Indologica Taurinensia

SR No.: 269196
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Colette Caillat, Siegfried Lienhard, Irma Piovano, Saverio Sani
Publisher: Comitato AIT
Publication Year: 2003
Total Pages: 56
Language: English
Classification: Article
File Size: 7 MB

Page 34

Piotr Balcerowicz
NA 109: definition of parârthânumāna as a special kind of verbal cognition, in which the reliable source is what the speaker himself experienced
Thus, Siddhasena's idea is to prove that there are only two pramāṇas: pratyakșa and parokșa, the latter comprising all categories of cognitions that are not pratyaksa. In this way, Siddhasena emulates Dinnāga's manoeuvre who first (PS 1.3) describes the nature of pratyakșa as being free from conceptual construction (kalpanâpodha) and then subsumes all other kinds of cognition under one general heading of anumāna, including inferences for oneself and for the others (PS 2.1ab and PS 3.1ab) as well as verbal cognition (śābda, PS 5.1: na pramāņântarań śābdam anumānāt), along with testimonial cognition derived from an authority (āpta, PS 2.5: āptavādâvi-samvāda-sāmānyād anumānatā). In the case of NA, all kinds of cognition other than pratyaksa, which is defined as first, are subsumed under the heading of parokşa. Just as Dinnāga specifically singled out sābda and emphasised that also verbal cognitions, including those based on testimony of authority, are comprised under anumāna, Siddhasena Mahāmati holds that verbal cognition (śābda, NA 8,9) and inference (NA 10), with its two subtypes 'for oneself' and 'for others' (svārtha-pratyaksa and parārtha-pratyakşa, NA 11), are likewise different varieties of parokșa 92. Therefore the place of NA 8 and 9 is justified in the whole scheme of cognitions. In other words, not only does Siddhasena do precisely what Dinnāga did when he comprised śābda / āpta-vāda under anumāna, but even terms used in both cases are almost identical!
son, which is not negligible, which does not contradict what is accepted or what is experienced, which gives the instruction about reality, which is for everybody (and) which obliterates errant paths. 91. NA 10:
sva-niscayavad anyeşāṁ niscayôtpadanam budhaih/
parârtham mānam ākhyātam vākyam tad-upacārataḥ // - 'A sentence which brings about the determination for others - just the way [it brings about the determination for oneself - is called by the learned the cognitive criterion for others because of the metaphorical transference of this (cognitive criterion onto the sentence].'
92. For further details see: BALCEROWICZ (2005, $$ 3, 4).