Pramanas And Language Dispute Between Dinnaga Dharmakirti And Akalanka

SR No.: 269198
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Piotr Balcerowicz
Publisher: Piotr Balcerowicz
Publication Year: 2005
Total Pages: 58
Language: English
Classification: Article
File Size: 5 MB

Page 51

A DISPUTE BETWEEN DINNĀGA, DHARMAKĪRTI AND AKALANKA 393
It would, therefore, be highly interesting whether Akalanka considered that, like all conventional perception, also yogic perception is to a certain degree tainted by conceptually constructed forms. That would, however, indicate inconsistencies in his framework in which all perceptions he has discussed so far are conceptual.
Indeed, in his commentary Rāja-vārttika on the Tattvârtha-sūtra, Akalanka, having rejected several definitions of perception (RVār 1.12, p. 53.26 ff.), including that of Dinnāga, declares in the context of yogic perception that: And also the following is not correct: "There are no entities whose essence is conceptual, there are [only entities) whose essence is non-conceptual”; [it is not correct), because there are no means to comprehend these (non-conceptual entities). For it is possible to demonstrate that there is no object (which would be) non-conceptual and there is no cognition of such [object]; [it is possible to demonstrate that), because there are no characteristics (on the basis of which one could either see them or infer them).100 · Subsequently (RVār 1.12, p. 55.5-25), Akalanka directly criticises Dinnāga's claim that 'Perception is free from conceptual construction' (PS 1.3cd), and demonstrates that no direct cognition can exist which is 'free from conceptual construction' either completely or in a particular respect (p. 55.9–10: kim tat sarvathā kalpanâpodham utâho kathaṁcid iti). In a slightly different context, he adds that: “[Ultimate] perception, (which is acquired] independently of sense organs and the mind (and which is] free of deviation, is the seeing of definite contents.:101 This also supports the hypothesis that Akalanka consistently regarded all kinds of perception to be conceptual.
However, Dinnāga's and Dharmakirti's description of yogic perception the validity of which Akalanka explicitly rejected (RVār 1.12) brings to light a highly significant evidence. In his commentary (RVār 1.12, p. 54.14), Akalanka directly quotes PS 1.6cd and makes reference to Dharmakirti's commentary on it (PV 2.281), which features a crucial term: “[Perceptual] cognition of yogins ... manifests itself as purely lucid' (yogināṁ jñānam ... spassam evâvabhāsate). Even though Akalanka repudiates Dharmakirti's claim that also perception of yogins is completely non-conceptual, this passage as well as the verses that follow (e.g., PV 2.284: spasțâbham nirvikalpam ca
100 RVār 1.12 (p. 54.19-21): "parikalpitâtmanā na santi bhāvā nirvikalpâtmanā santi" iti câyuktam, tad-adhigamöpāyābhāvāt. na hi nirvikalpo 'rtho 'sti tad-vişayam jñānaṁ cêti pratipādayitum sakyam laksanabhāvāt.
101 RVār 1.12 (p. 53.4): indriyânidriyânapeksam atita-vyabhicāram sākāragrahanam pratyakşam.