Indologica Taurinensia

Author(s): Colette Caillat, Siegfried Lienhard, Irma Piovano, Saverio Sani
Publisher: Comitato AIT
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269196/1

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hin. 569 - INDOLOGICA TAURINENSIA Official Organ of the International Association of Sanskrit Studies VOLUME XXIX 2003 Proceedings of the Xith World Sanskrit Conference (Turin, April 3d-81", 2000) 1* part EDIZIONI A.I.T. TORINO (ITALY)

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INDOLOGICA TAURINENSIA Official Organ of the International Association of Sanskrit Studies Founded and directed by OSCAR BOTTO Editors Colette Caillat, Emeritus Professor of Indology, Universite de Paris III. Siegfried Lienhard, Emeritus Professor of Indology, University of Stockholm. Irma Piovano, Supervisor of the scientific activities and cultural relations of the CESMEO, Torino. Saverio Sani, Director of the Deparment of Linguistics, Universita degli Studi di Pisa. Scientific Committee President Oscar Botto, Torino, Italy Members Pierre-Silvain Filliozat, Paris, France Minoru Hara, Tokyo, Japan Oskar von Hinuber, Freiburg, Germany Romano Lazzeroni, Pisa, Italy Manfred Mayrhofer, Wien, Austria Irma Piovano, Torino, Italy R.K. Sharma, Delhi, India Jaroslav Vacek, Praha, Czech Rep. Akira Yuyama, Tokyo, Japan Indologica Taurinensia has been acknowledged as a Journal of High Cultural Value by the Italian Ministero per i Beni e le Attivita Culturali, Copyright (c) 2003 Comitato AIT per la Promozione degli Studi sull'India e sul Sud-Est Asiatico, Torino (Italy) Apart from fair dealing for the purposes of research or private study, or criticism or review, and only as permitted under the current Italian Copyright acts, this publication may only be reproduced, stored or transmitted in any form or by any means, with the prior permission in writing of the Publisher. Publisher: Comitato AIT c/o Cesmeo, via Cavour 17 - 10123 Torino (Italy) Tel. +39 011 54 65 64 - Fax +39 011 54 50 31 E-mail cesme @tin.it Printer: Abaco Editori s.r.l., Torino (Italy) Annual Subscription (1 issue): EUR 30,00 Sole Agents: Herder International Book Center Piazza Montecitorio 120 - 00186 Roma Tel. +39 06 679 46 28 or 679 53 04 - Fax +39 06 678 47 51 E-mail distr@herder.it - www.herder.it ISSN 1023-3881 Autorizzazione del Tribunale di Torino N. 4703 - 21/7/1994

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PIOTR BALCEROWICZ ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE NYAYAVATARA AND THE SAMMATI-TARKA-PRAKARANA* . 1. For last few centuries the Jaina tradition came to uncritically attribute such works as the Sammati-tarka-prakarana (STP), the Nyayavatara (NA) and a number of Dvatrimsikas to one and the same author, namely to Siddhasena Divakara. A number of scholars raised doubts as to the authenticity of such attribution and, at least as far as the number of Dvatrimsikas is concerned, there is no doubt that some of them could not possibly have been composed by one and the same person, and certainly not by the author of STP. Despite the necessity to update it', a valuable resume of research heretofore done on Siddhasena Divakara is offered by UPADHYE (1971), who writes: 'Its (= Nyayavatara's - P.B.) constitution (whether it had 32 verses), its authorship by Siddhasena (the author of the Sanmati) and consequently it's date have to remain open questions for a number of : * The present contribution is a slightly modified version of my paper that was presented at the XI World Sanskrit Conference, Turin, April 3d-84, 2000 and referred to in BALCEROWICZ (2001b: 377) as 'forthcoming'. The major changes are incorporated in the latter part, $$ 6 ff., which contains my analysis of some arguments brought forward by Bansidhar BHATT (2000). The present contribution is a part of my research subsidised by the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung. 1. Among recent contributions to the research on Siddhasena, we could list papers of: MOOKERJEE (1971), DHAKY (1981-82), GRANOFF (1989-1990), DHAKY (1995) and BHATT (2000), who while referring to various Jaina Prabandhas giving biographical accounts of Siddhasena, is silent on GRANOFF's (1989-1990) papers, as well BALCEROWICZ (2001a: iii-xl), (2001b).

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Piotr Balcerowicz reasons 2.' Perhaps we will never know the true name(s) of the author(s) of STP and NA, but the question of the original number of verses of NA - viz. thirty-two, precisely as the text was rendered to us - seems to have been positively answered recently 3. In the present paper I intend to add some more arguments in favour of my thesis 4 that STP and NA are works of two different Siddhasenas, and their composition is separated by at least 150 years. Following my earlier suggestions that there is no substantial reason why to maintain the identity of the authors of STP and NA, I shall keep the name of Siddhasena Divakara for the author of the Sammati-tarka-prakarana. As a matter of fact, we can not even be sure that the Sammati-tarkaprakarana was written by a Siddhasena and we might only rely on such a late statement as that of Abhayadeva-suri, the commentator on STP, who - in the introductory part of Tattva-bodha-vidhayini. (TBV) - explicitly mentions the title of the work (A Prabandha called Sammati') and the name of its author: Siddhasena Divakara. In order to distinguish this Siddhasena from the author of the Nyayavatara, I will use the name of Siddhasena Mahamati for the author of the Nyayavatara, following Haribhadra-suri in this regard 6. 1.1. Here, I would like to draw attention to certain discrepancies in the text of STP and NA that prove, in my opinion, that these two works were written by two different people and at different times. Both the genuine title of STP (whether Sammati, Sammati-tarka or Sammati-tarka-prakarana) and the name of its author are of secondary importance. 2. UPADHYE (1971: xxiii). 3. See BALCEROWICZ (2001a: xxxvi). 4. See BALCEROWICZ (2001b). 5. TBV.1.1 (introductory part), p. 1.17-18: ...Siddhasena-Divakara - tad-upayabhuta-Sammaty-akhya-prakarana-karane ... 6. On the name of the author of NA see: BALCEROWICZ (2001a: xxxiv-xxxvi). See also Pt. Dalsukhbhai MALVANIA (1979: 287-288), UPADHYE (1971: xxiv) and DHAKY (1995: 44). The supposition against the common authorship of NA and STP is enforced by what UPADHYE (1971: xxiv) was right to point out: 'Haribhadra, in his Astaka, quotes the Nyayavatara 2, by referring to its author as Mahamati. Elsewhere, however Haribhadra speaks plainly about the author of the Sanmati as Divakara and Srutakevalin.'

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On the Relationship of the Nyayavatara and the Sammati-tarka-prakarana 33 Most conspicuous differences, viz. Sanskrit of NA and Prakrit of STP as well as an overall stylistic dissimilarity, would certainly be a highly unconvincing argument against joint authorship of both works. Much less so is, however, the general outline and matters discussed in both works: apparently the single feature these two works share is their epistemological concern. With the excep-tion of two verses (NA 29-30), NA discusses the question of epis-temic validity (pramanya) and the definition of pramana as well as its divisions and their definitions, there being no single reference to the method of the seven-fold predication (sapta-bhangi), an important issue in STP. The text of NA - both in its rigid outline and vo-cabulary - clearly follows the epistemological tradition of Dinnaga-Dharmakirti school, especially the Nyaya-bindu and the Nyaya-pravesa of Sankarasvamin ?. In its consistent structure, a definition is followed by its explanation and further exemplification; each thesis derives from the preceding. It is hard to find in NA typically Jinistic technical terms, in the sense that one does not have to be acquainted with the Jaina doctrine and creed in order to understand the contents of NA in its entirety. The contents of STP is, in it's turn, derives entirely from the Jaina tradition, with a detailed exposition of the theory of multiplexity of reality (anekanta-vada) - that includes nayas (dravyastika and paryayastika, as well as the set of seven viewpoints: rju-sutra, etc., especially STP 1.3-5, 7-18, 23, 31), niksepas (STP 1.6, 40 ff.), sapta-bhangi (STP 1.36-40) - and with a discussion of the cognitive faculties (upayoga) in Chapter 2, as well as ontological and ethical and soteriological questions of predominantly Jaina relevance. None of these topics is present in NA. Its outline seems to be entirely different from NA, much less rigid and consistent, almost chaotic, the same issue being discussed on several occasions. STP seems to be rather a plain exposition of some aspects of the Jaina doctrine, and a refutation of some contrary doctrines happens occasionally. STP constantly uses locutions and terminology that had been coined as early as in the Canonical literature and takes it for granted that the hearer / reader is well acquainted with Jaina doctrine and peculiarities of expression: certainly a non-Jaina would find it 7. See BALCEROWICZ (2001a: viii-xxix). Also BHATT (2002: 79-81) provides a useful list of structural and terminological similarities between NA and NB /NBT.

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Piotr Balcerowicz rather difficult to follow the contents of STP without any prior knowledge of Jainism. Thus, one may have an impression that NA and STP derive from alto-gether different intellectual backgrounds 8. 1.2. Any direct comparison of NA and STP is indeed an unfeasible task in view of the fact that neither the contents nor the vocabulary of NA and STP overlap. Accordingly, we cannot pinpoint a single concept of expression in order to be able to see whether it is treated in the same manner in both texts. Even a positive answer to the question (viz. the confirmation that a given term or concept is given precisely the same meaning both in STP and NA) would neither prove the same authorship for both works nor disprove the thesis that NA and STP were written by two different authors. Such overlapping could only have a supportive-corroborative strength, but would in no way be decisive; but its corroborative strength would be directly proportional to the uniqueness and singularity of the identical treatment of a given term / concept in both works and their divergence from the whole Jaina tradition in the case of the given term/concept. To find a concept, however, that is explicated entirely differently in both works or that rests on completely different presuppositions would, on the other hand, prove that NA and STP could not have been written by one and the same person. Indeed, there seem to be indeed some points that presuppose an entirely different conceptual frame work in NA and STP. 2. One of them is the question of the cognitive faculties (upayoga) of the living element (jiva). It is problematic what exactly the relation between the two cognitive faculties (upayoga), i.e. jnana (cognition) and darsana (insight / conation), on the one hand, and pramana (cognitive criterion), on the other, was for Siddhasena Divakara in STP. Commenting on STP, Abhayadeva-suri - against the general Jaina tradition - apparently takes upayoga to bifurcate into 8. The above issues are discussed in more detail in BALCEROWICZ (2001b: 353354).

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On the Relationship of the Nyayavatara and the Sammati-tarka-prakarana 35 pratyaksa and paroksa, and the five subvarieties (avadhi, manahparyaya, kevala and mati, sruta, respectively) to overlap with the Agamic varieties of pramana". Traditionally, pramana related only to the question of the validity of cognition (jnana), viz. to one aspect of the cognitive faculties (upayoga). Thus, Tattvartha-sutra in one chapter discusses five varieties of cognition, and only then adds that these are divided into two pramanas 10. This opinion is further supported by Tattvarthadhigamabhasya 11. The question of the cognitive faculties (upayoga) is discussed separately in the next chapter of TS 12; the upayogas comprise all possible cognitive faculties irrespective of their validity. For instance, four varieties of erroneous cognition (ajnana) as well as three varieties of erroneous conation / fallacious insight (adarsana) are still cases of upayoga 13. This is precisely the approach that overlaps with such Canonical works as the Pannavanasuttam 14, where the question of pramana is discussed separately. There seems to be no indication, in my opinion, as regards the exact relation of the upayogas and the pramanas in STP, and we must leave the question open. 9. See, e.g., TBV ad 2.1 (p. 457.6-7): ... upayogo 'pi paraspara-vyapeksasamanya-visesa-grahana-pravrtta-darsana-jnana-svarupa-dvayatmaka- pramanam darsana-jnanaikanta-rupas tv apramanam ...; TBV ad 2.1 (p. 458.4-5): nirakarasakaropayogau tupasarjani-krta-tad-itarakarau sva-visayavabhasakatvena pravartamanau pramanam na tu nirastetarakarau; and TBV ad 42 (p. 650.23-25): athava pratyaksa-paroksa-rupah sanksepato dvividha upayoga atmanah. tatra pratyaksopayogas trividhah avadhi-manah-paryaya-kevala-bhedena. ... paroksopayogas tu mati-srutarupo dvividhah. 10. TS 1.9-12: mati-srutavadhi-manah-paryaya-kevalani jnanam. tat pramane. adye paroksam. pratyaksam anyat. 11. See, e.g., TBh 1.12: mati-srutabhyam yad anyat trividham jnanam tatpratyaksam pramanam bhavati. 12. TS 2.8: upayogo laksanam, TBh 2.8: upayogo laksanam jivasya bhavati. TBh 2.9: sa upayogo dvividhah sakaro anakaras ca jnanopayogo darsanopayogas cety arthah. TBh 1.3: jnana-darsana-upayoga-laksano jiva iti vaksyate. 13. See TBh 2.9. 14. Pann 9.1912-1914: ... duvihe uvaoge pannatte. tam jaha - sagarovaoge ya anagarovaoge ya. ... tam jahahmati-nana-sagarovaoge, suya-nana-sagarovaoge, ohinana-sagarovaoge, mati-anana-sagarovaoge, suya-anana-sagarovaoge, vibhanganana-sagarovaoge. ... tam jaha - cakkhu-damsana-anagarovaoge, acakkhudamsana-anagarovaoge, ohi-damsana-anagarovaoge ya.

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36 Piotr Balcerowicz 2.1. However, the second chapter of STP opens with the verse that distinguishes two kinds of the soul's cognitive faculties (upayoga), cognition (jnana) and conation, or insight (darsana) 'S: STP 2.1: jam samanna-ggahanas damsanam eyam visesiyam nanam / donho vi nayana eso padekkam attha-pajjao // - 'Insight is the grasp of the general. Cognition is one, characterised by the particular. This modality of the object (viz. its general and particular aspect] is individually [the contents) for both viewpoints, [i.e. substance-expressive (dravyarthika) and the modal, or mode-expressive (paryayarthika). What the first hemistich of the verse states is that insight / conation (darsana) grasps the general (samanya), whereas the cognition (jnana) grasps the particular (visesa). Here the discrimination between the samanya and the visesa apparently does not pertain to the usual distinction of the universal (as related to the class notion, jati, language and concepts, kalpana) and the individual (vyakti, bheda). The dividing line is clearly the opposition between "general, indistinct, unclear' (for samanya) and 'particular, distinct, specific' (for visesa). Such a position was definitely liable to censure not only from the Buddhist side, in as much as it could easily be interpreted in opposition to perception (pratyaksa; called darsana), grasping the visesa, and inference (anumana), etc., grasping the samanya. Besides, certain inverted, as it were, parallelism of formulations (samanya - darsana and visesa - jnana) as compared with Dharmakirti's distinction of sva-laksana as a respective province (visaya) for perception (pratyaksa) and samanya-laksana as a respective province (visaya) for inference (anumana) is likewise conspicuous. If the author of STP had been acquainted with Dharmakirti's ideas, he would not have failed, I expect, to enter into a polemics or elaborate on the issue, just the way Siddhasena Divakara defends his position as regards the distinction of darsana and avagraha (see SS 4.2) against 15. I deliberately do not employ the term "perception' (reserved for pratyaksa) to render 'darsana', in order to preserve the distinct character of the two terms and to avoid hasty identification of pratyaksa and darsana, that in general epistemological discourse are often equated, but are often kept distinct in case of the Jaina theory of ipayoga.

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On the Relationship of the Nyayavatara and the Sammati-tarka-prakarana 37 possible misunderstanding (non-Jainas could have easily taken his darsana to be pratyaksa, or avagraha); by the same token one would expect him to have done the same in the case of the categorisation of the samanya related to darsana and the visesa related to jnana. And precisely in the same way as the author of NA anticipated a possible criticism from the side of his opponents (the school of Dharmakirti in the first place) in the case of svartha and parartha, while extending the distinction to both pratyaksa and anumana, 16 as well as in the case of non-erroneousness (abhrantatva) of both pratyaksa and anumana "7. I believe the author of STP did not merely ignore any possible criticism, for instance, from the Buddhist side, but he was not even aware that his statement could trigger such a criticism at all. This seems to be a serious indication that he flourished before Dinnaga and Dharmakirti. 2.2. On the other hand, in the text of NA we frequently find - as I have just mentioned - more or less concealed polemics directed against Dinnaga and Dharmakirti, e.g.: (1) in NA 5 18, the phrase stating that inference (anumana) 'is non-erroneous because it is a cognitive criterion, just like perception', is a refutation of Dharmakirti's thesis that inference, even though being a cognitive criterion, is erroneous 19, (2) NA 13 20 is reminiscent of the trairupya doctrine and NB 3.1 in the sense that it states new and better condi 16. Cf. JACOBI (1926: iii, n. 1), VAIDYA (1928: xviii-xx), BALCEROWICZ (2001a: iv ff., xii ff.). 17. Cf. JACOBI (1926: iii), VAIDYA (1928: xviii-xx), BALCEROWICZ (2001a: v-viii, xvi-xvii). 18. NA 5: sadhyavina-bhuno lingat sadhya-niscayakam smrtam/ anumanam, tad abhrantam pramanatvat samaksavat // - - 'Inference is regarded traditionally to determine the inferable property on account of the inferential sign, which is inseparably connected with the inferable property. It is non-erroneous because it is a cognitive criterion, just like perception.' 19. See BALCEROWICZ (2001a: xvi-xvii). 20. NA 13: sadhyavina-bhuvo hetor vaco yat pratipadakam / parartham anumanam tat paksadi-vacanatmakam // - - 'Such an utterance that demonstrates the logical reason as inseparably connected with the inferable property is the inference for others, whose essence are propositions, like the thesis, etc.

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38 Piotr Balcerowicz tions of validity 21. All these and similar passages prove that there can be no doubt that NA was written after Dharmakirti 22. Furthermore, NA reveals its author's general anticipation of possible criticism, e.g. verses NA 2-323 are meant to combat possible censure that the definition of cognitive criterion (stated in NA 1) is unnecessary. It is rather doubtful that the author of NA, so sensitive as regards possible criticism, might at the same time be the author of STP, so much oblivious of how controversial the verse of STP 2.1 could appear 24 . 3. Leaving aside a possible relationship between pramana and upayoga in both works, let us take a look at the paradigms of valid types of cognition and their division into kinds of cognitive criterion (pramana). 3.1. Let us begin with NA. We do not find any mention of cognitive faculties (upayoga) or insight / conation (darsana) there in the first place. After formulating the definition of pramana in the first hemistich 25, NA lcd states that there are only two pramanas: *[Cognitive criterion is) two-fold: perception as well as indirect cogni 21. See BALCEROWICZ (2001a: xvii-xviii). 22. See BHATT (2000) and BALCEROWICZ (2001a: (2001a: iii-xl)). 23. NA 2-3: prasiddhani pramanani vyavaharas ca tat-krtah/ pramana-laksanasyoktau jnayate na prayojanam // prasiddhanam pramananam laksanoktau prayojanam/ tad-vyamoha-nivettih syad vyamudha-manasam iha // - - '[Rejoinder:) "Cognitive criteria are well-known and everyday practice is accomplished by them; [therefore) no purpose is known for stating the definition of cognitive criterion". [Reply:] The purpose for stating the definition of cognitive criteria, (although they are) well-known, should be the eradication of disorientation concerning that [definition of cognitive criterion) in the case of the disoriented-minded here. On this see BALCEROWICZ (2001a: Xv-xvi: 8 4). 24. Another point of divergence is the way STP and NA approach logical issues and their different attitudes towards the question of reasoning and the proof formula (sadhana, pancavayava-vakya). These issues are discussed at length in BALCEROWICZ (2001b: 360-362). 25. NA lab: pramanam sva-parabhasi jnanam, badha-vivarjitam / - 'The cognitive criterion is cognition revealing itself and something else [different from it and it is) free from subversion.'

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On the Relationship of the Nyayavatara and the Sammati-tarka-prakarana 39 tion, corresponding to (the way of] determination of the cognoscible' 26. Subsequent verses provide more information as to the character of the two pramanas. The understanding of the nature of the direct cognition, or perception (pratyaksa), radically diverts from the traditional strand in the Jaina tradition which regarded it to be supra-sensory, and coincides with the general Indian epistemic tradition that took it to be the cognition directly derived through and with the help of sense organs. . Such an interpretation is not only confirmed by Siddharsi-ganin in his commentary 27 as well as by the whole subsequent tradition that followed NA, but also by the internal evidence. Indeed, the definition of pratyaksa and paroksa formulated in NA 428 is basically tautological in the logical sense, and henceforth brings no information 29. In other words, the two definitions allow for all possible interpretations! * Fortunately, several other passages give us a clear idea that the main division of the pramanas is along the lines of general Indian epistemological tradition, viz. the touchstone for directness of cognition (pratyaksa) are sense organs, whereas the indirect cognition (paroksa) comprises inference, verbal testimony, analogy, etc. sabdo jivit indriya-was-saksat-katne linguisticn the Canone lin 26. NA lcd: pratyaksam ca paroksam ca dvidha, meya-viniscayat // 27. NAV 1: pratyaksam cety-adi; tatra siddhanta-prasiddha-paramarthikapratyaksapeksayaksa-sabdo jiva-paryayataya prasiddhah. iha tu vyavaharikapratyaksa-prastavad aksa-dhvanir indriya-vacano grhyate. tatas caksam pratigatam pratyaksam. yad indriyam asrityojjihite 'rtha-saksat-kari jnanam tat pratyaksam ity arthah - ... Perception, etc. Concerning that [issue), the linguistic unit "perceiving organ" - with regard to ultimately real perception well-known from the Canon - is well-known as a synonym of the living element. Here [in this verse], however, the linguistic unit "perceiving organ" is used - since [we) are dealing (here) with the conventional perception - as an utterance [denoting) the senses. And, therefore, that which has gone towards "the perceiving organ" is perception. The meaning is as follows: such a cognition perceiving directly an object which commences resorting to the senses is perception'. 28. NA 4: aparoksatayarthasya grahakam jnanam idrsam/ pratyaksam, itaraj jneyam paroksam grahaneksaya // - - 'Such a cognition that grasps an object not-indirectly is perception; the other one should be known as the indirect cognition, as far as [the manner of) grasping [an object) is considered 29. To put it plainly, 'direct is not non-direct' for pratyaksa and 'what is not direct is non-direct' for paroksa, or a = -(-a)' and '-a = -a', respectively. If we want to keep the sentential negation (-) distinct for the predicative negation (~), we can symbolise the two sentences respectively as: 'a= (-a)' and '-arna'.

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40 Piotr Balcerowicz In the first place, subsequent verses illustrate two main divisions of the indirect cognition, viz. inference (anumana) and the verbal knowledge (sabda) 30. They are indirect because inference is based on the inferential sign (linga), or the logical reason (hetu), and because the verbal knowledge is derived from a sentence (vakya). Besides, NA 5 and NA 6, while discussing the issue of validity and erroneousness, contrast perception (pratyaksa) with inference (anumana) 31. They are also contrasted in a few other passages 32. While providing a definition of the thesis in NA 14 33, we find the statement that 'the thesis is not revoked by perception etc.' (paksah pratyaksady-anirakrtah), viz. the soundness of the thesis is generally verifiable with ordinary means and common cognitive apparatus: by implication 'perception' has to mean here ordinary, or sensory perception, employed by everyone, and not extra-sensory perception - viz. either clairvoyance (avadhi-jnana), mind-reading (manah-paryaya-jnana) or absolute knowledge (kevalajnana) - not accessible to common people. The phrasing emulates formulations of a validity condition well-known form several other works, just to mention a few, NP 34, NM 35 and PBh 36. Similarly, the 30. NA 8: drstestavyahatad vakyat paramarthabhidhayinah/ tattva-grahitayotpannam manam sabdam prakirtitam // - - 'The cognitive criterion - arisen as grasping reality due to a [momentous] sentence, which is accepted as that what is experienced and which is not contradicted [and] which communicates the ultimate truth is declared [to be] the verbal knowledge. 31. NA 5: sadhyavina-bhuno lingat sadhya-niscayakam smrtam/ anumanam, tad abhrantam pramanatvat samaksavat // na pratyaksam api bhrantam pramanatva-viniscayat/ bhrantam pramanam ity etad viruddham vacanam yatah // - 'Inference is regarded traditionally to determine the inferable property on account of the inferential sign, which is inseparably connected with the inferable property. It is non-erroneous because it is a cognitive criterion, just like perception. Neither is perception erroneous, because it is determined to be a cognitive criterion, since [to say:] a cognitive criterion is erroneous is a contradictory utterance." 32. E.g., NA 11ab pratyaksenanumanena prasiddhartha-prakasanat/ 33. NA 14: sadhyabhyupagamah paksah pratyaksady-anirakrtah/ tat-prayogo 'tra kartavyo hetor gocara-dipaka // - "The thesis is the acceptance of the inferable property; [it] is not revoked by perception, etc.; the pronouncement of it has to be made here as showing the domain of the logical reason." NA 6: 34. NP(1) p. 1.5-7 (= NP(2) 2.1, p. 72): tatra paksah prasiddho dharmi prasiddhavisesana-visistataya svayam sadhyatvenepsitah. pratyaksady-aviruddha iti vakya-sesah.

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On the Relationship of the Nyayavatara and the Sammati-tarka-prakarana 41 cases which invalidate a thesis and turn it into a fallacious thesis (paksabhasa) 37, enumerated in NA 21 38, overlap with formulations found both in Jaina texts posterior to NA 39 and in other epistemological-logical traditions in India 40. In other words, the meaning and implications of the term pratyaksa are so deeply interwoven in the epistemic system of NA in the very same manner as the term was - "Out of these [members of the 'syllogism'], the locus is a well-known subject; it is intended by [the propounder) himself to be proved as qualified by a well-known distinctive feature. The following annotation to the [above] statements [is tacitly implied: the locus) is not contradicted by perception, etc.' 35. NM 1 (as restored by G. TUCCI): paksadi-vacananiti sadhanam; tatra hi svayam / sadhyatvenepsita - pakso viruddharthanirakstah // - - 'Proof (consists in) utterances (expressing) the locus, etc. Among these very [utterances), locus is what is intended by [the propounder) himself as the inferable property [and] which is not revoked by objects (that are] contrary [to it).' . 36. PBh [266], p.49-50: avirodhi-grahanat pratyaksanumanabhyupagata-svasastra-sva-vacana-virodhino nirasta bhavanti. 37. The sequence of NA 12 (on vacas / vakya and pratyaksa), NA 14 (pratyaksady-anirakrtah) and NA 21 (pratipadyasya yah siddhah paksabhaso 'ksalingatah - it is the standard division of paksabhasa) may prove that perception is sensory, hence shows that pratyaksa here is also indriya-pratyaksa (not only anindriyapratyaksa). 38. NA 21: pratipadyasya yah siddhah paksabhaso 'ksa-lingatah/ loka-sva-vacanabhyam ca badhito 'nekadha matah // -- - 'The fallacy of the thesis is what is [already proved for a (person] to be taught, (what) is subverted by the perceiving organ and by the inferential sign as well as by the opinion prevalent among people and by one's own utterances; it is known [to be) manifold. 39. See, e.g., PALV.6.15,16: /151 (paksabhasah] badhitah pratijnanumanagama-loka-sva-vacanaih. /16/ tatra pratyaksa-badhito yathatusno 'gnir dravyatvaj jalavat. Cf. NAV ad loc.: tathaksa-lingato 'dhyaksa-hetubhyam loka-svavacanabhyam ca badhitas tiras-krto yah sa paksabhasah. ... pratyaksa-badhito yatha: niramsani svalaksanani, paraspara-viviktau va samanya-visesav iti. anumanabadhito yatha: nasti sarva-jna iti. loka-badhito yatha: gamya mata iti. sva-vacanabadhito yatha: na santi sarve bhava iti. 40. See, e.g., NB.(2).3.49-53: 7491 (2) tatra pratyaksa-niraksto yatha: asravanah sabda iti. /50/ (3) anumana-nirakrto yatha: nityah sabda iti. /517 pratiti-nirakrto yatha: acandrah sasiti. /521 (5) sva-vacana-nirakrto yatha: nanumanam pramanam. 153/ iti catvarah paksabhasa niraksta bhavanti; also to NP.(2).3.1: sadhayitum isto 'pi pratyaksadi-viruddhah paksabhasah, tad yatha: (1) pratyaksa-viruddhah, (2) anumana-viruddhah, (3) agama-viruddhah, (4) loka-viruddhah, (5) sva-vacana-viruddhah, (6) aprasiddha-visesanah, (7) aprasiddha-visesyah, (8) aprasiddho-bhayah, (9) prasiddha-sambandhas ceti // tatra...

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Piotr Balcerowicz understood in such systems as Nyaya, Vaisesika or in Buddhist tradition, that it is thoroughly unfeasible to interpret it differently, in agreement with the Jaina Agamic tradition. The only exception to the sensory interpretation of pratyaksa is provided in NA 2741. The exceptional case of perception is thus the absolute cognition (kevala). But such a standpoint does not contradict the thesis of th general Indian epistemological-logical tradition as the background for NA; in fact, it corresponds to the idea of mystic insight (yogipratyaksa) as an additional, supra-sensory kind of perception, wellknown not only from the Buddhist tradition 42. Thus, in NA we find two subdivisions of pramana: (1) perception (pratyaksa), divided into sensory an supra-sensory (kevala), 43 and (2) indirect cognition (paroksa) that comprises inference (anumana) and verbal testimony (sabda). 3.2. We find an entirely different world of epistemic ideas and notions in STP. In the first place, not only are the terms pramana, pramiti, mana, prama, or any equivalent, entirely absent from STP, but even the idea of cognitive criterion (pramana) and the concept of validity (pramanya) nowhere occur in STP. It is even more surprising in view of the fact that not only these questions are crucial in NA, but 41. NA 27: sakalavarana-muktatma kevalam yat prakasate / pratyaksam sakalarthatma-satata-pratibhasanam // - - 'That whose essence is freed from all veils, which shines as [something) absolute is perception representing constantly the essences of all objects.' 42. See, e.g., NB.1.11: bhutartha-bhavana-prakarsa-paryanta-jam yogi-jnanam ceti; or VS.9.13: atmany atma-manaso-samyoga-visesad atma-pratyaksam. 43. Siddharsi-ganin confirms this in NAV 1: tatas ca sarva-jnananam yat svarupa-samvedanam tad api pratyaksam ity uktam bhavati, tatrapi svarapasya grahyasya saksat-karana-sadbhavad iti. aksebhyah parato vartata iti paroksam. aksavyapara-nirapeksam mano-vyaparenasaksad-artha-paricchedakam yaj jnanam tat paroksam iti bhavah. - 'And, therefore, what it amounts to is the following: that which is a sensation of the intrinsic nature (of an object in case of acts of omniscience is perception, as well, because direct perception of the intrinsic nature (of an object] which is to-be-grasped is present also in (case) of these [acts of omniscience). That which operates aloof from the perceiving organs, [i.e., the senses), is indirect cognition. The intent is as follows: the cognition which determines an object indirectly by the operation of the mind, independent of the operation of the perceiving organs (sc. the senses) is the indirect cognition.'

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On the Relationship of the Nyayavatara and the Sammati-tarka-prakarana 43 also it was Siddhasena Mahamati who formulated the first descriptive definition of pramana in the history of Jaina epistemology 44. e keywords, as it were, are in STP upayoga, five kinds of jnana, and four kinds of darsana. The cognitive faculties are discussed at length especially in the second chapter, e.g. in STP 2.1-5, 18 ff., 30. The distinction between the two kinds is due to their respective provinces (STP 2.1, vide supra p. 4): conation, or insight (darsana), grasps the universal (samanya-grahanam darsanam), whereas cognition (jnana) grasps the particular (visesitam (=visesa-grahanam) jnanam); this way they are related to two viewpoints: the substantial, or substance-expressive viewpoint (dravyarthika) and the modal, or mode-expressive viewpoint (paryayarthika) respectively 45. However, none of the cognitive faculties is entirely bereft of the other viewpoint, STP 2.2 40: insight, being basically related to the substantial viewpoint, comprises secondarily the modal viewpoint, and the same rule applies mutatis mutandis to cognition. The difference between insight (darsana) and cognition (jnana) remains on all stages, including telepathy (manah-paryaya), but their distinct character disappears on the level of the absolute cognition-insight (kevala), according to Siddhasena Divakara 47. 3.3. To prove this identity of jnana and darsana in case of an omniscient person (kevalin) is one of the main points of STP, for which the work was subsequently criticised by many Jaina thinkers. The thesis that jnana and darsana have their end in the absolute cognition (kevale sanidhane) was apparently so important for Divakara that he considered it imperative not only to restate the same idea in 44. See BALCEROWICZ (2001a: xiv-xv) and (2005, n. 31). 45. Another difference is mentioned in STP 2.11: jnana is sakara (distinctive) and vyakta (manifest, distinct), whereas darsana is anakara (non-distinctive) and avyakta (not manifest, indistinct). See also STP 2.14 on the distinction sakaraanakara. 46. STP 2.2: davvatthio vi heuna damsane pajjavatthio hoi/ uvasamiyaibhavam paducca nane u vivariyam // 47. STP 2.3: manapajjava-nanasto nanassa ya darisanassa ya viseso / kevala-nanam puna damsanam ti nanam ti ya samanam // - - "Up to the telepathy, cognition and insight are different; however, [in case of] the absolute cognition insight and cognition are the same.'

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44 Piotr Balcerowicz STP 2.8 48, but also to introduce the parva-paksa verse of STP 2.22 49 that claims the conditional difference between the absolute cognition (kevala-jnana) and the absolute insight (kevala-darsana), which is subsequently refuted. This treatment of kevala is entirely with one exception 50 - different from its treatment in NA 27 (vide supra p. 8, n. 41). In NA there is not slightest trait of this highly debatable issue and the kevala knowledge is plainly stated there to be a special kind of pratyaksa. Furthermore, there is even an indirect indication as regards the real standpoint of NA. According to NA 7, the representation (pratibhasa), or the mental 'mirroring' of an object, is a characteristic fea 48. STP 2.8: samtami kevale damsanammi nanassa sambhavo natthi/ kevala-nanammi ya damsanassa tamha sanihanaim // 49. STP 2.22: damsana-puvvam nanam nana-nimittam tu damsanam natthi/ tena suvinicchiyamo damsana-nanana annattam // [The absolute] cognition is preceded by [the absolute] insight, but [the absolute] insight is not conditioned by [the absolute] cognition; hence we rightly conclude that there is difference between both [the absolute] cognition and [the absolute] insight." This verse, in my opinion, does refer to the alleged distinction between kevalajnana and kevala-darsana in view of the second hemistich of STP 2.21 that introduces. it: 'Just like [sensation], in the same manner, the difference between both the absolute [cognition and insight] is this much only...' (jaha ettha kevalana vi visesanam ettiyam ceva //). 50. This is the description of the absolute knowledge (kevala) in NA 27 and in STP 2.17. There is indeed some conspicuous similarity as regards the character of kevala (similarities are underlined): (1) NA 27: sakalavarana-muktatma kevalam yat prakasate/ pratyaksam sakalarthatma-satata-pratibhasanam // 'That whose essence is freed from all veils, which shines as [something] absolute is perception representing constantly the essences of all objects.' (2) STP 2.17: tamha cauvvi-bhago jujjai na u nana-damsana-jinanam/ sayalam anavaranam anamtam akkhayam kevalam jamha // = - "Therefore it would follow that [cognition would be] four-fold [not five-fold], but there [would be] no [separate] cognition and insight [in case of] Jinas, if the absolute cognition is without veils, eternal, imperishable." The verse of STP 2.17 is a rejoinder of Siddhasena Divakara's opponent who draws the conclusion from Divakara's thesis about the identity of cognition and insight. It does not express Siddhasena Divakara's own position! Hence the similarity of expression is only apparent and by no means conclusive since it may be due simply to a general, standard way of describing the nature of the absolute cognition..

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On the Relationship of the Nyayavatara and the Sammati-tarka-prakarana 45 ture of cognition (jnana) 51. At the same time, NA 27 defines the absolute cognition (kevala) as 'a perception that is a representation [revealing) constantly the essences of all objects' (p. 8, n. 41). Thus, the absolute cognition (kevala) is defined with the help of the characteristic mark of jnana, and the only difference between kevala and ordinary jnana is that the former is a representation of all things, whereas the latter is a representation limited only to some of their aspects. This can be interpreted as a proof that the kevala of NA is jnana and the aspect of darsana is either not relevant or not important for Siddhasena Mahamati, in so far as the author of NA does not consider it imperative to explain the nature of kevala explicitly. This would be surprising, if we assumed that the same person wrote also STP and was once in pains to prove that both jnana and darsana become one single unity on the level of kevala. 4. In STP we come across the fivefold division of cognition: (1) mai-nana = mati-jnana (STP 2.6, 23, 27) that corresponds to ahinibohe = abhinibodhika-jnana (STP 2.32), (2) suya-nana = sruta-jnana (STP 2.16, 27, 28), (3) ohi = avadhi (STP 2.16, 29), (4) manapajjava = manah-paryaya (STP 2.3, 16, 19, 26) and (5) kevala (STP 2.3, 5, 8, 14, 17, 20, 34, 36, 37). This is the typology well known from TS 1.9-12 (vide supra n. 10) as well as from Than 60 52 (vide infra p. 11 ff.). 51. NA 7: sakala-pratibhasasya bhrantatvasiddhitah sphutam/ pramanam svanya-niscayi dvaya-siddhau prasidhyati // - - 'Since it is incorrect to assume erroneousness of all representation, cognitive criterion, which is patent [and] which determines itself and something different [from it), proves to be correct with regard to establishing the dyad.' Cf. NA 12: pratyaksa-pratipannartha-pratipadi ca yad vacah / pratyaksam pratibhasasya nimittatvat tad ucyate // - 'And such an utterance that demonstrates an object recognised through perception is called perception, because it is the external sign for the representation. 52. This must have been the tradition from which TS evolved. In Than 336 we come across another strand of epistemological tradition (vide infra, n. 56). In fact, the epistemological ramifications of STP are even closer to Than 60 than to TS 1.9-12, inasmuch as both STP and the divisions found in Than 60 lack the 'pramana' element, in other words, pramana does not occur in the classification at all. Clearly, this strand is not the tradition from which NA stems from. We do, however, find in the Jaina Agamas another strand - in Viy 5.4.26[3] and in Than 336 (partly AnD 436] (vide infra, n. 56) - that goes back to the four-fold division of cognitive criteria, viz. pratyaksa-anumana-aupamya-agama, apparently derived from the Nyaya and

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46 Piotr Balcerowicz What is now the relation between the sensuous cognition (matijnana, abhinibodhika-jnana) and the opposition pratyaksa-paroksa according to the author of STP? In other words: under which heading did STP classify the sensuous cognition (mati-jnana, abhinibodhika-jnana)? 4.1. If we first take recourse to the Agamic tradition to decide whether the sensuous cognition (mati-jnana, abhinibodhika-jnana) is to be classified as direct or indirect according to the Jaina tradition, we can easily find out that the Agamic tradition was not at all unanimous as regards the divisions and subdivisions of upayoga and jnana. Accordingly, as far as classifications of cognitive faculties are concerned, we find at least five irreconcilable strands in the Canonical tradition prior to STP 53: Model I: upayoga: (1) jnana: (1) abhinibodhika-jnana, with its four stages: (a) avagraha, (b) iha, (c) apaya, (d) dharana, (2) srutajnana, (3) avadhi-jnana, (4) manah-paryaya-jnana, (5) kevalajnana, (II) darsana: (1) caksur-darsana, (2) acaksur-darsana, (4) avadhi-darsana, (5) kevala-darsana. 54 Anviksiki tradition. These two traditions find their partial reconcilliation in AnD 435440 (p. 173-174). I do not find anything in AnD 435-440 that would essentially contradict the typology of NA, granting that NA subsumed under the paroksa head the categories of anumana-aupamya-agama found in AnD and leaving aside the fact that NA is silent on the issue of the relationship of the pramana theory and the upayogas. Thus, it might have been the tradition from which the theoretical considerations of NA partly evolved. 53. Cf. e.g. SHASTRI (1990: 196-213, 'Divisions of Knowledge'), who gives a reliable account of various canonical positions regarding divisions of cognitive faculties (the tables on pp. 202-211 are generally quite handy). He distinguishes four strands, overlooking two models: my Model III, which is basically of non-Jaina origin, and Model VI. In the scheme of six models, Model I emphasises the subdivisions that could contribute to our case. Principally, I leave aside all sub-divisions of testimony (sruta), telaesthesia (avadhi) and telepathy (manah-paryaya), since they are not directly relevant here. 54. Viy 8.2.22-23 (p. 336): ...pamcavihe nane pannatte, tam jaha - abhinibohiya-nane suya-nane ohi-nane manapajjava-nane kevala-nane. abhinibohiya-nane catuvvihe pannatte, tam jaha - uggaho iha avao dharana. Cf. NamS 6[28-29] and 8 (pp. 6, 9): ...nana-damsana-gunanam... nanam pamcaviham pannattam. tam jaha abhinibohiya-nanam suya-nanam ohi-nanam manapajjava-nanam kevala-nanam. Viy 2.10.9[2] (p.115): ...jive nam anamtanam abhinibohiya-nana-pajjavanam evam suta-nana-pajjavanam ohi-nana-pajjavanam manapajjava-nana-pajjavanam

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On the Relationship of the Nyayavatara and the Sammati-tarka-prakarana 47 Model II: jnana: (I) pratyaksa: (1) kevala, (2) no-kevala: (a) avadhi, (b) manah-paryaya, (II) paroksa: (1) abhinibodhika: (a) sruta-nih srita (arthavagraha + vyanjanavagraha), (b) asruta-ni - srita (arthavagraha + vyanjanavagraha), (2) sruta 55. Model III: pramana / hetu: pratyaksa, anumana, aupamya, agama 56. Model IV: pramana: (I) jnana: (1) pratyaksa: (a) indriya-pratyaksa (srotra, caksur, ghrana, jihva, sparsa), (b) no-indriya-pratyaksa: (avadhi, manah-paryaya, kevala), (2) anumana: (a) parvavat, (b) sesavat, (c) sadharmya, (3) aupamya [...], (4) agama [...], (II) darsana: (1) caksur-darsana, (2) acaksur-darsana, avadhidarsana, kevala-darsana. 57 kevala-nana-pajjavanam mati-annana-pajjavanam suta-annana-pajjavanam vibhamga-nana-pajjava-nam cakkhu-damsana-pajjavanam acakkhu-damsana-pajjavanamohi-damsana-pajjava-nam kevala-damsana-pajjavanam uvaogam gacchati, upayoga-lakkane nam jive... 55. Than 60 (p. 14-15): duvihe nane pannatte, tam jaha - pacchakkhe ceva parokkhe ceva. paccakkhe name duvihe pannatte, tam jaha - kevala-nane ceva nokevala-nane ceva. kevala-nane duvihe pannate, ...no-kevala-nane duvihe pannate, tam jaha - ohi-nane ceva manapajjava-nane ceva. ...manapajjava-nane duvihe pannate, ...parokkha-nane duvihe pannate, tam jaha - abhinibohiya-nane ceva suya-nane ceva. abhinibohiya-nane duvihe pannate, tam jaha - suta-nissite ceva asuta-nissite ceva. suta-nissite duvihe pannate, tam jaha - atthoggahe ceva vamjanoggahe ceva. asuya-nissite vi emeva. suya-nane duvihe pannate, tam jaha - amga-pavitthe ceva amga-bahire ceva.... 56. Viy 5.4.26[3] (vol.1, p. 201.1-2); pamane cauvvihe pannatte, tam jaha - paccakkhe, anumane, ovamme, agame. Than 336 (p. 149): ahava heu cauvvihe pannatte, tam jaha - paccakkhe anumane ovamme agame. 57. AnD 435-471 (p. 173-179): [435] se kim tam jiva-guna-ppamane? ...tam jaha - nana-guna-ppamane damsana-guna-ppamane caritta-guna-ppamane. [436] se kim tam nana-guna-ppamane? ...tam jaha - paccakkhe anumane ovamme agame. [437] se kim tam paccakkhe?...tam jaha - imdiya-paccakkhe, noimmdiya-paccakkhe ya. [438] se kim tam imdiya-paccakkhe? ...tam jaha - soimdiya-paccakkhe cakkhurimdiya-paccakkhe ghanimdiya-paccakkhe jibbhimdiya-paccakkhe phasimdiya-paccakkhe. se tam imdiya-paccakkhe. [439] se kim tam noimdiya-paccakkhe? ...tam jaha ohi-nana-paccakkhe manapajjava-nana-paccakkhe kevala-nana-paccakkhe. se tam noimdiya-paccakkhe. se tam pacchakke. [440] se kim tam anumane?...tam jaha puvvam sesavam dittha-sahammavam... [471] se kim tam damsana-guna-ppamane? - tam jaha - cakkhu-damsana-guna-ppamane acakkhu-damsana-guna-ppamane ohidamsana-guna-ppamane kevala-damana-guna-ppamane ceva. cakkhu-damsane cakkhu-damsanissa ghada-pada-kada-raghadievsu davvesu, acakkhu-damsane acakkhu-damsanissa aya-bhave, ohi-damsa-nam-damsanissa davva-davvehim savvapajjavehi ya. se tam damsana-guna-ppamane.

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48 Piotr Balcerowicz Model V: jnana: (1) pratyaksa: (1) indriya-pratyaksa (five sensory kinds), (2) no-indriya-pratyaksa: (a) avadhi-pratyaksa, (b) manahparyaya-pratyaksa, (c) kevala-pratyaksa, (II) paroksa 58: (1) abhinibodhika: (a) sruta-nihsrita (with four stages: avagraha, iha, apaya, dharana), (b) asruta-nihsrita, (2) sruta 59. This classification is in so far inconsistent as it virtually classifies cognitive processes of mati-jnana both as indriya-pratyaksa and paroksa. Besides, this classification does not know the notion of upayoga 60. Model VI: (A) pramana (= jnana): (I) paroksa: (1) mati with four stages: (a) avagraha, (b) iha, (c) apaya, (d) dharana, (2) sruta, (II) pratyaksa: (1) avadhi, (2) manah-paryaya, (3) kevala; (B) upayoga: (I) jnanopayoga (sakara): (1) mati-jnana, (2) srutajnana, (3) avadhi-jnana, (4) manah-paryaya-jnana, (5) kevalajnana, (6) maty-ajnana, (7) srutajnana, (8) vibhanga-jnana, (II) darsanopayoga (anakara): (1) caksur-darsana, (2) acaksurdarsana, (3) avadhi-darsana, (4) kevala-darsana. 61 This model offers two very similar sub-models (pramana and jnanopayoga) that partly overlap. 58. The indirect cognition (paroksa) is in fact said to be homogenous, its two subdivisions (abhinibodhika and sruta) being in fact identical (NamS 44). 59. NamS 9-61 (p. 9-27) expands the division of NamS 8: [9] tam samasao duviham pannattam. tam jaha - paccakkham ca parokkham ca. [10] ...paccakkham duviham pannattam. tam jaha - imdiya-paccakkham ca no-imdiya-paccakkham ca. [11]...imdiya-paccakkham pamcaviham pannattam. tam jaha - soimdiya-paccakkham cakkhimdiya-paccakkham ghanimdiya-paccakkham rasanomiya-paccakkham phasimdiya-paccakkham. [12] ... no-imdiya-paccakkham tiviham pannattam. tam jaha - ohi-paccakkham manapajjava-paccakkham kevala-paccakkham... [43] se kim parokkham? parokkham duviham pannattam. tam jaha - abhinibohiya-nana-pasrokkham ca suya-nana-parokkham ca. [44] jaha 'bhinibohiya-nanam tattha suyananam, jattha suya-nanam tattha 'bhinibohiya-nanam. do vi eyaim annamannam anugayaim taha vi puna ettha 'yariya nanattam - abhinibujjhai tti abhinibohiyam, sunatiti sutam. 'mati-puvvam suyam, na mati suya-puvviya'. [46] se kim tam abhinibohiya-nanam? abhinibohiya-nanam duviham pannattam. tam jaha - suya-nissiyam ca asuya-nissiyam ca... [48] se kim tam suya-nissiyam mati-nanam? suya-nissiyam mati-nanam catuviham pannattam. tam jaha - uggahe iha avae dharana. [49] ...uggahe duviham pannattam. tam jaha - atthoggahe ya vamjanoggahe ya... [NamS 61 ff. (p. 27ff) discusses at length the divisions of sruta-jnana and the Canon]. 60. The term upayoga occurs only once in 47 [ga. 66] (p. 21) in a different context. Similarly, the term darsana occurs only once in 71[1] (p. 28) in the context of divisions of the Canon (damsana-dhara). 61. TS/TBh 1.9-12,2.8-9.

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On the Relationship of the Nyayavatara and the Sammati-tarka-prakarana 49 The idea of pratyaksa as the direct cognition occurs in Model II, Model IV, Model V and Model VI 62, it is still absent from Model I, while pratyaksa in Model III corresponds to sensory perception of other systems. Excluding Model III as genetically non-Jaina, Jaina divisions of pramana in the Agamic tradition could hardly accommodate the panIndian idea of pratyaksa as sensory perception directly, perhaps with the sole exception of Model V and Model VI. The most frequently recurring point in these models (with the exception of Model I and III) is that avadhi, manah-paryaya and kevala are classified as direct types of cognition (pratyaksa), whereas sruta is catalogued under indirect types of cognition (paroksa). The most controversial - and in our analysis crucial - issue is, therefore, the proper assignment of the sensuous cognition (mati-jnana). . Clearly, such a diversity of opinions points to the fact that there was no unanimity among Jaina thinkers and the author of STP could have either subscribed to any one of the Canonical models or could have devised his own model. 4.2. Since, as we have seen before, NA follows the general Indian epistemological tradition as regards the nature of pratyaksa as different from more advanced acts of conceptualisation, and the notion of the sensuous cognition (mati-inana) - with its four traditio stages, viz. sensation (avagraha), speculation (iha), perceptual judgement (apaya) and retention (dharana) - does not fit into the framework of NA 63. If we analyse all the six models, the idea of the four 62. Kundakunda's standpoint follows the same lines, cf. PSa 1.57-58: para-davvam te akkha neva sahavo tti appano bhanida / uvalddham tehi kadham paccakkham appano hodi // jar parado vinnanam tamm tu parokkham ti bhanidam atthesu / jadi kevalena nadam havadi hi jivena paccakkham // - "These perceiving organs are (made) of different substance. Under no circumstances can they be said to be the essential nature of the cognitive subject (soul). How could possibly what has been grasped by them become direct cognition for the cognitive subject (soul)? As regards objects, what is the discernment through other (means (i.e. senses)] is called indirect cognition; for when cognition arises through the living element (soul) completely is direct cognition.' See also PSa 1.54. 63. See Model 2 in BALCEROWICZ (2005, $ 5).

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50 Piotr Balcerowicz stages of the sensuous cognition (avagraha-iha-apaya-dharana) occurs in all of them, with the exception of Model III. What these models have in common is their treatment of the four stages (avagraha-iha-apaya-dharana) as indirect (paroksa). And it is not surprising, since only the first stage of sensation (avagraha) could correspond to the perception (pratyaksa) of other philosophical systems. The remaining stages - speculation (iha), perceptual judgement (apaya) and retention (dharana) - involve the process of conceptualisation, rationalising, memorising, etc. Even if one admits that the notion of pratyaksa does not necessarily have to be taken strictly in the Dinnagian-Dharmakirtian sense of being free of conceptualisation (kalpanapodha) but it may allow, as the Jainas would have it, for pronounced conceptual component (savikalpaka), beside the non-conceptual variety (nirvikalpaka), nevertheless the set iha-apaya-dharana entails deep and extensive involvement of exclusively mental activities. Furthermore, a clear indication of the truly indirect, i.e. conceptual character of the sensuous cognition is a series of expressions synonymous to mati-jnana from TS 1.13: matih smrtih samjna cintabhinibodha ity anarthantaram. Similar lists of synonyms can be found in other Jaina works 64. 4.3. In STP, Siddhasena Divakara clearly admitted of the sensuous cognition (mati-jnana, abhinibodhika-jnana) himself, since he speaks of it explicitly, mentioning its name four times (STP 2.6, 23, 27, 32). Was this mati-jnana for Divakara just the same kind of cognition as it was to the Jaina tradition prior to him only nominally, whereas in reality he took it to correspond to the sensory perception (pratyaksa) of non-Jaina traditions and considered mati-jnana to be in fact 'direct' in the sense of direct sensory grasp? I am convinced that such a supposition would neglect the available internal textual evidence. In fact, Divakara definitely subscribed to the notion of the four stages of the sensuous cognition (avagraha-iha-apaya-dharana), since he refers to the first stage avagraha twice, namely in STP 2.21 65: [The 64. E.g. VABh 396: abhinibohiya, iha, apoha, vimamsa, maggana, gavesana, sauna, sai, mai, panna. 65. STP 2.21: damsanam oggahametta 'ghado'tti nivvannana havai nana / jaha ettha kevalana vi visesanam ettiyam ceva //

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On the Relationship of the Nyayavatara and the Sammati-tarka-prakarana 51 prima facie position to be refuted:) 'Insight is nothing but sensation, because it designates "[this is) a pot", [hence it] becomes [the sensuous cognition. Just like (sensation), in the same manner, the difference between both the absolute [cognition and insight] is this much only...;' and in STP 2.23-24 66: [Rejoinder:) 'If you maintain that insight is nothing but [ocular 67] sensation, [or] a qualified cognition, (then), if it were so, it (would) follow that insight is nothing but the sensuous cognition, and such would necessarily be [the case) with the insight derived through the remaining sense organs. But this is not correct. [The opponent argues:) "If in [the case of] these [remaining senses] only cognition is understood , in the very same way in the case of] eyes (only cognition should be understood)" 69' Avagraha is a well-known technical term and it unequivocally implies the acceptance of the remaining three members of the sen. suous cognition, viz. iha, apaya and dharana. Such being the case, the use of the term avagraha not only indicated that Divakara subscribed to the tradition that subdivided the sensuous cognition (mati-jnana) into the four steps, but he must have classified the sensuous cognition as indirect in view of the indirect, i.e. mental, or conceptual character of the triad: speculation (iha)- perceptual judgement (apaya) - retention (dharana). This is confirmed also by two rejoinders above (STP 2.21,23). quoting the position of a hypothetical opponent. The oppo 66. STP 2.23-24: jai oggahamettam damsanam ti mannasi visesiam nanam / mai-nanam eva damsanam evam sai hoi nipphannam // evam sesimdiya-damsanammi niyamena hoi na ya juttam / aha tattha nanamettam gheppai cakkhummi vi taheva // 67. In view of the phrase sesimdiya (sesendriya) in STP 2.24, the sensation here must refer to caksur-avagraha (*cakkhuggaha =alocana). 68. The form gheppai corresponds to *Vghrp / *ghrpsyate, a root paralel to Vgrbh (see: PISCHEL (1981: 8 212, p. 182, $ 534, p. 434 and 8 548, p. 441). I would be inclined, nonetheless; to relate it to Vkhya / khyapyate ('to predicate'; cf. NA 19c: khyapyate yatra drstante). 69. The idea of the opponent is that if one accepts that there should be only respective sensory cognition, e.g., olfactory cognition (ghrana-jnana), and the idea of an olfactory insight (ghrana-darsana) be rejected, the same rule should be applied to the sense of sight: one should accept only ocular cognition (caksur-jnana) and reject the idea of ocular insight (caksur-darsana). In the preceding section (STP 2.20) Divakara - following tradition - recognises caksur-darsana as one of four subdivisions of darsana.

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Piotr Balcerowicz nent's criticism jointly points to a seeming affinity between Jaina avagraha and darsana that could be understood to tally with non-Jaina pratyaksa. Divakara's reply shows his intention to prove that darsana is something more and above avagraha 70. 5. A separate question is the exact semantic relationship between the term damsana occurring in STP in a variety of meanings and the term pratyaksa employed consistently in NA, i.e. whether there is any sense in which the damsana of STP corresponds to the pratyaksa of NA. 5.1. Indeed on some occasions one might have an impression that the damsana of STP is used in the sense of perception as such an operation of the cognitive apparatus (not necessarily sense organs in the case of STP) that provides some awareness of an external object, either indistinct (vyanjita) or non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka). This happens for instance in the case of STP 2.25 71: 'The cognition as regards an object not [directly) touched [by senses) and beyond the province [of senses) becomes insight (perception?), with the exception of such [cognition that pertains) to the provinces of the future and the past through the [inferential?) sign.' Similarly, the verses of STP 2.27-29 72: "[27] In (case of] a conditioned person (in the state of bondage) the comprehension of objects is occasioned by the sensuous cognition and testimony; there is no insight in any one of them; wherefrom (should there be) insight [in them]? [28] Since objects cognised through testimony are not amenable to grasping [them] directly, therefore the word "insight" (perception?) does not apply to the cognition through testimony at all. 70. More on the above passage (STP 2.21-24), comp. BALCEROWICZ (20016: 365-366, $ 6.2.2). 71. STP 2.25: nanam aputthe avisae ya atthammi damsanam hoi/ mottuna lingao jam anagayaiya-visaesu // 72. STP 2.27-29: mai-suya-nana-nimitto chaumatthe hoi attha-uvalambho/ egayarammi vi tesim na damsanam damsanam kutto? // jam paccakkha-gahanam na inti suya-nana-sammiya attha / tamha damsana-saddo na hoi sayale vi suya-nane // jam aputtha bhava ohi-nnanassa homti paccakkha / tamha ohi-nnano damsana-saddo vi uvayutto //

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On the Relationship of the Nyayavatara and the Sammati-tarka-prakarana 53 [29] Since entities not [directly) touched [by senses) become direct[ly cognisable] for the cognition through telaesthesia, therefore the word "insight" is (correctly] employed with regard to the cognition through telaesthesia.' Of course, the verses explicate in the first place the three - out of four - subdivisions of darsana (insight / conation) as a subtype of the cognitive faculties (upayoga), viz. caksur-darsana, acaksur-darsana and avadhi-darsana. The issue of the proper interpretation of the term damsana in these contexts would, however, require a separate detailed analysis. 5.2. What concerns me here is the peculiarity of expression in STP 2.28 and its comparison with even more peculiar statement of NA 12 73: 'And such an utterance that demonstrates an object recognised through perception is called perception, because it is the external factor for the representation. This startling statement of Siddhasena Mahamati should be viewed in the context of his thesis of pararthapratyaksa and his attempt to prove that the idea of efficacy for others (pararthya) and efficacy for oneself (svarthya) is applicable both to perception (pratyaksa) and to inference (paroksa). What is important, NA explicitly accepts the idea that perception can be directly generated in other people also through verbal communication 74. In other words, objects are amenable to direct comprehension also on the verbal level and verbal statements can be classified as perception under special conditions. This stands in contradiction with the statement of STP 2.28 quoted above that 'objects cognised through testimony are not amenable to grasping [them] directly' (paccakkha-ggahanan na inti suyanana-sammiya attha). And it is STP 2.16ab (pannavanijja bhava samatta-suya-nana-damsana-visao /) that links 'communicable entities' (prajnapaniya bhavah) with testimony (sruta). 73. NA 12: pratyaksa-pratipannartha-pratipadi ca yad vacah/ pratyaksam pratibhasasya nimittatvat tad ucyate // 74. Cf. NAV ad loc: pratibhasasya nimittatvat pratipadya-pratyaksa-prakasa-hetutvad upacarenocyata ity arthah. - "because it is the external factor for the representation", which means that can utterance) is called metaphorically [perception] because it is the cause of revealing (an object] through perception to a person] to be taught.'

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54 Piotr Balcerowicz 6. It is well known that the author of NA is innovative in his attitude with respect to Jaina tradition and seems to go against the Canon, e.g. in his new division of the pramanas and in his new definition of pramana, even though everyone knows what it is' 75. Nowhere in the whole text of NA does Siddhasena Mahamati takes recourse to tradition or the scriptures to corroborate his statements. He solely relies on the power of logic and argument. This attitude largely differs from the 'Agamic approach typical of STP, viz. the attempt to remain faithful to the Jaina tradition and to the authority are the Agamas, even though the 'Agamic tradition' is not always unanimous 76. A good example of such an 'Agamic' attitude is provided by STP 3.10-12. In the first step, Siddhasena Divakara introduces the parvapaksa position: 'As a matter of fact, two viewpoints were distinguished by the Lord (the Jina), viz. substantial viewpoint (dravyarthika) and modal viewpoint (paryayarthika); but since there is additionally the "quality" particular, [hence] also qualitative view-point (gunarthika) should be adopted 77.' This is rather a logical and consistent conclusion, if one accepts that the main divisions of view-points (naya) are derived from the main ontological aspects: the substance and its modes. Since there is also quality (guna) as the third aspect underlying the being, and it is even more fundamental ontologically, one would expect a separate viewpoint corresponding to it. Siddhasena Divakara's rejoinder to this argument is not based directly on logic or reasoning but takes first of all recourse to the stand of the 75. NA 2-3: prasiddhani pramanani vyavaharas ca tat-krtah/ pramana-laksanasyoktau jnayate na prayojanam // prasiddhanam pramananam laksanoktau prayojanam/ tad-vyamoha-nivettih syad vyamadha-manasam iha // - '[The prima facie position to be refuted:) Cognitive criteria are well-known and everyday practice is accomplished by them; [therefore) no purpose is known for stating the definition of cognitive criterion. [Rejoinder:) The purpose for stating the definition of cognitive criteria, (although they are] well-known, should be the eradication of disorientation concerning that (definition of cognitive criterion) in the case of the disoriented-minded here. 76. For instance comp. above the lack of unanimity as regards the divisions of the cognitive faculties (upayoga). 77. STP 3.10: do una naya bahavaya davvathiya-pajjavattiya niyaya / etto ya guna-visese gunathiya-nao vi jujjasto //

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On the Relationship of the Nyayavatara and the Sammati-tarka-prakarana 55 scriptures and the authority: 'But because what the Venerable One (the Jina) distinguished and expounded to Gautama and other [disciples) in those sutras is the notion of mode (paryaya), hence (we have] modal (viewpoints). Even though it is understood that "mode" and "quality" in many ways have the same meaning, nevertheless (we) do not say quality (viz., qualitative viewpoint), because [there is) the designation "modal viewpoint" 78. 7.1. Now, I would like to devote some space to recent arguments brought forward by Bansidhar BHATT (2000), who asserts that: 'we arrive at a certain conclusion that the author of NV (= Nyayavatara - P.B.) lived after Prajnakara / Dharmottara (both: 700-750 A.D.) - terminus a quo...' (p. 77). This 'certain conclusion' has, however, a asis. In the first place, BHATT practically treats NB and * NBT jointly throughout his paper, from the very moment these two works are first mentioned (p. 70), and whenever he refers to the Nyaya-bindu, he consistently writes 'NB/NBT', without making much distinction as regards the contents of NB and NBT. It is not surprising that via this petitio principii device one has to finally arrive at the con clusion that Siddhasena Mahamati lived after Dharmottara. Secondly, from the fact that NA follows the Buddhist texts on logic, e.g. Pramanasamuccaya, Nyayapravesa 79 etc. of Dignaga..., Pramanavarttika, Nyayabindu (NB) of Dharmakirti..., Prajnakaraguptabhyasya..., but more often Dharmottara's commentary on Nyayabindu (NBC)...', BHATT (2000: 71) comes to conclusion that NA must be posterior to all these works! Clearly, Prajnakaragupta in his PVA or Dharmottara in his NBT had to follow the pattern of the works which they decided to comment on, viz. Dharmakirti's PV and NB respectively. But there is nothing that would logically compel us 78. STP 3.11-12: jam ca puna arihaya tesu tesu suttesu goyamainam/ pajjava-sanna niyaya vagariya tena pajjaya // parigamanam pajjao anega-karanam guna tti tullattha / taha vi na guna tti bannai pajjava-naya-desana jamha // 79. Wrongly ascribed by BHATT (2000: 71, 72 n. 16) to Dinnaga, instead to Sankarasvamin, see MIRONOV (1927), Tucci, DHRUVA (1930: V-XIII), FRAUWALLNER (1961: 140), cf. also HATTORI (1968: 4) and STEINKELLNER-MUCH (1995: 16).

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56 Piotr Balcerowicz to assume that NA, which did follow the pattern of NB 80, is posterior to NBT, which follows the identical structure. His third and final argument to prove that Siddhasena was posterior to Prajnakaragupta, to which he devotes a few more lines, is based on the rather curious idea of 'perception for others' (pararthapratyaksa), most probably the innovation of Siddhasena Mahamati himself and clearly modelled on Dinnaga's and Dharmakirti's distinction of two kinds of inference, but later on dropped by most, though not all 81, thinkers of the Jaina tradition. BHATT (2000: 73) maintains that: 'A new variety of pratyaksa, viz. parartha pratyaksa in Indian logic is introduced by the NV [= Nyayavatara - P.B.] (v. 11). This represents a clear influence of Prajnakara who provided the NV-author with an idea of parartha pratyaksa (cp. yady anuma-notpadanad vacanam anumanam, pratyaksotpadanat, v. 1.: vacanam api parartham pratyaksam bhavet. PVB [= Pramana-varttikalankara P.B.) 3/4.1.1., p. 476; cp. also: NV v. 10cd with this PVB-statement).' 7.2. The first part of the argument about Siddhasena's authorship of the idea of parartha-pratyaksa is indeed sound 82, however, its latter part is a result of some confusion. When we read the whole passage of Prajnakaragupta from which BHATT extracted just a line (vide infra, bolded), we realise that the quotation referred to by Bhatt is, in fact, an objection against Prajnakaragupta's position (!), which he subsequently refutes. In the excerpt, Prajnakaragupta explains why it is possible that genuine inferential process (svarthanumana), which has been essentially carried out by the cogniser himself who witnessed the events that are the basis for generalisation, can be demonstrated ver bally to another person and evoke a similar cognition in the hearer; hence, even though the proof formula is, strictly speaking, merely a verbal statement, it is metaphorically called inference for others (pararthanumana), because it generates the same inferential conclu sion in the hearer as it did in the speaker. Prajnakaragupta insists that 80. See: BALCEROWICZ (2001a: xii ff.). 81. E.g. by Vadideva-suri in PNTAA 3.26 or by Gunaratna-suri in TRD, p. 223 ff., see BHATT (2000: 76, nn. 27, 28). 82. See above $ 5.2; cf. also BALCEROWICZ (2001b: 367-368, SS 8)..

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On the Relationship of the Nyayavatara and the Sammati-tarka-prakarana 57 this metaphorical transference, does not, however, apply to perception. The complete passage of PVA, p. 467.15-26, reads as follows: "However, the comprehension of the inferable property which has become the subject of the debate (is possible) by means of the demonstration of the triple-formed inferential sign, therefore [its) statement (sc. verbal demonstration of a proof formula) (which is inference for others (pararthanumana)] is not pointless. Because inference is produced on the account of this (verbal statement], also it is inference due to metaphorical transference of the genuinely inferential character of the inference for oneself (svarthanumana)]. [Objection:) "If the statement, (which is called the inference for others, is) inference because it produces inference, then (a verbal statement] is also perception for others, because it produces perception". No such quadruplet (is possible, viz. inference for oneself (svarthanumana), inference for others (pararthanumana), perception for oneself (svartha-pratyaksa) and perception for others (parartha-pratyaksa)]. [2] Perception never arises with respect to anything in the same way (sc. on account of the statement) as inference is produced: when one remembers the relation (sc. invariable concomitance) on account of the statement (of the logical reason). [3] When one remembers the triple-formed inferential sign, there necessarily arises inference. However, when a statement (is formulated by one person which describes) only an object that one has cognised oneself, no one (else except for the speaker) cognises (this object] through perception (on account of the statement). [In other words,] no perception arises on account of merely a statement. [Objection:] "[When one person exclaims:] <>, (the other person) looks [in that direction), (and in this way, there arises perception (in that person)". No, also in this case (on account of the statement) there immediately arises inference (and not perception). For it is as follows: [4] [A person) is enjoined to direct one's sight towards this object as follows: "Look!" (in the sense that:] "[This object which] I have (just) cognised (myself), has been demonstrated in the context". (So,] this is a statement of injunction (formulated by the speaker): "Direct your sight there!" in the sense of taking a look at the deer. And [further): "Just as I have directed my sight (towards this deer), so you, too, (look there]". Then, when [the other person) is directing (one's) sight towards (that deer) in this way, there (takes place) the operation of logical reasons: remem

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58 Piotr Balcerowicz bering (the logical ground) in this way, (the person) proceeds (with the intention to see the deer). So this is nothing but inference. Therefore, having considered, through inference, that there is a possibility of perception (sc. that one might be able to see a deer), one proceeds (sc. sees the deer). '83, 84 As we can see, there can be no doubt that Prajnakaragupta rejects even a slightest possibility of 'perception for others' 85. In his opinion, what the opponent - doubtlessly a Jaina thinker - considers to be perception for others is an inferential process, triggered by the verbal instruction: 'Look! A deer is running', which can be summarised as [2] [3] 83. PVA, p. 467.15-26: tri-rupa-linga-prakasana-dvarena tu vivadaspadibhatanu-meya-pratipattir iti na vacanasya vyarthata. tato 'numanam udetiti tad apy anumanam upacarat. yady anumanotpadanad vacanam anumanam pratyaksotpadanat pratyaksam api pararthai bhavet. nedam caturasram. yatha grhita-sambandha-smarane vacanat sati/ anumanodayas tadvan na pratyaksodayah kvacit // tri-rupa-linga-smarane niyamenanumodayah/ sva-pratitartha-matrasya vacane 'dhyaksavin na tu //. na vacana-matrad adhyaksam parasyodeti. nanu "pasya mrgo dhavatiti" drsyate darsanodayah. na, tatrapy anumanasyanantaratvat. tatha hi - [4] tad-arthonmukhatayam sa pasyety evam niyujyate / maya pratitam etat ca samarthyat pratipaditam // abhimukhi-bhava mrga-darsana iti niyoga-vacanam etat. abhimukhi-bhavas ca yatha mama tatha tavapi. tata evam abhimukhi-bhavane hetunam vyapara iti smaran pravartata ity anumanam eva. tato 'numanat pratyaksasambhavam alocya pravartate. 84. The same idea is elaborated also by Durveka Misra in DhPr, p. 89: nanu ca pararthanumanotpadaka-vakyavad asti kincid vakyam yat para-pratyaksopayogi. yatha "esa kalabho dhavati" vakyam. atah pararthanumanavat parartham pratyaksam kim na vyutpadyata iti? atrocyate - paroksartha-pratipatter ya samagri - lingasya paksa-dharmata sadhya-vyaptis ca - tad-akhyanad vakyam upacaratah pararthanu-manam ucyate. na tu tatra kathamcid anga-bhava-matrena, svasthyader api tatha prasangat. idam punah 'ayam kalabhah' ity-adi-vakyam na pratyaksotpatter ya sama-grindriyalokadi tad-abhidhanat tan-nimittam bhavat tatha vyapadesam asnute yena vyutpadyatam apy asnuvita, kim tarhi? kasyacid didyksa-matra-jananena. yatha kathancit para-pratyaksotpattav anga-bhava-matrena tadrapye netrotsave vastuni sannihite 'pi kathamcit paran-mukhasya parena yad abhimukhi-karanam sirasas tad api vacanatmakam parartha-pratyaksam vyutpadayitur vyutpadyam apadyeta. etac ca kah svasthatma manasi nivesayet. kim ca bhavatu tatha-vidham vacanam parartham pratyaksam. kim nas chinnam?... 85. See also Manorathanandin in PVV ad PVI 1.3bc (p. 4.2-4): artha-kriyanirbhasam tu pratyaksam svata evartha-kriyanubhavatmakam na tatra pararthakriyapeksyata iti tad api svato niscita-pramanya.

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On the Relationship of the Nyayavatara and the Sammati-tarka-prakarana 59 follows: 'He has seen a deer; if I look there the way he does, I will also see it. Instead of finding in the above passage 'a clear influence of Prajnakara who provided the NV-author with an idea of 'parartha pratyaksa', we see just the opposite: it is Prajnakaragupta who criticises the idea formulated in NA. This criticism cannot prove that the person whom Prajnakaragupta had in mind was Siddhasena Mahamati and his NA. All we can with certainty say is that the criticism is directed against the same idea which we find in NA, and which may have been also maintained by some other thinker(s) who might have directly provoked Prajnakaragupta censure. We cannot, however, claim with absolute certitude - but with a high degree of probability - that it was indeed Siddhasena Mahamati who was the inventor of the notion of parartha-pratyaksa. Additional corroboration for the above hypothesis is provided by Siddharsi-ganin, the commentator on NA. In his Nyayavatara-vivrti, he refers to Prajnakaragupta critical remarks, and reasserts the genuineness of parartha-pratyaksa: 'If perception were conjectured to be superior, on account of (the argument that) in certain cases the indirect cognition proceeds by the force of the relation which has [first] been grasped by perception, (then) the superiority of the indirect cognition would follow immediately on account of (the argument that) it is (also) an empirical fact that (1) a perception the province of which is a deer (that is observed] due to a sudden movement of the neck by the force of the speech element (sc. expression): "Look! A deer is running!" etc., [or] similarly [2] la perception) the domain of which is a forest or a temple, etc. (that are recognised) either due to the recollection (of the forest or the temple, etc.,) as such or due to grasping the linguistic convention [relating the word "temple" and the object temple) as such with curiosity, etc., to see objects not seen before, is preceded by the indirect cognition (in both cases). 86 86. NAV 1.8, p. 341: kvacit pratyaksa-parigrhita-sambandha-balat paroksam pravartata iti pratyaksasya jyesthatva-kalpane "pasya mrgo dhavatity" -adi-sabdabalat krkatika-motana-dvarena mrga-visayam, tatha smaranat sanketa-grahanad vapurvapurvartha-darsana-kutahaladina vana-deva-kuladi-gocaram paroksa-parvam pratyaksam drstam iti paroksasya jyesthatasajyeta. A rejoinder to Siddharsi-ganin's position seem to have been formulated subsequently by Durveka Misra, see n. 84.

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Piotr Balcerowicz The injunction within the bolded phrase is exactly the same as the one found in Prajnakaragupta, and the detailed description of the whole process which finally leads to "perception for others', triggered by a verbal statement, is to explicate the perceptual nature of this process, as against Prajnakaragupta's position. The fact that it is Siddharsi-ganin who, in his commentary on NA, defends the idea propounded by Siddhasena Mahamati in NA may lend some additional support to the claim that it was indeed the Nyayavatara which Prajnakaragupta had in mind. And that may be taken as a corroboration of the hypothesis that the time of composition of the Pramana-varttikalankara is terminus ad quem for Siddhasena Mahamati. As long as we do not prove that it was indeed Siddhasena Mahamati who was the first to introduce the idea of pararthanumana this remains only a very probable postulate. This does not have much bearing on the dating of Siddhasena Mahamati in view of the fact that the date of Prajnakaragupta is to be assigned to the similar time, i.e. circa 800 87, as the date of Haribhadra-suri 88, which is accepted as the upper limit for that Nyayavatara. 8. Is has been frequently suggested that the structure of NA is not intact, or that some of the verses of the text are interpolations. As a matter of fact, if we analyse all secondary literature written on NA, we see that reservations have been occasionally expressed about the genuineness of perhaps half of all the verses of NA! Recently a similar suggestion has been voiced also by BHATT (2000), who drew our attention to a number of verses which may imply, in his opinion, that they were not originally an integral part of NA. On subsequent pages I shall try to evaluate such arguments and discuss the place of the spurious verses in the general structure of NA. 8.1. We should approach with special caution, as BHATT (2000: 73) warns us, the verses of NA 8-9: 'However, the original text of the NV does not appear to be intact. NV v. 8-9 describing sabda pramana have almost similar expressions, e.g. drstestavyahata- (v. 8a); adsstesta-virodha- (v. 9b); tattva-grahita- (v. 8c); tattvopadesa- (v. 9c) 87. See STEINKELLNER-MUCH (1995: 74). 88. Cf. BALCEROWICZ (2001a: xxxiv).

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On the Relationship of the Nyayavatara and the Sammati-tarka-prakarana 61 etc. It is certain that v. 9, being confined furthermore to the sastra and not referring to the sabda in general, is spurious in general, is spurious in the logical treatise, viz. the NV. Moreover, it is not in agreement with the scheme the NV-author certainly had in mind, viz. to encompass precisely the subject matter of logic in a small compendium.' As a matter of fact, in expressing his reservations about NA 8, BHATT revives the arguments brougt forward, among others, by P.L. Vaidya in his introduction to NA3 (p. xiii-xiv, xxviii) and MUKHTAR (1956). The repetition of a phrase is hardly a conclusive ground to question the authenticity of any verse in NA. On the contrary, we can see that some verses in such a relatively short treatise reveal a repetitive character, just to compare three cases of pairs of adjoining verses: 2a, d: prasiddhani pramanani ... jnayate na prayojanam and . 3ab: prasiddhanam pramananam laksanoktau prayojanam 22a: anyathanupapannatvas and 23b: yo 'nyathaivopapadyate 24ab: sadharmyenatra drstanta-dosa nyaya-vid-iritah 25ab: vaidharmyenatra drstanta-dosa nyaya-vid-iritah By applying the suggested method to discard all verses that contain repetitions one would end with perhaps with a handful of verses The main point, as a matter of fact, concerns the occurrence of sastra, which might seem 'spurious in the logical treatise'. A closer analysis will reveal that the reference to sastra /apta not only is relevant to the discussion of epistemological issues, especially in the context of debate with Dinnaga and Dharmakirti, but also it is absolutely essential in the structure of NA, which offers a new model of pramanas. The sequence of the verses runs as follows: NA 889: definition of verbal cognition (sabda), NA 990: definition of a reliable source of verbal cognition (sastram + apta /aptopajna), 89. See n. 30. 90. NA 9: aptopajnam anullanghyam adsstesta-virodhakam / tattvopadesa-krt sarvam sastram kapatha-ghattanam // - 'Authoritative treatise is that which has been discerned by an authoritative per

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Piotr Balcerowicz NA 109: definition of pararthanumana as a special kind of verbal cognition, in which the reliable source is what the speaker himself experienced Thus, Siddhasena's idea is to prove that there are only two pramanas: pratyaksa and paroksa, the latter comprising all categories of cognitions that are not pratyaksa. In this way, Siddhasena emulates Dinnaga's manoeuvre who first (PS 1.3) describes the nature of pratyaksa as being free from conceptual construction (kalpanapodha) and then subsumes all other kinds of cognition under one general heading of anumana, including inferences for oneself and for the others (PS 2.1ab and PS 3.1ab) as well as verbal cognition (sabda, PS 5.1: na pramanantaran sabdam anumanat), along with testimonial cognition derived from an authority (apta, PS 2.5: aptavadavi-samvada-samanyad anumanata). In the case of NA, all kinds of cognition other than pratyaksa, which is defined as first, are subsumed under the heading of paroksa. Just as Dinnaga specifically singled out sabda and emphasised that also verbal cognitions, including those based on testimony of authority, are comprised under anumana, Siddhasena Mahamati holds that verbal cognition (sabda, NA 8,9) and inference (NA 10), with its two subtypes 'for oneself' and 'for others' (svartha-pratyaksa and parartha-pratyaksa, NA 11), are likewise different varieties of paroksa 92. Therefore the place of NA 8 and 9 is justified in the whole scheme of cognitions. In other words, not only does Siddhasena do precisely what Dinnaga did when he comprised sabda / apta-vada under anumana, but even terms used in both cases are almost identical! son, which is not negligible, which does not contradict what is accepted or what is experienced, which gives the instruction about reality, which is for everybody (and) which obliterates errant paths. 91. NA 10: sva-niscayavad anyesam niscayotpadanam budhaih/ parartham manam akhyatam vakyam tad-upacaratah // - 'A sentence which brings about the determination for others - just the way [it brings about the determination for oneself - is called by the learned the cognitive criterion for others because of the metaphorical transference of this (cognitive criterion onto the sentence].' 92. For further details see: BALCEROWICZ (2005, $$ 3, 4).

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On the Relationship of the Nyayavatara and the Sammati-tarka-prakarana 63 In addition to that, Siddhasena's peculiar, as it were, usage of the term sastra in a logical-epistemological treatise finds its precedence again in Pramana-samuccaya of Dinnaga. In the well-known opening verse, which is a homage to the Buddha, we read: 'Having paid to [the Buddha] who is a cognitive criterion, who strives for the welfare of the world, who is the teacher (sastr), the well-gone, the res 93 cuer... And further Dinnaga explains that 'the cause [why the Buddha is a cognitive criterion] is his perfection in inner disposition and in its application. The application [of being a cognitive criterion] is his being a teacher because he edifies the world.' 94 Instead of sastr, Siddhasena speaks of sastra, but in an active sense of sastr: 'authoritative treatise is that ... which gives the instruction about reality' (tattvopadesa-krt sarvam sastram). As we can easily notice, the idea, the wording and the epistemological context are very similar in both cases. Thus, there remains nothing that could seriously disprove that either NA 8 or 9 are out of place or are some later interpolations. 8.2. Bansidhar BHATT (2000: 74) expresses his further reservations: 'The NV v. 27 defining the pratyaksa as kevala appears all of a sudden between the final topic on the parartha anumana (v. 26) and the conclusion of the entire thesis, viz. pramana-phala (v. 28), without any specific hint of it at the initial stage (v. 1,4, 6 etc.). It is an interpolation.' We should remember that the concern of the author of the Nyayavatara, which is so closely tight to epistemological-logical issues, is not only to present a new model of epistemology, but also to present it in such a way that it may further serve as the basis of and proof for both Jaina ontology and soteriology, the latter being of paramount interest to the Jainas. This should, again, come to us as no surprise: it suffices to recall the opening verse of Pramana-samuccaya, which correlates soteriological issues and epistemology, as well Dharmakirti's two introductory verses to his Pramana-varttika. Even 93. PS 1.1ab: pramana-bhataya jagad-dhitaisine pranamya sastre sugataya tayine/, quoted in PV1 (Parisista, p. 518.26). 94. PSV: tatra hetur asaya-prayoga-sampat. chastrtvam. prayogo jagac-chasanac

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Piotr Balcerowicz the chapter called Pramana-siddhi of PV is formally a commentary on the idea of the Buddha's pramana-bhatvatva. Therefore there should be nothing extraordinary if we come across any soteriological discus on in NA. And precisely such is ultimately the relevance of NA 27 (n. 41), as I shall try to demonstrate in subsequent lines. The verse NA 27 introduces the idea of perfect perception (kevala), after all 'mundane' varieties of cognition, direct and indirect, have been discussed in the preceding. Thus, the placement of the verse after the pararthanumana section does not seem illogical or unjustified. On the other hand, it is hardly conceivable that NA could do without even mentioning the notion of kevala-jnana, because it has always played paramount role in Jaina epistemology, ontology and soteriology. And the most suitable place to mention perfect perception, which is the consummation of all cognitive processes, is in the concluding portion on epistemological issues. The emphasis on perfect cognition (kevala) was understood, for it fulfilled at least three cardinal functions in Jainism: ontological, epistemological and soteriological. According to Jaina ontology, the structure of the world was highly complex, in which all elements were related to the rest; consequently, the proper description of the reality, of its multiplex character (anekanta), would have to take into consideration all these intricate relations. A complete account of the multiplexity is possible on the level of perfect cognition, which can grasp all complexities. In such a way, only absolute perception (kevala) which perfectly reflects all relations in the world is the warrant for the idea of ontological premise of anekanta. Besides, being staunch realists, the Jainas maintained that one of the proofs of the multiplexity of reality is the multiplex representation of the world as it is reflected in cognition. A typical argument ran as follows: since any piece of knowledge has a multiplex character, so must be also the world reflected through it 95. Absolute cognition was 95. See e.g. (1) SVIV 1.27 (p. 115.11 ff.): ata evanekanta-siddhih. ... tad evas paramarthatah siddhih anekantat. - 'Precisely on the basis (of this act of grasping] the multiplexity sof data) is established. ... Thus, in exactly such a way, [we arrive at] a proof (of multiplex reality] on the level of the ultimate truth, because of multiplexity [of appearance)'; (2) NAV 29.1: iha yat pramanam tat parasparavinirlurhitanekadharma-parikarita-vastuno grahakam, tasyaiva tatra pratibhasamanatvad; iha yad

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On the Relationship of the Nyayavatara and the Sammati-tarka-prakarana 65 considered the most perfect and full representation of the complexity of the world. For this very reason, extrasensory cognition of kevalajnana (NA 27), being the paramount representation of anekanta, is followed almost immediately by its mundane equivalent, viz. the naya-vada (NA 29), that also proves anekanta, albeit in an imperfect manner. The soteriological dimension of kevala was equally important. Absolute cognition served as a necessary link to prove that liberation is possible, and was used in the so-called "purification argument'. The full argument boils down to the following: 'You can purify yourself completely, because there is a method. Since your nature is consciousness, when you become absolutely pure, you are by nature endowed with absolute knowledge.' This kind of popular proof was possible only within Jaina ontology thanks to two crucial elements: (1) peculiar understanding of the soul's nature as intrinsically pure and omniscient and (2) the idea of karman as subtle matter, or dirt, that obstructs innate capacities of the soul. In Jainism atman was conceived of as both the cognitive subject and cognitive instrument %. yatra pratibhati, tad eva tad-gocaratayabhyupagantavyam; tad - yatha niradinavanayana-prabhava-darsane pratibhasamanam patalataya japa-kusumam tathaiva tadgocaratayabhyupagamyate; parasparavibhaktaneka-svabhavakranta-martikam ca bahir antas ca vastu sarva-pramanesu prathata ity; atas tad eva tesam gocarah. - '[1. The thesis:) in this world, whatever is a cognitive criterion, it (also) grasps the real thing that is accompanied by multiple properties not detached from each other; (2. the logical reason:) because this (multiplex object] alone is represented in that (cognitive criterion); [3. the invariable concomitance accompanied by the example:) in this world, (if an object] x occurs in a cognitive criterion (cognition)] y, this (object) x alone should be accepted as the domain of this (cognitive criterion (cognition)] y; thus, [for instance]: just the way a (scarlet] China rose flower is being represented as roseate in perception having its origin in flawless eyesight, exactly as such (sc. as a roseate object) it is accepted as the domain of that (cognitive criterion]; [4. the application:) and (similarly, the real thing, both external and internal, endowed with a form that is under the sway, of multiplex essential natures not separate from each other, unfolds itself in all cognitive criteria; (5. the conclusion:] hence, this (multiplex object] alone is the domain of those (all cognitive criteria).' (3) NAV 29.9: tasmat tasyaiva tatra pratibhasanat "sarva-samvidam anekantatmakam vastu gocara" iti sthitam. - 'Hence, it is established that the real thing, whose essence is multiplex, [forms] the domain of all acts of awareness, because this (multiplex object] alone is represented in that (cognitive criterion).' 96. In its elaborate form it runs in two stages. The first stage has the form: 'The cognitive subject is such whose complete purification is possible, because the means

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66 Piotr Balcerowicz Accordingly, a reference to this most important notion from the Jaina point of view finds its most adequate place in the structure of the Nyayavatara: NA 27 concludes the discussion of pramanas, whereas the subsequent verse (NA 28 97) discusses their practical relevance and results (phala). After strictly epistemological issues have been dealt with, NA 29 describes the nature of the object of coghitions, NA 30 relates ontological concerns to epistemology and establishes the rela etc., hence Pise purification t with the alkalihich the me for [his) purification exists. In this world, whatever is such the means for the purification (of which] exists is (also) such the complete purification of which is possibly existent, like a particular gem for the purification of which the means exists, (namely] prolonged calcination in a clay furnace with the alkali, etc. And indeed the cognitive subject is such for whose purification the means exists, (namely] repeated practice of cognition, etc., hence (the cognitive subject is such whose complete purification is possibly existent.' (NAV 27.4; sambhavat-samasta-suddhika atma, vidyamanasuddhy-upayatvad; iha yo yo vidyamana-suddhy-upayah sa sa sambhavat-samastasuddhiko; yatha vidyamana-ksara-mrt-puta-pakadi-buddhy-upayo ratna-visesas, tatha ca vidyamana-jnanady-abhyasa-suddhy-upaya atmatah sambhavat-samasta-buddhika iti.) This first stage of the argument only proves that purification of the soul is possible, but it still does not prove that supernatural perception or omniscience is possible. In the second stage, the following equation is established: cogniser = cognition (because of the same nature): 'And the cognitive subject, (when) completely purified, is called the absolute, because there is no difference at all between cognition and cogniser.' (NAV 27.4: samastya-suddhas catma jnana-jnaninoh kathancid abhedat. kevalam abhidhiyata iti.) Both stages of this argument was formulated as early as in Kundakunda's works; SSa 278 recounts simile of a transparent crystal (= the knower) which is in its nature unaffected by colours (= passions) but is seemingly changing, the implication of the simile is that the crystal can be cleansed from colours that affect it. The idea that the soul can be omniscient by nature and the soul's knowledge can embrace everything is found e.g. in PSa 1.20, 28. The proof is formulated also by Hemacandra, who instead of the precious stone, speaks of clouds veiling the sun and the moon: 'The veiling of the self] of knowing essence is possible through cognitionveiling and other types of karman just like the moon and the sun (can be covered] by dust, fog, cloud, veil etc.; and like a blow of wind strong enough can remove [the veils obscuring) the moon and the sun, so can meditation and contemplation (remove veils obscuring the knowing self].' (PMIV 1.15 $ 50 (p. 12.20-22): prakasa-svabhavasyapi candrarkader iva rajo-nihaharabhra-pataladibhir iva jnanavaraniyadikarmabhir avaranasya sambhavat, candrarkader iva prabala-pavamana-prayair dhyana-bhavanadibhir vilayasy-ti.). 97. NA 28: pramanasya phalam saksad ajnana-vinivartanam / kevalasya sukhopekse sesasyadana-hana-dhih // - 'The direct result of cognitive criterion is the cessation (sc. removal of nescience; [the result] of the absolute [cognition) is [both) happiness and indifference; [the result] of the remaining (ones) is the faculty of appropriation and avoidance'.

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On the Relationship of the Nyayavatara and the Sammati-tarka-prakarana 67 tionship between cognition and the reality, NA 31 98 characterises the cognitive subject. The structure of the work in itself appears to be quite coherent. Conspicuously, this structure of NA 27-28, 31 corresponds also to that of the last chapter of the Tattvartha-sutra. In TS, first the causes of the kevala knowledge are mentioned, viz. "the destruction of confusion (sc. delusive karman) as well as the destruction of [the karman) veiling cognition, of [the karman) veiling insight (conation) and of the obstructive [karman]', all of them infecting innate cognitive capacities of the soul. 99 The contents of TS 10.1 corresponds to NA 28ab: "The direct result of cognitive criterion is the removal of nescience' (pramanasya phalam saksad ajnana-vinivartanam). Secondly, Umasvamin describes the result of perfect cognition, which is liberation, and defines it as a complete freedom (vipramoksa), or destruction of (ksaya) of all karmans, which are both the cause and manifestation of suffering. 100 Again, this corresponds to NA 28c: '[the result] of the absolute cognition is [both) happiness and indifference' (kevalasya sukhopekse). The subsequent portion of TS is an account of the final journey of the liberated soul to the top of the world, the abode of perfected beings (siddha-loka), which has no relevance in epistemological context. Clearly, it is understandable that it finds no equivalent in NA. However, the final aphorism of TS describes the nature of a perfected soul 101, and is echoed by NA 31. The final verse of NA 32 is merely a summary. As we can see, also final verses of NA do not only form a consistent whole, but even comply with the contents of the traditional Jaina 98. NA 31: pramata svanya-nirbhasi karta bhokta vivrttiman/ sva-samvedana-samsiddho jivah ksity-ady-anatmakah // - 'The cogniser is the observer of himself and of something different, the agent, the experiencing subject, is subject to change, is well-established by self-cognition, is the living element [and is someone) whose essence is not of earth, etc. 99. TS 10.1: moha-ksayaj jnana-darsanavaranantaraya-ksayac ca kevalam. 100. The Svetambara recension reads it as two separate sutras TS1 10.2-3: bandha-hetv-abhava-nirjarabhyam, krtsna-karma-ksayo moksah; the Digambara recension reads it as one sutra, with a slight modification TS2 10.2: bandha-hetyabhava-nirjarabhyam krtsna-karma-vipramokso moksah. 101. TSi 10.7 = TS2 10.9: ksetra-kala-gati-linga-tirtha-caritra-pratyeka-buddha-bodhita-jnanavagahanantara-samkhyalpa-bahutvatah sadhyah.

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68 Piotr Balcerowicz textbook. In view of the above, it is most debatable whether one should consider any of these karikas an interpolation. 8.3. In addition, Bansidhar BHATT (2000: 74) dismisses the authenticity of NA 27 on metrical grounds ("it is an interpolation'), whereupon adds: 'In contradistinction to v. 27, the authenticity of v. 26 cannot be questioned despite of its defective meter. ... Probably, this verse has been somehow disturbed.' No additional reasons are offered, why one of the two verses is accepted as spurious, whereas the other one is taken as authentic. Indeed, both the verses have defective meter and both have irregular number of syllables: NA 26 has only 7 syllables in pada b, whereas NA 27 has 9 syllables in pada a! Since NA 26 and 27 share the same fate of being abhinna-yoga-ksema (sc. are based on identical productive-supportive principle) in metrical terms, such a conclusions seem arbitrary. Either one should reject the authenticity of both, or accept them both as genuine constituents of NA, at least in terms of metrical analysis. 8.4. Concluding the main section of his paper, BHATT (2000: 75) briefly points to some terminological affinity between Prajnakaragupta's Pramana-varttikalankara and NA, which should, as far as I can understand, prove that NA is posterior to PVA: 'Some of its [of NA 32] expressions can be compared with those of PVB e.g. samvyavaharikam etad (= pramanam)..., and vyavaharatah ... pramanatva-vyavasthiti - (PVB 1.5.197, pp. 25-26).' Apart from the fact, that there is only a loose similarity in terms of terminology with the above-quoted expressions (NA 32 has: pramanadi-vyavastheyam and sarva-samvyavahartrnam), so it would not be easy to prove any direct relationship between PBV and NA on this basis only, the way the conclusion is reached is rather problematic. Indeed, when we compare expressions found in NA 32 102 with terminology found in other 102. NA 32: pramanadi-vyavastheyam anadi-nidhanatmika / sarva-samvyavahartinam prasiddhapi prakirtita // - 'The distinctive character of cognitive criteria etc., by nature with no beginning nor end, even though [it is) well-known to all (people) absorbed in everyday life, is [here) declared.'

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On the Relationship of the Nyayavatara and the Sammati-tarka-prakarana 69 works, we discover similarities not only with Prajnakaragupta and his PVA, but with a number of other Buddhist works that precede Prajnakaragupta. The two expressions which BHATT has in mind bear also resemblance to some expressions found in the Pramana-varttika: PV1 2.58cd: arthakriyanurodhena pramanatyam vyavasthitam II. PV1 1.5ab: pramanyam vyavaharena sastram moha-nivartanam 1, PV1 4.183: anumananumeyartha-vyavahara-sthitis tv iyam / This only shows that both Siddhasena and Prajnakaragupta were influenced by Dharmakirti. On this basis it would not be possible to establish any relative chronology between Siddhasena and Prajnakaragupta. 9. The authenticity of NA 16, viz. the illustration of a skilled archer, has frequently been questioned, most recently by BHATT (2000: 72). Indeed it is rather surprising to find, in such short treatise, a single explicit example which does not seem absolutely necessary at all: one could easily imagine the treatise without it. Let us first take a closer look at the context in which this puzzling simile transpires, viz. NA 14-16: '[14] The thesis is the acceptance of the inferable property; [it] is not revoked by perception, etc.; the pronouncement of it has to be made here as showing the domain of the logical reason. (15) Otherwise, for a (person] to be apprised, who is confused regarding the domain of the logical reason intended by the proponent, the logical reason might appear to be suspected of being contradictory, just like... (16) ...for a person watching an archer's skill, the archer who hits without the specific mention of the target [is endowed with both) skill and its op posite. 103 Conspicuously, NA 16 is announced with yatha in NA 150, through which both verses are syntactically connected. One might, 103. NA 14-16 [14] [15] sadhyabhyupagamah paksah pratyaksady-anirakstah/ tat-prayogo 'tra kartavyo hetor gocara-dipakah // anyatha vady-abhipreta-hetu-gocara-mohinah/ pratyayyasya bhaved dhetur viruddharekito yatha // dhanuska-guna-sampreksi-janasya parividhyatah / dhanuskasya vina laksya-nirdesena gunetarau // [16]

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70 Piotr Balcerowicz however, easily argue that yatha was a later modification after a new verse (NA 16) was inserted. On the other hand, we can see that the three verses follow in a logical sequence: NA 14 defines the subject of the thesis (paksa) and, most importantly, verbalises the necessity to formulate it as a required member in a proof formula; NA 15 is a prasanga-type of argument: without a clear pronouncement of the thesis, the debaters and spectators may come to the conclusion that one's thesis is a fallacy (paksabhasa); NA 16 is a typical drstanta to illustrate the idea. So much effort (and space!) just to express the importance of paksa in the proof formula? That appears striking. Clearly, NA 15 and 16 must have been formulated against an opinion of someone who maintained that no pratijna / paksa is necessary at all. In the Pramana-varttika we find the context for this puzzle. Dharmakirti argues that statement of the thesis (paksa-vacana) is not a necessary member of the proof formula, because it does not possess any capacity to prove anything, PV 4.18-22: '[18] The assertion of the incapability (to prove anything on the part] of this (statement of the thesis (paksa-vacana, PV.4.16)] is made on the ground that (the statement of the thesis) has (merely) as its contents the object (sc. inferable property) of the logical reason. [Objection:] "Also this statement of the thesis must] have the capability (to prove), because it facilitates the statement of the logical reason". [19] [Rejoinder:] [Then,] for a person who wishes to know (the true state of affairs) due to his doubt as regards this (inferable property (sc. whether it is present or not)], there should (also) be a ground for an opportunity (to produce this doubt as a proving member of the proof formula). Also, when one accepts a counter-proposition, this (should be accepted) as equal (member of the proof formula, that proves the thesis). Thus, there would be infinite regress (sc. no limit to the number of efficient members that prove). [20] However, the intrinsic efficacy (to prove the thesis) lies in three fea-tures (of the logical reason). Only the statement of these (three features] prevails as that which activates the memory as regards these (three features, and thus has the capacity to prove.] [21] [Objection:] "For when (the logical reason) is established sto have its scope) only on account of the demonstration of the scope - because

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On the Relationship of the Nyayavatara and the Sammati-tarka-prakarana 71 the operation of the logical reason would be impossible, if the scope [of inference (sc. thesis)] were not demonstrated - this [logical reason] is capable of proving the thesis]". [22] [Rejoinder:] [A reply] to this has already been given [in PV 4.19], [namely that] also without this [scope being demonstrated (sc. without the statement of the thesis)], even when one asserts [only]: "Sound is [something] which has been produced, [hence] all [entities] like this are impermanent", [then] the comprehension of the impermanence of this [sound] should occur by implication.' 104 With the purpose to disprove Dharmakirti's position, Siddhasena Mahamati inserts the simile in order to show the proper role of the thesis. He does agree that paksa is not an integral part of the proof formula in the logical sense, inasmuch as it has no 'proving capacity'. Its role is rather didactic, to clearly demonstrate what the proof formula is intended for. But also the thesis corroborates the soundness of the 104. PV1/PV3 4.18-22: hetv-artha-visayatvena tad-asaktoktir irita/ saktis tasyapi ced dhetu-vacanasya pravartanat // tat-samsayena jijnasor bhavet prakaranasrayah/ vipaksopagame 'py etat tulyam ity anavasthitih // antar-angam tu samarthyam trisu rupesu samsthitam/ tatra smrti-samadhanam tad-vacasy eva samsthitam // akhyapite hi visaye hetu-vrtter asambhavat/ visaya-khyapanad eva siddhau cet tasya saktata" // uktam atra" vinapy asmat krtakah sabda idrsah/ sarve 'nitya iti prokte 'py arthat tan-nasa-dhir bhavet // My translation differs in some crucial points from that of TILLEMANS' (2000:30-36). a. Cf. PV2 4.21cd: visaya-khyapanad eva samarthyam iti cen matam // For variae lectionis see TILLEMANS (2000: 35, n. 130). It seems to me that the translation in TILLEMANS (2000: 35) slightly distorts the logical connection of the elements of the verse, which is as follows: The condition in the clause is siddhau, to be connected with hetu-vrtter (primarily related with asambhavat, but here supplemented). Its justification is visaya-khyapanad eva, as the necessary single condition; the ground for the fact the operation of the logical reason can be warranted 'only on account of the demonstration of its scope', is 4.21ab, which explains why and under what conditions the logical reason is not operational. When the condition is fulfilled ([hetu-vrtter] siddhau), it is effective (tasya saktata). b. Cf. PV2 4.ab: vyapti-parve vinapy asmat krtakah sabda idrsah / For variae lectionis see TILLEMANS (2000: 36, n. 131). A similar idea is expressed succinctly in NB 3.34: dvayor apy anayoh prayogayor na avasyam paksa-nirdesah.

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72 Piotr Balcerowicz proof formula by indicating that no fallacy is involved. The role of the simile of the skilled archer is not simply to point to some empirical instance of a contest, but to illustrate that in a well-defined context (e.g. when all onlookers see the archer's target) any explicit mention of the target can be easily dispensed with. In this way, not only the verses of NA 14-15 are necessary elements in the argumentative structure, but also NA 16. 10.1. The idea of 'perception for others' is referred to not only in Buddhist sources, but also in later Mimamsa literature, i.e. by Sucaritamisra in his MSVT (III: p., 38.5-8) ad MSV 5.4.53-54: athanumana-gocari-krtartha-pratipadana-samartha-vacanapararthyad anumanam parartham ity upacaryate, tatah pratyaksapratipannam apy artham bodhayad vacah parartham iti pratyaksam api parartham apa-dyeta. Interestingly, the context in which the distinction svartha-parartha is mentioned is the critical evaluation of the Buddhist concept of twofold inference. Both Umveka Bhatta and Sucaritamisra reject the distinction into svartha- and pararthanumana in their respective commentaries on MSV 5.4.53-54, viz. SVVTT (p. 317.15-318.16, esp.: na tu pararthanu-manam nama kimcid astityuktam) and MSVT (III: p., 37.11-40.21) respectively. Both argue that what the Buddhists call pararthanumana is, in fact, just a verbal statement which communicates the result of an inference drawn by the speaker to the hearer; the hearer, on the basis of the utterance, subsequently draws his own inference, and there is no room for 'inference for others'. Interestingly, Sucaritamisra avails himself, in addition, of the Jaina concept of parartha-pratyaksa and argues that in the same manner as one were to accept pararthanumana one would also have to consent to parartha-pratyaksa, because both inference and perception can be indirectly triggered by a verbal statement. It would be quite natural that anyone who is willing to refute the idea of parartha-pratyaksa and is at the same time acquainted with the notion of paratha-pratyaksa, would use the latter to disprove the former. However, Umveka Bhatta does not seem to know the idea of parartha-pratyaksa at all; he is silent on it in his commentary on the same verses (MSV 5.4.53-54), which are an occasion for Sucarita

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On the Relationship of the Nyayavatara and the Sammati-tarka-prakarana 73 misra to speak of this kind of perception, see: SVVTT (p. 317-318) 105. That may be a hint (not a decisive proof!) that Siddhasena Mahamati composed NA either after Umveka Bhatta or at the same time, but NA and the ideas contained in it did not reach any prominence outside Jaina circles by the time of Umveka. Alternatively, in case the idea of paratha-pratyaksa was not Siddhasena's own invention, but he borrowed it from some earlier Jaina source, one may likewise suppose that the inventor of the idea of paratha-pratyaksa, who inspired Siddhasena, lived either after of contemporaneously with Umveka Bhatta. The date of Umveka Bhatta is uncertain, but can be roughly assigned to the first half of the gth century 106. That might mean that Nyayavatara was not composed before 700. 10.2. We can be quite certain that NA was composed also after Patrasvamin (alias Patrakesarin / Patrakesarisvamin), the author of the Tri-laksana-kadarthana. In his lost work Tri-laksana-kadarthana 107, Patrasvamin criticises Dharmakirti's concept of triple-formed logical reason (trairupya) and the three restriction criteria of validity imposed on it (traividhya-niyama 108), and offers instead his own definition of valid hetu, viz. the relation of the inexplicability otherwise' (anyathanupapatti), which was meant to replace Dharmakirti's definition. That clearly indicates that Patrasvamin was posterior to Dharmakirti 109. Both Jaina and Buddhist traditions regard him to be 105. On this discussion compare also Govardhan P. BHATT (1989: 248-249). 106. Either c. 700-750 (according to K. Kunjunni Raja in his 'Preface' (p. x] to SVVTT) or c. 710 (according to EIPHIL I: 8 371). 107. Anantavirya in SVIT (ad Svi 6.1, p. 371.19-372.6) mentions the title of Patrasvamin's (= Parrakesarin's) work: Tri-laksana-kadarthana, and quotes a verse from it: nanyathanupapannatvam yatra tatra trayena kim / anyathanupapannatvam yatra tatra trayena kim // The verse is also quoted also in: TSa 1369 and SVR ad 3.13 (p. 521.5-6). Importantly, it is incorporated by Akalanka in his NVil 323 (p. 74.1-2) = NVil 2.154 (II: p. 177.22-23), and the fact that the verse was not a later insertion of the commentator Vadiraja-suri is confirmed by the fact that Vadiraja-suri comments on the verse in his NViV exactly in the same manner as he does in the case of other Akalanka's verses. 108. Cf. SHIGA (2003: 489). 109. Cf. also SHIGA (2003: 489): 'Patrasvamin knew and criticised Dharmakirti as well as Dinnaga'.

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74 Piotr Balcerowicz the inventor of this new notion of the logical reason 110. Furthermore, Patrasvamin's use of examples of invalidating Dharmakirti's trairupya-hetu, which partly overlap with those used by Kumarila, shows that Patrasvamin was posterior to Kumarila as well 111. In his turn, Patrasvamin influenced Siddhasena Mahamati, who uses the idea of anyathanupapatti as some-thing already well known"12. 11. To recapitulate, there are some points that speak in favour of the separate authorship of STP and NA, namely (1) the peculiar use of the concepts samanya and visesa and their application to the terms darsana and jnana that indicates STP was composed before Dinnaga and Dharmakirti (8$ 1.1, 2.1-2.2), whereas NA was definitely con 110. For instance, Vadiraja-suri (NVIV 2.160, II: p. 186.24-26: sa prasiddhah sa va patrakesarisvamina nirapitah avinabhava eva sambandho hetu-sadhyayor na tadatmyadis tasyavyapakatvat) confirms that it was Patrasvamin who introduced the notions of 'inexplicability otherwise' (anyathanupapatti) as the definition of valid logical reason and of relation of inseparable connection (avinabhava) as the single logical relation between the logical reason and the inferable property (sadhya). This is further corroborated by Vadideva-suri in SVR (ad 3.13, p. 521.5-6: tad uktam patrasvamina), see also NViV 2.171ab (II: p. 198.30-31). The same information is also supplied by Santaraksita, who mentions Patrasvamin as the source of the idea, see TSal 1364 (p. 405.1: anyathety-adina patrasvami-matam asankate...), and quotes a number of verses from the lost Tri-laksana-kadarthana in TSa 1364-1379. As regards the correct reading. of the verses, TSa 1365cd should be emended to: eka-laksanaka - so 'rthat caturlaksanako na va II, instead of 'rthas, see STEINKELLNER (forthcoming). Furthermore, Kamalasila quotes two more verses (TSaPad TSa 1386 (p. 409.1214)), which I believe (see BALCEROWICZ (2003: 359)) to stem from the same work of Patrasvamin: vina sadhyad adsstasya drstante hetute syate / parair maya punar dharminy asambhasnor vinamuna // arthapattes ca sabarya bhaiksavaca canumanatah/ anyad evanumanam no nara-simhavad isyate // [a TS1: bhaiksavas. For the emendation cf. PATHAK (1930: 156-7) and KUNST (1939: 26, n. 3).] My ascription of these two verses to Patrasvamin is corroborated by Jinendrabuddhi's Pramana-samuccaya-tika, as confirmed by Ernst Steinkellner in private communication: 'PST B(i.e. the second manuscript) folio 54a2 says (after first quoting the stanza of TS 1365, and explaining anupapannatvam as aklptir asambhavah): slokam apy aha: vina sadhyad ...' = Tibetan translation of the verse ( 5766, 92a8f.): dpe la bsgrub bya med pa las/rtags nid ma mthong gean gyis 'dod / bdag gis 'di ni med par yang /chos can la ni mi srid pa'o/ 111. For instance MSV 5.4.64cd-65ab= TSa 1372, MSV 5.7.46 = TSa 1377, MSV 5.4.67d = TSa 1378. See BALCEROWICZ (2003: 343 ff.).. 112. See BALCEROWICZ (2003: 343). 199 My aschis Pramana sai.e. the se

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On the Relationship of the Nyayavatara and the Sammati-tarka-prakarana 75 ceived after Dharmakirti (SS 2.2); (2) the assignment of either sensory (NA) or strictly suprasensory (STP) character to pratyaksa, taken either as perception (NA) or as blanket term 'direct cognition' (STP) as well as the relation to concept of cognitive criterion (pramana) (98 3.1-3.2); (3) the (un)importance of the unity of inana and darsana at the kevala stage and different treatment of kevala ($ 3.3); (4) role of the four-phased sensuous cognition (mati-jnana) in the epistemic schemes of STP and NA ($ 4); (5) divergent opinions on the direct, i.e. perceptual character (pratyaksa) of verbal utterances and on the thesis that things conveyed through language are grasped directly ( 5.2); (6) different attitudes to the Agamic tradition and to novel solutions (6). These points are additionally strengthened by a number of minor differences and incongruences (8 1.1) that by themselves are not only inconclusive but could probably be explained away. Furthermore, the text of the Nyayavatara does not seem to contain any serious interpolations, perhaps with the exception of some minor changes in the wording, conspicuous in the defective meter of NA 26 and 27 ($ 8.3). 'In view of the lack of any hint that that author of STP knew of any novel concepts introduced by Dinnaga, I would maintain that he must have flourished before ca. 500 CE, viz. at least about 150 years before the composition of NA. Finally, considering Siddhasena Mahamati's dependence on Patrasvamin (SS 10.1), the Mimamsaka evidence (SS 10.2) and Prajnakaragupta's reaction (7), we may suggest roughly the following relative chronology: Siddhasena Divakara (STP): 450-500 Dinnaga: 480-540 Dharmakarti: 600-660 Patrasvamin: c. 660-720 Umveka Bhatta: c. 700-750 Siddhasena Mahamati (NA): c. 720-780 Prajnakaragupta: c. 800 Haribhadra-suri: c. 800

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76 Piotr Balcerowicz BIBLIOGRAPHY AnD = Anuoga-ddaraim (Anuyoga-dvarani). See: Nams. BALCEROWICZ 2001a = Balcerowicz, Piotr: Jaina Epistemology in Historical and Comparative Perspective. Critical Edition and English Translation of Logical-Epistemological Treatises: Nyayavatara, Nyayavatara-vivrti and Nyayavatara-tippana with Introduction and Notes. 1-2 Vols., Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 53, 1-2, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 2001. BALCEROWICZ 2001b = Balcerowicz, Piotr: 'Two Siddhasenas and the Authorship of the Nyayavatara and the Samati-tarka-prakarana', Journal of Indian Philosophy 29/3 (2001) 351-378. Balcerowicz 2003 = Balcerowicz, Piotr: 'Is "Inexplicability Otherwise" (anyathanupapatti) Otherwise Inexplicable?', Journal of Indian Philosophy 1-3 (2003) 343-380 (Proceedings of the International Seminar 'Argument and Reason in Indian Logic' 20-24 June, 2001 - Kazimierz Dolny, Poland). BALCEROWICZ 2005 = Balcerowicz, Piotr: 'Pramanas and language. A Dispute between Dinnaga, Dharmakirti and Akalanka'. Journal of Indian Philosophy (2005) [in print]. Bhatt 1989 = Bhatt, Govardhan P.: The Basic Ways of Knowing. An. In-depth Study of Kumarila's Contribution to Indian Epistemology, Second Revised Edition, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1989. Bhatt 2000 = Bhatt, Bansidhar: 'A Study in the Nyayavatara of Siddhasena', Festgabe fur Adelheid Mette, Indica Tibetica 37 (2000) 67-82 [Swissthal-Oldendorf]. DHAKY 1981-82 = Dhaky, M. A.: "Some less known verses of Siddhasena Divakara', Sambodhi 10 (1981-82) 169-173. DhakY 1995 = Dhaky, M. A.: "The Date and Authorship of Nyayavatara', Nirgrantha 1 (1995) 39-49. [Eds. M. A. Dhaky, Jitendra Shah, Ahmedabad).

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On the Relationship of the Nyayavatara and the Sammati-tarka-prakarana 77 DhPr = Durveka Misra: Dharmottara-pradipa. Pt. Dalsukhbhai Malvania (ed.): Pandita Durveka Misra's Dharmottara-pradipa [being a subcommentary on Dharmottara's Nyaya-bindu-tika, a commentary on Dharmakirti's Nyaya-bindu). Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna 1955 [reprinted: 1971). DHRUVA 1930 = Dhruva, A.B.: 'Introduction', in: NP1, pp. V-XXXV. EIPHIL I = Potter, Karl H.: Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. - Vol. I: Bibliography. Compiled by ... . Third Revised Edition. Princeton University Press, Princeton-New Jersey 1995 [Indian Edition: Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1995). FRAUWALLNER 1961 = Frauwallner, Erich: 'Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic', Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sud- und Ostasiens 5 (1961) 125-148. GRANOFF 1989-1990 = Granoff, Phyllis: 'The Bibliographies of Siddhasena - A Study in the Texture of Allusion and the Weaving of a Group Image'. Part I: Journal of Indian Philosophy 17 (1989) 329-384. Part II: Journal of Indian Philosophy 18 (1990) 261-304. HATTORI 1968 = Hattori, Masaaki: Dignaga, On Perception, being the Pratyaksa-pariccheda of Dignaga's Pramana-samuccaya, Edition of Tibetan translations and the Sanskrit text as well as the English translation of the Chapter I. Harvard University Press 1968. JAMBUVIJAYA 1981 = Muni Jambuvijaya: "Jainacarya-Sri Hemacandrasuri-mukhyasisyabhyam acarya-RamacandraGunacandrabhyam viracitayam Dravyalankara-svopajnatikayam'. In: Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus. Gedenkschrift fur Ludwig Alsdorf. hrsg. von Klaus Bruhn und Albrecht Wezler. Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien Band 23, Franz Steiner Verlag, Wiesbaden 1981: 121-149. MALVANIA 1979 = Malvania, Dalsukhbhai: "Parisista 1, Nyayavatara ki Tulana', 1979.

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78 Piotr Balcerowicz Mironov 1927 = Mironov, N.D.: 'Dignaga's Nyayapravesa and Haribhadra's tika on it', Jaina Shasan, Extra (Divali) No., Benares 1911. (2) (Reprinted] in: Aus Indiens Kultur - Festausgabe fur Richard von Garbe, ed. Julius von Negelein, Erlangen 1927. MOOKERJEE 1971 = Mookerjee, Satkari: 'A critical and comparative study of Jain Logic and Epistemology on the basis of the Nyayavatara of Siddhasena Divakara', Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin No. 1, Vaishali 1971. MSVT = Sucaritamisra: Mimamsa-sloka-varttika-tika. Sambasiva Sastri; V.A. Ramasvami Sastri (eds.): Slokavarttikam Sucaritamisra-pranitaya Kasikakhyayatikaya sametam. 3 Vols. Trivandrum 1926-1943. MUKHTAR 1956 = Mukhtar, Jugal Kishor: 'Samatisutra aur Siddhasena', Jaina Sahitya aur Itihasa par Visada Prakasa, Calcutta 1956: 538-543. NamS = Namdi-sutta / Namdi-sutta [Nandi-sutra / Nandi-sutra). Muni Punyavijaya, Dalsukh Malvania, Amritlal Mohanlal Bhojak (eds.): Nandi-suttam and Anuoga-ddaraim (Nandi-sutra and Anyoga-dvarani). Jaina-Agama-Series No.1, Shri Mahavira Jaina Vidyalaya, Bombay 1968. NA = Siddhasena Divakara: Nyayavatara. (1) See BALCEROWICZ (2001a). (2) Bhagavandas Harsacandra (Harakhchand) (ed.): Mahavadi-sri-Siddhasena-Divakara-pranita-Nyayavatarah sri Rajasekharasuri-viracita-Tippana samalankrta-acaryaSiddharsi-viracita-Vivrti-sahitah. Hemacandracarya-Jaina-sabha, Ahmedabad-Patan 1917. (3) P.L. Vaidya (ed.): Nyayavatara of Siddhasena-Divakara with The Tippana of Devabhadra. Shri Jain Shwetamber Conference, Bombay 1928 [reprinted: Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1 (1971) 1-95). NAV = Siddharsi-ganin: Nyayavatara-vivrti. See: NA. NB = Dharmakirti: Nyaya-bindu. See: DhPr. NBT = Dharmottara: Nyaya-bindu-tika. See: DhPr.

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On the Relationship of the Nyayavatara and the Sammati-tarka-prakarana 79 NM = Giuseppe Tucci: The Nyaya-mukha of Dignaga. The oldest Buddhist Text on Logic, after Chinese and Tibetan Materials. Heidelberg 1930. NP = Sankarasvamin: Nyaya-pravesa. (1) 'Part One: The Nyaya pravesa - Sanskrit Text with Commentaries' ed. by A. B. Dhruva, Oriental Institute, Baroda 1930; 'Part Two: Nyayapravesa of Acarya Dinnaga - Tibetan Text ed. by Vidushekhara Bhattacharyya, Oriental Institute - Central Library, Baroda 1927. (2) Piotr Balcerowicz: 'Sankarasvamin: Nyaya-pravesa - "Wprowadzenie w logike" ("Introduction to Logic"]', Studia Indologiczne 2 (1995) 72-77. NVi = Akalanka Bhatta: Nyaya-viniscaya. (1) Nyayacarya Mahendra Pandita Kumar Sastri (ed.): Srimad-Bhattakalarka-deva-viracitam Akalanka-grantha-trayam (Svopajna-vivrti-sahitam Laghiyas-trayam, Nyaya-viniscayah, Pramana-sangrahas ca). Sanasvati Pustak Bhandar, Ahmadabad (Ahmedabad) 1996 [1st edition: Ahmedabad-Calcutta 1939). (2) Mahendra Kumar Jain - (ed.): Nyayaviniscaya-vivarana of Sri Vadiraja Suri, the Sanskrit Commentary on Bhatta Akalarkadeva's Nyayaviniscaya. Vol. 1 & 2, Bharatiya Jnanapitha Prakasana, New Delhi, V 1949, 1955 [2nd edition: BhJP, D 2000). NViV = Vadiraja-suri: Nyaya-viniscaya-vivarana. See: NVi2. PALV = Manikyanandin: Pariksamukha-sutra. Pariksamukha-sutra of Manikya Nandi together with the Commentary Called : Pariknamukha-lagu-vytti of Ananta Virya, ed. by Satis Chandra Vidyabhasana. Bibliotheca Indica No. 1209, Calcutta 1909. Pann = Pannavana-sutta. Muni Punyavijaya, Dalsukh Malvania, Amritlal Mohanlal Bhojak (eds.): Pannavanasuttam. JainaAgama-Series No. 9, Parts 1-2, Shri Mahavira Jaina Vidyalaya, Bombay 1969-1971. PISCHEL 1981 = Pischel, Richard: A Grammar of the Prakrit Languages. Translated from German by Subhadra Jha. Second Revised Edition, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1981. [Grammatic der Prakrit-Sprachen. Band 1. Heft 8. Grundriss der IndoArischen Philologie und Altertumskunde. Strassburg 1990.).

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80 Piotr Balcerowicz PMi = Hemacandra-suri: Pramana-mimimsa. (1) Sukhlalji Sanghavi, Mahendra Kumar and Dalsukh Malvaniya (ed.): Kavikalasarvajna-Sri-Hemacandracarya-viracita svopajna-vrtti-sahita Pramana Mimimsa (with Bhasa Tippana of Pandita Sukhlalji Sanghvi). SPBh 1998. (2) Satkari Mookerjee and Nathmal Tatia (ed.): Hemacandra's Pramana-mimamsa. Text and Translation with Critical Notes. Tara Publications, Varanasi 1970. PMIV = Hemacandra-suri: Pramana-mimamsa-svopajna-vrtti. See: PMi. PNTAA = Vadideva-suri: Pramana-naya-tattvalokalankara. Pt. Dalsukhbhai Malvania (ed.): Pramananayatattvaloka of vadin Devasuri with a commentary with the commentary Ratnakaravatarika of Ratnaprabhasuri, with Panjika of Rajasekhara, Tipppana of Jnanacandra. L.D. Series 16, Ahmedabad 1969. PS = Dinnaga: Pramana-samuccaya. (1) See: HATTORI (1968). (2) In: Dvadasaram Naya-cakram of Acarya Sri Simhasuri Gani Vadi Ksama-shramana. (Muni Jambavijayaji), Pt. I, (1-4 Aras), Bhavahagar 1966: pp. 97-134. PSa = Kundakunda: Pavayana-sara [Pravacana-sara). A.N. Upadhye (ed.): Sri Kundakundacarya's Pravacanasara (Pavayanasara), a Pro-Canonical Text of the Jainas, the Prakrit Text critically edited with the Sanskrit Commentaries of Amrtacandra and Jayasena. Bombay 1935. [reprinted: Sri Paramasruta-Prabhavaka Mandala, Srimad Rajacandra Asrama, Agas (Gujarat) 1984). PSV = Dinnaga: Pramana-samuccaya-vrtti. See: PS. PV = Dharmakirti: Pramana-varttika. (1) Rahula Sankrtyayana (ed.): Pramanavarttikam Acarya-Manorathanandi-kytaya vrttya samvalitam / Dharmakirti's Pramanavarttikam with a commentary by Manorathanandin. Appendix to Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society 24 (1938) Parts I-II: 1-123 / Patna 19381940. (2) See: PVA. (3) Yasho Miyasaka (ed.): 'Pramana-varttika-karika (Sanskrit and Tibetan).' (Chapter 2 = Pramana-siddhi, Chapter 3 = Pratyaksa, Chapter 4 = Pararthanumana). Acta

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On the Relationship of the Nyayavatara and the Sammati-tarka-prakarana 81 Indologica (Indo-koten-kenkya] 2 (1971/72) 1-206 [Narita: Naritasan Shinshoji]. PVA = Prajnakaragupta: Pramana-varttikalankara. Tripitakacharya Rahula Sankstyayana (ed.): Pramanavarttikabhasyam or Vartikalankarah of Prajnakaragupta. (Being a commentary on Dharmakirti's Pramanavartikam). Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna 1953. PVV = Manorathanandin: Pramana-varttika-vrtti. See: PV1. Shastri 1990 = Shastri, Indra Chandra: Jaina Epistemology, P. V. Research Series No. 50, P. V. Research Institute, Varanasi 1990. SHIGA 2003 = Shiga, Kiyokuni: 'Jaina objection against trividha-hetu: an opinion attributed to Patrasvamin', Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 52.1 (2003) 491-488. SSa = Kundakunda: Samaya-sara. (1) Manohar Varni Sahajanand (ed.): Parama-pujya-srimat-Kundakundacarya-devena pranita[h] Samaya-sara[h], parama-pajya-srimad-Amstacandrasariviracita-samskrta-tika Atma-khyati, Sapta-dasanga-tika. Khemacanda Jaina Sararph, Mastri Sahajananda Sastramala, Ranajitapuri (Sadar Merath) 1977. STEINKELLNER-Much 1995 = Steinkellner, Ernst; Much, Michael Torsten: Texte der erkenntnistheoretischen Schule des Buddhismus - Systematische Ubersicht uber die buddhistische Sanskrit-Literatur II, Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Gottingen, Philologisch-Historische Klasse, Dritte Folge Nr. 214, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Gottingen 1995. STP = Siddhasena Divakara: Sammati-tarka-prakarana. Sukhlal Sanghavi; Becardas Dosi (ed.): Sammatitarka-prakaranam by Siddhasena Divakara with Abhayadevasuri's Tattva-bodha-vidhayini. Gujarat-pura-tattva-mandir-granthavali 10, 16, 18, 19, 21, Gujarat-pura-tattva-mandir, Amdavad 1924-1931 [reprinted: Vol. I & II, Rinsen Buddhist Text Series VI-1,2; Kyoto 1984). STEINKELLNER (forthcoming) = Steinkellner, Ernst: 'An Old Transmissional Mistake in Patrasvamin's Definition of the Logical Reason as Quoted by Santaraksita and Jinendrabuddhi', forthcoming.

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Piotr Balcerowicz SVIT = Anantavirya: Siddhi-viniscaya-tika. Mahendrakumar Jain (ed.): Siddhi-viniscaya of Akalarka edited with the commentary Siddhi-viniscaya-tika of Anantavirya. 2 Vols. Bharatiya Jnanapitha Prakasana, Varanasi 1959. SVR = Vadideva-suri: Syad-vada-ratnakara. Motilal Lalaji (ed.): Srimad-Vadideva-suri-viracitah Pramana-naya-tattvalokalankarah tad-vyakhya ca Syad-vada-ratnakarah. 5 Vols., Poona 1926-1930 [reprint: 2 Vols., Bharatiya Buk Karporesan, Dilli (Delhi) 1988). SVVTT = Umveka Bhatta: Sloka-varttika-vyakhya-tatparya-tika. S. K. Ramanatha Sastri (ed.): Slokavartikavyakhya-tatparyatika of Umveka Bhatta. Revised by K. Kunjunni Raja and R. Thangaswamy, Madras University Sanskrit Series 13, University of Madras, Madras 1971. TBh = Umasvati: Tattvarthadhigama-bhasya. See TSi. TBV = Abhayadeva-suri's Tattva-bodha-vidhayini. See: STP. TILLEMANS 2000 = Tillemans, Tom J.F.: Dharmakirti's Pramanavart tika. An annotated translation of the fourth chapter (pararthanumana). Volume 1 (k. 1-148). Verlag der Osterreichis chen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien 2000. TRD = Gunaratna-suri: Tarka-rahasya-dipika. Luigi Suali (ed.): Sad darsana-samuccaya with Gunaratna's Commentary Tarkarahasyadipika. Bibliotheca Indica 167, Calcutta 1905-1914 [reprinted: 1986). TS = Umasvamin: Tattvartha-sutra. (1) M.K. Mody (ed.): Tattvarthadhigama by Umasvati being in the Original Sanskrit with the Bhasya by the author himself. Bibliotheca Indica Nos. 1044, 1079, 1118, Calcutta 1903, 1904, 1905. (2) Mahendra Kumar Jain (ed.): Tattvartha-varttika Raja-varttika) of Sri Akalarkadeva. Edited with Hindi Translation, Introduction, appendices, variant readings, comparative notes etc. Parts I-II. First edition, Jnanapitha Martidevi Jaina Grantha-mala 10, 20 (Sanskrit Grantha), Delhi 1953-1957. [2. ed.: Delhi 1982]. TSa = santaraksita: Tattva-sangraha. (1) Embar Krishnamacharya (ed.): Tattvasangraha of santaraksita with the commentary of Kamalasila. 2 Vols., GOS, 1926 [reprinted: 1984, 1988). (2)

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On the Relationship of the Nyayavatara and the Sammati-tarka-prakarana 83 Dvarikadas Shastri (ed.): Tattvasangraha of Acarya Shantaraksita with the Commentary 'Panjika' of Shri Kamalashila. 2. Vols., Varanasa 1981-1982. Than = Thanamga-sutta. (1) Muni Jambavijaya (ed.): Thanamga suttam and Samavayamga-suttam (Sthananga-sutra and Samavayanga-sutra). Jaina-Agama-Series 3, Shri Mahavira Jaina Vidyalaya, Bombay 1985. (2) Sagarananda Suri (ed.): Thanamgasuttam And Samavayamgasuttam with the Vrtti of Acarya Abhayadeva Suri. Lala Sundarlal Jain Agama granthamala 2, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1985. UPADHYE 1971 = Upadhye, A. N.: Siddhasena Divakara's Nyayavatara (edited by the late S.C. Vidyabhusan with English Translation, Notes etc.) and with the Vivrti of Siddharsi as well as The Text of 21 Dvatrimsikas and the Sammai-suttam; Vinayavijaya's Nayakarnika edited by... with and Introduction, Bibliographic Review, Indices etc. Jaina Sahitya Vikasa Mandala, Bombay 1971. VABh = Jinabhadra-ganin Ksamasramana: Visesavasyaka-bhasya. Dalsukh Malvania (ed.): Acarya Jinabhadra's Visesavasyakabhasya with Auto-commentary; Part I-III, Lalbhai Dalpatbhai Series 10, 14, 21, Bharatiya Sanskrit Vidyamandir - L.D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad 1966, 1968, 1968. Viy = Viyaha-pannatti Bhagavai-viyaha-pannatti. Bechardas J. Doshi; Amritlal Mohanlal Bhojak (ed.): Viyahapannattisuttam. JainaAgama-Series No.4 Part I-III, Shri Mahavira Jaina Vidyalaya, Bombay 1974, 1978, 1982. VS = Kanada: Vaisesika-sutra. With the Commentary of Candrananda, ed. Muni Jambavijayaji, GOS 136, Baroda 1961.

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