above list does not exhaust all instances of reasoning considered in Jaina sources to be valid despite the fact that they do not satisfy one or all validity conditions of the logical reason, i.e. they lack either paksa dharmata, sapaks or vipaksa, or all. The list can easily be extended: 1) 'From the reflection of the moon in the water (we infer) the moon in the sky' (NAV 5.2: jala-candran nabarcandhani, LT 2.13cd, p. 450): 2) From one blossoming mango-tree in the proper season we infer) that all mango-trees are blossoming' (NAV 5.2: puguitaita-cital paspire-critin, of n. 12 above),

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350 PIOTR BALCEROWICZ IS INEXPLICABILITY OTHERWISE' OTHERWISE INEXPLICABLE? 351 "[In all above mentioned instances, there is no observation of (any inferential] relation whatsoevet. Hence all these and other cases would be unsound, if this (presumption) were not different from inference. If (presumption) having such a nature would assume the name of inference, we do not mind, if you wish. 3) From the rise of the moon, (we infer] the opening of clusters of kumuule white waterlilies' (NAV 5.2: candrea m ana prodan, ef. n. 12 above): 4) From a tree (we inferits) shadow' (NAV 5.2: take cje, LTV 2.1 led-12ab; cf. n. 12 bove) 5) (Somehow] existence and non-existence consist in being they both are real in a qualified sense), because they are somehow comprehended' (TSa 1371): 6) We infer that our skin has got in contact with an insect or a mosquito on the basis of a sensation, the bite (TSa 1373: p r eme verland) 7) From the perception of a visible thing as an effect of the operation of seeing which takes place in the eye, we infer that the eye possesses the exclusive capacity to perceive (TSa 1374 anti -grate dre damarlesmi dari pada darslanirl); 8) Since perceptible and imperceptible objects such as a pot or the soul are sometimes invisible, such as a non-existent donkey's hom, one can argue that in a way they are likewise non-existent (TSa 1375: Rarriate -indu s hailaiyai namll nepala dan mandh a ril); 9) Since non-existent objects, such as a hare's hom, can be somehow comprehended (eg. we can formulate their idea or they can be expressed in language), like the soul or a pot, one can argue that they are also in a way existent (TSa 1376: danhancang sad dominat sasistrigodose catalana alatidura de halddayah/); 10) The sun will rise tomorrow (LT 2 14cd). We can casily see that the Jaina exposition of anumana resembles to a certain degree the Mimamsaka notion of arthapath. The similarities of expression and structure of arguments make it highly plausible that the Mimarisaka paved the way for the development of the Jaina innovation. Now, how should we precisely understand the (Jaina) expression anyathanupapat? One of numerous replies is found in NKC p. 449.10-12 ad LT 2.12: sady do pratirena ar dari handdonare fasad sambandhi grataren fantap.... -By assuming the absence of the inferable property, i.e. "otherwise"; such inexplicability, i.c. inconceivability," of the logical reason; related to this inexplicability!-as that which grasp [inexplicability)-15 suppositional knowledge...! And this brings in another important element entailed by the concept of 'inexplicability otherwise', viz. the suppositional knowledge (tarka, see $ 4, p. 354 ff.). We also have a case of a reasoning which is invalid despite the fact that it satisfies the trainipya, which is not found in the early Mimarisa literature, viz. TSa 1371ab" 3. Sadhavinabhava Interestingly, Kumirila himself emphasizes that all the implied instances of genuine animana mentioned in MSV 5.4 (anumana pariccheda) 66 68 (p. 261) are valid because of presumption (arthapan), that rests on the principle of 'inexplicability otherwise (anwaridupapandi): bidhas tatrarthapartito bhaver. Furthermore, the inferences implied by Kumarila in MSV 5.4.66-68 are meant to refute invalid cases of reasoning expressed in the verses, for instance: the reasoning 'Caitra is not outside, because he is not in the house (MSV 5.4.66cd-67ab); 'fire does not burn' (MAV 5.4.67c)"; "the word has no denotative capacity' (MSV 5.4.67d); 'non-existence of the hearing faculty' (MSV 5.4.68a); "the (verbal) proof of impermanence of words' (MSV 5.4.68b). Moreover, to close the chapter on presumption (arta particchada), after having offered a few examples of artha Kumarila explicitly links the notion of presumption to that of inference: Like many others, the Jainas were convinced that not all knowledge they had could be derived either through experience (prahu ) or through extrapolation from individual experience anumana) Moreover, they must have been aware that much of their scriptural knowledge (agama) could be censured as a matter of ungrounded belief by non-believers. That is why Jaina thinkers already at an earliest stage attempted to combine inference (animand) with testimony (agama) into a category of indirect perception (paroksa), which found also its ethical dimension in combining knowledge, conation and conduct. This was probably the same fear that we find with Bharthanand others contemptuous of reasoning and reasoners. The fear was also that things vary due to their various conditions, place and time, and accordingly everything by nature would be susceptible to relativism, if we were to rely on pure reasoning. Furthermore, it would be

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352 IS INEXPLICABILITY OTHERWISE' OTHERWISE INEXPLICABLE? 353 This'expression of the inseparable connection states that if there is no occurrence of inferable property, there is no eccurrence of logical reason; therefore this is merely an expression of the negative concomitance, but not an expression of the relation.** Prabhacandra's reply runs as follows: PIOTR BALCEROWICZ impossible to reach agreement on interpersonal level, or even subjective certainty, if we were to rely on our reason alone." Also the suppositional knowledge (tarka, wiarka, tha), which warrants the reliability of inference, could be censured by opponents as ungrounded belief: "[The claim that the cognition of the inseparable connection is based on the presumptive knowledge is also a mere belief. What was necessary was an invariant rule that would guarantee reliability and certainty of inferences. The Buddhist theory of inference based on three conditions of validity (trairapya) and on two relations of essential identity (ladamna) and of causality (tad-utpati) as the basis for the logical reason" proved insufficient for two reasons. It suffered from the fault of over-extension (ativapa), because it also embraced such cases that did satisfy all the trairip conditions but were fallacious (alakswa-w ), as well as from the fault of under-extension (av ), because it did not comprise all valid cases but only some (lakyaikadesat). The query was also how one can infer from individual cases the problem of induction) or about individual cases (kevala-watirekin cases), which are uninstantiated except for the subject of inference. This also entailed the problem of universally present properties (kevalanawin), much debated in Navya-waya, and the problem of inferences that do not satisfy the first condition of the property present in the locus of inference (paksa-dharmatd), e.g. the case of the constellations of Kritika and Sataja/ Rohin." The Mimarisaka solution was not satisfactory, in as much as it took recourse, beside the vapoi relation, to the presence of the property in the locus of inference (paksa-dharmatd)", which the Jainas considered faulty The Jainas took the Buddhist relation of awindibhava instead ... The expression of the inseparable connection is not restricted only to the negative concomitance, because of the undesired consequence that even if there was no pot etc.--this [relation would still be) operative. But it is an expression of the relation. And this relation is determined through two modes: (either by explicability in this way or inexplicability otherwise. Hence both these (modes are expressed through the expression of the inseparable connection wherever there is smoke, there is fire; where there is no fire, there is no smoke either." Now this can be objected as follows:) "How can it be known that owhere there is no fire, there is no smoke eithero? Since smoke is invariantly not cognised when there is no fire, then only if this (fire) is present, that (smoke) can be there. Otherwise just like even though smoke is not present, in some cases fire is perceived, in the same way if the fire is not present, smoke would be perceived in some cases. If ris not inexplicable without x, then r is not invariantly related to x, just like even if smoke is not present, fire is perceived (because it is not invariantly related to smoke; but smoke is inexplicable without fire; therefore this (smoke) is invariantly related to fire. her is necessarily related to (does not deviate from).didna, or: rm makes abiar, p Even though this quotation is of later origin, its contents is very similar to, for instance, NAV 17.1 and NAV 18.1, as well as to Pariksdmutha sind", and the detailed expressions of Prabhacandra can easily be derived from such statements which we find in NA 17" We find another explanation of the avinabhawzrule in NKC: roccurs only when yis there, hence it does occur otherwise [i.e. if there is no x r does not occur). Conspicuously, the functioning of the relation of awindbhawa is here directly linked to the idea of anyathanupapalli. Historically speaking, there still can be some doubt what different authors considered to be vapal? Was it awindbhawe or anyathanupapam Certainly, in most cases I have examined vyapolis considered to be awindbhawa. NA 22ab is clear enough that anwarhanupapannana is hetor laksanam, and similarly, Patrasvamin (TSa 1364-5) takes anyarhanupapannana to replace tri-laksanah, hence the wapi for them is avinabhava. Akalanka himself (LT 2.12cd) as well as his tradition follows the same line. The only exception seems to be Vidyananda. The expression /wama is generally taken to mean yapa, especially in the Mimarisa tradition, but also among the Jainasor Buddhists', and therefore Vidyananda's usage (YAT ad In other words: rextrapolates in case there is no r without y Jawinirana or: However, they remodelled it, so that it required no additional positive (anwawa) or negative (ypatireta) instantiations. For Dinnaga this was a "no counter-example" relation . In this context, Prabhacandra refers to an interesting objection:

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PIOTR BALCEROWICZ IS INEXPLICABILITY OTHERWISE OTHERWISE INEXPLICABLE? 355 Then another problem arose: how can we know the avindbhava relation with certainty, 'because just by seeing two things together in some cases it is not proved that one of them) does not occur without the other one in all cases"? It does not suffice norto observe two things together to have negative example, either". Like the Buddhists, the Jainas rejected the idea of repeated observation (bio-darsiana) of either co-presence or co-absence of two particulars as the basis for our inference, propounded by the Mimarnsaka" because repeated observation, like repeated practice does not warrant any certainty, and as such could not be classified as valid form of inference. The problem concerns the extrapolation from individual cases to a universal rule: planation of We find YA 49, p. 122.20-123.2: tatha canyarhanupapannana-n/yamanescaya-laksanar sadhand the logical reason the characteristic of which is the determination of the invariant rule "inexplicability otherwise, see n. 23) implies that he apparently equates vyapti with anyathamupapannana. The interpretation depends on how we construe the compound anyarhanupapannana-nyama, which I would naturally construc as a karma-dharauanyarhamapapanahunamah). Only if we took the compound to be a tar-pura (anyuthmppannan niyama), we could infer that Vidyananda was no exception. A question arises whether what the principle of 'inexplicability otherwise' amounts to is our inability to offer any other explanation of a particular event apart from the one to which we find no other alternative? In other words, does anyathamupaparti express that out of a range of possible explanations of a particular event we chose the one which still remains unfalsified after we have eliminated all other rival answers that have proved unsatisfactory? That would be tantamount to saying that by anyathanupapatiwe choose the solution which we are only able to conceive of, but this solution does not have to be the correct one: we may simply not know the proper answer, and the answer we favour has so far not been falsified. The implication would be that the rule of 'inexplicability otherwise' merely points to most likely answers and expresses probability, but warrants no certainty. This is precisely what would seem the case to be at this stage of analysis. To overcome the problem of mere likelihood, the Jaina logicians had to combine it with an invariant relation, viz. that of avindbrava, that aimed at revealing not only the most probable but the only legitimate explanation, thus securing the veracity of our cognitions. Since inseparable connection is a relation, and it is preceded by grasping two relata, and these two relata are two separate particulars, how then it is possible to grasp (their) invariable concomitance as something which applies to everything? The Jainas tried to solve the dilemma in the following way: ...the invariable concomitance is possible as indeed something which applies to everything (when we take it as a relation that relates) two particulars characterised by (sc typifying) the universal. Therefore, the fault of infinite regress etc. does not find room here." 4. Tarka The Jainas had now the new logical reason (hen). Its sole defining characteristic (laksana) was 'inexplicablity otherwise (anathamupapan), which replaced the three characteristics of the het The invariable concomitance (ap), or the invariant rule (numa, sambandha) which relates the inferable property (said wa) and the logical reason (sadhana), assumed, in its turn, the role of inseparable connection (avindband), and thus it replaced the idea of the Buddhist relations of essential identity (Radarwa) and of causality (rad-parti). In other words, classes of individuals are tokened by their actual particular representations. This move was possible due to the Jaina ontology that recognised that that the notions of the particular and the universal are mutually dependent", and that manifold particulars are grounded in the universal (homogeneity)". Accordingly, at the moment of perceiving a particular, we cognise the universal in which this particular is grounded. But this still does not solve the question how to know that two separate universal-tokened particulars are related in a necessary way. Repeated observation (Awo-darsiana) does not suffice, because it entails a number of problems, pertaining both to the issue of universally binding validity and to the possible method of arriving at such an extrapolation. We cannot know the invariable concomitance (dpi) either by prabayaone of the reasons is that the wapi associates different times and places, which is impossible in case of pranasa or by anumana, because that would lead to the faults of mutual dependence (anyonisrawa), lack of foundation and wastha) or regressus ad infinitum). The conclusion is that we must accept a special cognitive criterion called farta to be able to cognise the vipi.

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356 PIOTR BALCEROWICZ Both the criticism and the conclusion are stated by Akalanka in the Laghiyas-traya in the verse 2.11cd-12ab and in his auto-commentary: 'No inferential sign can be known through non-conceptual comprehension (viz. perception) or through inference, because it is not established; [hence] another cognitive criterion (suppositional knowledge, tanka) is immediately (called for]. For perception is not capable of carrying out such operations as for instance: "a particular smoke is an effect of nothing else but some fire at some other time and some other place, not [an effect] of any other thing," because [perception] cannot examine (things], insofar as it arises by force of proximate things. Neither [can this be accomplished by] inference, because there is no difference with regard to all cases (e levels) [of inference), for-if the invariable concomitance between the inferential sign and the sign-possessor is not established as a whole there cannot be anything like inference with regard to anything. It is not correct to say that there is no non-perceptual cognitive criterion which is different from inference, because the faculty of comprehending the inferential sign is another cognitive criterion. What is meant here is the suppositional knowledge (tanka), being only a subdivision of the indirect cognition (paroksa)," one of two main types of cognitive criteria (pramana) recognised by the Jainas, which replaces the knowledge based on tadatmya and tad-utpatti (LTV 2.12cd-13.ab: 'it is impossible to know the relation of essential identity and relation of causality without the suppositional knowledge of "inexplicability otherwise", see p. 346 and n. 20). Suppositional knowledge warrants the reliability and certitude of inference, because it is maintained to be capable of legitimate extrapolation beyond the present instant.87 Further, Akalanka states that "Observation of one [thing] without reflection does not show the invariable concomitance of the logical reason with the inferable property: [and] this is the suppositional knowledge that has as its object uncognised [things] in their totality. The cognising of an uncognised object renders additional support to my claim (p. 347 f.) that there is deeper similarity between the Mimamsa notion of arthapatti and Jaina notion of anyathanupapatti. Still, these descriptions are not sufficient to understand the proper nature of tarka (suppositional knowledge), also called uha (presumptive knowledge). More revealing on this point is Siddharsigani: IS INEXPLICABILITY OTHERWISE OTHERWISE INEXPLICABLE? 357 "[Suppositional knowledge] arises in the point of time posterior to [either] perception or non-comprehension, grasps positive concomitance or negative concomitance, is undeviating and its domain pervades the three times, which is based on the sensuous cognition This is in complete agreement with another statement of his: 'Presumptive knowledge is disposed towards grasping the relation of the inferential sign, characterised by inexplicability otherwise, with the probandum that cannot be sensed by perception or by inference. How this presumptive knowledge (ha), or suppositional knowledge (tarka), works in a twofold manner is explained by Devabhadra: *Presumptive knowledge is the cognition of invariable concomitance by reason of comprehension or non-comprehension, e.g.: occurs only when y is there (r), and [ does not occur only when [] is not there (----), which is in agreement with Prabhacandra". If we also take into consideration the passage of NKC p. 423.10424.3 ad LT 2.10 (vide supra, n. 62), we notice that suppositional knowledge (tarka) of the Jaina seems to proceed as follow: whenever there is y, there must be rtoo (r-); or only when there is no, there is no y()). Thereafter the avindbhava relation is established: r is necessarily related to y(avina x-abhava) [ie, occurrence of y logically follows from the occurrence of x, and non-occurrence of r logically follows from the non-occurrence of ; and anyathanupapatti states: If there were no y, there would be no r. Hence the conclusion: but there is x, so there must be In the reasoning, we presume a counter-thesis contrary to 'yis P' and draw a conclusion that is contradicted by observation or other cognitively valid procedures. This is not a very different way of reasoning from the tarka uha recorded in the Myaya tradition:

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358 PIOTR BALCEROWICZ "Suppositional knowledge [consists in] presumptive knowledge in order to cognise the truth (se essence) [of an object]--in [the case of] an object the essence of which is unknown-by explicating [its] causes."" A closer description is found in the Bharya Suppositional knowledge is not reckoned among cognitive criteria, [because] suppositional knowledge is not another cognitive criterion; [it merely) assists cognitive criteria, as an ancillary, to [obtain] the cognition of the truth (sc: essence) [of an unknown object. So, here] is an illustration of that [suppositional knowledge]: is this birth (re mundane existence) brought about by a cause in force or by a [cause] not in force, or [is it] fortuitous? In such a manner proceeds presumptive knowledge with regard to an unknown matter by explicating [its] cause: "If [this birth (ac mundane existence)] [were] brought about by a cause in force, then at the destruction of the cause the destruction of this birth (sc. mundane existence) [would] take place. If [this birth (sc. mundane existence)] were brought about by a [cause) not in force, then the destruction of this birth (sc. mundane existence) [could] not take place [at all], because the destruction of the cause would be impotent. If [this birth (sc. mundane existence)] were fortuitous, then the cause of [its] termination would not be explicable, since [this birth (sc. mundane existence)], once being fortuitously brought about, would not terminate in its turn; hence (the result would be] the non-destruction of this birth (sc. mundane existence)"."" Here the reasoning is as follows: Is x Por Ror... or 5? xis P ris R ris S conclusion is contradicted by observation, inference, etc. -conclusion is contradicted by observation, inference, etc. -conclusion is contradicted by observation, inference, etc. - conclusion is contradicted by observation, inference, etc. therefore ris Q. X... Here we draw a series of conclusions that are not contrary, but are various possible solutions to the question. Then we eliminate all conceivable conclusions but one by showing that they are in the end contradicted this way or another by various cognitive criteria. What remains is the only correct solution left. Not only have we here more than one thesis (ris Pris R, ris S,...), but also we do not presume its counter-thesis (ris non-P). There seems to be some kind of link between the tarka of the Naiyayika and that of the Jainas. Both the Naiyayika and the Jainas must have been aware that they apply the same term, but classify it either as an additional tool (anugrahata), which in itself is not a pramana, or as a genuine pramana. In the light of the passage quoted above from NBh 1.1.1, that claims that tarka is not a separate pramana, IS INEXPLICABILITY OTHERWISE OTHERWISE INEXPLICABLE? 359 it becomes easier to explain the insistence of Jaina authors on the tarka's status of a separate pramana. 5. Conclusion The question now arises whether my demonstration is based on loose associations and verbal analogies? Revealing for us would therefore be what the Jainas themselves had to say on this matter. Let me refer to two verses quoted from Jaina sources (unidentified, Patrasvamin?) by Kamalasila in his Panjika. "Some accept what is not observed in the example without the inferable property to be [the correct] logical reason. However, I [accept] what is impossible in the property-possessor without this [inferable property to be the correct logical reason]. Our inference is accepted as indeed different from the presumption of the Mimamsa school as well as from the inference of the Buddhists, like a man-lion. These verses confirm my supposition that the Jaina model of inference evolved as a blend of Mimamsaka and Buddhist ideas. The image of nara-simha is both different from the man and from the lion, but to have this notion at all, we need essential similarity to both the man and the lion. The Jaina author of these two verses was well aware that the novel model of logic he wanted to apply resembled both Buddhist and Mimamsa models, and therefore he considered it crucial to emphasize the new elements. In their novel concept of inference, the Jainas combined three elements: (1) anyathanupapatti of the Mimamsaka, (2) avindbhava of the Buddhist, and (3) tarka of the Naiyayika. Jokingly we may say that this safeguarded their open attitude in the spirit of anekanta-vada! It is a matter of sheer speculation at this stage of investigation who was the first to combine and reinterpret various elements into a new definition of her and a new framework of anumana, and what motives prompted that shift. Perhaps the inspiration came from the side of the Samkhya. In the Yukti-dipika we come across a highly interesting and relevant passage, which only confirms the appositeness of the subtile of the WezlerMotegi edition ("The Most Significant Commentary on the Samkhyakarika'): "This [presumption] is twofold: deviating (fallacious) and undeviating (legitimate).... The [kind of presumption] which is characterised by

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360 PIOTR BALCEROWICZ inseparable connection and which is undeviating (legitimate) is [merely] inference, for instance: After one has seen a fight between a lion and a boar in vicinity, and after one has seen the lion roaming alone with its body marked with wounds [inflicted] by the boar, it is understood that the boar has been defeated. Why? Because there is an undeviating relation between the victory and defeat in the case of the lion and the boar. In this case, if one has seen the victory of the lion, the defeat of the other (viz. the boar) is understood in an undeviating manner. What else could that be except inference?! For-[in the case] of someone who understands the association of two related [objects.r and that have been comprehended-such an understanding of the related [object]y from one [object ) of two related [objects.rand previously perceived is inference. And accordingly, presumption cannot be different from that [inference]. This is in all probability the first, historically speaking, extant source in which we find the idea of arthapatti (based on anyathanupapatti) combined with the relation of avindbhava to form a variety of anumana. We do find another attempt to subsume the arthapatti procedure under the anumana scheme in Prasastapada-bhasya. *Presumption [derived] from an object of perception is nothing but fallacious. [Presumption derived] from hearing is inference [based] on something inferred." It is however very unlikely that this tradition influenced the development of the Jaina concept in question, because we lack here even one of the two crucial elements (avindbhava and tarka)." Despite serious drawbacks, this was a crucial move: the Jainas claimed to have one invariant relation that allows extrapolation irrespective of whether we could cite any positive instantiations (sapaksa) or negative instantiations (vipaksa). In general, this invariant relation no longer necessitated empirical exemplification, and tended to become an autonomous logically valid rule, and not merely an extrapolation from experience. Perhaps for the first time in Indian philosophy we can observe a strong tendency to emancipate reasoning from empirical instantiations. There was a price to pay. The burden of proving the invariability of our assumptions was shifted from the logical reason (het) onto the suppositional knowledge (tarka). The situation did become different though: we no longer had inferential rules and relations (het and vyap) that were liable to falsification. Instead, in the Jaina model, we were told to be able to infer by using what were believed to be infallible rules. In this way the question of verification of the logical reason was dissociated from the level of the logical reason. The verificatory IS INEXPLICABILITY OTHERWISE OTHERWISE INEXPLICABLE? 361 principles no longer constituted the nature (lakyana) of the logical reason, but were transferred to the second-level domain of the suppositional knowledge (tarka). What remained uncertain were still the methods to know infallible principles on which tarka rests. Consequently, I would view Jaina concept of logic based on the notion of anyathanupapatti as an attempt to solve the problem of induction, which is entailed by the generally empirically oriented Indian logic. The problem of induction involves primarily two phases: (1) one has to established an invariant relation between two individual particulars (visesa), which typify two classes, and subsequently (2) one has to extrapolate in order to establish a invariant relation between the two typified classes (samanya). The difficulty is that the two phases are equally defeasible and open to possible revision, if a counter-example obtains, and thereby that contributes to the increase in unreliability of the established relation. From the point of view of Jaina ontology, the two phases merged. We no longer had a two-phased inductive reasoning: by observing a relation between two particulars one instantly could extrapolate to whole classes. As soon as one could establish an invariant relation between two classes, the inference would loose its induction-based deficiency. A question now arises: how far is the distinction between induction and deduction relevant to Indian logic at all? The mere fact that Indian models of inference in general, it seems, resorted to empirical exemplification and left no scope for deductive reasoning would rather speak against ascribing a deductive character to Indian logic. In Indian logic we link not ideas or propositions, but events. That is why the inductive-deductive distinction seems not at all applicable to the realm of anumana. Where it does seem highly relevant is a kind of 'metaanumand, viz. second-level patterns that underlie first-level patterns of particular cases of anumana that pertain to events. What the Jaina seemed to attempt to achieve was to formulate conditions of validity of patterns of reasoning which we could classify as second-level inference, viz. proper logic where the distinction between inductive and deductive starts to apply. That would be the anumana based on the principles of avindbhava and anyathanupapatti, whereas the problem of traditional first-level anumana, which needs to be inductively instantiated, is shifted to the realm of tarka. That is why in my opinion the Jaina solution, albeit unique in India, cannot be deemed successful. The Jaina verses, allegedly by Patrasvamin, quoted from Kamalasila's Panjika, as well as several other formulations also show that we can dispense with distantas because our inference is concerned

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362 PIOTR BALCEROWICZ IS INEXPLICABILITY OTHERWISE OTHERWISE INEXPLICABLE? 363 which gradually requires further developments in the contextdisambiguating tools of the theory of spad-vada and naya-vida. with the subject alone. This was the next step in the economical trend to dispense with all unnecessary elements of our reasoning, and it opened a genuine possibility of developing strictly formal logic, in the sense of being independent from circumstances. Mere understanding of the logical rules allows us to infer correctly, without taking recourse to empirical instantiations: NOTES 'If a person to be taught recollects the logical reason as inseparably connected with the probandum in all cases, how could he then having recognised this [logical reason) in the thesis--not understand the probandum 7102 Additional positive and negative instantiations have no logical or formal value, because the inference is valid anyway. Nonetheless, they do have practical, or didactic value of instruction. The examples do not fulfil any formal role any longer and they are not necessary to validate the inference: the determination of two properties (sadhya and sadhana) in the example is already snea, nence it can be recalled (sambandha-smaranan. That is why the Jainas advise to apply a ten-membered proof formula for educational purposes alone. However, under certain conditions and provided one remembers the invariant relation, one can argue by applying a single-membered proof formula, that consists of the logical reason alone! For Siddhasena Mahamati, even the thesis (paksa) does not have to be necessarily expressed, if it can be understood from the context, the demand for a thesis is to disambiguate one's own statements, in case they cannot be easily understood from the context: I would like to thank Jonardon Ganer for his comments and suggestions. Inexplicability otherwise' in mentioned in NA 22abanatupapanawant heter latranom irita -The definition of the logical reason has been proclaimed to be inexplicability otherwise. The inseparable connection of her with sadhya is mentioned in NA Sac: sadhovna-bhuno lingar sadhu-nefcawatan saam! anumanaw..., NA 13c: Fidd wind- o hetor waco ya panipaidatamgaritham awwangwi... (vide infra, p. 16). Inexplicability otherwise' in mentioned in Akalahka's auto-commentary (Syd-wrath ad loc: (vol. 2, pp. 434-435.1-2): na hi tadatwa-road-wrant fiduw fabwe prinaratanupapan-ilantena d o w ina eta-laksana-siddhit, vide infan. 20. The inseparable connection of het with sadhwa is mentioned in LT, vol. 2, p. 434 (Pramano-pravesa 2 (Partosa pariccheda) 1lcd-12ab), wiele infra p. 346. YAT p. 122.20-123.2, YA 49 (wide infra, n. 23) and YATp. 127.2-3 (ad YA 50): lalo didi padarthailan parasparajahud-y-etneka-sablan paannnrrvrkaateriuthaaalppynnn. *PA 3.10: ennnnnnppaannnpaalkst ieems micrice ierar, Alias Patrakesarin / Pitrakesarisvamin (?), cf. Pandita Dalsukh Malvaniya's note (p. 270.15-18) in his Tigwanan' to Santi Suri's wann-sitra-viriba p. 102.27. Patrasvamin is occasionally (SUKHLAL-DOSHI (1928), CHATTERJEE (1978: 331)) identified with Vidyananda. Patrasvamin, however, preceded Santaraksita ( 725788cf. STEINKELLNER-MUCH (1995: 56)), the teacher of Kamalasila; cf. BHATTACHARYYA (1926: ixvi-ixvii): "In that case Patrasvimin must be an earlier author than both Santaraksita and Vidyananda, and he must have first propounded the theory that valid reason is that the existence of which cannot be maintained unless it is invariably concomitant with the major term... air 700 A.D. Therefore, he must be some other Vidyananda than the author of the Stoka-artita on Umasvati's TamarthaJitra which was composed around 850 CE, see UPADHYE (1971: '14-15), PATHAK (1930: passin) and PATHAK (1930-31: parin), who refers to him as Patrakesari Vidyananda or as Patrakesarisvami, and BALCEROWICZ (2000:45). SSVR ad 3.13, p. 521.5-6: lad udtam parar mina. Nanarhinupapannanan yarra latra Inayena bim! awyathanyapaana yatra tatra trama kuin lli[- TSa 1369) A reference to the work is found in DHAKY (1995: 43), who refers to Jugal Kisbor Mukhtar's article: 'Sarimatisutra aur Siddhasena' in Jaina Saking awr Inikaso par Visada Prataisa, Calcutta 1956: 538-543 [the work was not available to moc). * PS 2.5cd: anume tha tal-rule sadbidyo, nastrani. Cf. T$ 2.1, p. 13.16-17: amabus in-lakrano her thaita ad atka paksa-dharmashnapatanam patsvydytis ca, and NP p. 1.5-6: herur ir- r ah. Eine wwar trainipsam pakrodharmarami saraise saman watse ceramnamin. * The use of gamatan may be an additional clue to post-Kumarilan date of Patrasvimin, cf. MSV 5.4 (anamana pariacheda) 4 (p. 248.3.7): sambandho vrapir istara linga-dharmasy lingina rssy ry kaiklllass tears oovrai pare/ and MSV 5.4 (amundna pariccheda) 22cd-23ab (p. 251): said p EMI HEpirate as eithere arteries / "f14ed) the pronouncement of this thesis) has to be made here as showing the domain of the logical reason. (15) Otherwise, for a person to be apprised, who is confused regarding the domain of the logical reason intended by the proponent, the logical reason might appear to be suspected of being contradictory, just like... [16] ...for a person watching an archer's skill, the archer who hits without the specific mention of the target [is endowed with both] skill and its opposite.com Would that mean that this decrease in the number of members of the proof formula finally entails the consequence that the reasoning of the anyathanupapati type, based on the avind have relation, tends to gravitate towards a deductive formula with two variables (sad and Jadhana)? At the same time, however, as a counter-development, the procedures of reasoning seem to become more context-dependent,

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364 PIOTR BALCEROWICZ IS 'INEXPLICABILITY OTHERWISE' OTHERWISE INEXPLICABLE? 365 we gume na presungur "[TSa 1364) artinya ane drs nun transitada tam tikrlatnanas 13 [TSa 1365) aguinayapannat araw arate oko-labanata.no har car latnanalo na wall [TSa 1367) awidtava samhandhas - meditaci! andsamlings-Henry en plattell. [TSa 1368] anampapannana para darah Awal pw day'ennn kaam [TSa 1369) dicipant i ! and the TSa 1371) ralatan herrit ara kantarild palad bdw sad imatail... [TS 1379) fenalkulatramo pradhand gematonak! pro-warmdditir anu diwartai pertalia For verses TSa 1372-1976, see below pp. 349-350. The above fragment is also translated in KUNST (1939). "Cf. NAT ad NAV 5.2 (H: p. 54.1 and V:p 35.4): NAT ad loe n dinden arman maturantimino potrdi didad tnnn caakpprkk evr athnanai pattayaangkpptkkia di par t -'A gloss on the phrase "being his son, etc. Here the inference [is as follows: "He is dark-complexioned because he is his son, just like the son who is just being seen". By the word "etc." a reference is made to the erroneous following reasoning): "these mangoes are ripe, because they grow on the same branch, like the mango which is just being eaten. Devabhadra clearly regards the above examples as cases of unwarranted inference from sampling. However, in their structure they do not seem to differ from some cases of inference from sampling regarded as valid ones, for instance: -invalid inference: these mangoes are ripe, because they grow on the same branch, like the mango which is just being calen, valid inference:"all mango trees are blossoming, because one mango tree is blossoming' (see below, n. 12, NAV 5.2). Interestingly enough, Patrasvimin's register, found in TSa, of valid inferences that do not fulfil the conditions does not overlap with those mentioned, e.g. in NAV 5.2: Aumenaw i aseddipanar, are end and tim mailaksown awe maand w alcanhar adharcandant mitedade chalan g - c u -ci cand did m anerul verde c idal padharmanuvirate by anummima -'If you concede that it is indeed that inferential sign inseparably connected with the probandum that is love the condition of inference, then what is the use of requirement of the triplet of characteristics for the logical reason? Certainly, that being the case, the triplet of characteristics of the logical reason is useless because this [inferential sign inseparably connected with the probandum) alone leads to the comprehension of the inferendum). For it is as follows: we do infer-even without the characteristics of the inherence of a property in the locus-like in the following (examples): (1) from the reflection of the moon in the water (we infer] the moon in the sky. (2) from the rise of the constellation of the Pleiads (we infer] the rise of the Polisi constellation. (3) from one blossoming mango tree in the proper season we infer that all mango-trees are blossoming (4) from the rise of the m an (we in the opening of clusters of bad white waterlilies. (5) from a tree (we inferits) shadow,etc. C. KELLNER (1977: 97 . 146). H ein TSVA p. 203 (the discussion of a l l and the refutation of in laban is found there on pp. 198-217), in TBV (vol. II, p. 569.28-29), in NASV 43 and PMI 2.1.9 533 (p. 45.17-18). 1SE.g. Hemacandra's criticism against the Buddhist idea of trai in PMI 2.1.9933 (p. 45.1-16) closely follows the exposition of Patrasvamin's aphorisms quoted in TSa. NA Sau sidhd Mwne linguisdid . w w w / anwani... NA 13: Midwind-Muwe haturaco par prandakan parantamaan tapaki-paandall NA 22ab: Artippanunt hetor laksana inaw "As regards the expression Android cf. YS 2.16 ff. and NBh on NS 1.1: human sinarka Adnan dunia dan wanity in canary artheidni samog buddha t a dbiquechan, as well as NA 28: naarra plalar knnnrnnn vngkaallmaamaa / Aaniamentargaritre teamti. hane dit. On the issue of the avoidance of things which should be avoided, in the appropriation of things which are worth appropriating and in the indifference to things which deserve indifference', see WEZLER (1984). "LT 2.12cd-13ab (Prami l 2 (Parketa-panicchade) 12cd-13ab; Vol. 2 p. 434): iddialaran ligi dhiraman palan ini buldu "Since in the Diiniga's Dharmakini's logic, the probans (Aldund can either be the logical reason as essential property ( n iidu ) in case of relation of essential identity (Adam ) or the logical son as effect ( - ) in case of the relation of causality lad-part), therefore since in Akalanka's example the tree is examined as either the essential nature or the effect of the shadow, it is clear that the inference Akalahka has in mind is that from the tree to the shadow: hic cham, for the same example comp. n. 12 and p. 350. 36 LTV 2.12cd-13ab (Arimino.prwi2: Part i cle 12cd-13ab: Vol. 2 p. 635.1-3): Vlyti na e-da w l indiuidu ularirar Alathai in ehr-latam-sitht, mk' repetitehillai natatus king dirawamiden The verse (YA 49. p. 122) reads: tamikknnn avakitham arreen my maayaakkll anaman ito ng w asthant ad idream // O Jinal) Your persuasion (based on logical reasoning (a ndal' is the description of an object, which is not contradicted by what is perceived or by testimony. Here in your teaching the being is an external and internal] object, determined as an entity the nature of which consists in continued existence, rise and annihilation." Samantabhadra's and Vidyananda's description equate one with a n s, as a separate indirect cognitive criterion (framid), in addition to testimony (d m ). However, the Jainas of the non-Agamic tradition recognise one indirect cognitive criterion ( b) that bifurcates into two main divisions, and and Idada. Comp, similar idea in NA Bab ( bivanid out from thaidhodnaand NA 9b (adress-wiredhatan). See also Vidyananda's comments adYA 49: Tiki: fomas' carma M adawa yudarth kaalllk caaky raampkaar Alexantheerlmyaa att-vaikaar Aarate 'kaamaataannn mkkll paatriyapurikaar-paayppkaam ne p a nik-mana preta tad- dan arribar pran i y t te ima udarna stad ir prane

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366 PIOTR BALCEROWICZ IS INEXPLICABILITY OTHERWISE OTHERWISE INEXPLICABLE? 367 sebami For the peculiar use of was the last member of the compound (e.g. nr phim) see for instance NAV 29.17: inare intamahudiy tapu SYATA YA 49, p. 122.20-123.2: at clipathiyapandhu- mo-ruer athari' cnnnmkll aattrrisprurievaattaikaalvaannn raamaa Aaran frangumawardharyumurtaputter in drugamdidieniri m See also Vidyananda's discussion of amputhanyamalt and the refutation of in labrana is on pp. 198-217. Siddhasena maintains that dradila is not an essential part of syllogistic' reasoning inasmuch as the relation of invariable concomitance ( w ow) suffices to prove the thesis, see NA 20: antar wa r adware siddhar bakir-dlaka yarthd syd tad aradw y ayu-vido vichell -Since the probandum is proved only by the intrinsic invariable concomitance, an exemplification from outside would be pointless, experts in logic have recognised that also in its absence (this exemplification is such (pointless). Conspicuously Siddhasena refers to some earlier tradition ( e-vidovi ) *SBh 1.1.5 (p. 11): arthrir Andri Snowboard gradutely are appaa yashminaran caakkiyvr keemraa 27 MSV 5.7 (arttapatti-pariccando) (p. 320): pramano-sata-wito yairdrto nima blower ennntaannn vr vaaynnn arpatti Malaysi "LT 2.16 (Pramanarea 2(Pankara fricchedd) 16; Vol. 2, p. 462-463): adriya-para-childer alten lawiki wicht tad-aikana wikander anwarmapapaita // * Se people infer the existence of various invisible events, eg assume that other people are endowed with consciousness, etc., even though these are not directly perceived LT 2.16 (Pramana provela 2 (Panton paricched) 16; Vol. 2, p. 462): ada-para- caider abchian loubka it! Aad-abang-abander mangpaat NKC, p. 463.1-6. ad c redit c ardena baita graha parigrabataryMiwkilde bataily atro dreiddle arse para cildininko isurina-gula magpari-larang dikirattad Aldret aru- b adiracam-sena tapetamata This is an interesting point to notice how differently the same ostensibly obvious Case can be described depending on cultural background and presuppositions. In European cultural context in general the question whether a person is dead or alive is determined in terms of what the Jainas would consider mere symptoms. This attests to practical usefulness of 'inexplicability otherwise' and its indispensability in any activity ascribed by the Jainas. NAV 1.8: ... sanawuthuppannarradharitacchina-ssd -lingpotkkvaikkppaal cirmm iataiyaar tor-prairai-prime Mia-nyi-patindarsanad, anyathalota muddhidha prarangal >> For the Mimamsaka position, comp see above an. 26, 27 (SBh: strto de and MSV 5.7 Arthaparicinde 1). For the Jaina examples, comp. above an. 21, 23 (YA 49.p.122: umidin a damNA Sab: d a tud will paramdriditidina, and NA 9b: apa-wirohata). Similarly, commenting on LT 2.12 (p. 435.4-5). Prabhicand states explicitly that the invariable concomitance (comsists in the Imeperable connection with the inferable property that is qualified by a distinctive feature not subverted by what is accepted (s testimony) (k kittle-is-naamkdaiaip pa..) The idea that we may rightfully presume the existence of something perceptually inaccessible, either because of subtlety (e.g. some invisible potential, as in the example below), distance or time, is accurately expressed by Siddharigani in NAV 1.14: arthparts papadi-gocari- t ill-paddiduga dahane a ddiowhudder arranjaran dan pemand samadhitam awianian paikan pramadiwany ent- a vad'However, taking into account that people conclude from fire, etc., another object, which is additional to the domain of previous perception (andundeviating.namely, that fire) is possessed of the power of burning, etc., inasmuch as such entities as blisters, etc., that constitute the domain of perception, etc., are otherwise inexplicable, presumption (100) appropriates undeniably cognitive validity, because it satisfies the definition of this cognitive criterion *CI. NBh 2.2.1: atbild par ardui dati prin prangat M undine te veprat pragut nyarimga a r bu kiwaru preguntes AS (Fantas ) 15.29: padatta al padre d amit See, for instance, the usage of the presumptive scheme in Dharmottara's reasoning in NBT 1.9 (p. 62.2): ckrataan karacidapi wanan Onderwe, it would be inclinable how the sensory consciousness could be based on the eye. See above p. 344 and n. 11. Despite some similarity, this is a different kind of reasoning that the one found in MSV 2 (cadand ) 182ab (p. 74-75): Jimane pun e sde drape nidarianam/ Interestingly, this case is first classified by Siddharsigani as a proper instance of presumption in NAV 1.14: arttapam prascidi gocari p otidia ut datangan didikan Auderar durant darsan. paramaian awabarilan para prami d rary en alakunyoyil Immediately afterwards Siddharigani adds that even this case is an instance of indirect cognition ( or in Samantabhadra's terms and), NAV 1.14:an parte hartues granditaru dersione di prestandaard And all these (sub-varieties are included in the indirect cognition because they are apt to produce) a sensation of the object under discussion by the means of perception of another object which is otherwise inexplicable.' MAV 5.7 (arthianti pariccheda) 878-88 (p. 335): sambandet fra deid astill arawididyasamariasami sn ng W uid anda adal ana py and Mandani labbet end and their mall Cf. 'impossibility otherwise' (anathanamt ) in TSa 1367 (widewpu, n. 10). C. TS 1.1: mag-darsianas-and-cdni mo d ra "CC VP 1.30: did te dharma antena suratate! raa kaangmaa pyrmmaa And the normative principle cannot be established by reasoning without testimony, even the knowledge of [Vedic seers, too, was preceded by testimony Also Siddhasena Divakar (probably around the same time, c. 500 CE) expresses a similar idea that the application of reason is limited and subordinate to scriptural testimony (pm, the eschatological aim, ergo the truly ethical dimension and

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368 PIOTR BALCEROWICZ IS INEXPLICABILITY OTHERWISE OTHERWISE INEXPLICABLE? 369 soteriological destiny (e.g. one's capability to attain liberation cannot be known without the scriptural testimony, see STP 3.43-45: danike dhammado aterior her-woya Aartha wate-do bandwidao bad II hamisamma-diamananda-critte d nrkaaskoop-as a badthaan e-mayana je spadesammavum maayaam, s amayo.PURCH Siddharthae anno Il -The exposition of normative principle (or of properties) is twofold: the exposition without reasoning (scriptural; d) and the exposition based reasoning Further, the scriptural exposition ( d d) [distinguishes/deals with beings competent for liberation and incompetent for liberation The characteristic feature of the exposition based reasoning is to argue rationally] that the being competent for liberation, who is endowed with the understanding of conation, correct cognition and correct conduct, will necessarily bring an end to suffering The one who [applies) reasoning to a topic (within the scope of the exposition based reasoning (sc. in rational discourse) and (who applies) scripture to scriptural exposition, demonstrates his own doctrine. The other one [who fails to do so] abuses teachings. "See eg GANERI (2001:1-2). * Cf. VP 1.34 data-data-lalandim bhedid Miamija / Mladinim anamnena presidir a liderland! -"Since the endowments fof things) are different due to difference in condition, place and time, the proof of things through inference is most difficult Notice the pun on it by way of quoting the same verse with some modification in its very refutation found in TSa 1476: aart-desia-dilanda bhedid Minnirwakil keeppaannnkllai vaayaannn ad rikattai roaridad ... the proof of things through inferencer morso dificult on air dari "CL VP 1.34: pranimi rohat basilaranumit cttirrkaannn kaaroapamare 'Even (when) a thing is inferred with much effort by expert logicians, it is still] explicable in another way by other more skilled (logicians) Notice the pun on it by way of refutation in Ta a 1477: parendrars at a miraai krkrkkllmr entvr Nai "NKC LT 2.12 p. 444.16) sad prac y i samitra Here ad praatinde ranjant, and it make Cl, eg PVSV 3.24-25 (p. 185): armilaba dd wedd pamman paavttaikk y pan-Intuan Mediaalaip r ii pradara, and NB(1).3.31: h anifundwand prarat sana mwanada m citam Eg the cases mentioned in TSa 1371ab and NAT ad NAV 5.2: see also n. 11 and P. 344. SI See the examples on p. 349-350. *2 See the criticism in NKCR440.11-441.9. * C. NKC ad LT 2.12 (p. 440.4fE). SCL e.g. BHATT (1989: 218 ff.). s vides yra pp. 344 and 349. The above counters the supposition of UNO (1993: 160) that there is no divergence of opinion anong Indian philosophical systems that these two (e. and patro-durmar-P.B.) are postulated as indispensable factors, either separately or jointly, for obtaining the conclusion, or the final inferential cognition (mm) ** See e.g PV (P) 1.287cd (p. 61) PV (S) 1.287ab (p. 109): anumandirno longer bie-latranum/ -'The basis for infference is the inferential sign, which is characterised by the inseparable connection and PVV ad loc:undert said t hich allakanan yana tarati The term and was, however, not the sole property of the Buddhist and it were probably not the Buddhists who coined it (wide ifa, n. 60). However, I deliberately speak of the Buddhist relation of individ, for this relation is always discussed by the Jains authors in the context of such Buddhist sotions as train or Adid and ad-ugal SCE also Prajnakaragupta's analysis in PVA (p. 70 in nu vinde e l krpaalr pllvr kaakaraind. GANERI (2001: 152). Cf. also the Chapter 4.7 in GANERI (2001: 114-118). * GANERI (2001: 152). This idea goes back probably to the Vida-vidhana Vavi), an carlier work of Vasubandhu (), see Fr. Al 7 hour watsad visesan "The logical reason is the difference from dissimilar cases The term window was not an innovation of Dinnaga, for it is already attested in Vado-widWVIVI) of Vasubandhu as a relation validating the logical reason (Fr. B 5); ladry-awddw-dharmadarslanan her 'Logical reason is the demonstration of a property which is inseperably connected with a property of such a kind to be infered)', cf. FRAUWALLNER (1957:118, 136) and FRANCO (1990: 202). We find it also in PBh (2.12.26.0) (250), p. 46-47: www.sanaira deso-taldvind-tatan Harasya lingam. In this way the inferential sign of the other (viz. of the sign-possessor) is inseparably connected with it) as regards place and time in all cases, as well as in PBh (2.12.2b.0) (261), p. 49: samdidie pyawindhavand anumanomen *Equivalence as a cognitive criterion) is nothing but inference, in so far as it is based on the inseparable connection.' Cf. also NENNINGER (1992: 124 ff.). "NKC p. 4218-9 LT 2.10: ayum avindt dat d e sciandom adatto trata-mama-mucamat majambandhu-vocant. NKC p. 423.10-4243 LT 2.10yae containw indo tratami COMO na sambande-acarat And apylimme par winddica-abdom unr-nunwar -Mive par t karyk ennn krp c tattippaayrmaaktaurapat-araternity entin [se NA 17 n. 65), atat pend a nt quatre piatra daima intre samnet puurnir ni tatradimo na m argir nitiate dinimo and in-car but ante in ageri daima yene pratheriumararadism krrk ll, kaaraakyaridasie prbacil em muulcase arid vaattdir atima Akaril palarspels aga iad knnnpapatti - klai maannnk ll anpamaannn caar ditumena atat in induppatica dhaimau tamad asaw fan-patiti Comp. also PNT 3.29: www.eparat a matapatid pratarat. "CI NAV 17.1: by wagwaran dumasar apanter i This wyanen samdi vopacknad anparangpamin lakrawan aku sadhyayarete aparitiawidhumdinare lasa ataupun kesto wpagat po pokiym ars, thimahiyawadmapappaiter ad; etc,

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370 PIOTR BALCEROWICZ *PA (V) 3.89 = PA (J) 3.90: vyutpanna-prayogas tu lathapapatty-anyathanupapatter va. 45 NA 17: hetos tathopapattyd vi syt prayogo nyathap va dvi-vidho yatarendpi sadkya-siddhir bhaved iti NKC p. 448.8 (adLT 2.12) "idam asmin saty eva bhavati ato nyathana bhavaty eva". This passage occurs in NAT as a rule for suppositional knowledge (ha, tarka), cf. n. 91. Interestingly, seemingly a similar formulation is found in TSa 1692: asmin sati bhavaty eva na bhavaty asaritical tasmad ato bhavaty eva yuktir esa 'bhidhiyate This reasoning principle is called yw and is attributed by Santaraksita to Caraka the physician (TSAP ad loc. Caraka-vaidy) in TSa 1693ab: pramanantaram eveyam ity dha carako muni The main difference between Caraka's puki and Jaina suppositional knowledge lies in the fact that Caraka avails himself of a causal relationship (karya-karanata, cf. TSa 1696), which is pointed out by Kamalasila (TSaP ad loc tad-bhava-bhavitvena yat-karyata-pratipattiriyam yuktif), whereas for the Jainas suppositional knowledge extends to all kinds of anumana. Furthermore, we can notice apparently different position of er for Caraka the restrictive particle binds the result in the causal relationship (bhavaty eva), whereas for the Jainas, esa binds the antecedent in an inference (asmin saty eva). 67 On this issue comp. UNO (1993). "E.g. NKC p. 434-435 adLT 2.11cd-12ab: sadhyena istabadhitasiddha-visesanavisistena avindbhavo vyaptik, NKC p. 420.1 ff. ad LT 2.10: tacha hivyaptih sambandhorthanam, sa ca desatah kalato va kasyacit kenacit syat? na, NKC p. 418.15-419.1 ad loc. (LT 2.10): vyaptir hi sadhya-sadhanayor avinabhaval, see also: NKC p. 315.9 etc. E.g. NRA: ad MSV 5.4 (anumana-pariccheda) 4ab (p. 248.4): vyapti niyamah 10 E.g. NKC p. 423.11-424.3, or NAV 5.3: tatha karya-svabhavanpalabdhi-ripalinga-traya-niyamo pi kila tadatmya-tad-utpatti-laksana-sambandhastitvam etesv even, and NAV 18.1: sadhanam tad-gamako hetuk, tayoh sadhya-sadhanayor vyaptir, idam anena vina na bhavanity-eva-rupa... "Eg. PV (P) 3.1c: avindbhava-niyamad, and PV (P) 3.31c: avindbhava-niyamo NAV 18.1: na hi saha-darsanad eva kvacit sarvatredam amuna vina na bhavatiti sidhyati. Cf. also PV (P) 3.31: karya-karana-bhavad va svabhavad va niyamakat avindbhava-niyamo 'dariaman na darsanat!! -The law of the inseparable connection is [based] either on the cause-and-effect relationship or on the [essential] identity; [it is not based] on non-observation or on observation," as well as PVin II.63 (p. 94,23-26): gyu dan bras buidos po am Iran bin nes par byed pa las Imed na mibyun nes pa ste Ima mthon las min mihon las min 73 Cf PV (P) 3.13b: ma cadarsana-matrena vipake vyabhicarita 14 MSV 5.4 (Anumana-pariccheda) 12-14 (p. 249-250): bhiyo-darsana-gamya ca vyaptih samanya-dharmayoh jayate bheda-haneh kacic capi visepayab!! kritikodayam alaksya rohiny-asati-kiptivat vyaptes ca driyamanavah kascid dharmah prayojahah!! 75 .IS INEXPLICABILITY OTHERWISE OTHERWISE INEXPLICABLE? 371 "asmin saty amund bhavyam "iti saktya miripyate anye para-prayuktanam vyaptinam upajivakah Cf. VP 1.35: parecam asamakhyayam abhyasad eva jayate mani-padi-vijnanam tad-vidam nanumanikam -The experts' knowledge of precious stones and coins, which cannot be conveyed to others, arises from from repeated practice. It is not inferential." 36 NKC p. 421.8-9, adLT 2.10: kinca, avindbhavah sambandhak sa ca sambandhigrahana-prvakah, sambandhinau ca dvau dvau videsau, atah katham sarvipasamharena vyaptir grahitum sakya? "NKC p. 423.8-10, adLT 2.10: yad apy abhihitam "avindbhavah sambandhah, sa ca sambandhi-grahana-prvaka "ity-adi; tad apy anendiva pratyakkyatam samanydpalakita-vitepayor vyapreh sarvpasamharenaiva sambhavat na hi tatra anantyddi-dopo avakasam labhate 78 Cf. NAV 29.23: asmat kathancid bhedabhedinav evaitan-Therefore these two, (ie. the universal and the particulars), are somehow truly [both] different and not different from each other." Cf. LT 2.47cd (p. 646): dravya-paryaya-samanya-videsatmartha-nisthitam, as well as YA 40 (p. 94): samanya-nisha vividha visesah padam visesantara-paksapati antar-visesantara-vrtito nyat samana-bhavam nayate visesam 80 Cf. NKC p. 423.3-5: kasya kena vyapti iti, tatra yasya yena avyabhicarah tasya tena vyaptik samanya-vilesavatas ca dhumadeh samanya-videsavatigny-dinavyabhicarat tarya tendiva vyptik. Both the criticism of bio-darsana and the discussion of how up is cognised is found in NKC p. 429.9-434.11 adLT 2.11. Cf. e.g. NKC p. 429.19-20 adLT 2.11: ki ca pratyaksa-matram bhayo-darianasahayam anvaya-vyatireka-sahakrtam va pratyaksam vypti-grahanam prabhavet? ..., and NKC p. 431.12 ff. ad LT 2.11: etena bhayo-dramvaya ity-adi pratyuktam... Cf. e.g. NKC p. 433.16 ff. "To establish a first-level inference we have to establish the yap, for which we would require a second-level inference, for the yap of which to establish we would require a third-level inference, etc. Cf. NKC ad loc. (p. 433.21-22): sarvatra ity-adi. sarvatra prathamanumanavat dvitiye 'py anumane avilesat. Very similar argumentation is found in NAV 1.19: pratyaksanumanayas ca pramanya kuta iti cintyam na tavat pratyaksat... 85 LT 2.11cd-12ab (p. 426): avikalpa-dhiya lingam na kincit sampratiyate nanumanad asiddharvat pramanantaram njasam Vivrtih: na hi pratyaksam "yavan kacid dhimah kalanttare deiantare ca pavakardiva karyam narthantarasya" iti iyato vyparan karum samartham sannihita-visayabalotpatter avicarakatvat napy anumanantaram, sarvatraviesat na hi sakalyena lingarya lingind vyapter asiddhau kvacit kincid anumanam nama. "tan na apratyaksam anumana-vyatiriktam pramanam "ity ayuktam; linga-pratipatteh pramanantart Prabhacandra explains at an earlier portion of NKC p. 418.14-419.2 ad loc. (LT 2.10): kah punar ayam tarko nama iti cet? vyapti-jnanam, vyaptir hi sadhya-sadhanayor avindbhavak tad-grahi jaanam tarko bhidhiyate, tatra tasyaiva pramanyat (recte: pramanyal, jaanantaranam tad-grahane samartydsambhavatah tatra pramanydnupapatteh-What is it what you call suppositional knowledge? This is the cognition of the invariable concomitance. For the invariable concomitance is the

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372 PIOTR BALCEROWICZ IS INEXPLICABILITY OTHERWISE OTHERWISE INEXPLICABLE? 373 inseparable connection of the inferable property (id ) and the logical reason. Such a cognition that groups this invariable concomitance) is called suppositional knowledge, because only this (suppositional knowledge] possesses cognitive validity as regards that [invariable concomitance), in so far as cognitive validity of other kinds of cognition is inexplicable as regards that invariable concomitance), because they are] have no efficacy to grasp that [invariable concomitance), CE. NKC p. 434.9-10 ad LT 2.11: ligame n t franare artist vaangkmaannnaannni yetu thisays raamaannn-viyaal bidalanul. Akalahka follows the Canonical tradition subdivides p i ntomat dine, or sensuous cognition, and trad e, which comprises testimony, inference ete, see LT 2.10 and LT 2.61 (p. 682): al prabant parcarica didhaniwantvida antar-Add wante omad parata The tradition of Siddhasena Mahamati (and probably Patrasmin) differs from this tradition, see BALCEROWICZ (2001: xii). "See also NAV 119: dawid anuman adlaw and m e gratando dla gocaro iuii want and Therefore, since there is no other logical alternative, anybody postulating inference should also accept suppositional knowledge, which is disposed towards grasping that relation, the domain of which are three times (and) which is undeviating "LT 2.49b (p. 652.1-2): Man c he Artisakalenin tanto adiget "NAV 18.2: amewataka grati-pratimo r kalo-Admo padicaria vAhile we generaya man naatkasay i tikapa pramoniniana samanho grafikayetanol NAV 1.13: sito pro dramud datidan Lottane-linghandhagratana.promat pum aram. NAT NAV 1.14: palamidalamh- w a nita yurtidumami ay nakating b y Note that the same passage occurs in NKC, see n. 66, but there it is the formulation of avind ! NKC, sep. 351, comp. n. 66. NS 1.140: ag e rangpur adina aratat NBh 11.1: tarkem pro sangria Andorradinitran prumid anwradar myndinde kalan datangan dan jimatan Anand inaruwe dhanidark and armitam illam angive the tirandato a purpure-Jadraten und war henched wapanno Juniwdestat att patena Me hichdarand anuparannelandda atharmitant, ale ad inurumdan narayanti Mriym-ruarnnn keparate, an immoranetnians " TSaPad TSa 1386 (p. 409.12-14) cngkrlv papersenee hearts ! n krm alarmiyaarkkpplr nineN arispatialar.iet knnnm vaarm r! knnnvaallvr vaakkyae The text in Embar Krishnamacharya's edition a nd should be emended as above, cf. PATHAK (1930: 156-7) and KUNST (1939: 26 n. 3). If we concern the latest proposal of evaluating the data, YDI is a much earlier work than any of the Jaina sources discussed in my paper: MEJOR (2000:263): 'all that gives a solid basis for the lower limit of the Yuto 550 CE, which is in agreement with the date proposed by FRAUWALLNER.", and MEJOR (2000: 273): 'In this case YD cannot be placed later than 600 C.E. YDI (adSK.4) p. 73.7-18: war dann d uidhibicrimi dartinian windhavainni af kesarugor har sannanlalar dalam berulan besar ward-wanitaMarinaw p inta alabiya granadele jio wardia in tad anuman kanham sind kenar-wartaver you wardjayaw layer ga n sumandhat are valdkeranimo jauspalad arimanasa para gratuite r ud teminde dalgan amhandsamada i prijat prut ditandard-amband med handitantaru pranua ad amare han fregattirato me limit the a rat PBh (2.12.2.0) (260). p. 48-49: darsinarhad and when sind ennnaiyaallaa Interestingly, Dharmottara (c.740-800) seems (or pretends) not to know the notion of award for he does not refer to it, at least not in NBT, even in the discussion of two forms of the examples in NB 3.28 ff(-DhPr 3.26 fr). A reference to it is made by Durvekamisrn (970-1030), commenting on NB 3.26 in DhPr P. 16721-22 THCE BALCEROWICZ (2000:33): 'In NA 20 Siddhasena maintains that dr is not an essential part of "syllogistic reasoning, inasmuch as the relation of invariable concomitance( ) suffices to prove the thesis. This is a continuation of the economical trend in Indian logie-that starts with Vaubandhu and his Video s and do-widto limit the number of necessary members of the proof formula, to simplify the reasoning procedures and to make such procedures universally binding, without any need for further empirical justification than the promises themselves: NA 20: ...' (wide s a n. 25). 10 NAV 20.1: pada sanatra scidindovinaw herwsmarali pranidastada pabr wanawaww kathawi iwe praat? 12 Ceg, TSa 1368, 1371 p. 344, nn. 10,25. LTV a winarna ska-laban-riddhit, n. 20. Cf. NA 17.1: de care apy kamie dhe prayokaye 'id'o mare, me chipa d e pau ca scopata de ced etende slu t propanula atarakalem --'And in order to instruct someone who might maintain: "Both of these two together have to be pronounced with regard to one and the same) probandum," the author) says: "precisely in either way"... [The result of (either pronouncement is the proof of the probandum. If this (probandum) is proved just by one of these two ways of pronouncement), the pronouncement of the other one would only evince the ineptitude of the speaker, because it is purposeless. Further, in NAV 18, we find an opinion that all we need for valid inference are two members: paba and Anw. Prabhacandra refers to an interesting (hypothetical?) objection that if a person knows the context very well, he can understand the argument without stating the logical reason and only the thesis is enough, in other words, in certain circumstances it is enough to express the thesis only. not the see NKC p. 436.13-20: progi d haa ar anidhar prajit u rand programu sa prido karcin mande mani kamar mai are manda-mana pada praw a pravili prevaramanlardate, wideh parche paroge pralina w [recte: sanitats amb matera ad og teng migraka-thandhidhani hinaw anataman i am INS 3.2.12 i-ramai tine-mares in a program antarende w owo-main pratya naties are under her preveure und W ord mirar-di-prawomirjad udara ma nteprungut-drid-And it is not established that one does

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374 PIOTR BALCEROWICZ IS INEXPLICABILITY OTHERWISE OTHERWISE INEXPLICABLE? 375 anyaka wadyabhjoreto-retu-gocara-markimwahl priya bhared dhelur widdharekio yarha / dhamka-gund-sampratsamasya pariwdharalt/ matarve wind laksyu-inderen gunetaran // The same idea is expressed in NKC p. 437.4-11. BIBLIOGRAPHY BALCEROWICZ 2000 BALCEROWICZ 2001 not have to indicate (one's own purpose in argument), because a particular understanding of the person to be taught is the purpose of the matter to be indicated to him. For the person to be taught can be someone slow-witted or someone sharpwitted. Out of them, for the one who is slow-witted a particular understanding of the matter in question cannot be accomplished without the pronouncement of the thesis, neither (can this be accomplished) for someone who has understood the linguistic convention [govering the pronouncement of the five-mernbered proof formula of the Naiyayika and others (and) who even is not slow-witted, because when the pronouncement of this thesis is not made thereby a the point of defeat can be announced, in compliance with NS 5.2.12: "[The proof formula) is deficient even when one of the members) is missing." However, if for someone sharp-witted-who has acquired the understanding of the matter in question merely through the pronouncement of the logical reason, even without the pronouncement of this [thesis)--this (pronouncement of the thesis) were considered) purposeless, then also the pronouncement of the logical reason would [have to be considered) purposeless, because it can be empirically observed that soneone (may acquire the understanding of the matter in question merely through the pronouncement of a person who has certain knowledge and who is not deceitful which has merely the form of the thesis "There on the hilly there is fire", or similar.' This opinion is subsequently rejected by Prabhacandra as follows. First, we have to state the thesis in order to show what our argument aims at (NKC p. 437.4-11), here Prabbicandra uses the analogy of an archer, well-known from NA 16 (widerspra, n. 107). Secondly, even if our argument can be understood by stating the thesis alone, we still have to formulate the logical reason as the rule that warrants the correctness of our reasoning (NKC p. 437.12-438.4). 10 CE. NA 18: sadhu-sadhanawor wpir putra musicale Saram/ Sidharwyena sa crnah samhandhosmarin matall -'Such (a statement) in which the invariable concomitance between the probandum and the probans is determined in the best possible way Areause of the recollection of the relation is known as the example based on similarity. 109 NAV 13.2: ... Aadli heyvandanom en browserdida drop samstdrinila nairarthaud the demonstration of the logical reason alone is carried out (scit suffices to mention solely the logical reason) because the explicit statement of the remaining (members of the proof formula)-inasmuch as they have the form of subliminal impressions in the hearer-is purposeless. 100 NAV 13.2: ewa mawwale wat pratanas padomundan tanyak para subtena pramed print thanai latka ya mata pandangan latra dasigaw sidhanam pravidandadhart ladyarto... lada hepatipidanam ex brvare, erdhidhanasa sharmandiriai atrarhalde-The author] maintains that there is not only one variety of the inference for others, but also that the cognoscible object should be conveyed meticulously to another person) in such a way so that the awareness of the cognoscible comes about easily on the part of the other person. For this purpose), there is the ten-membered proof as the means of demonstration (of the cognoscible object), namely ... Then the demonstration of the logical reason alone is carried out (se it suffices to mention solely the logical reason) because the explicit statement of the remaining (members of the proof formula)-- inasmuch as they have the form of subliminal impressions in the hearer-is purposeless. Comp. however PV (P) 3.27cd: widesni deo heter er i krvalak*Since for scholars simply the logical reason alone is to be stated. I NA 14cd-16: tar-prayogo irabartavo kevor Jacana diatas / BHATT 1989 - Anth-dara. Kangle, RP: The Kawnia Arthariintra. Part I: A Critical Edition with a Glasrary, Part II: An English Translation with Critical and Explanatory Noves. Part III: A Sony University of Bombay, Bombay 1960, 1963, 1965. (Reprinted: Delhi 1986-881 - Balcerowicz, Piotr: "On the Date of the Mahard', in: Balcerowicz, Piotr; Mejor, Marek (eds.): On the Understanding of other cwuer. Proceedings of an International Conference on Sestri and Related Studies to commemorate the Centenary of the Birth of Naminlaw Schayer (1899-1941), Warsaw Unversity, Poland. Oamber 7-10, 1999. Saidia Indoline 7 (2000), Instytut Orientalistyczny, Uniwersytet Warszawski, Warsaw 2000: 17-57. - Balcerowicz, Piotr Jaina Estemology in Historical and Comune Perspective Critical Edition and English Translation of logical-Egersemlogical Treanser: Martina Me tira-witi and M arina-gaan with Introduction and Noves. Volume I & II. Alt- und New-ladische Studien 53,1 & 53,2. Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 2001. = Bhatt, Govardhan P.: The Basic ways of Krowing. An In-depth Study of manila's Contribution to Indian Epistemology Second Revised Edition, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1989. - Bhattacharyya, B.: "Foreword' to Tarrasarigrala of S arabica see TSa (1).i-cxvii. = Chatterjee, Asim Kumar. A Comprehensive Huntry of Javni up to 10W ADA Firma KLM Private Lid., Calcutta 1978. - Durvekamisra: Dharma tar-prady Pandie Dureta Men's Dharmarapradina dering a swimmentary on armadares Maatinti-ile, SCOmmentary romati s kll). Edited by Pt. Dalsukhbhai Malvania, Kashi Prasad Jayaswal, Research Institute, Patna 1971 = Franco, Eli: "Valid reason, true sign', Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kinde Sud- und Ontaries (Wien) (1990) 199-208. - Frauwallner, Erich: "Zu den Fragmenten buddhistischer Logiker im Nyayavarttikam', Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Morgenlander (Wien) 40 (1933) 300-304 (reprinted in: Frauwallner, Erich: Kleine Schriften, hrsg. von Gerhard Oberhammer und Erst Steinkellner, Glassenapp-Stiftung 22, Franz Steiner Verlag, Wiesbaden 1982: pp. 479 483). BHATTACHARYYA 1926 CHATTERJEE 1978 DhPP FRANCO 1990 FRAUWALLNER 1933

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PIOTR BALCEROWICZ IS INEXPLICABILITY OTHERWISE' OTHERWISE INEXPLICABLE? 377 376 FRAUWALLNER 1997 NB NBh NBT NENNINGER 1992 GANERI 2001 KELLNER 1977 KUNST 1939 MEJOR 2000 - Frauwellner, Erich: "Vasibandhu's Vidaviddhi'. Winner Zestrot die Kunde Suid- und Onder (Wien) (1957) 104146. (Reprinted: Fruwallner, Erich Kleine Sortie, hrsg. von Gerhard Oberbammer und Emst Steinkeller, Glassemapp-Stiftung 22. Fra Steiner Verlag, Wiesbaden 1982, pp. 716-758)] - Ganeri, Jonardon: Philangnty Clasical India. Routledge, London New York 2001. - Kellner, Birgit: Nicher bleib nicht. Die Buddhistische Zuriching w Kumanitar dondwanda Uberset und Interpretation on Sataraktar Tawasanirana w 1647 1890 mil Kamalasilar Tan gragana son nece und Arbeitsporterer ar Geschichte negative Enter der indische Pliagatie Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, Heft 39. Wien 1997. - Kunst, Amold: Probleme der Bundesretan logat in der Darstellung der Tomatsangraha (Zagadnienia logiki buddyjskiej wedlug Tattvasangrahy Siantarnkszity). Polska Akademia Umiejetnosci, Memoires de la Commission Orientaliste No. 33, Warszawa Krakow-Lodz-Poznan-Wilno-Zakopane 1999. - Akalarka: Lago-jer. See: NKC. - Akalahka: Laptor-the-on. See: NKC. - Mejor, Marek: 'Some Observations on the Date of the You dijita (Apropos of a New Edition).' In: Balcerowicz, Piotr & Mejor, Marek (eds.): On the Understanding of other culture Proceedings of an International Caplence on Santral and Related Studier to commemorate the Centenary of the Birth of Siaminlaw Schever (1899-1941), Warsaw Ulversity Poland Octader 7-10 1999. Sredia Indologiczne 7 (2000), Instytut Orientalistyczny. Uniwersytet Warszawski, Warsaw 2000: 255 - Kumirila Bharta: Mimina dilatarmik Sokmarks of K'umanila Bay with the Commentary Mwantara or si Parthana Mistra Edited by Dvarikid sa Sestri, RS3, Tari Publications, Varanasi 1978. - Siddhasena Mahamati: Ma lina. See BALCEROWICZ (2001). - Mahwllt Sulltanen-Diwdilar puke Madinatin Rajasekharanin-wracia-Tippansamali c eSadhana shari- Tirupatial. Edited by Bhagavindia Harsacandra (Harakhchand), Hemacandricirya-Jaina-sabha, Ahmedabad-Patan 1917. = Meffan of Siddesena-Dritare waill The Philof Siddharian and with the grand of Devabhadra. Edited by P. L. Vaidya, Shri Jain Shwetamber Conference, Bombay 1928 [Reprinted: Vaishaliestire Research Bullet! (1971) 1-95) Santi Suri: M utina-sino- Madratining SW Sin Sri critically edited in Sa w indices etc in Hindi (with the Proby Pandita Dalsukh Malvaniya, published by Singhi Jain Sastra Sikshapitha, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay 1949. - Devabhadra: Muddrama See: NA. - Siddharzigani: a dina-wyd: Soc: NA Dharmakirtis M ini Mid-Sindi la Darmantana with Mid- Dhurmatimi. Edited by Th. Scherbatsky. 887. (reprint Biblio Verlag. Osnabruck 1970). - Vatsyiyana Paksilasvimin: M obile See: NS. - Dharmottara: Nerimda. See: NB and DhPr. Nenninger, Claudius: Aner gutem Grund-Prasantvides awmana-Lehre und die drei Bedingungen des logichen Grunder. Philatelia Indica Einsichter Ansic Band 1. Dr. Inge Wezler (ed.), Verlag fur Orientalistische Fachpublikationen, Reinbek 1992. - Prabhicandra: Mahmuda-candra M a dre of Shimar Praticandrared Commentary on Baitalantadew Logijas . Edited by Mahendra Kumar Nyayacarya sastri, Vol. 1-2, Sn Garib Dur Oriental Series 121, Sri Satguru Publications, Delhi 1991.1" od Bombay 1938-1942). Sankarasvimin: Mw.premeria (1) Part One: The New ProtoSanskrit Text with Commentaries' ed. by A.B. Dhruva Oriental Institute, Baroda 1930, 'Part Two: Midapr o f dair Diliniya-Tibetan Text' ed. by Vidusheichara Bhattacharyya, Oriental Institute - Central Library, Baroda 1927. (2) Piotr Balcerowicz: Sahkarkmin: May prome-"Wprowadzenie w logike" ("Introduction to Logic Part One: 1 Plish Translation, I nkit Text HI Norer / Abbreviations and Bibliography Sadie Indlogiae (Warsaw) 2 (1995) 39-87. - Parthasarathi Misra: M orandiara See: MSV. - Aksalida Gautama: M ilo Malditor ' nlcraannn yookaay c Commentary of Sunderland Shastre, od. Dvariklidis Slstri, SS10, Sudhi Prakisanam, Varanasi 1986. - Minikyanandin: Prim. Pramuntamala of Lagi nani Commentary own Parikramwthe Sims Edited by Hira Lal Jain, Chowkhamba Vidyabhawan, Varanasi 1964. - Manikyanandin: Parimadora. Pari multe virs of Masia Nontogether with the Commentary Called Parimba-lagu-prof de Vige, ed. by Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana. B/No. 1209, Calcutta 1909. Ananta Virya: Pardubha-lagu- See: PA. - K B. Pathak: "Santaraksita's reference to Kumarila's Attacks on Samantabhadra and Akalahkadeva', Annals of the Bhandartar Oriental Research inte (Poona) 11 (1930) 155-164. - K.B. Pathak: "Dharmakini's Trilaksanahetu attacked by Parakesari and defended by Santaraksita', anals of the Bhandartar Oriental Research restitute (Poona) 12 (1930-31) 71-83 -Prasadda ne of Prasastapadn. Bronkhorst, Johannes and Ramseier, Yves: Worder to the Praia dah a c e le and inder to the pointed' edinions of the Prarlardable, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1994 NRA NS 09 MSV PA) PA (V) PALV PATHAK 1930 PATHAK 1930-31 NASV PBh

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PIOTR BALCEROWICZ IS INEXPLICABILITY OTHERWISE OTHERWISE INEXPLICABLE? 379 SVR PVA Hemacandra: Prand nom . Edited and translated by Satkari Mookerjee and Nathmal Tatia, Tara Publications, Varanasi 1970 - Devasun Vadin: Pramog omilotilastareEdited by Hari Satya Bhattacharya, Bombay 1967 - Diringa: Prum (1) Chapter Lee: HATTORI 1968.(2) The Tide Trata-Peting Edition, ed. Daisetz T. Suzuki, Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute, Tokyo-Kyoto 1957-Ba r Ak-rel Grisogor Rigel, Vol. 130, No.5700 - The Promis-warmwa low Dharmatin wit Slide commentarer Swing -tofthe Author and Pramane Pirita- i of Mandrahandain. Edited by Prof. Dr. Ram Chandra Pandeya, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1989. - Dharmakirti: Prominentia Rahula Sinkstylyana (ed.): Pramanavirttikam by Acarya Dharmakirti. Appendix to Journal of the Biter and Ort Research Society 24 (1938) Parts 1-11: 1-123. - Prajiskaragupta: Promine- v ilaitana Rahula Sarktydyana (ed.): Premindahkan Parnidir af Prana Bering a car o Dharmasramaritan. Kashi Prasad Jayawal Research Institute, Patna 1953. PVin 11 - Darmatitis Pramand w a t 2 Kapitel Sirhanudinam. Tib. Text und Samskrittexte von E. Steinkellner. Veriffentlichungen der Kommission fur Sprachen und Kulturen Sud- und Ostasiens 12, Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien 1973 PVSV - Dharmakirti: Pud i ng See: PV (P) PVV - Manorathanadin: Pum -mi- See: PV (P) and PV (S) STEINKELLNER-MUCH = Steinkellner, Emst; Much, Michael Torsten: Texte der 1995 ellaannorantieta Roles meeyaay piunemiere Obersicht der die buddhistische Sastri Literatur Il Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Gottingen, Philologisch-Historische Klasse, Dritte Folge Nr. 214, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Gottingen 1995 - Siddhasena Divakara: Sammalianteprakaran with Abhayadevasuri's Tahubade-idamEdited by Sukhla Sanghavi and Becerdas Dosi: Vol. I & II, RBTS VI-1.2: Kyoto 1984 (Reprinted from the original edition published in 5 vols., Gajar mendirgruna 10, 16, 18, 19, 21, Gujari-puri-tattva-mandir, Amdavad, 1924-1931) SUKHAL-DOSHI 1928 = Pt Sakhlalji Sanghavi: Bechardas Doshi: 'Sanature and its Importance. Aneer Sutvile Number, Bhavnagar 1928 (Sam. 1985): 109-121 (in Gujarati) (after UPADHYE (1971:"1231 - Vadideva-suri: Syd-wide-raditara Motilal Lalji (ed.): Srimad didina AramLahtelaiat tad-bteca Syddiantara 5 Vols. Poona 1926-1930. (Reprinted: Vol. 1 & 2, Bharatiya Buk Karporean, Dill 1988) Sabarasvimin: Sin an Edited by Yudhisthira Mimarisaka Vols. 1-6, Sri Santisvarup Kapur, Ramall Kapur Trast Press, Bahalgach Sonipat-Haryana L 1987, 11: 1990, 11 1980, IV: 1985,V: 1986, VI: 1990 = Abhayadevasuri: Tam-dodha-sida. Suman-ark pralanana by Silesena Dywitans with stand i ) Commentar: Tainu-boda-widhini. Edited by Sukhlal Sanghavi and Becardas Dosi; Vol. I & II, RBTS VI-1.2. Kyoto 1984 (Reprinted from the original edition published in 5 vols., Gyardlywi- mandir granthaval 10, 16, 18, 19, 21, Gujarat-purd-tattva-mandir, Amdavad, 1924-1931). - Umisvamin: aurther Edited together with Tandidijuma hipu by M.K. Mody, the Asiatic Society, Bali Indir 1044, Calcutta 1903-5. Santarakepita: Path grate (1) together with Kamalasila's Pag . Edited by Embar Krishnamacharya with a Foreword by B. Bhattacharyya, 2 vols., Gaetuds Oriental Series 30-31, Baroda 1926. (Reprinted: 1984]. (2) Edited by Svimi Dvarikadisa Sastri, BBS Vol. 1, Varanasi 1968.(3) Trans, into English by Ganganatha Jha, 2 Vols., GOS 80,83, Baroda 1937, 1939. - Kamalasila: Tam -angraha-pady . See: TSa (1). = Tarta-ma in: Giuseppe Tucci: Pre-Diding Buddhur Tende on Logic from Chinese Sourcer. Oriental Institute, Baroda 1929 - Vidyananda Pitrakesarisimin: Tat i laca mara Edited by Manoharalal, Ramacandra Natha Rangaji, Bombay 1918 - Uno, Atsushi: "Vyapti in Jainism, in: Wagle, N.KWatanabe, F(eds.): Sudiront Buddi Homow of Pro Ak Waruler. University of Toronto, Centre for South Asian Studies, Toronto 1993. - Upadhye, A. N.: Siddhanna Divadara Mu dra (edited by the late SC Pidualustan with English Translation, Norse) and with the prof Siddharsi as well as The Tele2/ Duritibar and the Smart Vingunge Nautarii din by... ar laimi Bibliographic R iwledines et: Jaina Sahitya Vikasa Mandala, Bombay 1971 - Vasubindhu: - See: PRAUWALLNER 1933 - Vasubandhu: dawidhi See: FRAUWALLNER 1957 = Bharthari: de Walter Rau (ed.): Baras Vabadbye Dle Mulakarstas nach den Handrifter hergegeben und mit einem Pida-Vader versehen. Mhandwew./ir die Kunde der Morgenlander XL.IT, 4. Franz Steiner Verlag, Wiesbaden 1977 TSAP TS TAVA Uno 1993 UPADHYE 1971 STP Vava VIVI

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- 380 PIOTR BALCEROWICZ Information for Contributors WEZLER 1984 Articles for publication and communications concerning editorial matters should be sent to: Professor Phyllis Granoff, Dept. of Religious Studies, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada L8S 4K1. YAT YDI = Wezler, Albrecht: 'On the Quadruple Division of the Yogasastra, the Caturvyhatva of the Cibitsasastra and the <